Unconventional monetary policy—characterized by “zero interest rate policy” (ZIRP) and “quantitative easing” (QE), along with macro-prudential regulation—has increased the power of central banks in the United States, Japan, and Europe. In the new issue of Cato Journal, contributors revisit the thinking behind unconventional monetary policy and the “new monetary framework,” make the case for transparent monetary rules versus foggy discretion, and point to the distortions generated by ultra-low interest rates and preferential credit allocation.
When the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in 2005, Denmark found itself at the center of a global battle about the freedom of speech. The paper’s culture editor, Flemming Rose, defended the decision to print the 12 drawings, and he quickly came to play a central part in the debate about the limitations to freedom of speech in the 21st century. In The Tyranny of Silence, Flemming Rose provides a personal account of an event that has shaped the debate about what it means to be a citizen in a democracy and how to coexist in a world that is increasingly multicultural, multireligious, and multiethnic.
The Cato Institute has released its 2014 Annual Report, which documents a dynamic year of growth and productivity. “Libertarianism is the philosophy of freedom,” Cato’s David Boaz writes in his book, The Libertarian Mind. “It is the indispensable framework for the future.” And as the new report demonstrates, the Cato Institute, thanks largely to the generosity of our Sponsors, is leading the charge to apply this framework across the policy spectrum.
Featuring Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, and Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute.
Foreign policy analysts are misreading the lessons of Iraq. The emerging conventional wisdom holds that success could have been achieved in Iraq with more troops, more cooperation among U.S. government agencies, and better counterinsurgency doctrine. Yet the Bush administration’s failures and errors in judgment did not derive from poor planning, but from flawed assumptions about the nature of Iraqi society. The difficulties in Iraq demonstrate the need for a new national security strategy and a newfound appreciation for the limits of power, not simply better tactics and tools. By insisting that Iraq was ours to remake were it not for the administration’s mismanagement, U.S. policy makers risk repeating these mistakes. Please join Cato scholars Christopher Preble and Benjamin H. Friedman for a discussion of these issues, which they and co-author Harvey Sapolsky also explore in the recent policy analysis, “Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq.”