In Bootleggers & Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics, economists Bruce Yandle and Adam Smith explain how money and morality are often combined in politics to produce arbitrary regulations benefiting cronies, while constraining productive economic activities by the general public.
Featuring Thomas Stanton, Fellow, Center for the Study of American Government, the Johns Hopkins University, and Former Staff, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission; with comments by Alex Pollock, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; moderated by Mark Calabria, Director, Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute.
The financial crisis revealed fundamental shortcomings in both public and private American institutions. While the firms that were successful each found their own way to weather the crisis, unsuccessful firms were remarkably alike in their inability to cope and in the mistakes they made. Combing through the wreckage, Thomas Stanton examines which financial firms survived the crisis and which ones failed. He analyzes how differences in governance, organization, and management between these firms led to their success or failure, and how government supervision and regulation failed to prevent the crisis. Based on interviews that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission conducted with CEOs, risk officers, traders, and others at major financial firms, Stanton systematically outlines how successful firms such as JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, and others used a multitude of approaches to distinguish themselves in operational competence and intelligent discipline, while unsuccessful firms such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Countrywide uniformly failed to prepare for low-probability, high-impact events.