Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

Remembering Japanese Internment

By
Mark Moller

Over the 4th of July, I headed out West to a family reunion in a very remote part of the U.S.: Minidoka County, Idaho–an apocalyptically stark stretch of mile-high lava rock and sagebrush in the heart of the Snake River basin, unfolding like a moonscape from the base of the Albion mountain range at the Utah-Idaho border.

I’d grown up on my dad’s stories about his Idaho childhood. One story that intrigued was his very early memory of working my grandfather’s fields alongside Italian and German World War II POWs, who were held in a prisoner-of-war camp near Twin Falls, Idaho. POWs were used to remedy a shortage of farmhands in agricultural areas throughout the U.S.

Not long ago, I asked my dad if any World War II Japanese internment camps had operated in the Minidoka area. He wasn’t aware of any. Imagine my surprise then when I learned of this memorial service, held today, for the Minidoka internment camp–one of the larger Japanese internment camps operated during World War II.

Its no surprise my dad–otherwise an encyclopedia of information about southern Idaho–was caught short on this question. Virtually nothing of substance remains to memorialize the camp today, although a more substantial memorial is planned.

Minidoka residents–fond of calling their region the “Magic Valley“–shouldn’t get off so easily. Just as the government loaned Axis POWs to some local farmers, it loaned Japanese-Americans to others. Some 2,300 “Nisei” camp residents worked area sugar beet farms on “agricultural leave” from the Minidoka camp–hard, backbreaking work at a time when local farming was undertaken without modern tractors or modern irrigtation technology. To be sure, the camp residents weren’t technically forced to work, as this bit of outrageously upbeat 1943 government propaganda notes–but the Japanese internees had little other choice of employment.

This shameful episode–part of the darker history of communities throughout the West and a telling example of the worst that can happen when courts abdicate oversight of the political branches during wartime–deserves substantial local recognition in Minidoka and other host communities. For more about the location of internment camps, see here and here.

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security, General, Law and Civil Liberties

Madness!!!

By
William A. Niskanen

President Bush has endorsed adding the former Soviet province of Georgia to NATO, a measure that seems designed to provoke the Russians without adding any net benefits to the alliance.  Georgia would bring more liabilities than assets to NATO because it is inherently indefensible.  It is nearly surrounded by Russia; its only border with NATO is a short border with eastern Turkey.  Georgia has no significant military forces of its own, and Russian troops already occupy two enclaves there.

Article V of the NATO Charter obligates all NATO governments to respond to an attack on any NATO country, increasing the probability that a minor confrontation between Georgia and Russia would lead to a larger war between NATO and Russia.  NATO should not be broadened to include countries on the Russian border unless those countries have substantial military forces and defensible borders.  For a similar reason, the earlier addition of the three Baltic countries to NATO was a mistake.  Peaceful and productive relations with Russia are more important than any value these new members bring to the United States and NATO.

President Bush was gracious in hosting the president of Georgia this week and was correct to support the major economic reforms that Georgia has initiated.  But he was wrong in endorsing NATO membership as a sort of after-dinner mint.  There are much larger issues at stake for the U.S., Europe, and Russia.  One wonders what Bush now expects to accomplish with Putin at the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg next week.  

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security, General

Technology - er, Paying Attention - Will Save Us All

By
Jim Harper

With masterful dry wit, ars technica skewers a new Defense Department research project.  The idea?  Using technology to find information.

The Air Force’s Office of Scientific Research has commenced a study called “Automated Ontologically-Based Link Analysis of International Web Logs for the Timely Discovery of Relevant and Credible Information.”  In translation, that means, “We’re going to pay attention to blogs.”  Price tag: $450,000. 

Talk about government waste. I would have sold them that idea for $399,000.

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security, Telecom, Internet & Information Policy

Pardon Me, Congressman, Is That a Log in Your Eye?*

By
Justin Logan

China hawk extraordinaire Rep. Steve Chabot had a piece in the DC Examiner last week calling for a “fresh review of America’s interests in Asia.” For one thing, Rep. Chabot loudly protested China’s “enormous and ever-growing militarization program.”

