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Introduction

American trade policy has traditionally been analyzed and fought over on a one-dimensional battlefield. At one end of the line are the internationalists, who want to lower trade barriers and promote “engagement” in the global economy. At the other end are the protectionists, sometimes known as isolationists, who want to raise or at least maintain trade barriers and oppose trade expansion. But the options for U.S. trade policy are more complex than simply opposing or favoring trade barriers.

As the 108th Congress takes office, America’s international economic policy will be an important item on the agenda. At home, the U.S. economy is struggling to shake off the recent recession, and trade will be an important foreign policy tool as the U.S. government seeks to win friends and influence nations in its ongoing war against terrorism. With trade promotion authority finally reenacted after lying dormant for eight years, the Bush administration will be actively negotiating trade agreements that Congress must ultimately vote to accept or reject.

As the new Congress shapes U.S. trade policy, the choice before its members will not be between engagement and isolation but between the free market and government intervention: Should U.S. policy favor a free international market by advancing free trade and rejecting government intervention such as export and agricultural subsidies, or should it favor intervention by curbing trade and supporting subsidies?

The real policy choices before Congress are not the two basic paths of engagement or isolation but four paths. Through their votes on legislation, members of Congress can

- oppose both trade barriers and trade subsidies,
- oppose barriers and favor subsidies,
- favor barriers and oppose subsidies, or
- favor both barriers and subsidies.

By considering those four policy alternatives, this study offers a more accurate and useful way

of measuring how Congress and its individual members vote on issues affecting American involvement in the global economy. It analyzes 18 major votes in the House and 12 in the Senate affecting both trade barriers and trade subsidies. It then classifies members of Congress according to their degree of support for an international market free from the distorting effects of barriers and subsidies.

How Government Distorts International Trade and Investment

Despite all the hype about globalization and the supposed universal triumph of free-market policies, governments around the world continue to intervene in the flow of goods, services, people, and capital across international borders. That widespread intervention takes two basic forms: tax and regulatory barriers aimed at discouraging certain types of commerce and government subsidies aimed at encouraging others.

Trade Barriers

Trade barriers reduce global wealth by denying people the ability to specialize in what they do best. Barriers protect higher-cost domestic producers from their lower-cost competition abroad, raising prices and drawing capital and labor away from industries that would be more competitive in global markets. Barriers to trade across international borders prevent producers from realizing the full benefits from economies of scale. By reducing competition, they stymie innovation and technological advances, reducing an economy’s long-term growth.

Global tariff and nontariff barriers have fallen remarkably in the last 50 years, first among the richer, industrialized countries and more recently among those that are less developed. China is the most spectacular example of the latter. But barriers remain stubbornly high worldwide against free trade in agricultural products, textiles and clothing, and many basic services such as insurance and air travel. Those barriers cost hundreds of billions of dollars a year

in lost wealth and keep hundreds of millions of people in poverty. A 2001 study by economists at the University of Michigan and Tufts University estimated that elimination of the remaining global barriers to trade in services and industrial and agricultural products would raise world welfare by \$1.9 trillion, including a boost to the U.S. economy of \$537 billion, or 5.9 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.¹

U.S. trade barriers continue to impose real costs on the U.S. economy despite postwar progress toward liberalization. The U.S. government maintains high, anti-consumer barriers to trade against such imports as textiles and clothing, sugar, peanuts, footwear, dairy products, frozen fruit and fruit juices, and costume jewelry. Other import barriers, such as those against shipbuilding, steel, softwood lumber, ball and roller bearings, pressed and blown glass, and coastal maritime shipping (through the Jones Act) impose higher costs on U.S. producers, jeopardizing jobs and production in import-consuming industries. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated conservatively that those barriers impose an annual collective drag on the U.S. economy of more than \$14 billion.² Meanwhile, discriminatory antidumping laws “protect” consumers and import-using industries from the benefits of competition and lower prices.

Trade Subsidies

Global commerce is further distorted by widespread use of subsidies aimed at promoting certain kinds of trade, investment, and domestic production. Those subsidies encourage overproduction of domestic agricultural products, through farm price supports, and exports and overseas investment in less-developed countries, through such agencies as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. Indeed, many supporters of lower trade barriers look kindly on subsidies because subsidies seem to promote economic activity at home and “engagement” in the global economy. But both kinds of intervention—barriers and subsidies—reduce our national welfare and curb the freedom of Americans to spend and invest their resources as they see fit.

Subsidies reduce national welfare by directing resources to less-efficient uses, substituting the judgment of government officials for that of private actors in the marketplace. Export subsidies such as those extended by the U.S. Export-Import Bank can raise demand for exports produced by the small number of U.S. multinational companies that benefit from its loans. But the increased production spurred by the extra exports raises costs for other, less-favored export industries competing for the same labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. They also crowd out unsubsidized exporters as foreign buyers bid up the price of U.S. dollars on foreign exchange markets to buy the more attractive, subsidized U.S. exports. Export subsidies also impose a higher burden on taxpayers.

Like protectionism, export subsidies favor the few at the expense of the many, make our economy less efficient, and reduce total national welfare. Output is focused not where returns are highest but where political clout is greatest. As a Congressional Research Service report concluded, “At the national level, subsidized export financing merely shifts production among sectors within the economy, rather than adding to the overall level of economic activity, and subsidizes foreign consumption at the expense of the domestic economy.”³

Equally damaging to global trade and welfare are domestic subsidies to agriculture. Those subsidies encourage overproduction and the flooding of world markets with commodities sold at below their actual cost of production. Artificially lower world prices then discourage production in countries, typically the less-developed ones, where the costs of production are naturally lower. The biggest losers from the subsidies are taxpayers and consumers in rich countries and producers in poor countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that governments (almost entirely in the advanced economies) spent \$311 billion in 2001 to support farmers.⁴ In Japan, 59 percent of farm income comes from government support, in the European Union 35 percent, and in the United States 21 percent.⁵ Those massive subsidies badly distort global trade, depressing global prices and discouraging imports, especially from less-developed countries.

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Subsidies further undermine an efficient and open global economy by tainting the cause of liberalized trade. Advocates of subsidies imply that American companies can compete in an open global economy only if the playing field is “leveled” by aggressive export promotion programs aimed at huge multinational corporations—as if free trade were inherently unfair unless offset by selective subsidies. Support for subsidies reinforces mistrust of the free market, reducing rather than encouraging support for free trade. International economic subsidies feed suspicions on the left and the right that free trade is just another form of corporate welfare.

Trade restrictions and subsidies are prompted by the same basic assumption: that Americans acting freely in the global marketplace cannot be trusted to spend their money in ways most beneficial to our national interest. That misconception leads to the policy error of thinking that government must therefore intervene, through either subsidies or restrictions, to produce an outcome different from what the market would create if left alone.

The Free-Trade Matrix: No Barriers, No Subsidies

True supporters of free trade and free markets oppose not only protection but also market-

distorting subsidies. That means the choice for policymakers is not merely between engagement in the global economy, subsidies and all, and isolation from it. The real choice is among four contrasting approaches to international economic policy: lower trade barriers without subsidies, lower barriers with subsidies, higher barriers with subsidies, and higher barriers without subsidies.

Combining trade barriers and trade subsidies as measures of free trade creates a two-dimensional matrix for evaluating public policy toward the free market and the international economy. That matrix allows a member’s voting record to be classified in one of four broad categories rather than on the simplistic one-dimensional scale with free trade at one pole and protectionism at the other. (See Figure 1.)

According to the matrix, members of Congress can be classified in the four categories.

Free Traders

Free traders consistently vote against both trade barriers and international economic subsidies. The end result of their votes is to enhance the free market and the ability of Americans to decide for themselves how to spend their money in the global marketplace. This group opposes legislation restricting the choice of goods and services Americans may buy voluntarily—whether apparel from Guatemala, shoes from Vietnam, trucking services from Mexico, or vacations in Cuba—and opposes the forced expatriation of tax dollars through export subsidies, overseas investment guarantees, and government-to-government bailouts. Members of this group can lay rightful claim to the title of free traders because they support trade that is free of all types of government intervention, whether in the form of barriers or of subsidies.

Internationalists

Members of this group generally vote for trade liberalization but also support subsidies that they believe promote the same end. Their touchstone is not economic freedom but U.S. participation in the global economy through both expanded trade and direct government participation in the form of export subsidies and government-to-

Figure 1
Who Supports Free Trade?

Trade Subsidies	Oppose	Isolationists	Free Traders
	Favor	Interventionists	Internationalists
		Favor	Oppose
		Trade Barriers	

government loans. Internationalists are pro-trade, favoring the reduction of import barriers as generally good for the economy and even world peace, but they also believe the global economic system cannot work in America's interest without U.S. taxpayer subsidies.

Isolationists

This category includes members of Congress who tend to vote against reducing trade barriers and also oppose international economic subsidies. They can reasonably be called isolationists because they tend to oppose any expanded American involvement in the global economy, whether through voluntary transactions or taxpayer subsidies. Isolationists show respect for their constituents as taxpayers by resisting tax-financed subsidies, but they question their judgment as consumers by restricting their freedom to buy, sell, and invest freely in the global marketplace.

Interventionists

Members of this group consistently support government intervention at the expense of the free market—favoring both subsidies and trade barriers. They tend to oppose bills and amendments that would lower trade barriers, as well as those that would cut or eliminate trade and investment subsidies. Interventionists challenge the judgment of Americans twice, first by denying them full liberty to spend their private dollars beyond our borders and then by seeking to divert public tax dollars for export promotion and government-to-government bailout packages.

How the 107th Congress Voted on Trade

During the 107th Congress, members had numerous opportunities to vote to reduce trade barriers and subsidies. In the House, members voted on 11 major bills and amendments with a direct impact on the freedom of Americans to trade with people in the rest of the world, and another 7 measures directly affected the level of subsidies doled out by the federal government to promote exports and subsidize domestic pro-

duction. In the Senate, this study identified eight key bills and amendments that directly affected barriers to international commerce and another four that involved subsidies for domestic producers facing international competition.

