THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
Reiterating the Tired Status Quo

by David Isenberg

Executive Summary

The Quadrennial Defense Review was the Pentagon's third effort to chart a post-Cold War military strategy and force structure. But it was impossible to reconcile the gap between the determination of the United States to maintain its preeminent global military status and the cost of maintaining a Cold War military establishment. Because the QDR, like the preceding efforts, failed to question the underlying strategic logic of an interventionist U.S. foreign policy, its results were similarly unsatisfactory.

Although during the review, defense officials insisted that there would be no "sacred cows," the QDR left unchallenged key tenets of U.S. security policy. It failed to recognize a more benign threat environment; it did not change the criterion that forces should be structured to fight two regional wars nearly simultaneously; it did not question the military budget level and force structure (numbers of air wings, ships, and Army and Marine divisions); and it did not terminate any Cold War-oriented weapon systems. The QDR developed no replacement for the two-war criterion because no consensus exists on what constitutes vital American interests after the Cold War.

The National Defense Panel—an independent group tasked by Congress to review the QDR—was concerned that the two-war criterion merely justified existing force structure. However, the NDP did not provide a critique of that force structure or even analyze alternatives to it. Both the QDR and NDP were mired in "inside the box" thinking. In the new, more benign international environment, U.S. defense budgets, force structure, and weapons suited for the Cold War can be cut.

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Introduction


The new mandate was the latest example of congressional frustration with the seeming inability of the executive branch to restructure the Pentagon in light of the events that had taken place since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since then, the United States has emerged as the sole superpower, standing alone as the world's most powerful military force but without an adversary worthy of the name. The Pentagon's response--typical of any large bureaucracy--to such radical change was tentative and hesitant. What change did come was both grudging and reluctant.

President Bush's 1991 National Security Strategy described a "minimum essential military force--the Base Force." The Base Force strategy emphasized continued forward presence, prepositioning of military equipment overseas, and the need to contain regional threats, including possibly a limited, conventional threat to Europe. Yet the Bush administration's strategy drew much criticism for adhering to Cold War assumptions and policies, albeit at modestly reduced force levels and budget levels.

Shortly after the Clinton administration took office, the Pentagon, headed by then-defense secretary Les Aspin, undertook its own review. On September 1, 1993, the administration unveiled its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which envisioned a strategy that would keep the United States prepared to fight and win--without allies--two major regional wars almost simultaneously.

In fact there was great continuity between the Base Force and the BUR. Both were based on the assumption that permanent forward presence, prepositioning, and containment of future, unspecified threats were necessary for American security. Despite the greatly reduced potential military challenges to the United States, from Russia as well as so-called rogue states, U.S. military reductions have been minimal. They merely reversed the Reagan military buildup. Currently, real military spending levels are about 80 percent of those of an average Cold War year.
As noted above, many members of Congress were dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform in the Pentagon and its apparent lack of vision. That dissatisfaction grew when a series of congressionally mandated commissions--reporting in 1995--largely validated the Pentagon's strategy, forces, roles and missions, deployments, and military infrastructure. Specifically, the May 1995 report of the Commission on the Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces, designed to study redundancies in the roles and missions of the armed services, failed to challenge or in any way dampen interservice rivalry.

To overcome institutional inertia and to ensure regular reviews in the future, Congress established the QDR. As the congressional conferees described it, the effort was to be a "complete re-examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, budget plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States, and establishing a national defense program, as we enter the 21st Century."

These issues fall into three categories: a definition of the threats, a strategy to thwart the identified threats, and the force structure needed to implement the strategy.

**Legitimate Concerns about the QDR**

A major problem with the QDR was that its authorizing legislation threatened the objectivity of the effort because of requirements imposed both on the QDR process and on the membership of the NDP. The legislation directed the QDR to incorporate specific Department of Defense (DoD) assumptions in the review but did not require the DoD or the NDP to justify those assumptions.

The legislation also presumed that forward military presence, the prepositioning of military equipment overseas, and other anticipatory deployments are necessary for conflict deterrence and are an adequate military response to anticipated conflict. The same point was repeated in the instructions given to the NDP. No instructions were given, however, to look at other force stationing alternatives that would deter conflict, increase force flexibility, remove local irritants arising from U.S. force presence, and perhaps incur less cost. The presumptions of forward deployment and prepositioning also assumed that all or a very high proportion of military forces must be sus-
tained at peak readiness so they can respond immediately to deter anticipated conflicts. Such assumptions justified current high levels of military spending.

