

# Policy Analysis

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## ***Fighting the War against Terrorism Elite Forces, Yes, Conscripts, No***

by **Doug Bandow**

### **Executive Summary**

The United States possesses the most powerful military on earth, one that has proved its potency in ousting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Yet, even as the military was gearing up to perform so well, some people were calling for a return to conscription or, more dramatically, for institution of mandatory national service for all young people.

A draft would make no sense militarily: U.S. soldiers are the best trained and educated ever. Operations like that against the Taliban—and potential future anti-terrorist initiatives elsewhere, such as in Yemen and Somalia—require elite special forces, not mass conscript armies.

Indeed, a draft would degrade the military's performance, requiring induction of less-qualified personnel, who are rejected today, and raising the rate of "indiscipline" by filling the armed services with people who don't want to serve. It comes as no surprise that the military leadership opposes conscription.

A broader national service draft would be even less justifiable. Conscripting 18-year-olds would do nothing to protect America from terrorism; a few skilled personnel can do far more to make us safe than can masses of untrained young people.

Turning over to Washington the lives of the 4 million men and women who turn 18 every year would guarantee the grossest misuse of enormous human potential. If opportunity cost is not considered, perceived "needs" will be infinite. Control by a federal government engaged in the usual pursuit of political pork would guarantee that national service would become a monumental boondoggle.

Most important, turning over control of young people's destinies to government would be a massive transfer of power from civil society to the state. Conscription would undermine the very individual liberty that makes our nation worth defending.

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## **Introduction**

Before September 11, it had been 60 years since the U.S. homeland had come under attack. As they did after Pearl Harbor, Americans turned to the military for their defense. But now, in contrast to the past, they are finding security in a volunteer military.

When the terrorists struck on September 11, they attacked the nation with the most powerful and effective military on earth. Its weapons are the most advanced; its troops are the brightest and best trained. The result is catastrophe for any opposing force, as the Taliban and al-Qaeda quickly learned.

Yet, even as America's volunteer military was gearing up for its decisive victory in Afghanistan, some analysts were calling for conscription. For instance, the day after the attack on the World Trade Center, Stanley Kurtz of the Hudson Institute wrote, "Maybe now, in the wake of this terrible act of war, we can break our great taboo and at least consider a revival of the draft." He complained that "military recruitment is [sic] in a state of crisis for some time now." Without reliance on women in the service, he argued, a draft would certainly be necessary, "And that's without taking into account the increased demands on our armed forces that the war on terrorism will surely impose."<sup>1</sup>

This is an extraordinary argument: today the globe's sole military colossus, America, needs a mass conscript army. Ironically, foreign nations are now following the United States in abandoning the draft. France and Spain have dropped conscription; Russia is professionalizing its military. Other states, such as Germany, are debating the same step, despite the opposition of powerful vested interests (for example, industries such as health care that are dependent on the labor of conscientious objectors). Even China's strategy for strengthening its armed forces is to cut numbers and increase quality, as did the United States after the advent of the All-Volunteer Force. No major power is moving in the other direction. Many of the forces

most dependent on conscription tend not to be ones whose example we should wish to follow—the Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, and Hutu rebels in Burundi.<sup>2</sup>

Today the U.S. military possesses an extraordinary ability to use high-tech weapons to maximize destruction of opposing forces and minimize American casualties. Observes William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "What sets the United States apart from its adversaries is that we use information much better than they do. Properly used, that can be an unbridgeable gap."<sup>3</sup>

Although high-tech weapons alone are unlikely to subdue an adversary and obviously cannot occupy a defeated country, they can ensure the defeat of opposing military forces. And they preclude the need for large U.S. ground forces. In Afghanistan, for instance, sustained air attack was supplemented by the extensive use of special operations forces—of whom, all told, the United States today fields some 29,000. Also active on the ground were the Marines, the smallest service branch—the one that has the reputation of being the toughest but has nevertheless consistently had the best recruiting success. The various ground forces helped target air strikes, disrupt Taliban military operations, and search for al-Qaeda strongholds.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, America fields a professional force of extraordinary quality.<sup>5</sup> Soldiers today are far brighter and better educated than the draft-era force. They are therefore much more capable of handling high-tech weapons.