Not all of those votes offer a pure test of support for free trade. By its nature, the legislative process produces compromise legislation that more closely resembles the proverbial sausages made of meat and meat byproducts than pure cuts of filet mignon. The process can produce bills that, while aimed primarily at reducing barriers or subsidies to trade, can also contain relatively minor provisions that would have an ambiguous or negative impact on free trade.

Each of the bills and amendments described below represents a reasonably clear attempt to either expand or restrict freedom to trade without the distortion of barriers or subsidies. The descriptions are intended, not to provide a definitive argument for or against the legislation, but only to explain why, from a free-market perspective, the vote either hinders or promotes free trade as defined above. Where available, studies and articles providing more detailed arguments have been cited. To further illustrate congressional attitudes toward trade barriers and subsidies, some of the descriptions are accompanied by comments made by members of Congress during floor debates.

Votes on Trade Barriers

Mexican Trucks on U.S. Roads. In the North American Free Trade Agreement signed a decade ago, the United States and Mexico agreed to open their markets to cross-border trucking, but the Clinton administration refused to implement the provision, citing alleged safety concerns. Since 1980 Mexican trucks have been banned from entering the United States, and U.S. trucks have been banned from Mexico. Despite the allegations of the Teamsters Union and other opponents, lifting the ban would not prevent the U.S. government from imposing the same, or even more restrictive, safety rules on Mexican trucks that are imposed on U.S. trucks. With 86 percent of U.S.-Mexican trade carried by truck, the ban was not only discriminatory against

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Both the House and the Senate voted on amendments regarding discrimination against Mexican trucks. On June 26, 2001, the House voted 285-143 (House Roll Call 193) in favor of an amendment sponsored by Martin Sabo (D-Minn.) “to prohibit use of funds to process applications by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers for conditional or permanent authority to operate beyond the United States municipalities and commercial zones adjacent to the United States-Mexico border.” On July 27, 2001, the Senate voted 57-34 (Senate Roll Call 254) to table, or kill, an amendment by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) that would have required that Mexican trucks be regulated the same as Canadian trucks, which are allowed to travel on U.S. highways. (See excerpts of the congressional debate in the following box.)

Normal Trade Relations with China. Before China officially joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, its trade status with the United States was subject to annual review under the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. Under that law, which was repealed for China with its entry into the WTO, the U.S. president needed to

issue a waiver for Chinese goods to enter the United States under the normal tariff schedule. Without normal trade relations (NTR) with China, Americans would face drastically higher tariffs on most imports from China, raising the cost of living for millions of American families that benefit from goods imported from China. Those higher trade barriers would also have invited retaliation against American goods sold in China and would have set back efforts to raise the living standards and enhance the autonomy and human rights of Chinese citizens.⁷ Under the old rules, Congress could override the presidential waiver and revoke NTR with China by a two-thirds vote in both chambers.

On July 19, 2001, the House rejected H.J.R. 50, a motion to override the presidential waiver and repeal NTR status for China, by a vote of 169-259 (House Roll Call 255).

Normal Trade Relations with Vietnam. After years of socialist isolation, the government of Vietnam has been gradually liberalizing and opening its economy. In 2000 the United States and Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement that guarantees U.S. exporters nondiscriminatory access to Vietnam’s 80 million consumers. In return, the United States

Mexican Trucks on U.S. Roads

Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-Tex.): “Let me also say to many of my colleagues who are supporting this amendment [to keep Mexican trucks out of the United States], this is an attack on many border communities who have seen an incredible economic boom as a result of free trade over the last 20 years. To support this amendment stops the progress, stops the jobs from being created in many of the communities close to the border. I do represent almost 800 miles of the Texas-Mexico border and have seen incredible opportunities come to these neighborhoods because of free trade. These people want more opportunity that would come with allowing these trucks to drive through these communities. And we know that they would not be held to any less a standard than an American truck driving through the community.” *Congressional Record*, June 26, 2001, p. H3590.

Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.): “Notwithstanding my vote against the trade agreement, I don’t think anyone who voted in favor of it ever would have contemplated, when they were voting, that we would be required to compromise safety on America’s highways as part of the trade agreement. That is not logical at all. . . . [T]he ultimate perversity, in my judgment, of this terrible trade agreement will be to have Mexican long-haul truckers driving unsafe trucks, hauling unfairly subsidized Canadian grain into American cities. You talk about a hood ornament to foolishness, that is it.” *Congressional Record*, July 25, 2001, p. S8164.

Normal Trade Relations with Vietnam

Rep. Judy Biggert (R-Ill.): “Let us continue to work with them, and in so doing teach the youthful Vietnamese the values of democracy, the principles of capitalism, and the merits of a free and open society.” *Congressional Record*, July 23, 2002, p. H5102.

Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.): “If we insist on human rights, Vietnam will comply in order to obtain a trade relationship with America. I ask my colleagues to support H.J. Res. 101. Stand up to the communists in Vietnam. Insist on human rights in Vietnam in exchange for free trade.” *Congressional Record*, July 23, 2002, p. H5104.

must grant Vietnam’s exporters NTR, that is, the same access to the U.S. market that we extend to all but a handful of other nations. But because Vietnam is a communist country, the president must first grant it a waiver from the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik amendment. If Congress were to override the waiver, NTR with Vietnam would be revoked, resulting in dramatically higher tariffs on imports from Vietnam. Thus a vote to override the presidential waiver would be a vote to impose high and discriminatory tariffs against imports from Vietnam. (The waiver also allows U.S. exporters to Vietnam to qualify for government subsidies through the Export-Import Bank, but those subsidies—as economically flawed as they are—are available for exports to virtually every other country with which the United States has established NTR. Those subsidies do not provide a justification for rejecting normal trade with Vietnam any more than they would justify the raising of tariffs against other nations where Export-Import Bank financing is available.)

On October 3, 2001, the Senate voted 88-12 (Senate Roll Call 291) to approve the presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for Vietnam. On July 23, 2002, the House voted 91-338 (House Roll Call 329) against a motion to disapprove the extension of NTR to Vietnam. A vote for the motion was a vote against NTR with Vietnam and for higher tariffs. (See excerpts of the congressional debate in the preceding box.)

Country-of-Origin Labeling. The new farm bill will require that the country of origin be

stamped on meat, fish, peanuts, and produce imports starting in the fall of 2004. This may sound like innocent consumer information, but it is really a disguised form of protectionism. It is an added regulatory cost that will do nothing to protect consumer health and safety and will raise the cost of food for American families. This provision of the law will make it more difficult for the United States to resist demands by the European Union that all genetically modified organism products from the United States be labeled, even though such products have been proven safe in study after study.⁸ Mandating country-of-origin labeling unnecessarily interferes with trade, leading the world in a direction that will harm the American farmer.

On October 4, 2001, the House voted 296-121 (House Roll Call 370) in favor of an amendment to require country-of-origin labeling of perishable agricultural commodities by September 30, 2004.

Antidumping Reform. America’s antidumping law is itself an example of “unfair trade.” The law unfairly targets foreign producers for engaging in practices—price discrimination and selling at below average total cost—that are rational, routine, and perfectly legal when followed in our domestic market by U.S. companies.⁹ Antidumping duties hurt domestic consumers and downstream industries by discouraging vigorous price competition in the U.S. market. The U.S. law hurts U.S. producers as other countries increasingly follow the U.S. government’s lead by turning their own antidumping laws against U.S. exports.¹⁰ For all

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those reasons, the U.S. government should seek to curb the use and abuse of antidumping laws through World Trade Organization agreements.¹¹ But the House and the Senate both voted by large margins in the 107th Congress to limit the ability of the administration to seek reform of U.S. antidumping law.

On November 7, 2001, as WTO members were about to meet in Doha, Qatar, to launch a new round of trade negotiations, the House voted 410-4 (House Roll Call 432) for a resolution stating that the president “should preserve the ability of the US to enforce its trade laws” while ensuring that “U.S. exports are not subject to the abusive use of trade laws by other countries.” Although the resolution was correct to point out foreign abuses of antidumping law, it expressed reluctance to tackle similar abuses of U.S. law. On May 14, 2002, the Senate rejected 38-61 (Senate Roll Call 110) a motion to table the so-called Dayton-Craig amendment, which would have required a separate vote on any trade agreement provisions that would limit U.S. antidumping law. The amendment, which was eventually dropped in conference committee, would have radically compromised the president’s ability to negotiate international curbs on the use and abuse of protectionist antidumping laws. On May 22, 2002, the Senate voted 60-38 (Senate Roll Call 123) to table an amendment that would have barred the negotiation of tariff reductions on imports that face antidumping or countervailing duties. The amendment, if enacted, would have unfairly punished U.S. consumers and foreign producers twice, first by imposing unfair antidumping duties and then by barring the reduction of statutory trade barriers on products targeted for antidumping and countervailing duties.

Andean Trade Preference Act. This act allows imports from Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia to enter the United States at reduced tariff rates. In the version of the bill that came before the House in November 2001, those benefits were expanded to grant duty-free, quota-free access for textile and apparel imports from the Andean countries and to lower barriers further for imports from 24

Caribbean countries and 22 Sub-Saharan African countries.

On November 16, 2001, the House rejected 168-250 (House Roll Call 447) a motion to “recommit” the act back to committee with instructions to remove the additional tariff reductions from the bill. A vote for the motion was a vote for higher trade barriers.

Trade Promotion Authority. Trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly called “fast track,” commits Congress to vote up or down without amendment on trade agreements negotiated by the executive branch. Without TPA, which every president since Gerald Ford has been given, foreign governments would be reluctant to negotiate with the U.S. government knowing that Congress could pick apart any final agreement. While TPA itself does not lower trade barriers, it facilitates agreements in the WTO and elsewhere to lower barriers at home and abroad.¹²

On December 6, 2001, the House voted 215-214 (House Roll Call 481) to approve the House version of TPA. On July 26, 2002, the House voted 215-212 (House Roll Call 370) to approve the conference committee version of TPA contained in the Andean Trade Preference Act. On May 23, 2002, the Senate voted 66-30 (Senate Roll Call 130) to approve its version of TPA. On August 1, 2002, the Senate voted 64-34 (Senate Roll Call 207) to approve the final conference committee version of the Trade Act of 2002. (See excerpts of the congressional debate in the following box.)

