

Faulty Justifications and Ominous Prospects NATO's "Victory" in Kosovo

by Christopher Layne

Executive Summary

With the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, President Clinton triumphantly proclaimed, "We have achieved a victory." Yet the Clinton administration's ill-conceived Kosovo policy has habitually failed to meet its objectives.

The threat of air strikes failed to get Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet peace accord. Once the air strikes began, the unintended consequences were horrific. Not only did the bombing trigger a refugee crisis, but U.S.-Russian relations were driven to a post-Cold War low—a development that makes Europe and the world more dangerous.

Even the various rationales for NATO intervention offered by the administration were faulty. Those rationales included assertions that (1) genocide was occurring in Kosovo; (2) if the United States did not intervene, American credibility would be lost and dictators around the world would assume that they had a free hand; and (3) NATO's role as the guarantor of European security would be discredited, thereby increasing the risk that Europe would be drawn into its third Continent-wide war this century.

The humanitarian situation in Kosovo prior to NATO bombing, however, was not unusual in the annals of counterinsurgency wars. NATO

member Turkey has been for years waging a similar war against Kurdish separatists. Moreover, the conflict in Kosovo was not a test of American credibility—the stakes were both murky and meager—until Washington needlessly transformed the situation into a test of American resolve. The Kosovo war was a challenge not to NATO's traditional role as a collective-defense alliance but only to its new and dubious role as a post-Cold War crisis-management institution. Furthermore, history shows that conflicts in peripheral regions such as Kosovo do not inevitably escalate to Europewide wars that imperil American interests. The two world wars involved exceptional breakdowns of the European balance of power.

NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia killed hundreds of civilians and exacerbated tensions throughout the region. Moreover, Belgrade's headache may soon become Washington's. U.S. and other NATO troops already have a tense relationship with the Kosovo Liberation Army, which still demands independence, not merely autonomy, for Kosovo. In short, NATO's "victory" means deploying U.S. troops on yet another multi-billion-dollar, open-ended peacekeeping and nation-building operation.

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Introduction

In diplomacy and politics, as in baseball, it is always better to be lucky than good. President Bill Clinton was very lucky that his ill-conceived war against Yugoslavia did not culminate in an irreparable fiasco. The result to date is bad enough. Although the administration's spinmeisters are depicting Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's acceptance of NATO's peace terms as a vindication of Clinton's Kosovo policy, "spin" should not be confused with truth. The reality is that the administration stumbled into war and blundered its way to "victory." If the outcome in Kosovo can be called a victory at all, then we should bear in mind the words uttered in the third century B.C. by King Pyrrhus of Epirus: "Another such victory and we shall be undone."

The Kosovo war was eminently avoidable, but the United States, Western Europe, and the peoples of the Balkans will be living with the consequences of that conflict for years to come. The Clinton administration was woefully ignorant of the historical and political context of events in Kosovo. After having absolved the Kosovo Liberation Army and concluded that the Serbs alone were responsible for the situation, the administration intervened in a civil war over power and land between the KLA and the Serbian government. At Rambouillet, instead of exploring the possibilities of a compromise settlement, which is what real diplomacy is about, the administration presented Belgrade with an ultimatum: sign or be bombed. Although the administration indignantly denies the charge, NATO bombing triggered the very humanitarian crisis in Kosovo that Washington said it was acting to prevent. As a result of the Clinton administration's policy, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians were forced to flee Kosovo, and hundreds were killed by NATO bombs (to say nothing of the Serb civilians killed by NATO bombing).

Moreover, Clinton's "victory" means that

the United States, along with its NATO allies, has assumed a commitment of indefinite duration to pacify and rebuild Kosovo; resettle the ethnic Albanian refugees; and stabilize Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro (in addition to the preexisting commitment in Bosnia). By turning Kosovo into a de facto protectorate, the United States and the alliance risk becoming involved in another war—this time with the KLA, which is committed to attaining independence for Kosovo. The war against Yugoslavia may be over, but America's Balkan difficulties are far from over.

How is it that the United States has become involved in this dubious enterprise? American policymakers invoked three basic rationales to justify the war against Yugoslavia: (1) preventing humanitarian disaster, (2) preserving American credibility, and (3) validating NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe. All three are fundamentally flawed.

Faulty Rationale Number One: Humanitarian Intervention

In his March 24, 1999, speech to the nation and subsequently, President Clinton stressed the "moral imperative" to intervene in Kosovo because of the humanitarian tragedy there.¹ (That rationale was seemingly lent new urgency by the May 28 decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to indict Milosevic for war crimes in connection with atrocities committed by Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo.) However, as a rationale for the war, humanitarian intervention is doubly flawed. First, before the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign, there was no humanitarian crisis in Kosovo; the Serbian drive to expel ethnic Albanians from Kosovo began after the United States and NATO launched the air strikes. Second, quite apart from that salient fact, even on its own terms the humanitarian rationale is an unconvincing explanation for Washington's decision to intervene in this *particular* conflict.

It is certainly true that innocent civilians were killed in Kosovo both before and after the NATO bombing.² The *New York Times* estimated that, as of the end of May 1999, 4,600 ethnic Albanians had been killed in Kosovo by Serbian forces since the NATO bombing commenced on March 24.³ And many ethnic Albanians fleeing Kosovo admitted that NATO air strikes were what triggered the Serbian backlash of ethnic cleansing. As one refugee explained, “It’s like this: The Serbs can’t fight NATO, so now they are after us.”⁴

In addition, an unknown number of ethnic Albanians (and Serbian civilians) in Kosovo were killed, not by Serbian forces, but as a result of NATO air strikes, including what appears to have been the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel cluster bombs. (Moreover, many Serbian civilians, victims of “collateral damage,” were killed during NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavian cities.)

