Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

Long-Term Solutions to the Ukraine Crisis

As I argued in a piece over at Forbes yesterday, western sanctions to roll back Russian action in Ukraine have been largely ineffectual. These sanctions - including asset freezes and visa bans – are ‘targeted’ at those suspected of having influence on Putin. Yet the sanctions, designed to be minimally painful for European states, are toothless - the majority of individuals sanctioned have only a minimal role in policy – and they won’t fix the long-term problem.

Over 150 individuals have been sanctioned by the United States and European Union, including 65 Ukrainian rebels, whose inclusion is presumably intended to inhibit their ability to wage conflict. The remainder are Russian, but most have no access to the corridors of power. Anatoly Sidorov, for example, the Commander of Russian military units in Crimea, is likely uninvolved in the policy formulation process. Other names are stranger, such as Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen republic. No doubt, he’s a trenchant proponent of the rebels, but he doesn’t influence Russian policy. In all, I estimate only a small proportion of those included in joint sanctions are actually involved in high-level decisionmaking.

The sanctions also vary in impact. Vladislav Surkov, suspected mastermind of Russia’s Crimea strategy, joked with reporters that sanctions didn’t worry him, as his only interest in the United States was Tupac. His point is valid: for those with no assets in Western Europe or the United States, sanctions are merely inconvenient.

Newer sanctions on companies certainly carry some more bite, restricting the ability of Russian banks to raise capital on Western markets. But they still don’t touch Russia’s key source of government revenues, an estimated 50-70% of which come from oil and gas sales. Unfortunately, Russia supplies one-third of Europe’s natural gas, and several countries (e.g., Estonia, Latvia) are entirely dependent on Russian energy. An immediate stop to imports is simply not possible, especially at the start of winter.

In the long-run, however, the most energy-dependent countries are also those most worried about Russia for security reasons. Now is an excellent time for these countries to begin to slowly divest themselves of Russian gas and oil. Dependence is a two-way street, after all: Russia is dependent on European payments for energy, and it will be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for Russia to find alternate buyers for its resources.

The United States can help Europe with this process. The global energy market is being reshaped by innovations like fracking and liquified natural gas (LNG) transports. Thanks to shale gas, the United States is now one of the world’s largest producers of LNG, with shipments set to leave ports as early as 2015. Indeed, House Speaker John Boehner argued in March that the United States could help to curb Russia’s influence by encouraging natural gas exports to Eastern Europe. But for the sake of their own security, European states must begin the long process of shifting away from Russian energy supplies, and turning off the spigot of energy wealth that keeps the Kremlin afloat. 

Use Education to Transform China From Within

BEIJING—China’s university system is growing.  However, the People’s Republic of China still lags behind the U.S. and other Western nations.  Chinese students increasingly are heading to America for higher education. 

While recently playing tourist in Beijing I spoke to a number of young Chinese.  They were bright and inquisitive, ambitious and nationalistic.  They worried about finding good jobs and were irritated by government restrictions on their freedom. 

Beijing’s global influence depends upon domestic economic growth and political stability.  And that ultimately depends upon China’s young. 

The PRC’s university students today are most likely to become the country’s leaders tomorrow.  The number of college graduates has increased to seven million, a four-fold jump over the last decade. 

While the number of universities in China is growing, few have national, let alone international, reputations.  Undoubtedly that will change over time.  Today, however, competition for the few available spots at top schools is extraordinary. 

For instance, Peking and Tsinghua Universities are the only Chinese universities among the world’s top 100.  They have space only for 6000 new students a year. 

Obviously, far more Chinese students could succeed, indeed thrive, at fine universities.  So more than 400,000 young Chinese are heading abroad every year. 

We Shall Not Be Moved. Unless There’s a Democrat in the White House.

Dana Milbank reports in the Washington Post:

The anti-Obama left was out in force. All 22 of them.

As the president stood on the South Lawn to announce the bombing campaign in Syria, liberal demonstrators gathered on Pennsylvania Avenue on the other side of the White House to protest the man they thought was their ally….

“If George W. Bush were launching wars with Congress out of town, oh, it would be flooded,” longtime liberal activist David Swanson said, looking across mostly empty Pennsylvania Avenue “They would be screaming.”

My thoughts from 2011 on the disappearance of the antiwar movement. Buzzfeed worries that antiwar celebrities may have been kidnapped.

President Poroshenko Goes to Washington

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko spoke before the U.S. Congress yesterday morning, and afterward met with President Obama at the White House. The visit was overshadowed by other major events of the week—Congress’s vote to authorize arms and training for Syrian rebels, and the Scottish independence referendumbut it was noteworthy that the visit didn’t elicit any U.S. offers of military support for Ukraine.

Poroshenko’s speech to Congress focused heavily on Ukraine’s role as a “strong American partner” and fellow democracy, and argued for greater U.S. involvement in the crisis. He even went so far as to argue that “this is America’s war too,” though he certainly offered no justification for why Ukraine is of key strategic interest for the United States. Between rousing rhetoric, references to John F. Kennedy, and anecdotes about brave Ukrainian warriors, he did ask the United States for three pieces of aid:

First, he asked for weaponry. Poroshenko thanked the United States for the humanitarian aid it has provided to Ukraine, but argued that “we can’t win a war with blankets.” The White House has promised a new $53 million aid package, comprising nonlethal military aid (i.e., blankets and food supplies). In contrast, the Ukrainians are particularly interested in heavy and antitank weapons.

Second, Poroshenko asked Congress for a massive injection of financial aid to support investment, fight corruption, and reform the Ukrainian state.

Finally, and most worrisome, he asked the United States (and NATO) to grant Ukraine a “special, non-allied partner status” for security and defense. It’s unclear exactly what this would entail, but it sounds suspiciously like a plea for NATO protection of Ukraine without full NATO membership.

There is limited interest in Congress to give Poroshenko some of what he is seeking. Sens. Bob Corker (R-TN) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) have co-sponsored the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, which would seek to arm Ukrainian troops. But though the bill unanimously passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is unclear what will become of it as the Senate begins its recess, or whether it would command broader support from Congress.

Arming Ukraine’s government is foolhardy at best. Even if Ukraine were central to U.S. interests, the United States cannot possibly provide enough military aid to allow Ukraine to prevail against the Russian military. Such aid has the potential to escalate the situation and undermine a diplomatic settlement. Giving Ukraine a “special defense status” is an even worse idea, especially if it were to commit NATO to the military defense of Ukraine.

Luckily, the Obama administration seems determined to give Poroshenko a public relations boost—rolling out the red carpet for his visit—and nothing more. President Obama’s remarks praised Poroshenko’s leadership, but promised only to continue to help Ukraine reach a diplomatic settlement with Russia. With the U.S. military already gearing up for action on two different continents, it isn’t surprising that American leaders would choose to avoid escalating another regional conflict. Let’s hope this restraint continues once the other crises are past. 

Countries at Risk, not Fake U.S. Coalition, Should Stop the Islamic State

President Barack Obama is fighting the Islamic State with a coalition without members.  What are allies for?

Washington collects allies like most people collect Facebook friends.  It doesn’t matter if the new “friends” enhance America’s security.  Washington wants more allies.

Yet America’s allies do little for the U.S.  Their view is that Washington’s job is to defend them.  Their job is to be defended by Washington. 

For decades Washington faced down a nuclear-armed power—the Soviet Union and then Russia—to protect the Europeans.  The Europeans did essentially nothing for the U.S. 

After 9/11 several European states contributed to America’s efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Neither invading the latter nor attempting to build a democratic central government in the former made policy sense, but some Europeans sacrificed on behalf of a professed U.S. interest. 

However, Washington quickly repaid the favor, underwriting Britain’s and France’s foolish war in Libya.  Now the Europeans want Washington to save Ukraine and “reassure” countries to the east.  Yet the EU has a larger GDP and population than America. 

With the U.S. now calling for assistance against ISIL, the continent has turned more frigid.  No one seems interested in joining Washington’s air war, even Great Britain.

Washington’s Asian friends are even less helpful.  For decades Japan wouldn’t help U.S. forces, even if they were defending Japan.  That is finally changing, but there still is no good reason Washington to stare down the People’s Republic of China to secure Tokyo’s disputed claim to the Senkaku Islands. 

The Costs of Independence

As my colleague Doug Bandow noted on Cato@Liberty a few days ago, Scottish independence is for the voters of Scotland to decide. And so it should be. But, as I write over at Foreign Policy, U.S. policymakers need to be aware that Scottish independence would carry some key costs for the United States:

  1. The loss of nuclear submarine basing privileges is the most concrete cost of Scottish independence, with Scotland’s nationalist party pledging a ‘nuclear-free’ Scotland if a Yes vote occurs. U.S. nuclear submarines, though based in King’s Bay, Georgia, use the United Kingdom’s HMNB Clyde Naval Base at Faslane, Scotland for maintenance and deployment needs. The site is located conveniently close to key North Sea patrol waters, and has acted as a visiting port for U.S. submarines since the Cold War. The loss of the base will force the UK to relocate its four Trident submarines, and the paucity of available sites in Europe may eventually lead to UK submarines being based alongside their American counterparts in Georgia.
  2. The UK and United States also have strong, historical links in intelligence sharing and military cooperation, formalized in the 1946 UKUSA agreement. Intelligence sharing and operational burdens are widely shared; officers on both sides of the Atlantic even refer to each other as ‘cousins.’ But independence could undermine the value of this alliance for the United States, at least in the short term.  In the case of a Yes vote, the remainder of the United Kingdom (RUK) will need to rebuild its military and intelligence capabilities, extricating itself from Scotland, and negotiating which military assets will go to which country. During this period, the United States will lose the benefit of British intelligence and military support.
  3. The breakdown of the UK will also result in the loss of a valuable U.S. supporter on the world stage. The UK is often the only nation which commits substantial levels of troops or financing to joint military or humanitarian operations. While ‘partner states’ like France committed only 88 troops to the War in Afghanistan, the UK contributed 10-15% of total troops to the conflict. In Iraq, the UK was responsible for almost half of the non-U.S. troops involved. The UK also carries its own weight in NATO, contributing between 2.5-3% of GDP in military spending each year, a level few European states achieve. The loss of Scotland will carve up the UK, removing at least 8% of its population and tax base, making it less able to commit to any U.S. initiatives.

The timing could not be worse: achieving consensus on Syria, Ukraine or a host of other issues will be harder in the turmoil of a Yes vote for independence. Whether the United States should be involved in these conflicts is debatable at best, but they will be costly, especially if Britain can’t contribute.  An independent Scotland, even without the incipient startup costs of independence, is not going to fill that gap. U.S. policymakers shouldn’t be telling Scotland what to do. But they should be worried. If a Yes vote occurs, the costs will certainly impact the United States

Imperialist Tourist Spots Help Explain Chinese Aggressiveness Today

BEIJING—Modern China continues to rise.  But ancient China remains.  And bears witness to a history the West would prefer to forget.

The Summer Palace is one of Beijing’s most enchanting tourist destinations.  But some of the old buildings are in ruins—courtesy of the Western powers.

Imperial China long was a cultured and advanced civilization that eventually fell into decay.  By the 1800s the Western powers had begun to carve out concessions and colonies.

The Summer Palace first was created in the 12th century and was meant to ease the life of the royal family.  In 1860 during the Second Opium War French and British troops destroyed most of what is now called the Old Summer Palace.

In 1886 the Empress Dowager Cixi used funds planned for a navy to rebuild the royal playground.  She called the site the Garden of Peace and Harmony, an appropriate name, except for the garden’s unwanted guests.

In 1900 came the Boxer Rebellion, named for the violent xenophobic, spiritual movement named the “Righteous and Harmonious Fists.”  The Boxers targeted foreigners, especially missionaries, and Chinese Christians.  The revolt, supported by the Empress Dowager, reached Beijing, in which Western diplomats were killed and legations were besieged.  The Western nations raised an eight-nation rescue force, including American troops.

The allied forces eventually relieved the city—alas, the Boxers discovered that their training did not render them immune to bullets.  One of the casualties was the New Summer Palace. The gardens and buildings were burned by the allies, objects contained within were plundered.

The Empress Dowager had to rebuild again on her return to Beijing, which she had fled in advance of the allies.  She died in 1908 and the republican revolution occurred three years later.

This unseemly history is of more than just academic interest.  It helps explain Beijing’s behavior today.

No doubt, some Chinese, both in and out of the People’s Republic of China, have an exaggerated sense of Chinese history, civilization, and destiny.  And Imperial China, despite the fascinating esoterica surrounding it, was an unfriendly place for most of the humane values which we value today.  Nevertheless, China has been treated badly, especially by the Western powers which today are most insistent on Beijing following Western standards.

This historical experience helps explain the nationalism which afflicts even young Chinese who are liberal in many other ways.  The same students believe in a strong, even dominant China.

In fact, many ethnic Chinese living outside of the PRC cheered Hong Kong’s 1997 reversion to Beijing’s control.  For them, the issue was CHINA, not the particular regime ruling the territory known as China at this moment.

More important, those in charge feel a special responsibility as their nation gains the resources, influence, and power necessary to reverse a century or more of humiliation.  That may not justify increasing Chinese assertiveness, especially in the West’s eyes.  But it helps explain the behavior.

This doesn’t mean other nations should automatically concede the PRC’s claims.  But it suggests that Chinese assertiveness involves something other than malevolent aggression.

In which case, as I write in my new article on China-US Focus, “Washington is foolish to militarize disputes which are, at most, of only moderate geopolitical interest.  Other nations, especially those, like Japan, whose behavior has been, shall we say, less than exemplary, have a special responsibility to accommodate Beijing’s perceptions and interests.”

History helps explain Beijing’s policies and politics today.  While those in the West might have amnesia about what their ancestors did to the forebears of China’s leaders, the latter are not so likely to forget.  Policymakers in the U.S. would do well to consider that history in designing their approach to Beijing.  A peaceful and prosperous 21st century might depend on it.