Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

You Go to War with the State Department You Have

There’s been a good bit of commentary over the last few weeks about the role of the State Department in post-“Mission Accomplished” Iraq.

First, WaPo reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran pulled the curtain back from America’s “provincial reconstruction teams” in Iraq, noting that in one instance

The USDA had trouble finding six people who wanted to work in Iraq among its more than 100,000 employees. Although a USDA official said the department encouraged its workers to apply, officials at State believe USDA did not move with alacrity because the two agencies had not agreed on a mechanism to reimburse the USDA for the services it would provide in Iraq. Eventually, USDA and State agreed that USDA would provide just two of the six. The other four would be private contractors hired by State.

The first USDA specialist, Randy Frescoln, a rural credit specialist from Iowa, landed in Iraq in December and was sent to the reconstruction team in Tikrit. Although he was supposed to stay in Iraq for a year, he said he plans to leave next month because he received a promotion while he was away. The second specialist has not yet arrived.

Even if USDA and State were to get an agriculture expert to Diyala now, [a State Department administrator] believes, it is too late. Security conditions have deteriorated so significantly in the province that reconstruction personnel are lucky to make one or two trips a week off the military base where they live and work.

Secretary of State Rice was left only to lament that the State Department simply doesn’t employ the types of people who the administration wants to rebuild Iraq: “These are people like agronomists, veterinarians, city planners and others. No diplomatic service in the world has these specialties.” That’s true enough. As a result, it’s been left to DOD to staff open State Department spots in Iraq. (No word on whether DOD employs veterinarians and city planners.)

We’ve seen the announcement that State intends to double the number of “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” in Iraq, from the total staffing today of 10 30-person teams to 20 teams. Also, Sen. Richard Lugar has resurrected the idea of the “Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization” in the State Department, which some of its strongest advocates liken to a “colonial office.”

And now we have former secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger discussing the super-ultra-mega embassy in Baghdad in today’s Post:

“I defy anyone to tell me how you can use that many people. It is nuts … it’s insane and it’s counterproductive … and it won’t work. I’ve been around the State Department long enough to know you can’t run an outfit like that.”

Then, a “senior State Department official” chimes in with a broader complaint:

“Maintaining an oversized mega-embassy in Baghdad is draining personnel and resources away from every other U.S. embassy around the world, and all for what?”

To try to salvage the Bush doctrine, that’s for what. 

But really, there’s an even broader question here: Do we want a national security bureaucracy that’s capable of taking on the types of tasks that we’re trying to do in Iraq? If so, we probably need a complete overhaul of the entire bureaucracy itself. That doesn’t mean just the State Department, or just DOD — it means everything.

There’s going to be inevitable bleedover between on-the-ground reconstructors, political advisers, police, military, intelligence operatives, and on and on. These people, by and large, are not currently employed by agencies that can force them to deploy into the middle of a conflict. You’d have to develop an agency that has these people on staff and could force them to deploy in order to come even close to the capacity that you’d need to have a good shot at success in these types of endeavors.

Simply put, our current bureaucracy is not designed — at all — with these sorts of operations in mind. If we came to the consensus that we need to do a lot more Iraq-style missions in the future, it’s time to completely reformulate not just our strategy, but the structure of the agencies that are devoted to executing the strategy.

Realistically, putting this into practice would probably mean at least tripling, if not quadrupling, the State Department’s budget, and maybe doubling the DOD budget, putting the combined budget well over a trillion dollars a year — about 10 percent of GDP. And that’s without anything near a guarantee of success. Sounds like a colossal waste to me.

For more on these themes, see Chris Preble and my paper on “failed states,” or the shorter essay (.pdf) we extracted for the American Foreign Service Association’s Foreign Service Journal.

Senator Susan Collins Supports National ID

I wrote here previously about Senator Susan Collins’ odd move to protect the REAL ID Act from a nationwide rebellion that began in her own state of Maine.  She had introduced a bill to extend the deadline for implementation of the REAL ID Act by two years.

Followers of REAL ID know that delaying implementation helps a national ID go forward by giving the companies and organizations that sustain themselves on these kinds of projects time to shake the federal money tree and get this $11 billion surveillance mandate funded.

It is now clear that the bill is intended to provide a key piece of support to proponents of a national ID, as shown by a press release on her Web site this morning touting a statement from the National Governors Association.  Collins has gone native, attending more carefully to the interests of national political organizations than to the interests of her constituents in Maine.

Representative Tom Allen (D-ME) has introduced legislation to repeal REAL ID and restore the identification provisions in the 9/11-Commission inspired Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.  Unlike Collins, he seems to be paying attention to his home state.  Politicians’ stances on REAL ID have affected their electability in the past.

Senator Collins should be well aware that delay can’t make the REAL ID Act work.  The real problem is the law itself, and it should be repealed.

Update: A DHS press release issued today announces that it will grant states an extension of the compliance deadline, and it will allocate funds from the Homeland Security Grant Program.  The money tree has already begun shaking.  Secretary Chertoff is quoted saying, “We are also pleased to have been able to work with Senator Susan Collins, and I believe that the proposed regulations reflect her approach.” 