Labor Standards and Human Rights. One of the major debates in trade policy today concerns efforts to precondition access to the U.S. market on whether a foreign nation meets labor, environmental, and human rights standards as determined by the United States or international organizations. Advocates argue that such linkage is necessary to promote U.S. values abroad and to protect the rights of workers around the world. But officials from less-developed countries are rightly suspicious that those standards could be easily abused to impose trade barriers against the very goods their countries are most

Trade Promotion Authority

Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kans.): “Trade promotion authority will allow the president to negotiate trade agreements and trade tariff agreements that will reduce tariffs. I think people need to recognize that a tariff is a tax. So this will be a tax reduction treaty. It will also open up trading opportunities for the United States and for our trading partners. One of the lead ways we can grow it is by doing this. What trade does when you lower tariffs, lower the barriers to trade, is it allows people to compete based upon the theory of comparative advantage and who can do the best and more.” *Congressional Record*, August 1, 2002, p. S7789.

Rep. Cal Dooley (D-Calif.): “This is a comprehensive package that embraces the best of policies in terms of how we can advance our economic opportunities and also expand the values of the United States. Through this increased trade with these countries, we ensure that we can expand democracy and capitalism and human rights, while at the same time providing the legitimate safety net for the workers in this country.” *Congressional Record*, July 26, 2002, p. H5970.

Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.): “As we all know, the real effect of fast track is not to promote trade—no, no, no—not to promote trade but to prevent amendments to trade agreements. That is why we have fast track. . . . This Constitution, which I hold in my hand, gives to the Congress the power to regulate trade and commerce with foreign nations. This Constitution is my authority, not fast track. This is my authority. . . . [Fast track] is not really about creating jobs or helping workers. It is about weakening our trade laws, making it easier for multinational corporations to move offshore where they can pay slave wages and where they do not have to pay health insurance and where they do not have to pay retirement benefits.” *Congressional Record*, August 1, 2002, p. S7789.

Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.): “My colleagues are asking me to vote on a bill to give the President the ability to unilaterally negotiate trade agreements, and dozens of pages affect textile policy. And when you double the amount that can come in from foreign countries, where the wage rates are almost nothing, no environmental laws, you are going to put some of my people out of business. And you are making me vote in the middle of the night on something I do not know about, and I resent the hell out of it, and I am going to vote no.” *Congressional Record*, July 26, 2002, p. H5970.

competitive at producing. Free trade is not in fundamental conflict with human rights and higher labor and environmental standards. In reality, by promoting economic development and a freer flow of ideas and people, sustained trade liberalization is typically associated with democratization and higher labor and environmental standards.¹³ To oppose linkage is not to put trade above other important values but to recognize that economic freedom complements both material development and a broad range of civil and political freedoms.

During its debate on TPA in May 2002, the Senate considered a series of amendments that would have placed various conditions on future agreements to lower trade barriers. On May 15,

2002, the Senate voted 54-44 (Senate Roll Call 112) to table an amendment offered by Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) that would have authorized the imposition of sanctions against poor countries that seek to gain trade advantages by failing to enforce their domestic labor laws. On May 23, 2002, the Senate rejected, by a 42-53 vote (Senate Roll Call 129), a motion to table an amendment by Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) to require that agreements covered by TPA promote human rights and democracy by including provisions that would require parties to those agreements “to strive to protect internationally recognized civil, political, and human rights.” (See excerpts of the congressional debate in the following box.)

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Trade and Labor Standards

Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa): “Open trade and investment have helped to raise more than 100 million people out of poverty in the last decade, with the fastest reductions in poverty coming in East Asian countries that were most actively involved in trade. We can see similar results in the next decade if we pass this bill. *Congressional Record*, May 16, 2002, p. S4458.

Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.): “The purpose of engaging in negotiations and reaching comprehensive trade agreements is to encourage other nations to stretch themselves to do more in these areas. Trade agreements should be viewed as a dynamic process for ratcheting up global standards across the board.” *Congressional Record*, May 16, 2002, p. S4444.

The embargo has deprived Cuban citizens of economic opportunity while giving the Cuban government a handy excuse for the failures of its socialist economic system.

Foreign-Born Doctors. Many rural areas in the United States lack an adequate number of physicians to serve the health care needs of residents. Under the J-1 visa program, qualified foreign-born doctors are allowed to practice in rural communities for two-year periods. In 2002 Congress considered a bill to expand the number of individual physicians that can be admitted under the state version of the program from 20 a year to 30 a year to meet the needs of rural communities across the country. By allowing Americans to “import” the medical services of qualified foreign doctors, the program helps to provide more affordable health care.

On June 25, 2002, the House voted 407-7 (House Roll Call Vote 254) to approve an extension and expansion of a bill to improve access to physicians in medically underserved areas by increasing the number of visas issued to foreign-born doctors.

Cuba Trade and Travel. The United States has maintained a comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba for four decades in an unsuccessful effort to oust the communist government of Fidel Castro. The 107th Congress considered legislation to loosen the embargo by granting Americans greater freedom to trade with and travel to Cuba. The almost total embargo has failed to achieve its policy objective of overthrowing the Cuban government or of even modifying its oppressive rule. American citizens have paid the price of that failure in lost economic freedom to trade, invest, and travel. The embargo has deprived Cuban citizens of

economic opportunity while giving the Cuban government a handy excuse for the failures of its socialist economic system.¹⁴

On July 23, 2002, the House approved an amendment 262-167 (House Roll Call 331) to repeal funding for enforcement of the travel ban to Cuba. A vote for the amendment was in effect a vote to repeal the travel ban. Later that day, the House voted 204-226 (House Roll Call Vote 333) against an amendment that would have denied funds to enforce any provision of the embargo. A vote for that amendment was in effect a vote to repeal the embargo entirely. (See excerpts of the congressional debate in the following box.)

Votes on Trade Subsidies

Members of the 107th Congress had several opportunities to vote to cut subsidies for trade and domestic production of tradable goods. The bills and amendments determined funding for the Export-Import Bank; subsidies for sugar, wool, and mohair; and the colossal and trade-distorting Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.

Wool and Mohair Subsidies. The federal government began subsidizing wool and mohair production in the 1930s out of concern that sufficient supplies be available to outfit American soldiers. That national security rationale, if it ever applied, has long since vanished with the development of synthetic fibers. Nonetheless, the U.S. government continues to subsidize production at a cost to taxpayers of \$20 million per year. While not a direct trade

Cuban Trade Embargo and Ban on Travel to Cuba

Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.): “If trade is good enough to break the barriers between people who do not understand the value of capitalism, if trade is what we want for people to be able to buy our wares and that we can buy theirs, if it is good enough for China, for the former Soviet Union, for communism around the world, tell me why not share it with the people of Cuba?” *Congressional Record*, July 23, 2002, p. H5301.

Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.): “Now, the denial of the U.S. market to the Cuban regime and the conditioning of democratic reforms for the end of the embargo constitute the most important leverage that exists for the democratic transition to take place. . . . If we give the dictatorship the trade and tourism dollars it seeks now, Mr. Chairman, unilaterally, in exchange for no democratic reform, like the people proposing this amendment are saying, that we should unilaterally, without getting any sort of democratic reform for the Cuban people in exchange, if we do that, Mr. Chairman, we risk making that regime permanent. We risk the possibility of that regime outliving the dictator.” *Congressional Record*, July 23, 2002, p. H5302.

Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.): “What the Flake amendment simply says is that this is all about freedom. Our government should not tell us where we can and cannot travel. It is a fundamental right of every American to travel. Every one of us ought to have the right to go to Cuba to see what a mess Fidel Castro has made of that island. We should have that right firsthand.” *Congressional Record*, July 23, 2002, p. H5294.

Rep. Zach Wamp (R-Tenn.): “This is not a trade issue where you do want to promote travel and open up markets. This is a national security issue and should be treated as such. We need to treat Cuba like Syria, not like Mexico.” *Congressional Record*, July 23, 2002, p. H5294.

barrier, the subsidy distorts trade by artificially stimulating domestic production and discouraging wool and mohair imports from countries where production costs are lower.

On July 11, 2001, the House voted 155-272 (House Roll Call 219) against an amendment by Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.) that would have prohibited use of funds in the fiscal year 2002 Agriculture appropriations bill for payments to producers of wool or mohair for the 2000 and 2001 marketing years.

Export-Import Bank Funding and Reauthorization. The Export-Import Bank provides subsidized incentives for U.S. exporters to sell in markets where competing foreign exporters are also subsidized or where the risk of nonpayment would otherwise be too high. However, most U.S. exporters who benefit from the Export-Import Bank subsidies do not face subsidized foreign competition, and nations that provide the most aggressive export subsidies do not enjoy faster export growth than nations that sub-

sidize less. In the United States, export subsidies do not significantly expand total exports but instead shift exports toward the small percentage of U.S. companies that qualify for the subsidies.¹⁵ Thus the Export-Import Bank delivers no net benefit to the U.S. economy and distorts rather than promotes trade and investment.

On July 24, 2001, the House voted 47-375 (House Roll Call 261) against an amendment by Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.) to strike the entire Export-Import Bank subsidy appropriation with associated funding of \$753 million from the Foreign Operations and Export Financing Appropriations bill. On June 5, 2002, the House voted 344-78 (House Roll Call 210) to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank through fiscal year 2006. The Senate reauthorized the Export-Import Bank by voice vote on June 6, 2002. (See excerpts of the congressional debate in the following box.)

2002 Farm Bill. The Agriculture, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2002 authorized

The Export-Import Bank delivers no net benefit to the U.S. economy and distorts rather than promotes trade and investment.