Another concern was whether the QDR recommendations would be grounded in fiscal reality. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) put the Pentagon on notice about that issue in September 1996 when he wrote a letter to then-defense secretary William Perry questioning the integrity of the process for conducting the QDR. The senator was worried that the process for the QDR would be as flawed as that used in developing the BUR. He noted that the BUR "suffered from one major shortcoming. It was not linked to the Pentagon's long-range financial plan--the Future Years Defense Program, or FYDP. That could be one reason why the funding proposed in the BUR was not adequate to support the force levels it recommended."

Senator Grassley's concern about a possible mismatch between programs and funding in the QDR was justified. A recent report of the General Accounting Office noted that "the 1998 FYDP retains substantial risk that DoD's program will not be executed as planned." Although that budget plan was formulated prior to the release of the QDR report, it does confirm that the mismatch between programs and budgets, long apparent in defense planning, continues undiminished.

The National Defense Panel

Remembering charges that the previous Base Force and BUR were both done entirely within the Pentagon, Congress authorized the independent, nonpartisan NDP to conduct interim and final assessments of the Pentagon's efforts. The panel was also required to make its own independent alternative assessment of a variety of possible force structures through the year 2010 and beyond, including the force structure proposed by the QDR.

The legislation establishing the NDP set a number of specific goals for the panel. Those goals included developing alternative force structures; assessing potential near- and long-term threats to U.S. national security interests from conventional sources, weapons of mass destruction, nontraditional sources such as terrorism and information warfare, and the emergence of a peer competitor; and developing alternative scenarios requiring a military response by the United States.
Subtle Biases in the NDP's Task

While the idea of an independent assessment is laudable, the NDP's broad mandate made it vulnerable to misuse. It was directed to develop military responses to virtually every potential threat to American interests and to estimate the costs of dealing with them; thus it had the potential to become a tool of hawkish members of Congress seeking to raise the Pentagon budget by creating a higher baseline of threats and costs. That was especially worrisome when the NDP was mandated to consider the unlikely prospect of the emergence of a major potential adversary with military capabilities similar to those of the United States, that is, a "peer competitor."

The establishment of the NDP can be viewed as an expression of a deep-seated distrust by Congress of the administration's defense policies. The Republican Party's 1994 Contract with America called for a national commission to review the administration's national security strategy and propose a larger defense program. Congressional supporters of a larger military saw a prominent review as crucial for producing a stable consensus on defense policy and funding, which would lead to more orderly decisionmaking and program execution.

Biases Intrinsic to the NDP's Composition

Other members of Congress have long been skeptical that the Pentagon can rise above institutional and service parochialism to conduct an unbiased review of service roles and missions and related issues. That is certainly a valid concern. Ironically though, legislative language stating that the nine members of the NDP should be individuals in the private sector who were recognized experts in matters relating to the national security of the United States reduced the chances of a truly dispassionate assessment. Most of the "recognized experts" turned out either to have been senior officers in the military, to have held top-level civilian posts in the Pentagon, or to have spent most of their careers in defense industry posts they could not have held unless they had largely shared the strategy and force structure assumptions of the Cold War. Five of the NDP's members were retired or reserve military officers and four were civilians, three of whom had served as DoD officials. In addition, four of its members, including the chairman, were top executives of defense contract firms.
Not everyone was pleased by the appointments. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said, "The selection of forward-thinking members for the NDP was critical, and quite frankly the Administration missed the mark—with a few notable exceptions. I have grave concerns that this panel will not produce the innovative approach to our future strategy and force structure that is absolutely necessary to maintain our security as we enter the 21st century."

Overall, the NDP was charged with taking a "longer and broader" view of America's defense needs than the QDR, extending further into the future and encompassing a wider range of scenarios and international developments—an ambitious assignment for a part-time panel with a limited staff.

**QDR Unveiled**

When it was unveiled in May 1997, the QDR was predictably cautious in its recommendations. Indeed, the principal conclusions epitomized status quo thinking. While some tinkering was done, the military budget, force structure, and battle doctrine were all left largely intact. Evolution, rather than revolution, prevailed. As one civilian defense official noted, "Forgive us for being conservative but we haven't changed much because much wasn't needed."

Although the QDR spent considerable time talking about changing threats and a new military strategy of "shaping, responding, and preparing," the Washington-based Center for Defense Information noted that it sounded suspiciously like the previous BUR strategy of "prevent, deter, defeat." The "new" QDR strategy referred to changes in terminology rather than in thinking.

