Cato At Liberty

Word is our pro-free-market brethren at the Heritage Foundation will release a new study on the fiscal impact of immigration reform in time for the congressional debate. It will be an update to a 2007 study that played a key role in derailing immigration reform then.

While the 2007 study was influential, it was fatally flawed, as I detail here.  Hopefully Heritage’s updated version will correct for those criticisms and others, or else its analysis must be judged as lacking. 

The key flaw in Heritage’s 2007 study is its use of static fiscal scoring, rather than dynamic fiscal scoring, to evaluate that year’s immigration reform bill. “Scoring” a bill means predicting its impact on the U.S. budget in the future by estimating how it will affect future spending and tax revenue. A statically scored prediction assumes the bill will not affect the rest of the economy – which is highly unrealistic. 

A dynamically scored prediction, on the other hand, assumes that the bill will affect the rest of the economy, also changing tax revenue and government spending. Since increased immigration will increase the size of the economy, it will also increase tax revenue and some government spending. It’s important to factor those increases into any scoring model. Heritage’s 2007 study did not. 

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has adopted dynamic scoring for the coming immigration bill for reasons they explain here.  The best justification for using dynamic scoring comes from Ed Feulner, who only recently stepped down as head of the Heritage Foundation and retains an emeritus title there. He writes:

Indeed, some lawmakers are fighting a proposal that would require them to take real-world considerations into account. They prefer to keep ‘scoring’ each bill-estimating how it will affect the economy and the amount of taxes they take in-with the ‘static’ model used by the store owner’s friend. If, say, a 5 percent tax on something brings in $50 million, they assume a 10 percent tax will fetch $100 million.

Not surprisingly, this approach has caused lawmakers to come up with some wildly inaccurate assumptions over the years.

Feulner goes on to explain how numerous tax cuts actually produced more revenue despite static models predicting the opposite. 

Can you imagine any private business acting this way? Of course not. That’s why it’s time Congress switched to a method many business owners use-‘dynamic scoring’-which assumes that if you change the way you do business, customers will react in relatively predictable ways. Before they’ve hiked a price or changed a product, most companies have a pretty good idea of how many customers they’ll gain or lose.

Would ‘dynamic scoring’ always give lawmakers perfect estimates? No, but it surely would get much closer to the true cost than “static scoring” does. If doubts remain, put it to the test: Have Congress produce ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ scores of various pieces of legislation for a few years and see which prove more accurate.

Using dynamic scoring to predict the effects of legislation is as relevant for immigration reform as it is for tax cuts. Allowing more legal immigration, and legalizing those here, will increase the number of workers and entrepreneurs in the U.S., necessarily growing the size of the economy. Capital accumulation and land improvements then catch up to the population growth. Those effects boost GDP, ergo tax revenue.

A common retort to the above is that many new immigrants will be low-skilled and, because of our progressive tax system, will not pay much in taxes.  Expanding the supply of laborers and entrepreneurs through immigration would increase profits, expand the production possibilities frontier, increase the return to capital, and raise incomes for most American workers who are complements.  Thus, even if most future immigrants are low-skilled—and they likely will be—their positive effect on the economy would increase tax revenues indirectly.   

Heritage’s former president supports dynamic scoring, and now so does the CBO, at least for immigration.  For the sake of an honest debate, I sure hope Heritage’s upcoming report does too.

My recent observations on Hoover’s Defining Ideas about the relationship of civil liberties to national security have drawn a stern response from Cato’s own Jim Harper, whose central claim is that I have sounded “needless anti-privacy notes” in my attack on the privacy protective policies that have been championed by Massachusetts Republican State Senator Robert Hedlund, whom I criticized for being too squeamish on aggressive and targeted government action to counter the threats that became all too visible on April 15, 2013. 

Harper’s initial parry is to stress a proposition that no one should care to deny, namely, that the Fourth Amendment imposes a bar against unreasonable searches and seizures, which in turn requires an examination of the purported relationship between the restriction that government seeks to impose and the evil that it seeks to defend against.  But in his choice of example and articulation of principle, Harper is guilty of grievous non sequiturs that add needless confusion to a problem that is already difficult enough to handle.

To examine the relationship between privacy and security, it is always a mistake to start with an example that the author describes as “an illustration ad absurdum,” which is just what Harper does when he bravely denounces a rule that allows for “100% crotch checks at street corners in major cities.”  The simple response is that this kind of action is under current law regarded as per se illegal even in connection with the so-called Terry stopswhich allow a police officer “to stop and frisk” individual on the public street if he or she has “reasonable suspicion” to think that the targeted person has engaged in illegal activity. 

That example has absolutely nothing to do with the design of a workable surveillance system. It also falsely calibrates the relevant choices by dismissing the current cries for increased surveillance as a “closer” question, when the two situations are worlds apart.  The Fourth Amendment treatment of unreasonable searches and seizures rests on a critical distinction between investigation of particular suspects and the stopping of dangers from unknown quarters.  There is a lot more information in the first case, so that a dragnet search makes no sense, which is why particularized evidence is required.  But general surveillance at unknown targets has to spread its net far wider.  It is both less intrusive and more comprehensive, and it can and does work. It was painfully clear from the pattern of events in Boston that the private surveillance cameras that were trained on the Boston Marathon provided indispensable information toward identifying and apprehending the Tsarnaev brothers.  What makes their use unreasonable, when there is not the slightest evidence that the information so acquired was used for improper purposes unrelated to the search?

It may be “worth discussing,” as Harper suggests, whether the use of surveillance will help deter some crimes and stop others.  But, if so, the only useful discussion is one that asks the means-ends question of how, in light of cost and privacy concerns, one can construct the best cost-effective surveillance system available, which can then be coordinated with the activities of police officers and volunteers on the ground, especially at any public event that presents a soft target.

But to dismiss these efforts on the unsupported speculation that “the possibility of apprehension seems not have occurred to the Tsarnaev brothers” can only be described as blinding error, especially in light of their frantic efforts to escape capture so they could strike again.  Nor does it make the slightest sense to tie general surveillance policy to some dubious account of the psychological make-up of two individuals.  It is far wiser to develop policies that improve the ability to track and identify dangerous suspects. Of course it is possible to construct a “surveillance architecture” that so dense as to be useless.  But once again, the sensible case for beefing up Boston’s public surveillance does not require that system designers leap from one indispensable extreme to another.  The real question is how to identify the comprehensive policies that do make sense.

Harper is equally off target about the potential gains from racial or ethnic profiling.  No one accepts the extreme proposition that all terrorists come from the same ethnic stock or practice the same religion. But that observation offers absolutely no reason to ignore valuable information that could help tweak the design of surveillance systems of searches.  The question here is not whether sensible protocols and profiles can narrow the search down to one-fifth the world’s population, most of which does not live in Boston anyhow.  It is the question of whether one can winnow the list of potential suspects from 100 to 20 people, which, if done reliably, gives law enforcement a huge leg up in conducting its investigations.

In sum, Harper would have a stronger case if he had tried to comment constructively on serious proposals that are put forward.  But to take an ill-advised a priori position that does nothing to advance either the protection of human life and human property, both private and public, is inconsistent with any sound libertarian position.  Remember that libertarians like myself, and I hope Harper, regard the protection of both as the primary function of the state. Harper’s careless and imprecise invocation of the Fourth Amendment cannot conceal this fundamental truth.