Defunding the Export-Import Bank

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.): “I do not believe this Congress should be in the business of subsidizing anyone. We should be protecting the American taxpayer, and we should be protecting the individual liberty of all American citizens, not dealing in subsidies. . . . [The Export-Import Bank] is a subsidy to large corporations, and it is a subsidy to foreign entities and foreign governments. The largest foreign recipient of the foreign aid from this bill is Red China, \$6.2 billion. So if one is for free trade, as I am, and as I voted last week to trade with China, one should be positively in favor of my amendment, because this is not free trade. This is subsidized, special interest trade, and I think that is wrong.” *Congressional Record*, July 24, 2001, p. H4447.

Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.): “[T]he American Export Credit and Guarantee Agency of the Export-Import Bank is already underfunded as compared to the similar institutions from other major export countries of Europe, Japan, and even elsewhere. We are outstripped as it is. In a perfect world, we would not have to have subsidy, but we are dependent to a major extent in our economy on our job base, on being able to export. But this is not a perfect world. If our exporters are to compete, if we are to build and sustain a job base in this country, we must have an effective, properly funded Export-Import Bank in this country. This [amendment] would totally eliminate it.” *Congressional Record*, July 24, 2001, p. H4447.

Farm subsidies promote overproduction in the domestic U.S. market, driving down global prices and distorting global agricultural trade.

farm programs that will cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated \$170 billion during the next decade. While the bill does not directly raise trade barriers against agricultural imports, it does provide massive subsidies for the domestic production of corn, sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, soybeans, oilseeds, cotton, and rice. Those subsidies promote overproduction in the domestic U.S. market, driving down global prices and distorting global agricultural trade.¹⁶ The farm bill undercuts U.S. leadership in global agricultural trade talks at the WTO, complicating the task of reducing still-high trade barriers abroad to U.S. farm exports.

On October 3, 2001, the House voted 187-238 (House Roll Call 365) to reject an amendment by Rep. Nick Smith (R-Mich.) that would have cut subsidy payments by \$1.3 billion a year by placing a cap on the amount of subsidy payments that could be made to individual farms in a given year. On February 7, 2002, the Senate voted 31-66 (Senate Roll Call 18) against a motion to table a similar amendment offered by Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.). On October 5, 2001, the House voted 291-120 (House Roll Call 371) in favor of its version of the farm bill, the Farm Security Act. On May 2, 2002, the House voted 280-141 (House Roll Call 123) to approve the final conference com-

mittee version of the Farm Security Act. On February 13, 2002, the Senate voted 58-40 (Senate Roll Call 30) to approve its version of the 2002 farm bill. On May 8, 2002, the Senate voted 64-35 (Senate Roll Call 103) in favor of the final version of the bill.

Sugar Subsidies. The federal sugar program benefits domestic producers through a system of subsidized price support loans and quota barriers against imported sugar. The program forces American consumers to pay prices far above those in world markets for sugar and sugar-containing products.¹⁷ According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, the sugar program costs America’s sugar-consuming families as much as \$1.9 billion a year in higher real prices.¹⁸ The program is a classic example of protectionism, benefiting a small group of producers at the expense of consumers and the nation’s overall economic health.

On October 4, 2001, the House voted 177-239 (House Roll Call 367) to reject an amendment by Rep. Dan Miller (R-Fla.) that sought to reduce the sugar loan rates by 1 cent, increase the forfeiture penalty by 1 cent, and authorize the use of program savings for conservation and environmental stewardship pro-

grams to enhance the Florida Everglades ecosystem that has been damaged by intensified cane farming in the region. On December 12, 2001, the Senate voted 71-29 (Senate Roll Call 364) to table an amendment by Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) to phase out the sugar program by fiscal year 2006 and use the savings to fund nutrition programs.

Who Supports Free International Markets?

The 107th Congress cast a large enough number of votes on trade barriers and subsidies to provide ample material for judging the performance of Congress and its individual members. Members were deemed to exhibit a consistent pattern of voting if they voted two-thirds or more of the time for or against trade barriers or trade subsidies. Those who voted two-thirds of the time or more against both trade barriers and subsidies were classified as free traders. Those who voted two-thirds of the time against trade barriers and for subsidies were classified as internationalists. Those who voted two-thirds of the time for trade barriers and against subsidies were classified as isolationists. And those who voted two-thirds of the time for trade barriers and for subsidies were classified as interventionists.

A House Divided on Trade Barriers

Of the 432 members who voted on more than half of the issues rated in this study, a mere 15 voted as free traders, consistently opposing trade barriers and trade subsidies. Another 70 members, the largest category, voted as internationalists, opposing trade barriers and favoring subsidies. At the opposite corner of the matrix in Figure 1 were 9 members who voted as isolationists, consistently favoring trade barriers while opposing subsidies. Another 36 members voted as interventionists, consistently favoring barriers and subsidies. The balance of House members had mixed voting records.¹⁹

Of the 15 free traders, 14 were Republicans and 1 was a Democrat. The most consistent of

the free traders was Jeff Flake, a freshman Republican from Arizona, who voted against barriers and subsidies on every vote he cast but one. Charles Bass (R-N.H.) voted for free trade on every vote but two; and Richard Armev (R-Tex.), Judy Biggert (R-Ill.), Phil Crane (R-Ill.), Jim Ramstad (R-Minn.), and John Sununu (R-N.H.) voted for free trade on every vote but three. The other free traders were Thomas Petri (R-Wis.), Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.), Jim Moran (D-Va.), Constance Morella (R-Md.), Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), Pat Toomey (R-Pa.), and the new House majority leader, Tom DeLay (R-Tex.).

Republicans also dominated the internationalists, outnumbering Democrats by 58 to 12. The purest internationalists in their voting were Samuel Graves (R-Mo.), Ruben Hinojosa (D-Tex.), and Tom Osborne (R-Neb.), who voted against trade barriers and in favor of subsidies on every vote they cast but one. Voting as internationalists on every vote but two were Ken Bentsen (D-Tex.), Sonny Callahan (R-Ala.), Jo Ann Emerson (R-Mo.), Greg Ganske (R-Iowa), Wayne Gilchrest (R-Md.), Timothy Johnson (R-Ill.), Tom Latham (R-Iowa), George Nethercutt (R-Wash.), Jim Nussle (R-Iowa), Dennis Rehberg (R-Mont.), Charlie Stenholm (D-Tex.), John Tanner (D-Tenn.), William "Mac" Thornberry (R-Tex.), and Heather Wilson (R-N.Mex.) Also among the internationalists was Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), the new House majority whip.

Six isolationists were Republicans and three were Democrats. The most consistent in voting as an isolationist was John Duncan Jr. (R-Tenn.), who voted in favor of trade barriers and against subsidies on every vote he cast but one. Voting as isolationists on every vote but three were Frank LoBiondo (R-N.J.) and Dana Rohrbacher (R-Calif.). Voting as isolationists on every vote but four were Bob Andrews (D-N.J.), Bob Barr (R-Ga.), and Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.).

Democrats dominated the interventionists, outnumbering Republicans 24 to 12. The purist of the interventionists, voting for trade barriers and subsidies on every vote but two, were Charlie Norwood (R-Ga.), Gene Green (D-

The most consistent of the free traders was Jeff Flake, a freshman Republican from Arizona, who voted against barriers and subsidies on every vote he cast but one.

Party affiliation mattered greatly when House members voted on trade. Republicans were far more likely to oppose trade barriers than were Democrats, although support for subsidies was about the same in both parties.

Tex.), James Traficant (D-Ohio), Corrine Brown (D-Fla.), Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.), and Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.). Voting as interventionists on every vote but three were Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), now in the U.S. Senate, Charles Taylor (R-N.C.), Carrie Meek (D-Fla.), Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), Peter Visclosky (D-Ind.), Robert Wexler (D-Fla.), Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-Tex.), Mike McIntyre (D-N.C.), Michael Ross (D-Ark.), John Spratt Jr. (D-S.C.), and Walter Jones (R-N.C.). Other interventionists include the former and new Democratic minority leaders, Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) and Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). (See Appendix A for a list of members in each of the four categories.)

Party affiliation mattered greatly when House members voted on trade. Republicans were far more likely to oppose trade barriers than were Democrats, although support for subsidies was about the same in both parties. On average, Republicans in the House opposed trade barriers on 60 percent of votes compared to 43 percent for Democrats. Republicans opposed subsidies on 31 percent of votes compared to a nearly identical 30 percent for Democrats. Even when controlling for years in office and region of the country represented, party affiliation was a strong factor in how members voted on trade barriers. A Republican House member was 15 percentage points more likely to vote against trade barriers than was a Democrat with the same seniority from the same region of the country.²⁰

Partisan differences were starkest on lifting the ban against Mexican trucks on U.S. roads, with 62 percent of Republicans in favor and only 4 percent of Democrats; TPA was favored by almost 90 percent of Republicans and 12 percent of Democrats; and an amendment to end the embargo against Cuba was supported by 83 percent of Democrats but only 14 percent of Republicans. On subsidies, Republicans were far more likely to favor the end of funding for the Export-Import Bank—19 percent of Republicans favored that options vs. a minuscule 3 percent of Democrats—while Democrats were twice as likely to favor capping farm subsidy payments. (See Table 1.)

Years in office matter, too, although not as much as party affiliation. Members elected in 1996 or more recently were more inclined to oppose trade barriers than were those elected before then but were slightly more inclined to favor subsidies. Regression analysis reveals that, controlling for party affiliation and region of the country, a member's opposition to trade barriers declined by about 3 percentage points per decade served. Members from the Midwest, Southwest, Plains, and Pacific Coast were significantly more inclined to oppose trade barriers than were members from other regions, even after controlling for party affiliation and years in office, while those from the Midwest, Plains, South, and Southwest were significantly less inclined to oppose trade subsidies than were members from other parts of the country.²¹ (See Appendix B for a complete list of House members and their votes.)

A Senate Even More Divided

Of the 99 Senators rated in this study, 22 voted as free traders, 12 as internationalists, 2 as isolationists, and 22 as interventionists. The other 41 senators had mixed voting records.²²

All of those categorized as free traders were Republicans. Those with perfect free trader voting records were Sam Brownback (R-Kans.), Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), John McCain (R-Ariz.), Don Nickles (R-Okla.), Rick Santorum (R-Pa.), and Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.). Voting as free traders on every vote but one were Lincoln Chafee (R-R.I.), John Ensign (R-Nev.), Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), Pat Roberts (R-Kans.), Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.), and George Voinovich (R-Ohio).

The parties were more evenly represented among the internationalists, with seven Republicans and five Democrats. Compiling a perfect score in this category was Zell Miller (D-Ga.), who voted against trade barriers and in favor of subsidies on every vote he cast. Voting as internationalists on every vote but one were John Breaux (D-La.), Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Christopher "Kit" Bond (R-Mo.), and James Inhofe (R-Okla.).

Table 1
Major House Votes on Trade Barriers and Subsidies, 107th Congress

Short Description	Date	Roll Call No.	Free Trade Position	Final Vote	% Voting Free Trade	
					GOP	Dem.
Trade barrier votes						
Ban on Mexican trucks	6/26/2001	193	No	285-143	62	4
Disapprove China NTR	7/19/2001	255	No	169-259	71	49
Country-of-origin labeling	10/4/2001	370	No	296-121	43	14
Protect U.S. antidumping law	11/7/2001	432	No	410-4	1	0
Recommit ATPA	11/16/2001	447	No	168-250	91	27
TPA, House version	12/6/2001	481	Yes	215-214	89	10
Access to foreign-born doctors	6/25/2002	254	Yes	407-7	97	100
Disapprove Vietnam NTR	7/23/2002	329	No	91-338	71	87
End travel ban to Cuba	7/23/2002	331	Yes	262-167	33	91
End Cuban embargo	7/25/2002	333	Yes	204-226	14	83
TPA, final passage	7/27/2002	370	Yes	215-212	87	12
Trade subsidy votes						
Cut wool and mohair subsidies	7/11/2001	219	Yes	155-272	36	37
Defund Ex-Im Bank	7/24/2001	261	Yes	47-375	19	3
Limit farm subsidy payments	10/3/2001	365	Yes	187-238	30	58
Cut sugar subsidies	10/4/2001	367	Yes	177-239	49	36
Farm bill, House version	10/5/2001	371	No	291-120	28	31
Farm bill, final passage	5/2/2002	123	No	280-141	34	33
Ex-Im Bank reauthorization	6/5/2002	210	No	344-78	24	13

Source: *Congressional Quarterly*, various issues.

The only two senators to vote as isolationists were both Democrats, Jon Corzine (D-N.J.) and Russell Feingold (D-Wis.).

All of the 22 senators categorized as interventionists were Democrats. Those with the most consistent voting records were Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D-S.C.), Jean Carnahan (D-Mo.), Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii), Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), who voted as interventionists on all but one vote. Among the more well-known senators in this category were John Edwards (D-N.C.), considered a potential candidate for president in 2004, Deputy Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), and the late Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.). (See Appendix C for a list of senators in each of the four categories.)

The Senate was even more sharply divided along party lines than the House. Republican

senators in the 107th Congress voted against trade barriers an average of 86 percent of the time compared to a 31 percent average for Democrats. Republicans voted against trade subsidies 62 percent of the time compared to 26 percent for Democrats. When controlling for years in office and region represented, party affiliation remained a potent factor. A Republican was 51 percentage points more likely to oppose trade barriers than was a Democrat with the same seniority from the same region and 39 percentage points more likely to vote against trade subsidies.²³

The votes that most sharply divided the parties were to allow Mexican trucks on U.S. roads, to bar tariff reductions for products facing antidumping duties, and amendments to condition trade liberalization on foreign labor and human rights standards, with Republicans more likely to favor lower barriers by margins that

exceeded 75 percentage points. The one trade-barrier vote where Democrats were more inclined to support lower trade barriers was to grant normal trade relations to Vietnam. (See Table 2.)

One explanation for the partisan divide on trade could be the narrow majority held by the Democrats during the last 18 months of the 107th Congress, which put a premium on party discipline in voting and raised the political stakes in anticipation of the 2002 elections. An additional explanation could be that Republican senators were more inclined to support the trade-promoting initiatives of a president of their own party and Democrats more inclined to oppose them for the opposite reason, exacerbating ideological differences between the two caucuses.

Regional affiliation mattered far less in predicting how a senator would vote, and years in office mattered not at all. Controlling for party affiliation and years in office, senators from the South and Southwest regions were significantly more inclined to vote against trade barriers, and those from the South more inclined to

vote for subsidies than were senators from other regions. The popularity of the farm bill among Southern constituencies probably accounts for much of the support for subsidies among southern senators, although senators from the Midwest and Plains regions were more successful in resisting constituent pressure for subsidies than were their counterparts in the House. (See Appendix D for a complete list of senators and their votes.)

Clues to the 108th Congress

The most profound change in the 108th Congress toward trade will be the switch of Senate control from Democrats to Republicans. Given the sharp differences in how members of the two parties voted in the last Congress, Republican control of the leadership offices and committee chairmanships should make a noticeable difference in how the Senate handles both trade barrier and subsidy issues. Votes cast in the 107th Congress indi-

Table 2
Major Senate Votes on Trade Barriers and Subsidies, 107th Congress

Short Description	Date	Roll Call No.	Free Trade Position	Final Vote	% Voting Free Trade	
					GOP	Dem.
Trade barriers votes						
Allow Mexican trucks into U.S. (table)	7/27/2001	254	No	57-34	79	2
Approve Vietnam NTR	10/3/2001	291	Yes	88-12	80	96
Dayton-Craig AD amendment (table)	5/14/2002	110	Yes	38-61	67	12
Labor standards and trade (table)	5/15/2002	112	Yes	54-44	100	14
No tariff cuts for "dumped" goods (table)	5/21/2002	123	Yes	60-38	100	24
Human rights and trade (table)	5/22/2002	129	Yes	42-53	85	6
TPA, Senate version	5/23/2002	130	Yes	66-30	89	49
TPA, final passage	8/1/2002	207	Yes	64-34	90	41
Trade subsidy votes						
Phase out sugar subsidies (table)	12/12/2001	364	No	71-29	41	18
Cap farm subsidy payments (table)	2/7/2002	18	No	31-66	70	68
Farm bill, Senate version	2/13/2002	30	No	58-40	81	4
Farm bill, final passage	5/8/2002	103	No	64-35	58	14

Source: *Congressional Quarterly*, various issues.

Note: A vote to table is a vote to kill the amendment on the floor. Thus a vote in favor of tabling an amendment is, in effect, a vote against the amendment.

cate that the new Senate should be more hospitable to a free trader agenda to lower barriers and subsidies.

At the top, the new Senate majority leader, Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), leans toward internationalist in his voting record. In the last three Congresses, he has compiled a nearly perfect record of opposing trade barriers, but he has also voted frequently in favor of trade subsidies. In 1997 he voted against a cut in funding for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and in 1998 he voted in favor of \$18 billion in additional funding for the International Monetary Fund. In 2002 he voted for the final version of the trade-distorting farm bill and against an amendment to limit farm subsidy payments. The Democratic minority leader, Tom Daschle (D-S.D.), had voted consistently against trade barriers in the 105th and 106th Congresses but became much more inclined to support barriers in the politically charged 107th Congress. Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the former Republican leader, has voted consistently as an internationalist.

The change of chairman of the Senate Finance Committee may not make as dramatic a difference as party differences would indicate. Former chairman and ranking Democrat Max Baucus (D-Mont.) has compiled a solid internationalist voting record. He and the new chairman, Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), both vote consistently against trade barriers, although Baucus is more inclined to support trade subsidies.

The turnover of individual senators also points to a more trade-friendly chamber. The 10 senators who retired or were defeated for reelection were as a group less inclined to oppose trade barriers than the senators who remained in Congress (51 vs. 58 percent), although they were slightly more inclined to oppose trade subsidies (45 vs. 43 percent). The Senate lost some of its most consistent opponents of lower trade barriers, such as Paul Wellstone, Robert Torricelli, Jesse Helms, and Jean Carnahan.

Of the new senators with congressional voting records, Jim Talent (R-Mo.) voted as a free trader in the 105th Congress and as an internationalist in the 106th, in contrast to Carnahan's solid interventionist record in the 107th. John Sununu (R-N.H.) voted as a free trader in each

of the last three Congresses, in contrast to the generally isolationist record of the Republican he replaced, Bob Smith. Former and new Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) was significantly more inclined to oppose trade barriers in previous ratings than was the senator he replaced, Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.). New Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) has compiled an interventionist voting record similar to that of the now retired Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), and, in the House, Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) compiled a record that was mixed on trade barriers and pro-subsidy, broadly comparable to that of the senator he defeated, Max Cleland (D-Ga.).

In the House, a slightly larger Republican majority means no wholesale change in committee chairs, but both parties will see significant turnover in leadership. New House Majority Leader Tom Delay (R-Tex.) has consistently opposed trade barriers, but his record on trade subsidies is mixed. He voted as a free trader in the 107th Congress and as an internationalist in the 106th. Dick Armey (R-Tex.), the former majority leader, voted as a free trader in all three previous Congresses. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), the new majority whip, has voted as an internationalist. The one trade-barrier issue on which DeLay and Blunt deviate from free trade is the Cuban embargo and travel ban. They sharply differ with each other on trade subsidies, with DeLay consistently voting against them and Blunt voting just as consistently in favor.

Changes in the Democratic leadership could portend a slight shift away from its hard-line interventionist pattern of the past. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), the new minority leader, has been more inclined than former leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) to oppose trade barriers, although her record in the 107th Congress still qualified her as an interventionist. In contrast to Gephardt, she voted for the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the 106th Congress and for defunding the Cuban embargo and travel ban in the 106th and 107th, although she voted against normal trade relations with Vietnam while Gephardt voted in favor. Similarly, Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), the new minority whip, has been more inclined to oppose trade barriers than the retired whip David Bonior (D-Mich.), who was one of

Votes cast in the 107th Congress indicate that the new Senate should be more hospitable to a free trader agenda to lower barriers and subsidies.