**QDR Validates the Status Quo**

To "shape" the new international environment, the United States would continue its strategy of forward deployment. That meant stationing 100,000 troops in Europe and another 100,000 in Asia and maintaining traditional Cold War patterns of routine "presence" deployments of Navy and Marine Corps units.

To "respond" to the full spectrum of threats envisioned, the United States would continue to prepare for the two-regional-war scenario originally elucidated by the BUR. Like the BUR, the QDR argued that U.S. forces must
be able to conduct almost simultaneous major offensives in two widely separated theaters and prepare for less intense combat operations such as assisting with humanitarian relief or peacekeeping. Unlike the BUR, the QDR stated that the United States must be able to conclude a single war in about half the time of Desert Storm.

To "prepare" for new threats and dangers, the Pentagon would pursue the "Revolution in Military Affairs" by aggressively pursuing high-technology innovations in information warfare, precision-guided munitions, and missile defense.

**Minimal Cuts in Force Structure and Personnel**

In terms of force structure, the QDR maintained the Army's 10 divisions (6 armored mechanized and 4 light) and 15 enhanced National Guard brigades. The Army's active forces were to be cut by 15,000 personnel from the BUR totals through deactivation, consolidation, and realignment of headquarters and support facilities. The Army, however, was already planning to cut 15,000 positions from its six heavy divisions. The QDR also called for a restructuring of the Army reserve components. The Army National Guard was to give up some of its combat structure and continue converting 12 combat brigades to combat support roles, thus resulting in the elimination of some 45,000 personnel from the BUR total. Civilian personnel were to be cut by only 33,700. Given the much more benign threat environment after the Cold War, those force reductions were minuscule.

The Navy retained its 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups but was to reduce its surface combatant ships from 128 to 116. The QDR also reaffirmed that the submarine force could be reduced from 73 to 50 boats, which was midway in the 45-55 range recommended by the previous BUR. Yet it failed to justify even that smaller number because it did not identify those submarines' opponents. None of the threatening states mentioned in the QDR have large naval forces. Navy personnel were to be cut by 18,000 active members, 4,100 reservists, and 8,400 civilians.

The Air Force maintained 20 fighter wings but transferred 1 active wing to the reserves, leaving 12 active and 8 reserve wings. The service converted 6 squadrons from North American continental air defense to general support and training and executed a planned reduction from
202 bombers to 187. The Air Force's active personnel were reduced by about 27,000, reserves by 700, and civilians by 18,300.

The Marine Corps was allowed to maintain three Marine Expeditionary Forces but was to cut its personnel slightly by 1,800 active personnel, 4,200 reservists, and 400 civilians--testimony to the Corps's legendary political clout on Capitol Hill.

With such slight changes in the force structure from the BUR, the QDR's personnel reductions were minimal. The proposed cuts from the services, as well as from the defense agencies, would reduce active military personnel by only 60,000, reservists by about 55,000, and civilians by about 80,000, resulting in a projected force of 1,360,000 active duty personnel, 835,000 reservists, and 640,000 civilians.

Strategic nuclear forces remained largely unchanged: 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, 500 Minuteman III missiles, 18 ballistic missile submarines (eventually scheduled to go down to 14), and 92 B-52H and B-2 bombers. The QDR also called for the shifting of an additional $2 billion into the National Missile Defense program, even though Defense Secretary William Cohen acknowledged that "even with additional funds, NMD will remain a program of high schedule and technical risk."

As it turned out, the nuclear portion of the QDR did not yield anything much different from the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). According to Morton Halperin, a Pentagon official during the Carter administration and a National Security Council staff member during the Clinton administration,

It is my understanding that the same people who did the NPR are going to do the nuclear piece of the QDR and will take as their starting point the requirements that have been laid on them by past presidents of what kind of nuclear forces they have and what kind of targeting [is needed]. You will not get from that kind of study a fundamental look at the basic issues which is what I think needs to be done in light of the end of the Cold War.
Base Closures and the Defense Reform Task Force

The QDR also called for two more rounds of military base closings in fiscal years 1999 and 2001—the need for those closings is well documented. Cohen tried to deflect the inevitable congressional opposition to that recommendation by noting that "there aren't any more easy choices. Those are all gone. It's hemlock time now. Are you going to protect these excess facilities that are no longer needed or are you going to protect our forces by putting modern weapons in their hands?"

Secretary Cohen also announced the creation of a Defense Reform Task Force that is to streamline and deregulate the Pentagon's business operations, leading to a "Revolution in Business Affairs." In November 1997 Secretary Cohen announced the task force report, which led to a Defense Reform Initiative. Its four main objectives were to reengineer and adopt the best private sector business practices; consolidate organizations to eliminate redundancy and move program management out of corporate headquarters and back to the field; introduce competition into the many functions now being performed in-house to improve quality, cut costs, and make the DoD more responsive; and eliminate excess military infrastructure. Yet while its goals are commendable, this initiative, like others before it, is not likely to accomplish much, given bureaucratic inertia and possible job cuts. Although Pentagon leaders are familiar with "teeth" issues, such as cutting military force structure, they are poorly equipped to deal with such "tail" issues. After all, officers don't make general or flag rank by reengineering business functions such as payroll services, health care, and accounting.

Where Is the Threat?

The biggest sacred cow was the Pentagon's insistence on the existence of a robust "threat," despite all the evidence to the contrary. Although the QDR seemed oblivious to the issue, a reassessment of the threat should have been of paramount importance.

QDR Fails to Reflect Changes in the International Environment

Today and for the foreseeable future, the international security environment will remain benign. As a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies...
noted, "The collapse of the Soviet empire brings fundamental change to the international security system. A half-century of war and near-war for the United States and its allies is over and the only hostile counterweight to the military power of the United States is gone." That fact was largely ignored in the QDR process. Although hawks like to highlight (and to bemoan) cuts in U.S. military force levels and budgets since the end of the Cold War, they tend to ignore what is happening in the international environment. U.S. military capabilities should be considered, not in isolation, but relative to those of other countries, particularly those hostile to the United States. In that regard, the trends are very favorable to the United States. The hawks also emphasize that the United States has cut military spending significantly from the high point of the Reagan administration buildup. Yet they fail to note that those expenditures are still at the Cold War levels of the late 1970s. Spending at Cold War levels in a benign international environment is a waste of taxpayer dollars.

Despite a reduction in U.S. military spending between 1986 and 1995, America's share of worldwide military spending actually increased from 28 to 32 percent during that period, according to the Project on Defense Alternatives. In 1986 the United States spent only two-thirds as much on defense as did "potential threat states." In 1995 it spent 76 percent more than did the members of that diminished category. The United States also spends over 10 percent more than all of its allies combined, a group that includes the next strongest economies and militaries on the planet. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accounts for 72 percent of world military spending. Current adversary states account for only 18 percent.

"Threats" Are Not Impresssive

The news is just as astonishing when one turns to the "rogue" states that are the prospective opponents in a two-war scenario--Iraq and North Korea. The latest annual report of the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) noted that "the prospect of near simultaneous conflicts in both theaters are declining." It found that "in both cases, the threat is diminishing. It is even possible the Korean threat will collapse." The report also noted that "given current and foreseeable conditions, major war would not seem to be a rational option for the North Korean leadership. Indeed, an all-out attack could be suicidal." Similarly, "Iraq
has not been able to replace its war-damaged and aging weaponry. It has suffered serious desertions from its armed forces, indicating poor morale. There has been unrest in the officer corps and repeated purges and executions of officers, impairing command and control." The report concluded, "In this environment, a strategy of preparing for two nearly simultaneous MRCs [major regional conflicts] is less important than in the past."

Even if by some miracle Iraq, North Korea, or other states were able to prevail against regional rivals on a battlefield, the consequences would not be a critical blow to U.S. vital interests. As Richard Betts of the Council on Foreign Relations has written, "The risks in being unable to cope efficiently with this scenario are nothing like the risk in the Cold War that 175 Soviet divisions might be able to roll to the English Channel, take control of the European continent, overturn the global balance of power, and leave the West with little prospect of recovery."

Regional contingencies are not a significant threat, but some analysts mention a future threat from a competing superpower--what the Pentagon likes to call a "major peer competitor." There are only two candidates for such a threat, China and Russia. While China's military capabilities are slowly improving, it is, according to the INSS report, "years away from being able to project sustained military force at any distance from China's borders." The report also notes that the People's Liberation Army in 1996 "was probably two decades away from challenging or holding its own against a modern military force."

Russia is in such dire straits that the probability that it will return as an international military power in the next two decades (or more) is minuscule. A Congressional Research Service report noted that

All quantitative indicators show a sharp, and in most cases, an accelerating decline in the size of the Russian armed forces. Since 1986, Russian military manpower has decreased by over 70 percent; tanks and other armored vehicles by two-thirds; and artillery, combat aircraft, and surface warships by one-third. Weapons procurement has been plummeting for over a decade. In some key categories, such as aircraft, tanks, and surface warships, procurement has virtually stopped. This has led not only to a decline in present inventory, but implies a long-term crisis of bloc obsolescence in the future.
It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this reversal in what the Soviets used to call the "correlation of forces." The Russian Army, quantitatively and qualitatively far inferior to its Soviet predecessor, bereft of its Warsaw Pact allies and the resources of the non-Russian Soviet republics that made up half the population of the U.S.S.R., perceives itself to be thoroughly overmatched by the superpower United States, which retains powerful allies in NATO.27

**U.S. Military Dominance**

In addition to lacking serious opponents, the United States has substantial qualitative advantages over any possible adversary. Take, for example, aviation capabilities, which are considered critical in virtually all conflicts. The QDR assumed that other countries will try to challenge U.S. supremacy in that area, which is why the review did not terminate any fighter aircraft programs. Left unanswered is the question of why any nation would be foolish enough to try to compete in an area of such massive U.S. comparative advantage. As retired Lt. Gen. William Odom, former head of the National Security Agency, noted, the United States "demonstrated that capability so overwhelmingly in the Gulf War that most countries see the futility of investing heavily in air forces if they intend to fly against the United States. No other air force can hope to stand up against it, so why buy an expensive air force and lose it in the first day of combat?"28 Indeed, an earlier report by the Congressional Budget Office found that U.S. tactical air forces would be far superior, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to those of any opponent.29

In short the United States is holding almost all the aces. As Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Russell Travers pointed out,

the United States will almost certainly enter the new millennium in an extraordinary favorable strategic position. Militarily, the United States is on the verge of a breathing space that could easily extend one to two decades. Of course, the country must hedge against long-term uncertainty, and threats and risks clearly do remain: but their scope and scale are critical. It is entirely possible that no regional power will prove capable of conducting large-scale con-
ventional operations against U.S. forces or allies for more than a decade; and the pace of foreign weapons development has slowed substantially. The United States has not seen such a favorable strategic position since the end of World War I.\textsuperscript{30}

That view is not held only by outside critics. It is the view of the Pentagon itself. The September 1997 National Military Strategy Report, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted, "We are not confronted by a 'peer competitor'--a hostile power of similar strength and capability--nor are we likely to be in the near future. Given the United States' military potential and ability to deploy to any region of conflict, it is also unlikely that any regional power or coalition could amass sufficient conventional strength to defeat our Armed Forces."\textsuperscript{31}

**Defects of the QDR**

Given the political constraints laid on it by the administration, the QDR never really had much of a chance. The Pentagon was asked to do a review of a national military strategy. As professionals, they followed orders. But such a review is only one component of a national security strategy, which is the responsibility of the White House, not the DoD. And if the president is unwilling to distinguish between what is truly vital and what is merely desirable, it is no wonder that we have a military establishment still committed to the Cold War assumption that the United States should be able to intervene anywhere in the world on short notice.

The administration's latest national security strategy report, quietly released just three days before the QDR, reflects a mindset that emphasizes global intervention. For example, "America must continue to be an unrelenting force for peace--from the Middle East to Haiti, from Northern Ireland to Central Africa." It is a struggle to find vital U.S. interests in Northern Ireland, aside from those developed to curry favor with Irish-American voters. Given that sort of universalist mandate, it is no wonder military leaders insist that they be given more money and that forces remain at their current levels so that they can be deployed promptly around the world.
Status Quo Thinking

When the QDR was formally released, orthodoxy had once again won the day. While that was no surprise, it was disappointing. Even the Wall Street Journal, a usually reliable supporter of the military status quo, ran an op-ed before release of the QDR noting that the Pentagon was bowing "to the weight of various external pressures--to cut its budget, and to maintain expensive but unnecessary programs. Those pressures have derailed the QDR process and threaten to produce a business-as-usual approach."

In theory, the QDR was supposed to hold nothing sacred. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, "Everything is on the table. We are not holding sacrosanct any particular end strength, any particular platform size, any particular structure. We are going to look at everything." The view from the field, however, was less optimistic. Early on, Marine Gen. John Sheehan, head of the U.S. Atlantic Command, said, "Basically [the QDR] is current force structure justified." Some assumptions were never questioned. White acknowledged that the planned budget for the next five years was approximately $250 to $260 billion annually--the current program size plus inflation. In fact, the Pentagon revealed that it was structuring the future forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps under the assumption that defense budgets would stay level over the next five years. Such statements were common throughout the QDR process, despite the protestations of Secretary Cohen that the QDR was to be strategy, not budget driven.

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

The services that thought the status quo of the current national military strategy benefited them supported it; those that thought a different strategy would benefit them were more critical. That conflict was evident in the debate over whether to retain the two-war planning scenario, which was a hallmark of the previous BUR. The divergent views of the Army and the Air Force are a good example.

Gen. Ronald R. Fogelman, Air Force chief of staff, was the most vocal critic of the current standard. He argued that the cost of maintaining the force structure necessary to fight two major regional conflicts was too high. On the other hand, Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, Army chief of staff, contended the United States must be prepared to fight wars in both southwest and northeast Asia.
Switching to a one-war-plus scenario, he said, would present the United States with the dilemma of deciding which war would get secondary status and explaining why to coalition partners.

A couple of months later, Gen. Reimer said, "I don't see how we are going to fight one or one-and-half. I just don't see that world out there. My view has been that I look out there and there are two areas—southwest Asia and northeast Asia—we have to be prepared to fight there." Not lost on observers was the fact that a switch from the two-war scenario would undercut the Army's rationale for maintaining its active duty force structure. The likely resulting budget cut would enable the Air Force to gain more funding.

**Rejection of Two-War Strategy Never Considered**

Early in the QDR process, the entrenchment of the two-war strategy was obvious. Robert Bell of the National Security Council staff said in October 1996, before the QDR formally began, that he did not foresee a change in the military's strategy of fighting two major regional wars nearly simultaneously. "We don't have the option in the quadrennial defense review of saying we'll just take out of the strategy one of the MRCs to save money. Not only was the decision right when it was made, it's not clear to me sitting here today that the world has changed... in terms of two-MRC requirement. I don't think the likely outcome of the quadrennial defense review is to abdicate one of the MRCs."

Moreover, maintenance of a "nonspecific" two-war scenario—that is, one that does not identify specific opponents—is far more demanding than that of a "specific" two-war scenario. As the Project on Defense Alternatives noted, "It is inappropriate for the United States to embrace any nonspecific numerical 'warfighting standard' at this time—whether one, two, or many MRCs. Unlike a force sizing guideline such as the 'defense of Europe,' the prescription to be able to fight two regional wars separates the statement of military requirements from a clear statement of US interests."

Indeed, as noted earlier, the underlying Clinton administration security strategy bears much responsibility for that vague standard. The conceptual tunnel vision of the Clinton doctrine of "engagement and enlargement" makes a "nonspecific" policy inevitable. William Lynn, DoD's
director of program analysis and evaluation, acknowledged early in the QDR that those tenets would not be reevaluated.

In its most striking failure to break out of the status quo, the QDR retained the two-war requirement because there was no accepted consensus on what should replace it and because nobody identified U.S. vital interests or the threats to them. Although defense officials could not point to specific threats that justified the two-war requirement, they kept it because they feared both an unpredictable world—as if the world had ever been predictable—and the prospect that abandonment of the two-war scenario would lead to smaller forces and lower budgets.

As Adm. William A. Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said,

So, is 2 MRCs the best characterization? Some people say [it's not], because if you look at what's happening in the world, Bosnia is not an MRC, Rwanda is not an MRC, Partnership for Peace efforts in Europe are not an MRC, and security in the Pacific and all the [forward] presence there are not an MRC, so how do you account for all of that in a 2 MRC strategy? I agree with that [critique]. But the real issue is, how do you draw a line under some acceptable force structure that is enough? What I worry about is, that if you don't draw that line, then there will be this continued erosion of procurement dollars that will go even further in putting us in trouble in 15 or 20 years.49

**Force Structure: Another Sacred Cow**

Another option for change—cuts in force structure—was not considered. Before he left office, Secretary of Defense William Perry laid down a policy marker when he said, "We cannot and we should not reduce below the force structure we have now."50 The various military services, as they had done in previous Pentagon battles, immediately went to battle stations to prevent or at least minimize cuts in force structure.51

For example, Assistant Army Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the Army's point man on the QDR, said in a speech before the U.S. Army's Institute of Land Warfare, "So what I'd like you to do as you leave here is think about what I told you. