

working conditions, these are all human rights. Justice therefore requires that each individual be able to claim all of these, in adequate amounts, as a matter of legally enforceable right, and, as a necessary consequence, that others have a legally enforceable obligation to supply all of these goods or the means to obtain them. The assertion of such positive rights, however, entails the denial of negative human rights. People cannot have the right to use their own time and other resources as they choose, free from interference by others, if others have the right to commandeer those resources whenever they lack the means necessary to their flourishing.

Rasmussen contends that, on the bishops' own normative grounds, human beings are in justice entitled to negative rights that preclude the positive rights for which the bishops argue. Any positive rights that people possess must be derived from the negative rights that are the precondition of self-directedness or autonomy, an essential constituent of human flourishing.

Sterba's response seizes upon Rasmussen's contention that negative rights are absolute but can nonetheless be disregarded in emergencies, and argues in effect that society will be in a chronic state of emergency unless it contains the sort of welfare institutions that Sterba himself favors. Rasmussen's response objects to Sterba's conception of liberty as the power to do whatever one wants, unconstrained by other persons. The liberty for which Rasmussen contends is a normative conception; liberty requires only that people be unconstrained by others in doing what they have a *right* to do. Mere wants do not generate rights.

I would have liked to have seen much more discussion of this last issue. Everyone is in favor of liberty, but as Rasmussen notes, liberty is not a univocal notion. The argument over positive versus negative rights raises fundamental questions about the proper way to define liberty. It would have been instructive to see Sterba and Rasmussen elaborate, apply, and defend their conflicting definitions of liberty in debating the bishops' proposals. That would have compelled them to pay attention to questions of practical implementation and probable consequences, matters into which Sterba in particular seems reluctant to enter. While that would also have carried them outside the realm of philosophy narrowly conceived, philosophy cannot be narrowly conceived if it is going to assist in the discussion of public policy.

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Impulse to Revolution in Latin America

Jeffrey W. Barrett

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Jeffrey Barrett's volume is part of an encouraging trend among scholars to view the economic development problems of Latin America in more realistic terms. By employing an analytical framework that emphasizes the role played by indigenous political and cultural values, Barrett provides a useful corrective to prevailing leftist theories. In particular, he effectively undermines

the simplistic notion that the disappointing pace of economic progress throughout Latin America is due to exploitation on the part of multinational corporations and the region's dependent, "colonial" status with respect to the industrialized West.

Barrett provides a different and more compelling explanation. He contends that from the beginning, a number of "modernization-impeding" values have afflicted Latin American societies. These include an obsession with status (and the concomitant formation of a rigid status hierarchy), a pernicious envy of the economically successful, and the prevalence of conspicuous consumption rather than productive investment. Barrett makes the telling point that immigrants from societies where such destructive attitudes are less dominant have always occupied a disproportionate percentage of leadership positions in Latin American economies.

The woeful lack of economic development has produced an ongoing "identity crisis" in Latin American cultures, according to Barrett. Attempts to resolve that identity crisis have assumed a variety of forms. In the past, many Latin American modernists affected an extreme cosmopolitanism while others imitated the outward cultural forms of the United States and Europe. More recently, however, the trend has been toward a "reactive nationalism" which is characterized by a refusal to acknowledge the self-inflicted nature of the region's underdevelopment and, instead, to transfer responsibility for that situation abroad. Reactive nationalism, Barrett contends, creates an ideal environment for a totalitarian solution, either in the form of Peron-style fascism or the Marxist-Leninist variant exemplified by Castro's Cuba.

Barrett's argument is most persuasive when he examines the societal values that have molded Latin American behavior over centuries. The plethora of examples that he cites should render it impossible for critics to dismiss his thesis. Barrett does, however, lapse into a few questionable assertions even in this area of inquiry. The worst of these is his contention that excessive individualism has impeded modernization in Latin America. That allegation seems dubious in light of his overwhelming evidence concerning the deleterious role played by state paternalism and the presence of stifling public bureaucracies throughout the region. Moreover, anyone familiar with the cultural history of the United States and the prevalence of intense individualism during the 19th century—the period of most rapid industrialization—will be exceedingly skeptical of his theory.

The author's apparent infatuation with "community" and his corresponding hostility toward individualism leads him into an intellectual minefield. For example, despite a scathing critique of Leninist economic fallacies, Barrett inexplicably finds much to be admired in the Castro regime's campaign to instill a sense of discipline and community spirit in the supposedly anarchic Cuban masses. The recipients of such regimentation, one suspects, might view the situation differently.

Barrett commits even more egregious sins when he delves into areas in which he clearly lacks expertise. While his effort to dispel the myth that Latin America's woes are entirely the fault of Yankee imperialism is com-

mendable, his attempt to exculpate all U.S. conduct is considerably less so. Barrett's casual dismissal of charges that the Nixon administration deliberately destabilized the Chilean economy in order to weaken the regime of Salvador Allende distorts the historical record. Worse still is his contention that the Eisenhower administration merely provided support for "indigenous anti-communist factions in Guatemala" against a regime of "coffeehouse communists" (p. 174). In reality, the United States cynically orchestrated a coup against the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz-Guzman. Barrett's apologia betrays both a lack of knowledge and a disturbing insensitivity. Consulting such works as Blanche Wiesen Cook's *The Declassified Eisenhower* and Richard H. Immerman's *The CIA in Guatemala* might have impelled him to reach a less sanguine and far more accurate conclusion.

Such lapses detract significantly from what would otherwise have been a superb book. Nonetheless, Barrett does advance a provocative and generally well-argued thesis to explain the retarded pace of economic development in Latin America. Despite its flaws, *Impulse to Revolution* is a worthwhile contribution to a small but growing body of literature on hemispheric issues exemplified by the works of perceptive writers such as Carlos Rangel and Michael Novak.

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