Judging by the voting behavior analyzed in this study, most members of the U.S. Congress have no standing to criticize other governments for deviating from free trade.

the most reliable votes in the House against lowering trade barriers. Specifically, Hoyer differed from Bonior on trade with Cuba and Vietnam.

Unlike the Senate, there is virtually no difference in the House between the average voting record of the outgoing members and that of returning members. Among the 50 members of the 107th Congress who did not return to the 108th, the average support for lower trade barriers was 49 percent vs. 51 percent for returning members, and on trade subsidies it was an even less significant 30 percent vs. 31 percent.

On the basis of past trade votes and changes wrought by the 2002 election, the 108th Congress should be more hospitable to lowering trade barriers but no more so toward lowering trade subsidies. Congress remains sharply divided along partisan lines on trade barrier issues, but there are indications that House Democrats may be ready to reduce that gap. Unfortunately, members of both parties are equally reluctant to oppose trade subsidies, and the retirement of Dick Armey deprives the Republican leadership of one of its most principled advocates of trade free of subsidies and barriers.

Conclusion

Creating a free and vibrant market for international trade is about more than eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers. It requires the elimination of export and production subsidies that distort trade, draw resources away from their best use, and leave the United States and its trading partners worse off. Weighed on the scale of a more comprehensive definition of free trade, the 107th Congress was found wanting.

A minority of House and Senate members voted consistently in the 107th Congress to reduce either barriers or subsidies to trade, but only a handful voted consistently to do both. While Republicans are more likely to vote against barriers than are Democrats, they are just as prone as Democrats to favor subsidies. As long as so many members of both parties continue to support trade-distorting subsidies, free traders will be rare.

The 107th Congress did manage to enact trade promotion authority, a key piece of legislation that will enable the president to negotiate agreements in the future to lower trade barriers, bilaterally, regionally, and globally through the WTO. But TPA was achieved only after sharp partisan debate and amid setbacks on antidumping reform, Cuban trade and travel, and Mexican trucks. On trade subsidies, the 107th Congress was an unmitigated disaster. Congress approved the huge farm bill, continuing sugar, wool and mohair subsidies, and export subsidies through the Export-Import Bank.

The lack of commitment in practice to free trade stands in contrast to the pronouncements members frequently make that they support the goal of free trade. America's political leaders complain incessantly that U.S. producers must compete in a world of "unfair" trade barriers and subsidies, while the U.S. market is open. But this study shows that very few members of Congress vote consistently for policies that would create an international market free of those distorting barriers and subsidies. Judging by the voting behavior analyzed in this study, most members of the U.S. Congress have no standing to criticize other governments for deviating from free trade.

Members of Congress who want to advance the cause of limited government, economic liberty, and national prosperity at home and abroad should favor a consistent agenda of eliminating trade barriers and trade-related subsidies. Both protectionism and subsidies undermine the workings of the free market, substituting the judgment of politicians for that of millions of informed citizens cooperating in the international marketplace for mutual advantage.

When weighing policy toward the international economy, members of Congress do not need to choose between anti-trade, anti-subsidy isolationism and pro-trade, pro-subsidy internationalism. They can choose to vote for a coherent program to liberalize trade and eliminate subsidies—in sum, to let Americans enjoy the freedom and prosperity of a seamless free market undistorted by government intervention.

Appendix A: House Members by Category

Party	State	First Elected	Barrier Votes	Subsidy Votes		Party	State	First Elected	Barrier Votes	Subsidy Votes	
<i>Free Traders</i>											
Flake, Jeff	R	AZ	2000	90%	100%	Johnson, Nancy	R	CT	1982	82%	71%
Bass, Charles	R	NH	1994	82%	100%	DeLay, Tom	R	TX	1984	67%	86%
Sununu, John	R	NH	1996	82%	86%	DeMint, Jim	R	SC	1998	73%	71%
Crane, Philip	R	IL	1969	73%	100%	Moran, James	D	VA	1990	73%	71%
Armey, Richard	R	TX	1984	73%	100%	Morella, Constance	R	MD	1986	73%	71%
Biggert, Judy	R	IL	1998	91%	71%	Shays, Christopher	R	CT	1987	73%	71%
Ramstad, Jim	R	MN	1990	91%	71%	Toomey, Patrick	R	PA	1998	73%	71%
Petri, Thomas	R	WI	1979	73%	86%						
<i>Internationalists</i>											
Graves, Samuel	R	MO	2000	91%	0%	Knollenberg, Joseph	R	MI	1992	73%	0%
Osborne, Thomas	R	NE	2000	91%	0%	LaHood, Ray	R	IL	1994	73%	0%
Hinojosa, Ruben	D	TX	1996	90%	0%	Lewis, Ron	R	KY	1994	73%	0%
Latham, Tom	R	IA	1994	91%	14%	McCrery, Jim	R	LA	1988	73%	0%
Bentsen, Ken	D	TX	1994	82%	0%	Ortiz, Solomon	D	TX	1982	73%	0%
Stenholm, Charles	D	TX	1978	82%	0%	Ose, Doug	R	CA	1998	73%	0%
Emerson, Jo Ann	R	MO	1996	82%	0%	Simpson, Michael	R	ID	1998	73%	0%
Johnson, Timothy	R	IL	2000	82%	0%	Vitter, David	R	LA	1998	73%	0%
Nethercutt, George, Jr.	R	WA	1994	82%	0%	Whitfield, Edward	R	KY	1994	73%	0%
Nussle, Jim	R	IA	1990	82%	0%	Dooley, Calvin	D	CA	1990	91%	29%
Rehberg, Dennis	R	MT	2000	82%	0%	Otter, C.L.	R	ID	2000	91%	29%
Tanner, John	D	TN	1988	82%	0%	Houghton, Amory, Jr.	R	NY	1986	70%	0%
Thornberry, William	R	TX	1994	82%	0%	Blunt, Roy	R	MO	1996	70%	0%
Wilson, Heather	R	NM	1998	82%	0%	Combest, Larry	R	TX	1984	70%	0%
Ganske, Greg	R	IA	1994	90%	17%	Boehner, John	R	OH	1990	73%	14%
Gilcrest, Wayne	R	MD	1990	90%	17%	Horn, Steve	R	CA	1992	73%	14%
Callahan, Sonny	R	AL	1984	78%	0%	Isakson, John	R	GA	1998	73%	14%
Bereuter, Douglas	R	NE	1978	82%	14%	McKeon, Howard	R	CA	1992	73%	14%
Brady, Kevin	R	TX	1996	82%	14%	Oxley, Michael	R	OH	1981	73%	14%
Leach, James	R	IA	1976	82%	14%	Reynolds, Thomas	R	NY	1998	73%	14%
Moran, Jerry	R	KS	1996	82%	14%	Ryun, Jim	R	KS	1996	73%	14%
Terry, Lee	R	NE	1998	82%	14%	Shimkus, John	R	IL	1996	73%	14%
Tiahrt, Todd	R	KS	1994	82%	14%	Snyder, Vic	D	AR	1996	73%	14%
Herger, Wally	R	CA	1986	82%	17%	Thune, John	R	SD	1996	73%	14%
Largent, Steve	R	OK	1994	83%	20%	Dicks, Norman	D	WA	1976	73%	17%
Baker, Richard	R	LA	1986	73%	0%	Bono, Mary	R	CA	1994	70%	14%
Cannon, Chris	R	UT	1996	73%	0%	Stump, Bob	R	AZ	1976	67%	0%
Jefferson, William	D	LA	1990	73%	0%	Sweeney, John	R	NY	1998	67%	0%
Carson, Brad	D	OK	2000	73%	0%	Greenwood, James	R	PA	1992	82%	29%
Cooksey, John	R	LA	1996	73%	0%	Manzullo, Donald	R	IL	1992	82%	29%
Fletcher, Ernest	R	KY	1988	73%	0%	Peterson, John	R	PA	1996	91%	33%
Granger, Kay	R	TX	1996	73%	0%	Issa, Darrell	R	CA	2000	80%	29%
Hulshof, Kenny	R	MO	1996	73%	0%	Cantor, Eric	R	VA	2000	73%	29%
John, Christopher	D	LA	1996	73%	0%	Matheson, James	D	UT	2000	73%	29%
Kennedy, Mark	R	MN	2000	73%	0%	Upton, Fred	R	MI	1986	73%	29%

continued

	Party	State	First Elected	Barrier Votes	Subsidy Votes		Party	State	First Elected	Barrier Votes	Subsidy Votes
<i>Isolationists</i>											
Duncan, John, Jr.	R	TN	1988	9%	100%	Stearns, Clifford	R	FL	1988	25%	71%
Rohrabacher, Dana	R	CA	1988	27%	100%	Brown, Sherrod	D	OH	1992	27%	71%
LoBiondo, Frank	R	NJ	1994	9%	71%	Hefley, Joel	R	CO	1986	27%	71%
Barr, Bob	R	GA	1994	27%	86%	Rivers, Lynn	D	MI	1994	27%	71%
Andrews, Robert	D	NJ	1990	18%	71%						
<i>Interventionists</i>											
Green, Gene	D	TX	1992	9%	14%	Capito, Shelley Moore	R	WV	2000	27%	14%
Norwood, Charles	R	GA	1994	9%	14%	Gilman, Benjamin	R	NY	1972	27%	14%
Brown, Corrine	D	FL	1992	20%	0%	Holden, Tim	D	PA	1992	27%	14%
Hastings, Alcee	D	FL	1992	20%	0%	Watson, Diane	D	CA	2001	27%	14%
Graham, Lindsey	R	SC	1994	18%	14%	Wu, David	D	OR	1998	27%	14%
Taylor, Charles	R	NC	1990	18%	14%	Young, Don	R	AK	1973	33%	0%
Traficant, James, Jr.	D	OH	1984	17%	20%	Coble, Howard	R	NC	1984	18%	29%
Engel, Eliot	D	NY	1988	20%	17%	Gephardt, Richard	D	MO	1976	18%	29%
Jackson-Lee, Sheila	D	TX	1994	27%	0%	Hilliard, Earl	D	AL	1992	30%	17%
McIntyre, Mike	D	NC	1996	27%	0%	Hunter, Duncan	R	CA	1980	20%	29%
Ross, Michael	D	AR	2000	27%	0%	Quinn, Jack	R	NY	1992	25%	29%
Spratt, John, Jr.	D	SC	1982	27%	0%	Berkley, Shelley	D	NV	1998	27%	29%
Kennedy, Patrick	D	RI	1994	0%	29%	Gutierrez, Luis	D	IL	1992	27%	29%
Jones, Walter, Jr.	R	NC	1994	9%	29%	McHugh, John	R	NY	1992	27%	29%
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	R	FL	1989	30%	%	Strickland, Ted	D	OH	1996	27%	29%
Visclosky, Peter	D	IN	1984	30%	0%	Taylor, Gene	D	MS	1989	27%	29%
Wexler, Robert	D	FL	1996	30%	0%	Lewis, John	D	GA	1986	30%	29%
Meek, Carrie	D	FL	1992	30%	0%	Pelosi, Nancy	D	CA	1987	30%	29%

Appendix B: Individual House Voting Records

Roll call number	Year of vote	"Free Trade" position	Party	State	First Elected	Trade Barrier Votes	Trade Subsidy Votes	Mexican Truck Ban	Disapprove China NTR	Country-of-Origin Labels	Protect Trade Law	Recommit ATPA	TPA House Passage	Access to Foreign Doctors	Revoke Vietnam NTR	Cuba Travel	Defund Cuban Embargo	TPA Final Passage	Cut Wool/Mohair Subsidies	Defund Ex-Im Bank	Cap Farm Payments	Cut Sugar Subsidies	House Farm Bill	Final Farm Bill	Ex-Im Bank Reauthorization
Abercrombie, Neil	D	HI	1990	36%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ackerman, Gary	D	NY	1983	36%	43%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aderholt, Robert	R	AL	1996	45%	0%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Akin, W. Todd	R	MO	2000	64%	57%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Allen, Thomas	D	ME	1996	55%	43%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Andrews, Robert	D	NJ	1990	18%	71%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Armey, Richard	R	TX	1984	73%	100%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baca, Joe	D	CA	1999	36%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bachus, Spencer	R	AL	1992	64%	0%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baird, Brian	D	WA	1998	45%	29%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baker, Richard	R	LA	1986	73%	0%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baldacci, John Elias	D	ME	1994	36%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baldwin, Tammy	D	WI	1998	36%	86%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ballenger, Cass	R	NC	1986	55%	0%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barcia, James	D	MI	1992	40%	43%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barr, Bob	R	GA	1994	27%	86%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barrett, Thomas	D	WI	1992	45%	71%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bartlett, Roscoe	R	MD	1992	36%	57%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barton, Joe	R	TX	1984	55%	0%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bass, Charles	R	NH	1994	82%	100%	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Becerra, Xavier	D	CA	1992	45%	29%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bentsen, Ken	D	TX	1994	82%	0%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

continued

	Party	State	First Elected	Trade Barrier Votes	Trade Subsidy Votes	Mexican Truck Ban	Disapprove China NTR	Country-of-Origin Labels	Protect Trade Law	Recommit ATPA	TPA House Passage	Access to Foreign Doctors	Revoke Vietnam NTR	Cuba Travel	Defund Cuban Embargo	TPA Final Passage	Cut Wool/Mohair Subsidies	Defund Ex-Im Bank	Cap Farm Payments	Cut Sugar Subsidies	House Farm Bill	Final Farm Bill	Ex-Im Bank Reauthorization
Roll call number						193	255	370	432	447	481	254	329	331	333	370	219	261	365	367	371	123	210
Year of vote						2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002
"Free Trade" position						N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Bereuter, Douglas	R	NE	1978	82%	14%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berkley, Shelly	D	NV	1998	27%	29%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-
Berman, Howard	D	CA	1982	55%	71%	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	-
Berry, Marion	D	AR	1996	36%	0%	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Biggert, Judy	R	IL	1998	91%	71%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Bilirakis, Michael	R	FL	1982	36%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Bishop, Sanford, Jr.	D	GA	1992	45%	0%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blagojevich, Rod	D	IL	1996	40%	17%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blumenauer, Earl	D	OR	1996	50%	71%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Blunt, Roy	R	MO	1996	70%	0%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Boehkert, Sherwood	R	NY	1982	64%	29%	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Boehner, John	R	OH	1990	73%	14%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Bonilla, Henry	R	TX	1992	64%	0%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bonior, David	D	MI	1976	0%	43%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+
Bono, Mary	R	CA	1994	70%	14%	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Boozman, John	R	AR	2001	100%	0%	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-
Borski, Robert	D	PA	1982	36%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Boswell, Leonard	D	IA	1996	55%	29%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Boucher, Rick	D	VA	1982	45%	14%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Boyd, F. Allen, Jr.	D	FL	1996	45%	0%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Brady, Kevin	R	TX	1996	82%	14%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
Brady, Robert	D	PA	1998	36%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Brown, Corrine	D	FL	1992	20%	0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Brown, Henry, Jr.	R	SC	2000	64%	29%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Brown, Sherrod	D	OH	1992	27%	71%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+

Party	State	First Elected	Trade Barrier Votes	Trade Subsidy Votes	Mexican Truck Ban	Disapprove China NTR	Country-of-Origin Labels	Protect Trade Law	Recommit ATPA	TPA House Passage	Access to Foreign Doctors	Revoke Vietnam NTR	Cuba Travel	Defund Cuban Embargo	TPA Final Passage	Cut Wool/Mohair Subsidies	Defund Ex-Im Bank	Cap Farm Payments	Cut Sugar Subsidies	House Farm Bill	Final Farm Bill	Ex-Im Bank Reauthorization
		Roll call number			193	255	370	432	447	481	254	329	331	333	370	219	261	365	367	371	123	210
		Year of vote			2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002
		"Free Trade" position			N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Davis, Jo Ann	VA	2000	18%	43%	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+
Davis, Susan	CA	2000	73%	57%	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Davis, Thomas, III	VA	1994	64%	71%	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Deal, Nathan	GA	1992	36%	14%	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
DeFazio, Peter	OR	1986	22%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+
DeGette, Diana	CO	1996	45%	67%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	-
Delahunt, William	MA	1996	45%	50%	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-
DeLauro, Rosa	CT	1990	45%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
DeLay, Tom	TX	1984	67%	86%	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
DeMint, Jim	SC	1998	73%	71%	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+
Deutsch, Peter	FL	1992	27%	57%	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	FL	1992	45%	0%	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dicks, Norman	WA	1976	73%	17%	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Dingell, John	MI	1955	36%	0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Doggett, Lloyd	TX	1994	55%	71%	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Dooley, Calvin	CA	1990	91%	29%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Doolittle, John	CA	1990	55%	57%	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	+
Doyle, Michael	PA	1994	45%	43%	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Dreier, David	CA	1980	82%	57%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Duncan, John, Jr.	TN	1988	9%	100%	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dunn, Jennifer	WA	1982	73%	43%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-
Edwards, Chet	TX	1990	64%	29%	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-
Ehlers, Vernon	MI	1993	73%	43%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Ehrlich, Robert, Jr.	MD	1994	55%	43%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Emerson, Jo Ann	MO	1996	82%	0%	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-

Party	State	First Elected	Trade Barrier Votes	Trade Subsidy Votes	Mexican Truck Ban	Disapprove China NTR	Country-of-Origin Labels	Protect Trade Law	Recommit ATPA	TPA House Passage	Access to Foreign Doctors	Revoke Vietnam NTR	Cuba Travel	Defund Cuban Embargo	TPA Final Passage	Cut Wool/Mohair Subsidies	Defund Ex-Im Bank	Cap Farm Payments	Cut Sugar Subsidies	House Farm Bill	Final Farm Bill	Ex-Im Bank Reauthorization
					193	255	370	432	447	481	254	329	331	333	370	219	261	365	367	371	123	210
					2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N</										

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LaHood, Ray	R IL	1994	73%	0%	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lampson, Nicholas	D TX	1996	55%	0%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Langevin, James	D RI	2000	36%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lantos, Tom	D CA	1980	40%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Largent, Steve	R OK	1994	83%	20%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Larsen, Richard	D WA	2000	64%	0%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Larson, John	D CT	1998	40%	43%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Latham, Tom	R IA	1994	91%	14%	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LaTourrette, Steven	R OH	1994	50%	29%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Leach, James	R IA	1976	82%	14%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lee, Barbara	D CA	1998	36%	43%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Levin, Sander	D MI	1982	55%	0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lewis, Jerry	R CA	1978	50%	17%	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lewis, John	D GA	1986	30%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lewis, Ron	R KY	1994	73%	0%	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Linder, John	R GA	1992	64%	71%	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lipinski, William	D IL	1982	20%	60%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LoBiondo, Frank	R NJ	1994	9%	71%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lofgren, Zoe	D CA	1994	50%	57%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lowey, Nita	D NY	1988	45%	43%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lucas, Frank	R OK	1994	64%	0%	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lucas, Kenneth	D KY	1998	64%	0%	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Luther, William	D MN	1994	45%	29%	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lynch, Stephen	D MA	2001	50%	0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maloney, Carolyn	D NY	1992	45%	57%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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					193	255	370	432	447	481	254	329	331	333	370	219	261	365	367	371	123	210
					2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
					N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N</										