## **Anti-Terrorism Missions Require Elite Forces**

Technical skills will become even more important in the future, especially since anti-terrorism has surpassed conventional defense as America's most important security goal. Masses of cannon fodder are of dubious value even in a typical conventional war today, given the killing potential of well-trained soldiers using the latest technology. And conscripts would be even less helpful in

attempting to track down an elusive foe, such as terrorists operating worldwide.

The value of special forces was obvious enough in the attack on the Taliban government in Afghanistan. They are the only forces that can help to train Philippine troops in their war with Muslim insurgents. Action in Somalia or elsewhere would require a similar, well-targeted approach, not a large occupying army.

Even the Army sees a need for quicker, lighter, and more lethal forces in the future.<sup>6</sup> That means an elite, not a mass, army and a volunteer, not a draft, force. Observes Philip Gold of the Discovery Institute: “The present military is an Industrial Age, labor-intensive structure ill-suited to 21st-century technologies and threats. Properly organized, equipped and with more superfluous bases closed and many support functions privatized, it could easily drop to 1.2 million or less.”<sup>7</sup>

The military opposes conscription, not just because it tends to resist change, as some charge, but also because today’s force is the best ever. Observes Gordon Sullivan, former Army chief of staff and current president of the Association of the United States Army, “Military commanders prefer high-quality volunteers to mixed-quality draftees.”<sup>8</sup> Retired Lt. Gen. Al Lenhardt, once the Army’s chief recruiter, warns that conscription would yield a poorer quality force.<sup>9</sup> Retired Maj. Gen. Ted Stroup, formerly the Army’s deputy chief of staff for personnel, explains that with a draft “you wouldn’t get the quality or the staying power that you also need.”<sup>10</sup>

## Recruitment and Quality

All of the services met their recruiting goals in fiscal year 2001. More than 90 percent of Army and Navy accessions had high school diplomas; 96 percent of Marine and 99 percent of Air Force recruits had diplomas. Roughly two-thirds of those joining the first three services scored in mental categories I-III A (of five); three-fourths of Air Force recruits fell into those categories.<sup>11</sup>

Recruiting was tougher in 1998 and 1999, though there was never a crisis: DOD fell

short by 6,000 and 8,000 recruits in those years, respectively. Even then, the military’s problem was inadequate quality of recruits, not inadequate numbers of recruits. The All-Volunteer Force is choosier than a draft military, rejecting many applicants; the percentage of “high-quality” enlistees, that is, those with high school diplomas and scoring above average on the AFQT test, has jumped 50 percent since the advent of a volunteer military in 1973.<sup>12</sup> With few exceptions, the armed services today do not accept those scoring in categories IV and V on the military aptitude test or who lack a high school diploma.

Navy recruiter Petty Officer Benny Granillo explains, “Most of the people who walk into the office have something wrong with them.”<sup>13</sup> Army Maj. Gen. Evan Gaddis reported that “only 14 percent are the high quality, fully qualified and available prospects all military services want to recruit.”<sup>14</sup> The military could solve any recruiting problems by simply lowering its standards to those of a conscript military.

The volunteer force is superior in another way: the armed services are filled with people who desire to serve. Even Kurtz acknowledges that discipline problems would inevitably increase with conscription. And that problem would permeate the force: draftees have little incentive to train, accept greater responsibility, or reenlist; yet the military must retain them, almost no matter how ill suited they are to military service.

That explains the fact that the volunteer military has higher attrition rates, something that perplexes *Washington Post* columnist Mark Shields. Attrition is higher in the volunteer military—it peaked at about 20 percent for the Army in 1998—a fact he notes with satisfaction: “Facts are stubborn things.”<sup>15</sup> But that’s because it is a voluntary military. The services get to choose who remains; with conscription, they can ill afford to kick out even the worst malcontent since being kicked out would be seen as a reward for anyone seeking an out.<sup>16</sup> Think about it: is a military healthier if it relies on those who desire to serve and succeed or if it

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is forced to include those who desire to escape at any price?

## **Women in the Military**

Kurtz also contends that only the presence of women—33,621 of 182,845 recruits in 2001—allows the All-Volunteer Force to survive. The role of women in the armed services remains controversial, of course, though so far the military has performed superbly even as women have filled more roles.

Moreover, an all-male military might yield a different culture, in which male enlistment was higher. For instance, while the number of women between the ages of 16 and 21 interested in enlisting remained unchanged between 1991 and 1994, the number of young men interested in volunteering dropped by a third.<sup>17</sup> Observed Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, “There is something wrong with the changes in the culture of the military that is turning off young men, and young men are the primary market.”<sup>18</sup> How much the military has lost of what was once part of its fundamental appeal is a matter of serious debate.<sup>19</sup>

This issue is serious but does not justify conscription. The proper question is how best to build a volunteer military, given whatever constraints are imposed by the civilian leadership. Reducing the role of women would not necessitate conscription. Rather, it would require a different approach to recruiting, including perhaps a different set of quality standards.

## **Proposals for a Special Skills Draft**

Since a draft would lower the quality of enlisted manpower while diverting attention from creating the specialized, professional forces needed in the future, is there another reason to conscript? Commentator John Derbyshire suggests a draft to meet specific

needs, such as a need for Pashto or Chinese speakers.<sup>20</sup> This proposal builds on more traditional plans for a medical draft to ensure the availability of doctors and other health care personnel in a crisis.<sup>21</sup>

A medical draft has long been justified because it would occur only in the midst of a serious war. A special skills draft, in contrast, could be implemented at any time; in theory, there might be a draft of just a few hundred people, if they were unlucky enough to possess a particular skill demanded by the military. Yet conscription of only Afghan immigrants, for instance, would correctly be seen as grossly unfair. It would also create perverse incentives—encouraging anyone with unique abilities that might suddenly come into demand to hide those skills (deny that one speaks Pashto, make a hash of interpretation duties, or refuse to speak it at all) or undertake an extended sabbatical abroad or even emigrate (Pakistan might begin to look good to someone who otherwise faced induction into a Ranger unit to be dropped behind Taliban lines).

Conscription also offers an unnecessarily complex solution to a relatively simple problem. A draft is unable to provide a long-term supply of any skill: absent lifetime conscription, most draftees will leave when their tour ends. And a draft cannot quickly fill an unexpected need. Even if the Pentagon had decided on September 12 that it wanted Pashto speakers, they would not have been inducted and trained in time to serve during the fighting in Afghanistan. Better to rely on either civilian contractors or military reservists with the necessary special skills to do such jobs.

## **Curb Commitments, Not Liberty**

Northwestern University’s Charles Moskos and Paul Glasris, editor in chief of the *Washington Monthly*, recognize that a high-tech military requires professionals. But they suggest a draft to acquire raw numbers for other purposes—peacekeeping duty, for

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instance. "This would free up professional soldiers to do the fighting without sacrificing other U.S. commitments."<sup>22</sup>

Fear of maintaining expansive commitments also motivates Kurtz. Imagine, he writes, a United States busy garrisoning Afghanistan and preparing to invade Iraq, then having to deal with the collapse of Pakistan's government, followed by a North Korean invasion of South Korea. That "would stretch our forces past the breaking point and almost surely force the president to ask the Democrats to join him in imposing a draft."<sup>23</sup>

More sensible, however, would be to ask: which commitments are worthy of U.S. attention? More particularly, which commitments are worth meeting through conscription?

For instance, no vital national interest is at stake in policing the Balkans. The area is important to Europe, which has more than 1 million men under arms, not to America. The artificial settlements imposed in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia reflect the opinions of international elites rather than local residents and thus do not warrant spilling American blood. There is certainly no reason to conscript young Americans to force three hostile communities to live together in Bosnia or to ensure that Kosovo remains an autonomous part of Serbia, a position that satisfies none of the combatants. Americans' lives and freedom should not be sacrificed so frivolously.

As for Kurtz's slightly lurid scenario of the United States choosing to war with most of the Muslim world, Washington maintains a substantial reserve force precisely to handle such unexpected contingencies. No one suggested maintaining, day in, day out, a sufficient active force to manage the unlikely contingency of a full-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflagration. Instead, in the event of war Washington would have called up the reserves while expanding its active forces.<sup>24</sup>

In any case, the United States could easily expand its available military resources by no longer defending its prosperous and populous industrialized allies. At present the United States maintains 100,000 troops in Europe and a similar number in East Asia.

The European Union faces no serious security threat, and the Europeans are able to deal with modest problems such as disruptive civil wars in the Balkans. Japan is capable of doing much more to enhance regional stability, and South Korea can counter the sole serious regional military threat, posed by North Korea. At a time when South Korea has upwards of 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea, as well as a vast technological edge over its northern antagonist, Americans should stop talking about what they would do in the unlikely event of an invasion and let South Koreans talk about what they would do.<sup>25</sup> Unnecessarily subsidizing wealthy client states is dubious enough; drafting young Americans so allies don't have to burden their own citizens is senseless.

### **Foolish Missions Hurt Recruitment and Retention**

Dubious commitments unrelated to American security have exacerbated the military's recruitment and retention problems. Focus group interviews have found that young men are reluctant to support America's increasing role as international policeman. Two researchers at the Defense Manpower Data Center reported that "youth today generally view the military as less attractive than before the end of the Cold War. A considerable number of young men indicated they did not wish to serve as peacekeepers in foreign countries. . . . Some suggested that recent military ventures were motivated by the interests of national leaders—Congress or the President—but were not in the national interest. They objected to being put in jeopardy to fight someone else's battles."<sup>26</sup>

Parents shared that concern and "generally were not supportive of this evolving role for the United States military," report the defense researchers.<sup>27</sup> Navy recruiter Petty Officer 1st Class Saul Lowery explains: "Parents are telling us that it's OK for their kids to defend the nation—they can live with that. But they

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can't see their kids serving as peacekeepers for someone else's battles."<sup>28</sup> The September 11 attacks had the opposite impact on people's attitudes, transforming the sentiments of even many pacifist-minded college students. National defense, not international social engineering, is the surest bedrock from which to appeal for military service.<sup>29</sup>

Promiscuous and frivolous deployments have also harmed retention. This may be the most important reason for the loss of Air Force pilots.<sup>30</sup> The Navy is feeling a similar effect.<sup>31</sup> One serviceman complained, "We're not really fighting the country's wars; we're just acting like the world's policeman."<sup>32</sup> An Army officer explained in his resignation letter: "I didn't join the Army to be a peacekeeper."<sup>33</sup> The *New York Times* has reported that "the combat readiness, morale and effectiveness of the troops appears to plummet after six months of duty" in such operations.<sup>34</sup> This problem is beyond the reach of conscription, unless Uncle Sam's lottery ticket means a lifetime of service.

### **Conscription for Homeland Defense?**

Another proposal is to use conscription for defense at home. Writes *Washington Post* columnist David Broder: "The reality is that homeland defense in the war on terrorism is bound to be labor-intensive, as demanding of manpower as the big wars of the past. But we do not have the vital tool we used in those wars: the draft."<sup>35</sup> University of North Carolina journalism professor Philip Meyer argues that "a system of universal training—military, civil-defense or related skills that could be called into use on short notice to combat terrorism—would reduce [the gap between military and civilian society] and make the USA more democratic and, at the same time, a safer place to live."<sup>36</sup>

Moskos and Glatris propose a three-part draft: choose among the military, homeland security, and civilian work. This system, they write, "would focus less on preparing men for

conventional combat—which hasn't been very extensive in this war so far—than on training young men and even young women for the arguably more daunting task of guarding against and responding to terrorism at home."<sup>37</sup> Why pay a salary when people can be forced into uniform? Moskos and Glatris write:

We are clearly going to need more armed federal personnel to guard dams, nuclear power plants, sports complexes and U.S. embassies; more border patrol and customs agents to keep terrorists and their weapons from entering the country; more INS agents to track down immigrants who have overstayed their visas; more Coast Guard personnel to inspect ships; more air marshals to ride on passenger jets; and more FBI agents to uncover terrorist cells still operating inside and outside our borders.<sup>38</sup>

Others use anti-terrorism as a hook for creating a mandatory program intended primarily to meet other goals, such as creating a huge new federal social program. "Our schools are as important to our future as are border patrols," argues David Gergen of *U.S. News & World Report*.<sup>39</sup> Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Evan Bayh (D-Ind.) have proposed legislation to expand the (currently voluntary) service program AmeriCorps. But their proposal appears to be a stalking horse for conscript service. McCain adviser Marshall Wittman of the Hudson Institute explains: a move to coercion "may be sooner than we think, depending on what the needs are in this war."<sup>40</sup>

A draft for national service would be unprecedented, although the idea goes back more than a century to the famous William James essay "The Moral Equivalent of War" and the even earlier Edward Bellamy novel *Looking Backward*.<sup>41</sup> Some advocates of national service claim that the practice is not unprecedented, pointing to alternative service for conscientious objectors; but that program was always a minor adjunct to the mil-

itary draft.<sup>42</sup> Voluntary civilian programs, ranging from the Peace Corps to AmeriCorps, have never handled anything close to the 4 million men and women who turn 18 every year.

## **Homeland Defense Conscription Fallacies**

A draft is not an intelligent way to fill a set of needs as diverse as the needs presented by the war on terrorism. If costs are not considered, “needs” will be infinite. After all, before the concern for homeland defense, the number of estimated “unmet social needs” ranged between 3.5 and 5.3 million.<sup>43</sup> But the number was meaningless, since the proper number of librarians, or airport screeners, or Immigration and Naturalization Service agents can be decided only by balancing the benefits of their work with the costs of paying for it.

Calling something “homeland defense” does not change the analysis. For instance, stationing national guardsmen—more than 9,000 have been called up—at airports across America is a complete waste. No one expects al-Qaeda terrorists to storm airport security checkpoints, which the guardsmen could conceivably protect. The guardsmen have nothing to do with screening passengers, the real issue of airline security. Indeed, this diversion is proving particularly costly since guardsmen could play other important roles; in private life many are cops, for instance. The National League of Cities reports “a temporary loss of public safety personnel to National Guard and military reserve call-ups.”<sup>44</sup> Conscripting people wouldn’t make the “scarecrow” presence in airports any more valuable.

There are nearly 600,000 bridges in America. Protecting every bridge would entail at least a two-man detail at all times—that is, three shifts a day plus weekend duty. That’s at least eight people per bridge, or more than 4 million people—the entire number of men and women turning 18 each year. Even if only the few thousand most prominent bridges were guarded, the personnel drain would be

daunting. There are also 91,062 schools, 4,000 water treatment plants, 3,329 major malls, 493 skyscrapers, 322 commercial sports stadiums, 103 nuclear reactors, and 190,000 miles of natural gas pipeline. Add in all of the other potential targets and, if we value people’s labor at zero, no one will be doing anything other than guard duty.

Conscription will not draw people into useful tasks at acceptable cost. Not everyone is fit to be an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; some people have talents suited to work other than manning an airport security checkpoint.

In fact, a labor draft involving the 4 million Americans who turn 18 every year would inevitably result in poor use of manpower. Inefficient central government control mixed with the usual pursuit of political pork would ensure a failure to make serious trade-offs among competing tasks. This is the experience of AmeriCorps, which has funded “volunteers” to engage in all manner of low-value activities, including political activism.<sup>45</sup> Consider the debate over federalizing airport screening. Although many people apparently felt that they would be more secure if the job were turned over to a government bureaucracy, most foreign countries rely on a competitive mix of airport authorities, local governments, and private companies.<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, if conscription is a good idea, don’t draft the young; instead, follow Derbyshire’s idea of a skills-based draft and grab cops, security personnel, private investigators, and others from their present jobs. Not that doing so would save money. Conscription only shifts the burden of paying to those drafted. There’s no such thing as a free lunch when it comes to recruiting soldiers, training firemen, or hiring airport screeners. Instead of attempting to foist the cost off on the young, in the name of patriotism, all Americans should share in the cost of protecting their society.

That is, the government should follow the normal path of fulfilling important needs: identify the tasks that require a professional and use both patriotic appeals and financial

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incentives to find the best people.<sup>47</sup> More broadly, officials should promote citizen awareness of security needs and encourage volunteer involvement where it can be helpful. President George W. Bush has called for a new volunteer civil defense service, though officials have yet to figure out how to make use of volunteers.<sup>48</sup>

## **Conscription Undermines American Values**

Patriotism and civic commitment are good things. Write Moskos and Glastris, "It's a shame that it's taken terrorist attacks to reawaken us to the reality of our shared national fate."<sup>49</sup> But nothing in that shared fate suggests that we should abandon the shared principles upon which the American nation is based, most notably a commitment to individual liberty.

Well, asks Mark Shields, "should only American volunteers be asked to die in the defense of the United States?"<sup>50</sup> Should only American volunteers be asked to die in arresting criminals? In fighting fires? In devoting their lives to the poor? A free society doesn't mean there are no shirkers, content to benefit from the sacrifices of others. That is the inevitable price of freedom. Allowing the pampered elite that populates Washington to decide how everyone else should spend his or her life is far too high a price to pay for such a dubious form of "fairness."

Conscription matters, not just by itself, but also in its impact on a free society more generally. As war inflated the state, warns historian Robert Higgs, "countless individuals suffered the destruction of their liberties, property, and lives."<sup>51</sup> Conscription has been an integral part of that process, promoting growth of the government and manipulation of the economy.

In America homeland defense does more than secure a plot of land. It protects an ideal, a free society built on respect for and protection of individual liberty. Renewing conscription would destroy the very thing we are supposed to be protecting.

## **Notes**

1. Stanley Kurtz, "Revive the Draft," National Review Online, September 12, 2001, [www.nationalreview.com](http://www.nationalreview.com). At least one commentator thinks a draft of sorts exists now. *Washington Post* columnist Mark Shields contends that the military's use of "stop-loss," which freezes departures from the service, means we have a conscript force. Mark Shields, "The New 'Draftees,'" *Washington Post*, December 29, 2001, p. A23.

Alas, Shields confuses involuntary service with voluntarily accepting restrictions on one's actions when serving. After all, someone who freely enlists cannot quit before his term ends without permission; he can be arrested for being AWOL if he leaves his post without permission. So, too, the government can hold personnel past the end of their enlistment terms or planned retirement dates. This simply reflects the unique nature of military service. It should be obvious that this is quite different from forcing someone to serve.

2. See, for example, Peter Baker, "Not So Full of Fight," *Washington Post*, October 13, 2001, pp. A1, A19.

3. Quoted in Fareed Zakaria, "Face the Facts: Bombing Works," *Newsweek*, December 3, 2001, p. 53.

4. See, for example, James Crawley, "SEALs' Aim Was Clear: Put 'Eyes on Target,'" *San Diego Union-Tribune*, December 21, 2001, pp. A1, A4; Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks, "Marines Secure Afghan Foothold," *Washington Post*, November 27, 2001, pp. A1, A6; Pauline Jelinek, "Rumsfeld: Commandos Target Taliban," Associated Press, November 16, 2001; Vernon Loeb and Bradley Graham, "Special Forces Block Traffic in Search for bin Laden," *Washington Post*, November 15, 2001, p. A35; Michael Gordon, "Special Forces Hunt Al Qaeda on the Ground," *New York Times*, November 15, 2001, pp. A1, B4; Thomas Ricks and Bradley Graham, "U.S. Special Forces Stepping Up Pursuit of Taliban Leaders," *Washington Post*, November 14, 2001, pp. A1, A23; Michael Phillips, "Why Master Jwad and His Cargo Have SEALs on Their Tail," *Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 2001, pp. A1, A10; Greg Jaffe, "An Elite Army Team Opens a New Front: The Afghan Mind," *Wall Street Journal*, November 8, 2001, pp. A1, A6; James Dao and Thom Shanker, "Special Forces, On the Ground, Aid the Rebels," *New York Times*, October 31, 2001, pp. A1, B2; Chip Cummins, "After Bombing Ends, Green Berets May Lead the Afghanistan Fight," *Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 2001, pp. A1, A12; George Friedman, "Special Forces Eyed for Afghanistan," *Washington Times*, September 29, 2001, p. A10; and Robert Burns, "Special Forces Needed in Attack," Associated Press, September 17, 2001.

5. See generally Doug Bandow, "Fixing What Ain't Broke: The Renewed Call for Conscription," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 351, August 31, 1999.
6. See, for example, Brad Knickerbocker, "War May Prod Military Reforms," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 3, 2002, pp. 1, 4; and Thom Shanker, "After Terrorist Attacks, Army Rethinks Priorities on Fighting and Spending," *New York Times*, November 8, 2001, p. B6.
7. Philip Gold, "Viewpoint: Resuming Peacetime Conscription Bad Idea That Would Clog Courts," *Tacoma (Wash.) News Tribune*, November 29, 1998, p. B13."
8. Gordon Sullivan, "Washington Tightwads Are Creating a Hollow Military," *Wall Street Journal*, September 22, 1998, p. A22.
9. Quoted in William Matthews, "Little Enthusiasm for Return of Draft," *Army Times* January 25, 1999, p. 14.
10. Quoted in Brian Mitchell, "Is the Draft in Your Future?" *Investor's Business Daily*, February 19, 1999, p. A1.
11. Conversation with Maj. James Cassella, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, November 9, 2001.
12. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997* (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), p. D-14. Observes Thomas Ricks, in some ways a critic of the all-volunteer force, "The result of [the services'] selectivity is that the military is now far better educated than the general population." Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap between the Military and Society," *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997, electronic edition.
13. Quoted in Steven Lee Myers, "Good Times Mean Hard Sell for the Military," *New York Times* November 3, 1998, p. A19." See also Moniz.
14. Evan Gaddis, Statement before Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House National Security Committee, Hearing on Recruiting Issues, March 18, 1999, pp. 3-4.
15. Mark Shields, "Sacrifice for a Few," *Washington Post*, November 7, 2001, p. A29.
16. Moreover, since attrition is expensive, the services have been working, with success, to increase the number of recruits who complete basic training. Gerry Gilmore, "Recruit Attrition Rates Fall across the Services," American Forces Information Service, August 13, 2001, www.defenselink.mil.
17. Lancaster and Lehnus. The propensity to enlist did fall from 14 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 1997, however. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997*, p. 2-1.
18. Quoted in Mitchell, "Is the Draft in Your Future?" p. A22.
19. See, for example, William Moore, "The Military Must Revive Its Warrior Spirit," *Wall Street Journal*, October 27, 1988, p. A22. This isn't just an American issue. Clashes between military and civilian cultures have been evident in other democracies, such as France. See Steward Ambler, *The French Army in Politics: 1945-1962* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 277-307. The armed services' apparent shift from institutional to occupational models has also been observed throughout Europe. See Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, eds., *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp. 153-275.
20. John Derbyshire, "Draft as Needed," National Review Online, October 4, 2001, www.nationalreview.com.
21. See, for example, Michael Betsch, "Women, Pacifists Could Be Included in Military Draft," CNSNews, November 12, 2001, www.cnsnews.com.
22. Charles Moskos and Paul Glastris, "This Time, A Draft for the Home Front, Too," *Washington Post*, November 4, 2001, p. B4.
23. Stanley Kurtz, "Draft Realities," National Review Online, October 24, 2001, www.nationalreview.com.
24. Indeed, the Pentagon called up a number of reservists for duty in preparing for war in Afghanistan. See, for example, Dan Gilgoff, "Stepping Up to the Plate," *U.S. News & World Report*, November 5, 2001, pp. 54-55.
25. See, for example, Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington: Cato Institute, 1996).
26. Jerry Lehnus and Anita Lancaster, "Declining Interest in Military Service: Quantitative Observations," Defense Manpower Data Center Report no. 97-001 (paper presented at International Military Testing Association conference "Youth Attitudes toward Military Service in the Post-Cold War Era," San Antonio, 1996), p. A-3.
27. *Ibid.*, p. A-6.
28. Quoted in Stephen Barrett, "Perceptions Making It Tough on Service Recruiters," Department of Defense, August 1996, www.defenselink.mil.

29. See, for example, David Chen, "On College Campuses, Students See Military with New Set of Eyes," *New York Times*, November 26, 2001, p. A15; Michael Fletcher, "Trust, and Interest, in Government Soar on College Campuses," *Washington Post*, November 23, 2001, p. A3; Allison Samuels, "They Know I'm about Something," *Newsweek*, November 12, 2001, p. 56; and Molly Williams, "Many Americans Try to Join the Military, But Not So Many Measure Up," *Wall Street Journal*, October 25, 2001, pp. B1, B3.
30. Mitchell, p. A1; Rowan Scarborough, "Airline Pay Lures Military Pilots Bored by Peacekeeping," *Washington Times* October 4, 1998, p. A6; Bradley Graham, "Strains on Many Fronts Drive Pilots from the Skies, Airmen Say," *Washington Post*, August 13, 1998, p. A29; Rowan Scarborough, "Military Is Subpar, Lott Tells President," *Washington Times* July 2, 1998, pp. A1, A11; and Philip Shenon, "Top Guns Quitting for Life at Cruising Altitude," *New York Times*, October 22, 1997, p. A14. Air Force personnel have also made that argument directly. Tom Henwood, "Payback for Military Service," letter to the editor, *Washington Post*, March 20, 1999, p. A17.
31. Rowan Scarborough, "Navy Secretary Seeks Way to Boost Morale," *Washington Times*, January 1, 1999, pp. A1, A9.
32. Quoted in Mitchell, p. A28. See also John Diamond, "Pilots Flying Away from Military," *Washington Times*, March 24, 1998, pp. B7, B8.
33. Quoted in Ricks and Robbins, p. A6. Maj. Gen. Evan Gaddis put it more delicately when he told a congressional subcommittee: "Because the scope of Army operations has changed and continues to change since the breakup of the Soviet Union, deployments involve a variety of humanitarian and peace keeping missions with special requirements for each situation. As a result, soldiers must also be sensitive to their environment and capable of working with a variety of people. The requirement for highly strenuous physical activity will remain as well. In short, the future will require a multifunctional, full-spectrum soldier." Gaddis, pp. 3-4.
34. Chris Hedges, "Studying Bosnia's U.S. 'Prisoners of Peace,'" *New York Times*, March 30, 1997, p. 11.
35. David Broder, "Old Idea for a New Era," *Washington Post*, November 21, 2001, p. A23.
36. Philip Meyer, "Crisis Exposes Military, Civilian Divide," *USA Today*, October 16, 2001, www.usatoday.com.
37. Moskos and Glastris, p. B1. Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Evan Bayh (D-Ind.) have introduced legislation to promote voluntary service in all three areas. John McCain and Evan Bayh, "A New Start for National Service," *New York Times*, November 6, 2001, p. A23.
38. Moskos and Glastris, p. B4. See also Meyer; Cynthia Tucker, "Draft Youth into Serving," *Atlanta Constitution*, January 2, 2002, www.accessatlanta.com /ajc/tucker.
39. David Gergen, "A Time to Heed the Call," *U.S. News & World Report*, December 24, 2001, p. 60. See also Robert Litan, "Diversity in Israel: Lessons for the United States," *Brookings Review* 20, no. 1 (2002): 41-44.
40. Quoted in Richard Just, "Suddenly Serviceable: Is This the Moment for National Service?" *American Prospect* 13, no. 1 (January 1-14, 2002), www.Americanprospect.com.
41. See Doug Bandow, "National Service: The Enduring Panacea," *Cato Institute Policy Analysis* no. 130, March 22, 1990.
42. Broder.
43. Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton, *National Service: What Would It Mean?* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 40-41; and Donald Eberly, *National Service* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. 4.
44. Christine Hall, "National Guard Call-Ups Having 'Quite an Impact' on Local Police," *CNSNews*, November 6, 2001, www.cnsnews.com.
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47. The Office of Personnel Management is already using patriotism as part of its appeal in filling jobs. "U.S. Uses Patriotism in Appeal to Restore Its Emergency Force," *Washington Times*, November 5, 2001, p. A3.

48. Alison Mitchell, "After Asking for Volunteers, Government Tries to Determine What They Will Do," *New York Times*, November 10, 2001, p. B7.

49. Moskos and Glastris, p. B4.

50. Shields. Others often articulate this concern by complaining that the military is unrepresentative. However, the armed services are weighted toward middle America, especially when the role of largely college-educated officers and reservists,

who span occupations from cops to lawyers, is considered. Bandow, "Fixing What Ain't Broke," p. 10. See also Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1999* (Washington: Department of Defense, November 2000).

51. Robert Higgs, "War and Leviathan in Twentieth-Century America: Conscription as the Keystone," Independent Institute, November 13, 2001, [www.independent.org](http://www.independent.org).

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