Topic: Tax and Budget Policy

The Necessary and Valuable Economic Role of Tax Havens

Economists certainly don’t speak with one voice, but there’s a general consensus on two principles of public finance that will lead to a more competitive and prosperous economy.

To be sure, some economists will say that high tax rates and more double taxation are nonetheless okay because they believe there is an “equity vs. efficiency” tradeoff and they are willing to sacrifice some prosperity in hopes of achieving more equality.

I disagree, mostly because there’s compelling evidence that this approach ultimately leads to less income for the poor, but this is a fair and honest debate. Both sides agree that lower rates and less double taxation will produce more growth (though they’ll disagree on how much growth) and both sides agree that a low-tax/faster-growth economy will produce more inequality (though they’ll disagree on whether the goal is to reduce inequality or reduce poverty).

Since I’m on the low-tax/faster-growth side of the debate, this is one of the reasons why I’m a big fan of tax competition and tax havens.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression

[Reprinted with permission from Alan Reynolds, “What Do We Know about the Great Crash?National Review, November 9, 1979]

 Many scholars have long agreed that the Smoot-Hawley tariff had disastrous economic effects, but most of them have  felt  that  it could  not have caused the stock market collapse of  October  1929, since the tariff was not signed into law  until the following June. Today we know that market participants do not wait for a major law to pass, but instead try to anticipate whether or not it will pass and what its effects will be.

 Consider the following sequence of events:

 The Smoot-Hawley tariff passes the House on May   28, 1929.  Stock prices in New   York   (1926=100) drop   from 196 in March to 191   in June.   On June   19, Republicans   on the Senate Finance Committee   meet   to   rewrite   the   bill. Hoping for improvement, the market rallies,  but  industrial production  ( 1967 = 100)  peaks  in  July,  and  dips  very  slightly through  September.  Stocks  rise  to  216  by  September,  hit­ting their peak on  the  third  of  the  month.  The  full  Senate Finance Committee goes to   work  on  the  tariff  the  following day,  moving  it  to  the  Senate  floor  later  in  the   month.

 On October 21, the Senate rejects, 64 to 10, a move to limit tariff increases to agriculture. “A weakening of the Democratic-Progressive Coalition was evidenced on October 23,” notes the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. In this first test vote, 16 members of the anti-tariff coalition switch sides and vote to double the tariff on calcium carbide from Canada. Stocks collapse in the last hour of trading; the following morning is christened Black Thursday.   On  October 28,  a  delegation   of   senators   appeals   to   President   Hoover to help push a tariff  bill  through  quickly  (which  he  does  on the 31st). The Chronicle  headlines  news  about  broker  loans on  the  same  day:  “Recall  of  Foreign  Money  Grows  Heavier-All Europe  Withdrawing  Capital.” The following day is stalemate. Stocks begin to rally after November 14, rising steadily from 145 in November to 171 in April. Industrial production stops falling and hovers around the December level through March.

Progressives Fought for High Tax Rates in the 1920s Too (They Lost)

“A deeper reason for the failure of progressives to unite ideologically in the 1920’s was what might be called a substantial paralysis of the progressive mind… .[They] fought so hard all through the 1920’s against Andrew Mellon’s proposals to abolish the inheritance tax and to make drastic reductions in the taxes on large incomes. [Yet] the progressives were hard pressed to justify the continuation of nearly confiscatory tax levels.”

–Arthur S. Link, “What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920s?” American Historical Review 64 (1959): 851-883.

Right-to-Know Payroll Tax Reform

I met with a group of House Republicans last week to talk about tax reform. Ways and Means chairman Kevin Brady is laying the groundwork for a major tax restructuring next year, and so GOP members are boning up on reform ideas. I discussed income tax reforms with the members, including the creation of Universal Savings Accounts. And, on payroll taxes, I proposed reviving the Right-to-Know National Payroll Act, a bill that passed the House back in 2000 but died in the Senate.

The federal payroll (or FICA) tax that funds Social Security and part of Medicare imposes a huge burden on workers and the self-employed. Liberals are right when they note that the 15.3 percent tax costs moderate-income people far more than the income tax does. In addition to the large burden, the problem with the payroll tax is that half of it (7.65 percent) is collected from employers and hidden from citizens because it does not appear on worker paystubs or annual IRS W-2 forms.

Economists agree that the “employer” half of the payroll tax actually falls on employees in the form of lower wages. Thus the tax reduces wages of American workers by $550 billion a year without them even knowing it. For transparency in taxation, Congress should change the administration of the payroll tax so that the full 15.3 percent is clearly visible on worker paystubs and W-2 forms.

Economic Lesson from Europe: Higher Tax Rates Are a Recipe for More Red Ink

We can learn a lot of economic lessons from Europe.

Today, we’re going to focus on another lesson, which is that higher taxes lead to more red ink. And let’s hope Hillary Clinton is paying attention.

I’ve already made the argument, using European fiscal data to show that big increases in the tax burden over the past several decades have resulted in much higher levels of government debt.

But let’s now augment that argument by considering what’s happened in recent years.

There’s been a big fiscal crisis in Europe, which has forced governments to engage in austerity.

But the type of austerity matters. A lot.

Here’s some of what I wrote back in 2014.

…austerity is a catch-all phrase that includes bad policy (higher taxes) and good policy (spending restraint). But with a few notable exceptions, European nations have been choosing the wrong kind of austerity (even though Paul Krugman doesn’t seem to know the difference).

And when I claim politicians in Europe have chosen the wrong kind of austerity, that’s not hyperbole.

Uncle Sam the Middleman

The federal government funds hundreds of subsidy programs for state, local, and private activities, such as programs for housing and economic development. State and local governments, businesses, charities, and individuals could fund such local activities by themselves without federal aid. But America is increasingly kicking local activities up to the federal government, and so Uncle Sam the Middleman keeps growing.

How much does Uncle Sam the Middleman cost? As a rough estimate, the federal bureaucracy represents about 10 percent of the costs of the projects it gets involved in.

I described how U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) rural programs fund such activities as local broadband, clam fishing, energy projects, apartment construction, and street paving. USDA rural programs will cost federal taxpayers $6.5 billion in 2016. Most of the money will go to the people and businesses that are subsidized, but a portion will end up in the hands of federal bureaucrats.

The federal budget appendix shows that there are 5,000 workers in the USDA’s Rural Housing Service, Rural Utilities Services, and Rural Business Cooperative Service. Based on data in the appendix, they earn an average annual salary of about $73,000 and receive benefits of $25,000. They earn less than other federal workers, but still far more, on average, than private sector workers. Fun fact: these 50 rural program administrators earn an average annual salary of about $135,000.

All and all, workers in the three rural agencies impose an annual cost on taxpayers of about $490 million. But these folks need office space, telephones, travel expenses, and supplies to do their paperwork. Based on data in the appendix, that cost is roughly $38,000 per worker for the rural programs, or $190 million a year.

Thus, of the $6.5 billion taxpayer cost of the rural programs, roughly $680 million does not get to the broadband companies, the clam fisherman, and street paving contractors—it goes into the pockets of the federal middlemen.

Why is this important? Because politicians and federal program supporters often talk as if federal funding of local activities is a free boost to the economy. But it is not free for a lot of reasons. Most directly, federal programs are not free because Uncle Sam the Middleman carves off for itself about 10 percent of the money flowing through it.

The USDA rural programs spent $651,000 on an arts center in Bozeman. But about $65,000 would not have gotten to the arts center; it would have been consumed by the federal bureaucracy. Rather than raising the money locally, Bozeman citizens essentially filled in their 1040s, sent their income tax money to Washington, and then had to lobby federal officials to get some of it back for their arts center. Such roundabout financing of local projects makes no sense.

For more on the problems of America’s roundabout financing system, see here.

We’ll Never Improve the Tax System by Clinging to Partisan Folklore

top marginal tax rates over time

A stubborn myth of the pro-tax left (exemplified by Bernie Sanders) is that the Reagan tax cuts merely benefitted the rich (aka Top 1%), so it would be both harmless and fair to roll back the top tax rates to 70% or 91%.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Between the cyclical peaks of 1979 and 2007, average individual income tax rates fell most dramatically for the bottom 80%  of taxpayers, with the bottom 40 percent receiving more in refundable tax credits than paid in taxes.  By 2008 (with the 2003 tax cuts in place), the OECD found the U.S. had the most progressive tax system among OECD countries while taxes in Sweden and France were among the least progressive.

What is commonly forgotten is that before two across-the-board tax rate reductions of 30% in 1964 and 23% in 1983, families with very modest incomes faced astonishingly high marginal tax rates on every increase in income from extra work or saving (there were no tax-favored saving plans for retirement or college).

From 1954 to 1963 there were 24 tax brackets and 19 of those brackets were higher than 35%.  The lowest rate was 20% -double what it is now.  The highest was 91%.

High and steeply progressive marginal tax rates were terrible for the economy but terrific for tax avoidance. Revenues from the individual income tax were only 7.5% from 1954 to 1963 when the highest tax rate was 91%, which compares poorly with revenues of 7.9% of GDP from 1988 to 1990 when the highest tax rate was 28%.