For advocates of Taiwan independence like Rep. Chabot, the PRC’s military modernization program is no doubt worrisome. But the United States is in no position to protest any other country’s allegedly “enormous and ever-growing militarization program.”

US defense spending is more than $400 billion annually, not including the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has the largest blue-water navy in the world, with 12 aircraft carriers. We can project naval (or other) power anywhere in the world in a matter of days.

Chinese defense spending is hard to pin down, precisely, but experts generally center around a median estimate in the neighborhood of $50 billion. China has 0 aircraft carriers, and thus is unable even to protect its precarious supply of energy that comes from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca.

China looks at things pretty simply: The United States could militarily impose its will on issues that China perceives as life-or-death concerns: the future of Taiwan, the balance of power in East Asia, and the security of China’s supplies of energy. It would be like if China were the dominant military power in the Western hemisphere, and then started squawking about America’s attempt to build up its own military.

For Rep. Chabot (or Secretary Rumsfeld) to think that the United States has any position to protest anybody’s “enormous and ever-growing militarization program” is a bit ridiculous. At a time when we’re engaged in two wars halfway ‘round the world, spending nearly as much on defense as the rest of the world combined, it’s a shaky line of reasoning that says that China’s attempt to bring a 1950s-era military into the 21st century is anything that we are in any position to protest.

As Martin Wolf noted in the FT last September (sub. req’d),

the Chinese can justifiably react by asking why the US needs to spend as much on its military as the rest of the world put together. With Canada and Mexico as its neighbours, why does it feel so threatened? To this the US would respond that it has special responsibilities as guarantor of world peace and, in any case, threatens no other nation. China, in its turn, could then ask who elected the US global policeman and why, given the public debate in the US about whether and how to curb its rise, it should trust its security to the US.

Just so.

—

* For an explanation of the title, go here.

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security

Military Tribunals Plan B, or C, or D, or…

By
Tim Lynch

Yesterday, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bush administration’s military tribunals violated the law. On the news today, I heard someone say that the White House must now consider “Plan B.” 

Ahem — we passed Plan B some time ago.

Here’s a recap of what has transpired over the past four years:

PLAN A: Issue “military tribunals” order. (The resistance may be negligible.)

On November 13, 2001, President Bush quietly and matter-of-factly issued a “military order” to establish military tribunals for prisoners in the “war on terror.” The order stated that any prisoner designated by the president to be an “enemy combatant” would be imprisoned by the military. The order boldly declared that such prisoners could be tried before tribunals and that the prisoners “shall not be privileged to seek any remedy in any court of the United States.”

When the prisoners did get legal representation, Mr. Bush’s people told the defense lawyers that the military order precluded them from challenging the legality of the tribunals in court. After all, that’s what the order said. 

However, Plan A failed; legal challenges were filed anyway.

PLAN B: Make the argument to the judges. (They may buy it.)

The Bush administration argued in federal court that legal challenges to the tribunals must be dismissed immediately because the president’s order clearly said that prisoners may not “seek any remedy in any court.” 

But Plan B failed; the court was not persuaded.

PLAN C:  Appeal. (Keep arguing until some court buys it.)

A key aspect of the controversy reached the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush in 2004. Mr. Bush’s lawyers argued that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction to consider any legal challenges from prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay. 

Plan C failed; the Supreme Court was not persuaded.

PLAN D: Start the tribunals anyway, and handle any legal challenges later. (Perhaps by bringing strong cases against unsympathetic figures like Hamdan, the judicial system will acquiesce.)

Hamdan’s lawyer immediately challenged the legality of the tribunal. Mr. Bush’s lawyers responded by telling the court that Hamdan’s argument was without merit. The judge was not persuaded.

PLAN E: Appeal. (Keep arguing.)

At first, Plan E appeared to work. The appellate court overturned the district court and ruled that the tribunals were legal. But Hamdan’s lawyers refused to go along, and they appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

PLAN F: Persuade the Supreme Court not to hear Hamdan’s appeal. (This will secure the lower court victory.)

But the Supreme Court was not persuaded, and granted certiorari.

PLAN G: Persuade Congress to pass a law that will prevent the Supreme Court from hearing Hamdan’s appeal. (The legislative branch could check the judiciary.)

With time growing short before the High Court would hear Hamdan’s opening arguments, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act, ostensibly blocking the case. But the Supreme Court responded that it would hear arguments on the new law at the same time that it would hear arguments on the merits of the military tribunal controversy.

PLAN H: Argue again that the new law means the Court has no jurisdiction to hear Hamdan’s case, then argue that Hamdan’s objections should be heard on post-conviction appeal, and then argue that the tribunals are lawful and proper. (The plan could also be called “Broken Arrow.”)

But Plan H failed. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by all three arguments and found the tribunals unlawful.

PLAN I is presently in the works, under the codename “Plan B.” 

When it arrives, scrutinize it.

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security, Law and Civil Liberties

This Sunday in Bolivia and Mexico

By
Ian Vásquez

This Sunday, when Mexicans will vote for a new president, Bolivians will also be going to the polls — selecting a new constituent assembly that will rewrite their constitution.

Bolivian president Evo Morales is using Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez’s example as a model to concentrate power. Chavez introduced a new constitution that centralized political control and he has used popular referendums to eliminate checks and balances on his power. Morales will have a somewhat harder time at gaining and maintaining similar control, since he doesn’t have the vast oil resources or military background to support him that Chavez has.

If Mexican populist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is elected this weekend, will he too follow the Chavez path? Many observers, including the market, don’t seem overly concerned. Mexico is not Bolivia; it is a much larger, more diverse, open economy with a free trade agreement with the United States. Democratization and economic reforms — especially openness to international capital markets — will temper Lopez Obrador’s populist sentiments. At least, so the argument goes.

Unfortunately, I don’t believe that Mexico’s reforms have been sufficiently institutionalized. Mercantilism, political opportunism, and the party machine are still quite alive in a Mexico that spent most of the 20th century looking inward and under state domination. Even President Vicente Fox’s great achievement of maintaining a macroeconomic stability not seen in more than 30 years depended heavily on the admirable qualities of the current finance minister and central bank president.

As Mexican economist Manuel Suarez Mier has been emphatically warning, a President Lopez Obrador would find it relatively easy to buy off congressmen from the opposition and discredited PRI party and to thus begin re-establishing the political hegemony that existed in Mexico before Fox came to power. Except this time, the ruling party would be Lopez Obrador’s PRD.

That scenario may seem extreme, especially since it would require plenty of resources to sustain. The path to populism in Mexico would be different than that of Venezuela. But given Lopez Obrador’s political record of behaving irresponsibly and openly disdaining the rule of law (e.g., he has disregarded court rulings with which he disagrees), there is every reason to believe that he will follow through with the vast New Deal-type spending projects that he has promised, the creation of state-owned businesses, and the protection of favored industries even in the face of adverse economic results.

Bolivia is guaranteed a rough ride almost regardless of its election results this weekend. Because the leading presidential contenders are essentially tied in the polls, Mexico can still opt against the candidate that promises to take the country backward.

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security, International Economics and Development

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: A (Tentative) Guide for the Perplexed

By
Mark Moller

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the recent Supreme Court case concerning the use of special military commissions to try Guantanamo prisoners, is a bear to boil down, accurately, in a single blog post. It touches on a perfect storm of arcane questions: customary international law, treaty interpretation, the common law of war, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and jurisdiction-stripping.

The Court’s basic argument, as I understand it, is this: Congress can set the rules governing military commissions in most cases, including this one. Those rules, spelled out in the U.S. Code of Military Justice and corresponding treaties, specify as follows:

  • The commissions must conform as much as practical to the procedures that govern standing courts-martial (the standing tribunals in which U.S. serviceman can be tried) and ordinary civil criminal trials.
  • The Geneva Convention sets additional, overlapping requirements that trial of prisoners must occur in “regularly constituted” courts.

Those requirements have been violated. While the commissions depart from the standard procedures of courts-martial, the president hasn’t made a sufficient showing that consistency with the procedures of ordinary courts-martial isn’t a “practical” option, as U.S. law (specifically, Article 36 of the U.S. Code of Military Justice) requires. Because the president hasn’t made that showing, the Gitmo commissions also aren’t “regularly constituted” courts — and therefore trying persons before the commissions violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.

Got that? Good, because there are some more wrinkles:

The Court also holds that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention is part of the “law of war” that governs military commissions under U.S. law. That means that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention is a restraint on the procedures that govern the commissions. Furthermore, the Court holds that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the armed conflict with al Qaeda. That suggests that the Geneva Convention is a restraint on the way we treat prisoners who are in U.S. custody, since Common Article 3 requires that they be treated humanely.

Finally, the Court lays out a safe harbor for the administration. If the administration (1) adopts procedures and oversight mechanisms that apply to courts-martial — particularly, standards and procedures that insulate the “presiding officer” (judge-like officer who presides over trials in commissions) from control by political appointees selected by the SecDef, and (2) conform standards governing admission of evidence to the rules that govern courts-martial, the commissions might be upheld. Also, if the administration offers record evidence that the procedures of courts-martial are impractical, it might also secure judicial approval of the commissions. Even if it doesn’t do this, the military can still hold Guantanamo detainees indefinitely without trial. The administration can also convince Congress to approve the procedures it prefers.

Here’s some of what the Court didn’t decide:

  1. Can Congress withdraw the Supreme Court’s authority to hear future challenges to the military commissions by persons who aren’t yet enmeshed in a prosecution before a commission? We don’t know. The Court holds only that Congress hasn’t withdrawn its jurisdiction over prosecutions already initiated.
  2. Is the Detainee Treatment Act — which removes Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear appeals by Guantanamo detainees based on U.S. statutes or the Constitution, gives lower courts discretion to deny appeal of non-capital cases in which defendants face short prison sentences, and limits appeal to judgments contained in a “final decision” of a military commission — valid as applied to persons who haven’t yet been charged? No answer.
  3. Does the president have inherent power to ignore Congress in cases of “controlling necessity” in, for example, the field of combat? The Court doesn’t clearly answer that question. Says the Court: “Whether Chief Justice Chase was correct in suggesting that the President may constitutionally convene military commissions ‘without the sanction of Congress’ in cases of ‘controlling necessity’ is a question this Court has not answered definitively, and need not answer today.” The Court specifies, in footnote 23, only that the President “may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own powers, placed on his powers.” The meaning of that all important qualification — “proper” — remains undetermined.
  4. Can the president establish commissions that depart from ordinary procedure of courts-martial? Yes — if he shows that the ordinary procedures are impractical. The Court holds only that the president hasn’t made such a showing — not that he can’t ever make such a showing. The Court also doesn’t settle when such a showing is substantial enough to deserve deference.
  5. Can civil courts hear claims raising violations of the Geneva Convention? This, too, remains unanswered. The majority, including Justice Kennedy, holds that only the Convention is enforceable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as part of the “law or war” that governs military commissions. That ruling has no necessary application to civil courts. However, the opinion is quite suggestive. Both the majority and concurrence cite 18 U.S.C. § 2441, which Justice Kennedy stresses makes violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention a war crime punishable as a federal offense, enforceable in federal civil court. The majority holds, of course, that trying pesons under the president’s military commission order violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, suggesting that trial is a war crime within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2441. Furthermore, the majority stresses that the Geneva Conventions “do extend liability for substantive war crimes to those who ‘orde[r]’ their commission” and “this Court has read the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 to impose ‘command responsibility’ on military commanders for acts of their subordinates.” The Court’s emphasis on the liability that attaches to “orders” is significant, because trials in the military commissions are, of course, pursuant to a direct presidential order. Even so, its difficult to imagine circumstances in which charges under Section 2441 might actually be prosecuted.

[Ed. note: In the original post, the author mistakenly cited 18 U.S.C. § 2241.  The correct citation is 18 U.S.C. § 2441, updated in the text above.]

Topics: 
Foreign Policy and National Security, Law and Civil Liberties

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