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Roll call number						193	255	370	432	447	481	254	329	331	333	370	219	261	365	367	371	123	210
Year of vote						2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002
"Free Trade" position						N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Schiff, Adam	D	CA	2000	36%	29%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-
Schrock, Edward	R	VA	2000	73%	57%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-
Scott, Robert	D	VA	1992	36%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+
Sensenbrenner, F. J., Jr.	R	WI	1978	45%	100%	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Serrano, Jose	D	NY	1990	60%	0%	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sessions, Pete	R	TX	1996	64%	0%	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Shadegg, John	R	AZ	1994	64%	100%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Shaw, E. Clay, Jr.	R	FL	1980	64%	57%	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Shays, Christopher	R	CT	1987	73%	71%	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sherman, Bradley	D	CA	1996	27%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-
Sherwood, Don	R	PA	1998	64%	43%	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Shimkus, John	R	IL	1996	73%	14%	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Shows, Ronnie	D	MS	1998	36%	0%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Shuster, Bill	R	PA	1972	64%	29%	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Simmons, Robert	R	CT	2000	55%	43%	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Simpson, Michael	R	ID	1998	73%	0%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Skeen, Joe	R	NM	1980	64%	0%	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Skelton, Ike	D	MO	1976	55%	0%	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Slaughter, Louise	D	NY	1986	36%	67%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Smith, Adam	D	WA	1996	73%	50%	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Smith, Christopher	R	NJ	1980	18%	43%	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Smith, Lamar	R	TX	1986	64%	0%	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Smith, Nick	R	MI	1992	82%	43%	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Snyder, Vic	D	AR	1996	73%	14%	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Solis, Hilda	D	CA	2000	36%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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		Roll call number			193	255	370	432	447	481	254	329	331	333	370	219	261	365	367	371	123	210
		Year of vote			2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2002
		"Free Trade" position			N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Waters, Maxine	D CA	1990	45%	43%	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Watkins, Wes	R OK	1996	64%	0%	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Watson, Diane	D CA	2001	27%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Watt, Melvin	D NC	1992	45%	14%	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Watts, Julius Ceasar, Jr.	R OK	1994	60%	0%	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Waxman, Henry	D CA	1974	50%	67%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Weiner, Anthony David	D NY	1998	45%	71%	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Weldon, Curt	R PA	1986	45%	17%	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Weldon, Dave	R FL	1994	36%	14%	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Weller, Gerald	R IL	1994	64%	0%	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wexler, Robert	D FL	1996	30%	0%	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Whitfield, Edward	R KY	1994	73%	0%	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wicker, Roger	R MS	1994	55%	0%	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wilson, Heather	R NM	1998	82%	0%	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wilson, Joe	R SC	2001	40%	0%	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wolf, Frank	R VA	1980	36%	29%	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-
Woolsey, Lynn	D CA	1992	36%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Wu, David	D OR	1998	27%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wynn, Albert	D MD	1992	45%	0%	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Young, C.W.	R FL	1970	50%	57%	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-
Young, Don	R AK	1973	33%	0%	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix C: Senate Members by Category

Party	State	First Elected	Barrier Votes	Subsidy Votes	Party	State	First Elected	Barrier Votes	Subsidy Votes		
<i>Free Traders</i>											
Brownback, Sam	R	KS	1996	100%	100%	Voinovich, George	R	OH	1998	88%	100%
DeWine, Mike	R	OH	1994	100%	100%	Hagel, Chuck	R	NE	1996	100%	75%
Gramm, Phil	R	TX	1984	100%	100%	Kyl, Jon	R	AZ	1994	100%	75%
Lugar, Richard	R	IN	1976	100%	100%	McConnell, Mitch, Jr.	R	KY	1984	100%	75%
McCain, John	R	AZ	1986	100%	100%	Roberts, Pat	R	KS	1996	100%	75%
Nickles, Don	R	OK	1980	100%	100%	Thomas, Craig	R	WY	1994	100%	75%
Santorum, Rick	R	PA	1994	100%	100%	Hatch, Orrin	R	UT	1976	88%	75%
Thompson, Fred	R	TN	1994	100%	100%	Enzi, Michael	R	WY	1996	86%	75%
Chafee, Lincoln	R	RI	1999	88%	100%	Specter, Arlen	R	PA	1980	75%	75%
Ensign, John Eric	R	NV	2000	88%	100%	Bunning, Jim	R	KY	1998	75%	75%
Gregg, Judd	R	NH	1992	88%	100%	Bennett, Robert	R	UT	1992	100%	67%
<i>Internationalists</i>											
Miller, Zell	D	GA	2000	100%	0%	Lott, Trent	R	MS	1988	88%	25%
Breaux, John	D	LA	1972	88%	0%	Hutchison, Kay Bailey	R	TX	1993	88%	25%
Baucus, Max	D	MT	1978	88%	0%	Allen, George	R	VA	2000	88%	25%
Bond, Christopher	R	MO	1986	100%	25%	Lincoln, Blanche	D	AR	1998	75%	25%
Inhofe, James	R	OK	1994	100%	25%	Nelson, E. Benjamin	D	NE	2000	75%	25%
Cochran, Thad	R	MS	1978	88%	25%	Burns, Conrad	R	MT	1989	71%	25%
<i>Isolationists</i>											
Corzine, Jon	D	NJ	2000	13%	100%	Feingold, Russell	D	WI	1992	0%	75%
<i>Interventionists</i>											
Hollings, Ernest "Fritz"	D	SC	1966	13%	0%	Reid, Harry	D	NV	1986	13%	25%
Leahy, Patrick	D	VT	1974	13%	0%	Wellstone, Paul	D	MN	1990	13%	25%
Carnahan, Jean	D	MO	2000	13%	0%	Boxer, Barbara	D	CA	1992	13%	25%
Akaka, Daniel	D	HI	1990	14%	0%	Dorgan, Byron	D	ND	1992	13%	25%
Byrd, Robert	D	WV	1958	0%	25%	Durbin, Richard	D	IL	1996	13%	25%
Edwards, John	D	NC	1998	25%	0%	Johnson, Tim	D	SD	1996	13%	25%
Levin, Carl	D	MI	1978	13%	25%	Torricelli, Robert	D	NJ	1996	13%	25%
Dodd, Christopher	D	CT	1980	13%	25%	Clinton, Hillary Rodham	D	NY	2000	13%	25%
Rockefeller, John, IV	D	WV	1984	13%	25%	Stabenow, Debbie	D	MI	2000	13%	25%
Conrad, Kent	D	ND	1986	13%	25%	Harkin, Tom	D	IA	1984	25%	25%
Mikulski, Barbara	D	MD	1986	13%	25%	Dayton, Mark	D	MN	2000	25%	25%

Notes

1. Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "CGE Modeling and Analysis of Multilateral and Regional Negotiating Options," Discussion Paper Series 2001-08, Tufts University, January 23, 2001, p. 17, <http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/200108.pdf>.
2. U.S. International Trade Commission, *The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints: Third Update 2002*, USITC Investigation no. 332-325, Publication 3519, June 2002, p. xvii.
3. James K. Jackson, "Export-Import Bank: Background and Legislative Issues," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 98-568E, January 19, 2001, p. 5.
4. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries, Monitoring and Evaluation 2002: Highlights* (Paris: OECD, 2002), p. 4, www.oecd.org/pdf/M00030000/M00030609.pdf.
5. *Ibid.*, Annex Table 2, "OECD: Producer Support Estimate by Country," pp. 41-42.
6. Daniel T. Griswold, "House Vote Erects Roadblock to U.S.-Mexico Trade," July 10, 2001, www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles/DG-7-10-01.htm.
7. See Mark A. Groombridge, "China's Long March to a Market Economy: The Case for Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the People's Republic of China," Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 10, April 24, 2000; and Daniel T. Griswold et al., "Trade and the Transformation of China: The Case for Normal Trade Relations," Cato Institute Trade Briefing Paper no. 5, July 19, 1999.
8. See Ronald Bailey, "The Looming Trade War over Plant Biotechnology," Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 18, August 1, 2002, especially the section on labeling, pp. 10-12.
9. See Brink Lindsey, "The U.S. Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality," Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 7, August 16, 1999; and Brink Lindsey and Dan Ikenson, "Antidumping 101: The Devilish Details of 'Unfair Trade' Law," Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 20, November 26, 2002.
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13. See Daniel T. Griswold, "Trade, Labor, and the Environment: Why Blue and Green Sanctions Undermine Higher Standards," Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no. 15, August 2, 2001.
14. See Philip Peters, "A Policy toward Cuba that Serves U.S. Interests," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 384, November 2, 2000.
15. See Aaron Lukas and Ian Vásquez, "Rethinking the Export-Import Bank," Cato Institute Trade Briefing Paper no. 15, March 12, 2002.
16. See Chris Edwards and Tad DeHaven, "Farm Subsidies at Record Levels As Congress Considers New Farm Bill," Cato Institute Briefing Paper no. 70, October 18, 2001.
17. See Mark A. Groombridge, "America's Bittersweet Sugar Policy," Cato Institute Trade Briefing Paper no. 13, December 4, 2001.
18. Cited in U.S. International Trade Commission, p. 69.
19. Two-thirds of House members in the 107th Congress voted in a way that defied categorization. More than half of those members—154—voted consistently in favor of trade subsidies but fell somewhere in the muddled middle (between 33 and 67 percent) on trade barriers. Another 44 voted consistently against subsidies but were also somewhere in the middle on trade. Of the remaining 104 members, 16 voted consistently against trade barriers but were inconsistent on subsidies, 17 voted consistently in favor of trade barriers but were inconsistent on subsidies, and 71 were inconsistent on both barriers and subsidies.
20. Regression analysis performed by the Cato Institute's Peter VanDoren.
21. For purposes of this study, the states were divided into eight regions: Northeast (New England plus New York), Mid Atlantic (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia), South (North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana), Midwest (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri), Plains (North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas), Southwest (Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona), Rockies (Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Nevada), and Pacific (Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii).
22. Of the 99 senators whose voting records were analyzed in this study, 41 voted in a way that did

not fit into any of the four categories. Almost half of those, or 17, voted consistently in favor of trade subsidies but voted inconsistently (between 33 and 67 percent) on trade barriers. Another 2 voted consistently against trade subsidies but inconsistently on barriers. Of those who voted somewhere in the inconsistent middle on trade subsidies, 4

voted consistently in favor of trade barriers and 11 against trade barriers. Seven senators voted somewhere in the middle on both trade barriers and subsidies.

23. Regression analysis performed by the Cato Institute's Peter VanDoren.

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