The death of noncombatants in wartime is lamentable. Unfortunately, civilian deaths are an inescapable part of warfare. War is an inherently brutal enterprise and has been especially so during the last 200 years. Modern warfare erased the distinction that, in the era before industrialization, nationalism, and conscript armies, had delineated civilians from combatants. During World War I, for example, the Allied naval blockade sought to force Germany’s capitulation by starving its civilian population. In World War II, the United States and Britain had no qualms about deliberately inflicting widespread casualties among innocent civilians by conducting indiscriminate terror bombing against German and Japanese cities. That the end—crushing Hitler and Japan’s militarists—may have justified the means does not change the fact that civilians of cities like Dresden, Tokyo, and Hiroshima were dead.

There is evidence suggesting that what the Clinton administration and NATO advertised as an air war against Yugoslavia’s military capabilities was really a war of attrition against the Serbian people to get them to force Milosevic to do what the West wanted.

The U.S. Air Force commander in charge of the Kosovo campaign, Lt. Gen. Michael Short, admitted that NATO was trying to do more than just hurt the Yugoslav military. The larger goal was to break the will of the Serbian people and make ordinary Serbs so miserable and fearful that they would force Milosevic to pull out of Kosovo. NATO planners, the general explained, hoped that Serbs would react to the economic devastation of their country in the following way: “If you wake up in the morning and you have no power to your house and no gas to your stove and the bridge you take to work is down and will be lying in the Danube for the next 20 years, I think you begin to ask, ‘Hey, Slobo, what’s this all about? How much more of this do we have to withstand?’ And at some point, you make the transition from applauding Serb machismo against the world to thinking what your country is going to look like if this continues.”⁵

The Kosovo Conflict: A Typical Secessionist War

The war that had been taking place in Kosovo prior to the NATO bombing was a particularly brutal form of modern conflict: a counterinsurgency campaign by a sovereign government, Yugoslavia, against a guerrilla force, the KLA. In counterinsurgencies, civilians inescapably become targets because the guerrillas draw their manpower, material sustenance, and political support from the population in whose name they fight. Insurgent forces often deliberately provoke the authorities into harsh reprisals against their own civilian allies to strengthen domestic support for the insurgency and to gain outside sympathy and support for their cause. From early 1998 until the commencement of the NATO bombing, the KLA engaged in such tactics of provocation in an attempt to trigger NATO intervention on behalf of the guerrillas. The Clinton administration was explicitly warned by the U.S. intelligence community of the KLA’s ulterior motives.⁶

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Serbs conformed closely to the usual pattern of guerrilla wars. The Serbian army's late-March offensive in Kosovo was a response to KLA actions, "including the ambushing of Serbian police patrols and officials by Albanians and several instances of the kidnaping and killing of Serbian civilians."⁷ Certainly, Serbia's prebombing campaign against the KLA was harsh. Nevertheless, the total number of fatalities (including Serbian casualties) before the onset of the NATO bombing campaign was approximately 2,000, a relatively low figure compared with those for other internecine conflicts in the 1990s. Before the onset of NATO's air campaign, Belgrade's objective was not to forcibly expel ethnic Albanians from Kosovo but rather to remove them from KLA strongholds, thereby depriving the KLA of its base of support.

Once the bombing began, however, the Serbian campaign in Kosovo intensified as Belgrade moved (apparently according to a previously formulated contingency plan) to crush the KLA and to expel large numbers of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. That campaign had an immediate military objective:

By expelling ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, Serbian forces aimed to restrict the guerrillas' base of support and cover. By controlling the borders and the devastated corridors along the major highways, the Serbs planned to isolate and then eradicate the Kosovo Liberation Army in the forests and mountains.⁸

However, Belgrade also had a broader political objective: to reverse the demographic trends in Kosovo, which, largely because of differential birthrates, have seen ethnic Albanians become almost 90 percent of the province's population. In stepping up their actions in Kosovo following the start of the NATO bombing, Serbian forces were, as reported in the *New York Times*, "seeking to defuse a potential demographic time bomb," but their goal was "depopulation

rather than extermination."⁹

Although the brutality of Belgrade's actions should not be minimized, such actions are not unusual in the context of guerrilla warfare. More to the point, they were not a "horrific slaughter," or "genocide," as repeatedly alleged by U.S. and NATO officials.

Precedents for Belgrade's Counterinsurgency Tactics

Students of counterinsurgencies will recognize the similarities between the Serbs' tactics in Kosovo and those of the French in Algeria, the British in the Boer War, and the Americans in the Philippines and Vietnam. As military analyst Jeffrey Record says of U.S. tactics in Vietnam:

The evidence, including the widespread declarations of free-fire zones in "enemy"-controlled regions, strongly suggests that firepower was deliberately employed to depopulate—by death or abandonment—entire rural areas of Vietnam. During the war, at least 50% of South Vietnam's peasantry was involuntarily urbanized by combat in the countryside. . . . Between 1964 and 1974, South Vietnam's urban population went from 15 to 65% of the country's total, and by 1968 *refugees alone accounted for 5 million of South Vietnam's total population of 17 million.*¹⁰

The ferocity of the war between the Serbs and the KLA in Kosovo was explained by the conflict's historical and ethnic dimensions.¹¹ In that respect, the war differed little from previous Balkan conflicts. As a Carnegie Endowment report on the First Balkan War (1912) observed:

The burning of villages and the exodus of the defeated population is a normal and traditional incident of all Balkan wars and insurrections. It is the habit of these peoples. What

they have suffered themselves, they inflict in turn on others.¹²

General Sherman was correct: War is hell. It is particularly so in a region like the Balkans, a region where memories are long and fuses are short.

Washington's Selective Outrage

Of course, even if one were to accept the claim that the United States should intervene in conflicts that cause widespread suffering, the question still must be posed: Why Kosovo but not Sudan, Rwanda, Congo, or Sierra Leone—all places where armed humanitarian intervention could be as justified to stop appalling atrocities? Furthermore, why were President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright so outraged by the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo yet utterly indifferent to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Croatia?

Before 1991 ethnic Serbs composed 12 percent of Croatia's population. Today, virtually no ethnic Serbs remain in Croatia. Interestingly, several days before the NATO air strikes began, the Hague war crimes tribunal (the same tribunal that indicted Milosevic) released a report that spelled out in chilling detail the atrocities committed by the Croatian army during its 1995 summer offensive, including the forced expulsion and summary execution of ethnic Serbs.¹³ (The Croatian army was trained and organized by "unofficial" U.S. military advisers, who also supervised the planning of the summer 1995 offensive.) Moreover, President Clinton took what one administration official characterized as a "yellow-light approach," and another called an "an amber light tinted green approach," to the Croatian ethnic sweep through the Krajina region.¹⁴ The U.S. ambassador to Croatia at the time, Peter Galbraith, dismissed the flight of up to 150,000 Serbs from Croatia, telling a BBC radio interviewer that ethnic cleansing was carried out only by Serbs. "Ethnic cleansing," he explained, "is a practice sponsored by the leadership in Belgrade, carried out by the

Bosnian Serbs and also by the Croatian Serbs, of forcibly expelling the local population whether it was Muslim or Croat using terror tactics."¹⁵ Red Cross officials, United Nations representatives, and Western diplomats rejected Ambassador Galbraith's assessment. One ambassador described the remark as "breathtaking."¹⁶

Although the Clinton administration and NATO (especially the British) have depicted Serbian actions in Kosovo in the most chilling light possible, they have remained silent about the human rights atrocities perpetrated by Turkey, a NATO member that participated in the war against Yugoslavia. For the past 14 years, Turkey has been waging a savage military campaign of repression against its own ethnic Kurd minority; that campaign has resulted in the death of approximately 37,000 people, mostly Kurds.¹⁷ Turkey's actions against the Kurds—terror, "genocide," and suppression of human rights—are far more egregious than Serbia's actions in Kosovo before the onset of NATO air strikes.

The United States and NATO were willing to bomb Belgrade; however, they did not bomb Ankara and Zagreb. Yet the logic of the alliance's policy, if applied evenhandedly, would suggest that Turkey and Croatia deserve the same kind of punishment meted out to Serbia. In addition, the war crimes tribunal has not indicted Turkish leaders, or Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and his henchmen, for war crimes, although they have committed the same kinds of "crimes against humanity" of which Milosevic and his colleagues are accused.

Humanitarian concerns, and the desire to punish war crimes, were pretexts for U.S. and NATO policy, not the motives behind the policy. The same rationales could also be invoked to justify U.S. military action in countless trouble spots around the world. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, as in Kosovo, those rationales are called up by U.S. policymakers for the purpose of manipulating public opinion into backing foreign interventions that would otherwise be unsupported. During the conflict, Washing-

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ton, and NATO headquarters in Brussels, engaged in a calculated campaign of “perception management”—for example, continually treating uncorroborated rumors of Serbian atrocities as established fact and hyperbolically comparing Serbian actions in Kosovo to the Holocaust. Of course, ethnic cleansing is cruel and unjust, but it is not genocide. A military counterinsurgency campaign that appears to have resulted in fewer than 5,000 deaths is not comparable to the Holocaust. To suggest otherwise is to engage in the rank-est kind of war propaganda.

Humanitarian concerns were not the reason the United States became involved in Kosovo; rather, they were the “reason” that most successfully dampened public and congressional opposition to the administration’s policy.

Faulty Rationale Number Two: American Credibility

The arguments that intervention in Kosovo was required to preserve U.S. “credibility” and to prevent the toppling of geopolitical dominoes in Europe are neither novel nor persuasive. The administration’s line—which was based on a simplistic, and unhistorical, interpretation of events in the 1930s—goes like this: If aggression by “dictators” is not quickly opposed, their appetites will grow and they will have to be stopped later, at greater cost. If the United States does not stop aggression when it first occurs, that aggression will inevitably spiral into a wider conflict. The structure of peace, thus, is said to be indivisible. In his March 24, 1999, speech, President Clinton declared, “Let a fire burn in this area and the flames will spread.” Secretary Albright stated:

Here we are in 1999, at the end of what historians agree has been the bloodiest century in the history of the world. We know how the blood was created and why it happened. It happened because there were evil dic-

tators or aggressive leaders in countries who felt their own space was not big enough and that they had to expand it.¹⁸

Washington’s Shopworn Arguments

Those are the same arguments, almost verbatim, that American policymakers employed throughout the Cold War. President Clinton’s March 24 remarks were an eerie echo of President Harry S Truman’s 1951 assertion that it is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze. If history teaches us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world.¹⁹ The Clinton administration’s arguments for intervention in Kosovo were evocative, as well, of the Johnson administration’s arguments for U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

There is a reason, of course, why policymakers repeatedly employ the metaphors of spreading wildfires or falling dominoes. Those metaphors are useful, perhaps even indispensable, in rallying support for interventions in places that bear no intrinsic strategic relationship to America’s security interests.²⁰ Thus, U.S. policymakers did not claim that America had vital interests in Vietnam. Instead, they argued that if the United States failed to intervene in Vietnam, worse things would happen later on and America’s allies would lose faith in U.S. commitments everywhere. Former secretary of state Dean Rusk explained why he believed that the United States needed to fight in Vietnam: “The lesson I learned from World War II was that if aggression is allowed to gather momentum, it can continue to build and lead to general war. . . . If I thought there was no connection between the events in Southeast Asia, the broad structure of world peace, and the possibility of a third World War, I might have advised differently on Vietnam.”²¹

The Clinton administration used the same “logic” to justify intervention in Kosovo: if aggression were not halted there, it

would automatically spread and endanger peace and stability throughout Europe. Distilled to its essence, the administration's argument was that it was necessary to fight a European war (in Kosovo) now to avoid having to fight a European war later.

Foolish Commitments in Peripheral Regions

Washington's obsessive concern with credibility, and with falling dominoes, highlights a little-understood paradox at the core of U.S. foreign policy. Because of geography, the formidable U.S. military, economic, and technological capabilities, and the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, the United States today—as has been the case throughout the post-World War II era—is more secure than any great power in history. Yet, both during the Cold War and since, the United States has repeatedly found itself involved in conflicts in strategically peripheral regions—ostensibly out of a need to maintain its credibility.²² Credibility is seen as important by U.S. policymakers, who regard it as the key to America's ability to impose order on the international political system.

The pursuit of world order, however, is taxing—even for the world's "sole remaining superpower." Because that ambition requires the United States to impose order on, and control over, the international system, the United States must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its strategic responsibilities in order to maintain the security of its already-established interests. The result is the continual expansion of America's frontiers of insecurity into peripheral areas, such as the Balkans. As foreign policy scholar Robert H. Johnson observes, this process becomes self-sustaining because each time America pushes its security interests outward, threats to the new security frontier will be perceived. That new uncertainty "leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new uncertainty and further self-extension."²³ Fear that instability in Kosovo would ripple back and affect

more important U.S. interests in Western Europe led first to NATO military intervention and then to the further extension of NATO security guarantees to Albania and Macedonia.²⁴

It is that kind of strategic thinking that explains why Washington believes it must demonstrate its leadership and resolve by intervening in places that, in themselves, have no strategic importance to the United States. However, American policymakers have gotten it backward: precisely because these regions are not strategically consequential, U.S. credibility is not at stake in such peripheral areas as the Balkans. Credibility is a function of the interests at stake in a specific crisis. When America's intrinsic claims in a particular dispute are high (and obvious), and America's military capabilities are robust, neither declared adversaries nor others will question U.S. resolve. By the same token, when the United States fails to intervene in peripheral areas, others will not draw adverse inferences about America's willingness to defend vital core interests.²⁵

Another fallacy underlying Washington's obsession with credibility is the assumption that global events are tightly interconnected and that what the United States does in one crisis sets a precedent for subsequent crises. Hence, Clinton argued that if Serbian "aggression" in suppressing an insurgency in Serbian territory went unpunished, leaders in other troubled regions would be emboldened to take similar actions. But the fact that the United States and NATO thwarted Serbia is no more likely to deter future aggressors than U.S. action in the Persian Gulf—which, after all, was defended as part of George Bush's "new world order" that would punish aggressors—deterred Serbia.

In the world of statecraft, most crises are discrete, not tightly linked.²⁶ The outcome of events in other potential hot spots (Taiwan, Korea, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Basin) will be decided by local conditions, not by what the United States does or does not do in the Balkans. Just as Milosevic was not

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deterred by U.S. action against Iraq, Saddam Hussein was not deterred by U.S. action in Panama; Manuel Antonio Noreiga was not deterred by U.S. actions in Lebanon, Grenada, and Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh was not deterred by U.S. action against North Korea; and Kim Il Sung and Joseph Stalin were not deterred by U.S. action against Adolf Hitler. NATO's "victory" in Kosovo will not deter future crises. In those crises, the relative importance of the stakes to each side will determine the "balance of resolve"—and the credibility of U.S. threats.

Faulty Rationale Number Three: Validating NATO

The final rationale for U.S. intervention in Kosovo was the need to validate NATO's importance in post-Cold War Europe. For Washington, Kosovo became a test of NATO's relevance and credibility in the post-Soviet world.²⁷ President Clinton bluntly expressed that reasoning when he said on March 24 that to stand aside in Kosovo "would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for 50 years now."²⁸ As one senior administration official put it at NATO's 50th anniversary commemoration, Kosovo is "a metaphor for what the new NATO is supposed to be all about."²⁹ That logic, of course, begs the key questions, questions that so far have not been adequately debated in the United States: A decade after the Cold War's end, why is NATO still in business, and why is it that the American military presence in Europe is still considered vital by U.S. policymakers? After all, the alliance's survival beyond the Cold War is an anomaly: throughout history alliances have typically dissolved after the common threat to the allies' security has dissipated.³⁰

America's Traditional European Strategy

Historically, "counterhegemonic" concerns have shaped U.S. strategy toward Europe—that is, American policymakers

have feared the prospect of a single power's dominating the European continent.³¹ In command of the Continent's resources, a European hegemon would be powerful enough to threaten America's security in the Western Hemisphere. The counterhegemonic strategy has allowed the United States to stand aloof from involvement in European security affairs, because geography has largely insulated the United States from the great-power rivalries in Europe and the European balance of power has usually prevented any single state from dominating the Continent. However, in 1940, and again after World War II, the collapse of the European balance of power impelled the United States to intervene militarily to forestall the looming hegemony first of Nazi Germany and then of the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union's disappearance, the counterhegemonic rationale for U.S. military involvement in Europe has ceased to carry weight.

From Counterhegemony to an Obsession with Stability

The collapse of Soviet power has compelled U.S. policymakers to articulate a new rationale for NATO and the American military role in Europe. It is now contended that the United States has a crucial interest in preventing any regional instability on the Continent because, so it is asserted, history demonstrates that the United States is invariably drawn into Europe's wars. Secretary Albright has explicitly stated the connection between Kosovo and this putative U.S. interest in overall European stability:

I think that this is in the national interest of the United States because we are so concerned about making sure there is not instability in this part of Europe. We've learned, over the 20th Century, that instability in Europe and fighting and ethnic conflict has in fact brought American soldiers in twice at great cost, and that we have an opportunity to do

something now to stop massacre [*sic*] and fighting before its spreads beyond national boundaries.³²

As Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said several years ago, “If history teaches us anything, it is that the United States is always drawn into such European conflicts because our vital interests are ultimately, albeit somewhat belatedly, engaged.”³³ Although this line of reasoning is repeatedly invoked by officials and policy analysts, it is wrong as a matter of historical fact.

The Stability Argument’s Faulty Historical Assumptions

Instability in its peripheries may affect Europe, but, contrary to the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s conventional wisdom, it has never been true that Europe’s wars invariably affect America’s security interests. Most of Europe’s wars—even wars involving the great powers—have not affected American security. Moreover, the counterhegemonic strategy much more accurately delineates the requirements of America’s European strategy than does the current strategy of reassurance and stabilization. The kinds of small-scale conflicts that have occurred this decade in the Balkans do not threaten America’s security interests because such conflicts do not raise the single strategic danger that Europe could pose to the United States: the emergence of a continental hegemon. Thus, the “new” NATO represents a radical transformation of the alliance’s strategic mission—and of America’s role in NATO.

Since the United States achieved independence, there have been 10 great-power wars in Europe—namely, in 1792–1802, 1803–15, 1853–55, 1859–60, 1866, 1870, 1877–78, 1912–13, 1914–18, and 1939–45. The United States has been involved in only three of those wars; moreover, it could have safely remained out of two of those three. In 1812, hoping to conquer Canada while the British were preoccupied with the Napoleonic Wars, the United States *initiated* war with Britain. In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson took the United

States into World War I for idealistic reasons, notwithstanding that American strategic interests were not at issue.³⁴ Postwar disillusionment, both popular and elite, with Wilson’s crusade “to make the world safe for democracy” had the backlash effect of causing the United States to take a hands-off posture toward European security affairs until 1940.

America’s Commitment to Europe Fosters Dependence

Fifty years after NATO’s founding, in the wake of the alliance’s first war, the time has come to reassess America’s continental commitment. The original purposes of America’s post-World War II policy in Europe have been fulfilled in all respects save one: Western Europe’s remarkable recovery from the war’s ravages has not been matched by the emergence of a strategically independent Western Europe. Ironically, as some key American policymakers recognized at the end of World War II, the U.S. commitment to postwar Europe had the paradoxical effect of making Western Europe’s rehabilitation possible and, at the same time, creating a dependency on America that has proved to be a major impediment to Western Europe’s political unity and strategic self-sufficiency.³⁵

Today, on both sides of the Atlantic, there is ambivalence about the future of the Euro-Atlantic relationship. The United States, on the one hand, fears West European unity and the consequent loss of hegemonic control that such unity would entail. The Europeans, on the other hand, fear taking the last—and most difficult—steps to unity and independence. They also fear losing the security of being an American protectorate (which nevertheless remains a source of transatlantic friction). Still, as Johns Hopkins University diplomatic historian John Lamberton Harper notes in his recent book *American Visions of Europe*, neither the Americans nor the Europeans see “the status quo as either salutary or tenable.”³⁶ Washington can cut this Gordian knot; however, as long as the Europeans believe the United States will assume the main responsibility for the Continent’s security, they will be

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reluctant to move decisively toward strategic self-sufficiency.

In the early 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower, then serving as NATO's first military supreme commander, observed that, if 10 years hence U.S. troops were still in Europe, NATO and the Marshall Plan would have failed.³⁷ In the broad sweep of history, the celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary marks the failure, not the success, of American policy. The time has come to complete America's historic post-1945 project and, in an orderly fashion, devolve the task of ensuring the Continent's peace, stability, and prosperity to a stable and prosperous Western Europe. Having achieved its goals in Europe, America should bring its forces home from “over there.” In the absence of a hegemonic threat, U.S. security is no longer affected by parochial European quarrels. There is certainly no reason why U.S. soldiers should be asked to die for Kosovo or future Kosovos.

NATO's Pyrrhic Victory

The fruits of NATO's “victory” over Yugoslavia have a bitter taste: the United States and NATO will be entangled in the southern Balkans for years keeping the peace, resettling refugees, and undertaking postwar reconstruction. Those missions are going to be expensive and dangerous. The Balkans—always volatile—now are even less stable than they were before NATO commenced its war in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo itself “peace” has brought with it the usual countercycle of revenge: now it is that province's ethnic Serbs who are being forced into exile by vengeful ethnic Albanians. In an especially brutal incident, 14 Serbian framers harvesting their crops were massacred in the village of Gracko in July. By the seventh week of NATO's deployment, there had been 198 confirmed homicides, 573 arson attacks, and 840 cases of looting.³⁸ According to Human Rights Watch, more than 164,000 Serb civilians have been driven from Kosovo.³⁹

More worrisome for the United States and NATO is the rise of the KLA, which has moved boldly to fill Kosovo's postwar political vacuum. Although NATO and the KLA may reach a modus vivendi for the short term, the seeds for a new war in Kosovo have already been planted. As part of the postwar settlement, NATO is committed to upholding Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo, but KLA leaders have made it perfectly plain that they will accept nothing less than complete independence. Even after NATO's “victory,” Kosovo remains a powder keg.

Relations with the KLA

Although American officials denied allegations that the United States was tacitly involved in arming and training the KLA, there were indications during the war that such involvement occurred.⁴⁰ Moreover, evidence existed that American support for the KLA crossed from tacit to active during the latter stages of the war. President Clinton reportedly even signed an order authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency to covertly train KLA forces to conduct sabotage operations against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.⁴¹ Also, NATO coordinated its stepped-up air attacks in early June with a KLA ground offensive.⁴²

Cooperating with the KLA seemingly accords with the timeless logic of power politics: that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The flaw in that argument is its incorrect premise: the KLA, in fact, is on its own side, not America's or NATO's. Thus, in the case of the KLA, the enemy of our enemy is (or soon will become) our enemy, too. That situation poses serious problems for NATO's postwar peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.

It is difficult to see why the KLA has come to be the “good guy” in the Kosovo conflict.⁴³ The KLA includes disparate and unpleasant elements: radical Islamic fundamentalists, communists, drug traffickers, criminals, and the descendants of the ethnic Albanians who fought for the Nazis in World War II. The KLA's aims are inconsistent with Washington's vision and NATO's vision for the province—a vision that calls

for the creation of a multiethnic democracy. The KLA is not committed to democracy. As Chris Hedges, a reporter who spent more than a year investigating the KLA, writes, the KLA has “little sympathy with or understanding of democratic institutions.”⁴⁴ The KLA is not committed to living side by side with ethnic Serbs in postwar Kosovo. Already, in just the first weeks of peace, the KLA has turned the tables and Kosovo’s Serbs have become the new victims of ethnic cleansing.

The KLA’s Agenda and Its Implications

The KLA’s long-range political ambitions are in direct conflict with those of the United States and NATO. Washington and the alliance seek a postwar Kosovo that enjoys substantial self-rule as an autonomous province of Serbia. The KLA, however, is committed to attaining independence for Kosovo and ultimately to forcibly uniting Kosovo with Albania and the ethnic Albanian portion of Macedonia. The latter objective would almost certainly trigger a wider Balkan conflict. As Hedges puts it, the KLA is “uncompromising in its quest for an independent Kosovo now and a Greater Albania later.”⁴⁵ If the KLA succeeds in achieving its goal of independence for Kosovo, it will bode ill for Balkan stability—the ostensible goal of U.S. policy. Furthermore, the prospect of a radical Islamic state on the Continent is anathema to the West European countries. Yet, paradoxically, that is the likely long-term consequence of NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict.

Although the United States and NATO now find themselves in an uneasy alliance with the KLA, the KLA is profoundly distrustful of, and hostile to, the United States and its West European allies. The organization is “militant, nationalist, uncompromising, and deeply suspicious of all outsiders.”⁴⁶ The KLA is merely using NATO temporarily to advance its own political agenda. NATO’s postwar plans for Kosovo call for the KLA to “demilitarize,” but the KLA has made it clear that it has no intention of fully disarming.⁴⁷

Although the KLA forces will probably surrender their heavy weapons and take off their uniforms, they are not likely to give up their small arms, assault rifles, and grenades. Those weapons, the backbone of any insurgent force, will be hidden from NATO peacekeepers. In addition, the KLA can, and almost certainly will, use Albania—which is beyond NATO’s peacekeeping jurisdiction—as a training base and an armory.

The KLA is a guerrilla force, accustomed to operating “underground.” Thus, NATO’s formal “demilitarization” of the KLA is unlikely to impair either its political or its military effectiveness. The KLA has also made it clear that any peace settlement that fails to provide for Kosovo’s independence is “unacceptable.”⁴⁸ Given that the alliance has no plans to grant independence to Kosovo, NATO soon could find itself fighting a different war in Kosovo, a war in which NATO will have replaced the Serbs as the KLA’s foe. That is reason enough to reconsider the wisdom of deploying American troops as peacekeepers in Kosovo.

By deciding to intervene in Kosovo’s civil war, the United States created its own political version of “Frankenstein’s monster” in the Balkans. The KLA is likely to come to power in postwar Kosovo—it has already begun to do so—and that is not a good outcome for the Balkans, or for America and Western Europe.

NATO’s New Balkan Protectorates

The KLA is only part of the problem. To maintain peace in the region, U.S. and NATO peacekeepers will have to remain in Kosovo for years to come. Moreover, NATO has assumed new formal defense obligations with respect to Albania and Macedonia. Because of its own fragile ethnic balance, Macedonia remains especially prone to instability (not least because the KLA seeks to incorporate parts of Macedonia into the “Greater Albania” it wants to create).

NATO has also implicitly assumed responsibility for the Yugoslav republic of Montenegro. During the conflict in Kosovo,

The KLA is likely to come to power in postwar Kosovo—it has already begun to do so—and that is not a good outcome for the Balkans, or for America and Western Europe.

The war over Kosovo will hasten the formation of countervailing coalitions to rein in what other nations see as a too powerful America.

Montenegro's democratic, anti-Milosevic government pursued a policy of benevolent neutrality toward NATO. Consequently, there is a real possibility that Belgrade may intervene, through the overt use of force or by covert destabilization, to overthrow Montenegro's government. NATO has warned Belgrade to keep its hands off Montenegro.⁴⁹ Whether that warning will be challenged by the Serbs remains to be seen.

Finally, the Clinton administration has made it clear that it wants Milosevic removed from power in Belgrade. Whatever one thinks of Milosevic (and few can think well of him), a U.S. policy that seeks to cause a change of regime in Belgrade may open a political Pandora's box. If there is political upheaval in Serbia, it is far from clear that pro-Western democratic forces will come to power (much less be able to retain power). It is also possible that a change of regime could bring to power political elements even more nationalistic than Milosevic. Given that many Serbs may harbor hopes of revenge for the recent conflict, such an extreme situation is a worrisome possibility.