Who You Gonna Believe, Me or Your Lying Eyes?

Here’s Representative Barbara Cubin’s (R-WY) letter to state legislators regarding the REAL ID Act, as reported in the Casper Star-Tribune:  “The new driver’s licenses will allow state and federal law enforcement to check the authenticity of a license, but will not grant access to state databases of private information.”

Now here’s section 202(d) of the REAL ID Act:

To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall adopt the following practices in the issuance of drivers’ licenses and identification cards: …

(12) Provide electronic access to all other States to information contained in the motor vehicle database of the State. 

(13) Maintain a State motor vehicle database that contains, at a minimum–

(A) all data fields printed on drivers’ licenses and identification cards issued by the State; and

(B) motor vehicle drivers’ histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses.

Who you gonna believe?

Government Identity Programs in Collapse?

Government Computer News has had a number of articles recently about the problems besieging the Transportation Worker Identity Card (or TWIC), one of a number of government identification systems nominally responding to the post-9/11 threat environment.  It should be no surprise to government watchers that a service provider for TWIC, viewed by many as unqualified, happens to be in the district of the former Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee’s Homeland Security Subcommittee.

The REAL ID Act is a bigger government identity control project, by far, which attempts to force states to convert their drivers’ licenses into a national ID card.  Regulations implementing REAL ID are widely expected to be released this week.  

Even while the architects of the surveillance state gather to talk about implementation, the Washington Post has an article out today that is probably best taken as the first post mortem on REAL ID

The headline (“As Bush’s ID Plan Was Delayed, Coalition Formed Against It”) wrongly attributes REAL ID to the Bush Administration, which was not a proponent of REAL ID, though the President did accept it as part of a military spending bill.  The article correctly attributes responsibility to Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the former Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.

Though the Bush Administration has room to distance itself from this colossal unfunded national surveillance mandate, a prominent member of the Administration appears to have consumed the REAL ID Koolaid - in quantity.

“If we don’t get it done now, someone’s going to be sitting around in three or four years explaining to the next 9/11 commission why we didn’t do it,” Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told the Senate’s Homeland Security Committee on Feb. 13.

Secretary Chertoff’s shameless terror-pandering is matched only by his ignorance of identification’s utility as a security tool.  People who understand identification know that it does not provide security against committed threats.

It’s unfortunate that government works by trial and error, but this trial may soon show that a national ID is error.

Some Sensible Thoughts on the REAL ID Act

Today I’ll be testifying on the REAL ID Act in a state legislature for the second time in two days. In the morning yesterday, I spoke to the Government Operations Committee of the Utah House of Representatives, along with the Committee’s Chairman Glenn Donnelson (R-North Ogden). His resolution to reject the REAL ID Act was passed unanimously by the committee and sent to the full House.

Mid-day, I flew from Salt Lake City to Boise, Idaho to speak on a panel about REAL ID convened in the capitol building by Representative Phil Hart (R-Athol). Today, Hart’s resolution opposing REAL ID will be heard in the House Transportation and Defense Committee.

Among the people on yesterday’s panel in Boise was Bill Bishop, Director of the Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security. You might think that a homeland security guy would support REAL ID. He doesn’t. Knowing full well he might be making it harder on himself the next time it comes time to getting grants from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, he laid out his opposition to REAL ID.

Along with his philosophical objections to a national ID, he pointed out its practical weaknesses as a security tool. You can nail down the identity of everyone and you’ll be no better off in preventing something like a terrorist attack. And as soon as you come out with a highly secure, highly valuable ID like the REAL ID, the hackers and forgers will go to work on faking it or corrupting someone in order to get it. It’s a good security practice to diversify your protections rather than creating a single point of failure like the REAL ID Act does. You might make yourself less safe if you rely on a uniform ID system for your security.

What frustrates me about this kind of guy (I say, tongue firmly in cheek) is that I had to study security and risk management for a couple of years before I understood these concepts well enough to put in my book. The Bill Bishops of the world just kinda know it. Not fair.

Summarizing REAL ID’s utility as a national security tool, Bishop said: “I don’t believe in the Easter Bunny, I don’t believe in Santa Claus, and I don’t believe in the Lone Ranger. Which means I don’t believe in silver bullets.”

We ought to take advantage of this kind of wisdom, and the obvious benefits of local knowledge - maybe by coming up with some kind of decentralized governmental structure. I don’t know how you would do that. Just putting an idle thought out there.

Why the United States Must Leave Iraq

The U.S. military occupation of Iraq has already cost more than 3,000 American lives and $350 billion. In “Escaping the Trap: Why the United States Must Leave Iraq,” Cato scholar Ted Galen Carpenter argues for a rapid and comprehensive withdrawal from Iraq. “It is time to admit that the Iraq mission has failed and cut our losses. We need an exit strategy that is measured in months, not years.” Carpenter also examines alternative prescriptions offered by opponents of immediate withdrawal—gradual or partial withdrawal, escalation, and partitioning—and concludes that they are unrealistic, expensive, and insufficient to stem the violence in Iraq.