Even if none of those pessimistic scenarios comes to pass, the United States and Western Europe are going to spend a great deal of money attempting to rebuild the Balkans in the hope of purchasing political stability in the region. The European Union has pledged to spend \$500 million a year rebuilding Kosovo during the next three years. The cost of rebuilding and stabilizing the region as a whole (including Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro) is estimated at \$30 billion during the next five years.⁵⁰

Although President Clinton has declared that Western Europe should shoulder the bulk of the responsibility for the Balkans' economic reconstruction, it seems almost inevitable that the United States, too, will end up contributing substantially to that effort.⁵¹ Yet, even as the European Union and the United States acknowledge the need to rebuild the Balkans, any effort to do so is handicapped by the fact that Washington and Europe will continue to

isolate Serbia as long as Milosevic remains in power. Whatever the moral rationale for that policy, its practical effect will be to undermine the goal of developing the Balkans economically. Politically and economically, Serbia is the region's most important power. Without Serbia's participation, any plan to revive the economy of the Balkans will fail. To give just two examples: Serbia's economic rehabilitation is vital to Macedonia (Serbia is Macedonia's major trading partner) and the economies of those states both upstream and downstream from Serbia have been severely affected by the interruption of commerce on the Danube (NATO destroyed a number of Yugoslavia's Danube bridges, thereby blocking the waterway).

Wider Ramifications

Finally, the war with Yugoslavia has had important geopolitical effects that reverberate far beyond the Balkans. Clinton's Kosovo policy has had portentous consequences for America's relations with its great-power rivals, Russia and China, and its great-power allies, the West European nations. Friend and foe alike have been treated to a demonstration of America's power, which is bound to make them nervous.⁵² The war over Kosovo will hasten the formation of countervailing coalitions to rein in what other nations see as a too powerful America. Washington's policy in Kosovo, in fact, contains the seeds of U.S. imperial decay.

When one assesses the great burden the United States has incurred as a result of fighting this war, President Clinton's claims of "victory" ring hollow. If this is victory, we must hope fervently that the United States is spared the consequences of a real defeat.

Notes

1. William Jefferson Clinton, Speech to the nation, March 24, 1999, <http://www.pub>.

whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/25/1.text.1.

2. Prior to the start of the NATO air strikes, Serbian forces were engaged in a bitter guerrilla war with the KLA, during which both sides engaged in atrocities. Although some ethnic Albanian civilians were killed, and others displaced, as a consequence of the Serbian counterinsurgency campaign, the Serbian forces were not engaged in systematic murder, or "ethnic cleansing." For discussion and documentation, see Christopher Layne, "Blunder in the Balkans: The Clinton Administration's Bungled War against Serbia," *Cato Institute Policy Analysis* no. 345, May 20, 1999.

3. John Kifner, "The Ravaging of Kosovo," *New York Times*, May 29, 1999, p. A1. In mid-June 1999, a British spokesman estimated that the Serb offensive in Kosovo had resulted in the deaths of 10,000 ethnic Albanian civilians. See "Kosovo Killing Estimate Grows to at Least 10,000: Ethnic Albanian Survivors Streaming Home," *Chicago Tribune*, June 17, 1999, p. 1. This claim, however, was based on uncorroborated reports from ethnic Albanian refugees.

4. Quoted in Daniel Williams, "Brutal Conditions Enveloping Kosovo," *Washington Post*, March 27, 1999, p. A1. See also Barton Gellman, "Yugoslavia Pounded for 2nd Day: Ground Fighting Spreads, Refugees Swarm across Border," *Washington Post*, March 26, 1999, p. A1; and Frank Ahrens, "An Endless Stream of Human Misery: As Thousands Flee Kosovo, Aid Workers Put a Thousand Faces on Suffering," *Washington Post*, March 27, 1999, p. C1.

5. Quoted in "Air Supremacy," *Daily Telegraph* (London), May 25, 1999.

6. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, "The Case against Intervention in Kosovo," *Nation*, April 19, 1999.

7. Kifner.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Jeffrey Record, *The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 8. Emphasis added.

11. For an overview of the Serbian view of the conflict, see Daniel Williams, "Analysis: The Serbian Perspective on the War," *Washington Post*, June 20, 1999, p. A19.

12. Quoted in Tim Juddah, *The Serbs* (New Haven,

Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 74.

13. Raymond Bonner, "War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops 'Cleansed' the Serbs," *New York Times*, March 21, 1999, p. A1.

14. Quoted in Stephen Engelberg, "Clinton Administration Took Hands-Off Position on Croat Offensive," *Houston Chronicle*, August 13, 1995, p. 30.

15. Quoted in "Britain Angry after U.S. Denies 'Ethnic Cleansing,'" *Independent* (London), August 8, 1995, p. 1.

16. Quoted in *ibid.*

17. Henri J. Barkey, Graham E. Fuller, and Morton I. Abramowitz, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Lanham Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); and Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Frank Cass, 1997).

18. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Press Conference on Kosovo, March 25, 1999.

19. Harry S Truman, Paraphrase from his address "Strong Defense," September 1, 1950.

20. For a discussion of why U.S. policymakers rely so heavily on the "domino theory," see Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 20-50.

21. Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk, in *As I Saw It*, ed. Daniel S. Papp (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), pp. 494-95.

22. Thomas C. Schelling put it this way: "Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves. . . . But defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one's commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times." Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 124.

23. Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), p. 206.

24. The intervention in Kosovo and the consequent expansion of NATO's geographic scope and its strategic responsibilities are part of the larger

picture of the alliance's enlargement. The same strategic mindset that led to intervention in Kosovo also underlies NATO's recent enlargement, which resulted in the membership of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Almost certainly, NATO will continue to expand, and each time it does, it will create a new unstable periphery that demands further expansion. For some leading American grand strategists, the continual enlargement of NATO, and perforce of U.S. power, is the objective. For example, former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski advocates unceasingly enlarging NATO by expanding to the east. For him, today's alliance is simply the precursor to what will eventually become an American-dominated Trans-Eurasian Security System (TESS). See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

25. For recent studies arguing that the historical record does not support the claim that the United States must fight on the peripheries to establish its resolve to defend vital core strategic interests, see Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Johnson.

26. See Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "American Hegemony—Without an Enemy," *Foreign Policy* 72, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 5-23.

27. Even during the hiatus in the Rambouillet talks, in early March 1999, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that, with the alliance about to observe its 50th anniversary at a Washington, D.C., summit, Kosovo was a crucial test of NATO's relevance in post-Cold War Europe. Anticipating the resumption of the Rambouillet conference, Talbott declared, "If the talks and their aftermath go badly, it will cast a pall over the Washington Summit but, much more important, over the Allies' . . . ability to fulfill the objectives that they will set for themselves at the Summit." Strobe Talbott, "A New NATO for a New Era," Address at the Royal United Services Institute, London, U.K., March 10, 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990310_talbott_nato.html.

28. Clinton, Speech, March 24, 1999. Similarly, Secretary Albright stated that "Belgrade's actions constitute a critical test of NATO, whose strength and credibility have defended freedom and ensured our security for five decades." Madeleine K. Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., April

20, 1999. See also "Defining NATO's Aims," *The Economist*, April 24, 1999, pp. 15-16.

29. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Kosovo Now Bellwether As Well As Battlefield," *New York Times*, April 25, 1999, p. A12.

30. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

31. On America's counterhegemonic strategy toward Europe, see Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance toward Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," in *America's Strategic Choices*, ed. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 244-82; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe*, ed. Geir Lundestad (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 221-45.

32. Interview with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, CNN's *Larry King Live*, March 23, 1999, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990323.html>.

33. Richard Lugar, Remarks to the Atlantic Council's Board of Directors, University Club, Washington, December 1993.

34. As the late foreign policy scholar Robert Osgood demonstrated, American intervention in World War I was not driven by any tangible threat to American security interests. Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

35. In the late 1940s, some leading U.S. policy-makers recognized that NATO and the Marshall Plan might have the paradoxical effect of retarding rather than facilitating both West European integration and Western Europe's reemergence as an independent center of power in international politics. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's policy planning staff, predicted that NATO would "come to overshadow, and probably replace, any development in the direction of European Union" as Western Europe became habituated to U.S. leadership in political and military affairs. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 63.

John Foster Dulles, then a leading Republican foreign policy spokesman, observed in 1949 that over time it might come to be seen that "the Economic Recovery Act [the Marshall Plan] and the Atlantic Alliance Pact [NATO] were the two things which prevented a unity in Europe which in the long run might have been more valuable

- than either of them." Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 185.
36. John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 341.
37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to Edward John Birmingham, February 28, 1951, in Louis Galambos, ed., *NATO and the Campaign of 1952*, vol. 12, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 74–78.
38. Scott Glover, "Revenge Attacks Fill Police Blotter in Postwar Kosovo," *Los Angeles Times*, July 28, 1999, p. A1.
39. See Human Rights Watch, "Harassment and Violence against Serbs and Roma in Kosovo," Press release, August 1999, <http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/aug/kos0802.htm>.
40. R. Jeffrey Smith, "KLA Bolstered by Allies, Training, Arms," *Washington Post*, May 26, 1999, p. A1; and Kevin Done, "KLA: Move to Re-establish Leadership," *Financial Times*, May 27, 1999 (electronic version).
41. Gregory L. Vistica, "Cyberwar and Sabotage," *Newsweek*, May 31, 1999, p. A38. The European allies consistently opposed giving arms to the KLA. See Carla Anne Robbins, Bob Davis, and Matthew Kaminski, "Proposals in U.S. to Arm Kosovars Stir Fierce Diplomatic Opposition," *Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 1999, p. A17; and Raymond Bonner, "NATO Is Wary of Proposals to Help Arm Kosovo Rebels," *New York Times*, April 4, 1999, p. A8.
42. Dana Priest and Peter Finn, "NATO Gives Air Support to Kosovo Guerrillas," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1999, p. A1.
43. On the KLA, see Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (May–June 1999): 24–42; Chris Hedges, "Victims Not Quite Innocent," *New York Times*, March 28, 1999, sec. 4, p. 1; Norman Kempster, "Rebel Force May Prove to Be a Difficult Ally," *Los Angeles Times*, April 1, 1999, p. A23; and Tim Judah, "KLA Is Still a Force to Be Reckoned With," *Wall Street Journal*, April 7, 1999, p. A22.
44. Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" p. 28.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
47. Jane Perlez, "Clinton Says Bosnia Offers Model for Force Envisioned for Kosovo," *New York Times*, May 8, 1999, p. A1.
48. *Ibid.*
49. This warning was delivered by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during a postwar visit to Montenegro. See Tyler Marshall and John-Thor Dahlburg, "With War Won, Can NATO Win Peace in the Balkans?" *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1999 (electronic version).
50. Roger Cohen, "Reform Urged as Condition for Yugoslavia to Get Aid," *New York Times*, June 21, 1999, p. A8.
51. Guy Dinmore, Neil Buckley, and John Lloyd, "Europeans to Form Bulk of Force Says Clinton," *Financial Times*, June 1, 1999 (electronic version); and John M. Broder, "Clinton Declares Most of War Cleanup Is Europe's Task," *New York Times*, June 1, 1999 (electronic version).
52. Michael Binyon, "Third World: NATO'S 'Mindless War' Condemned," *Times* (London), March 26, 1999, www.the-times.co.uk; "Law the Loser," *Times of India*, June 5, 1999, www.timesofindia.com; and Anthony Faiola, "Bombing of Yugoslavia Awakens Anti-U.S. Feeling around World," *Washington Post*, May 18, 1999.

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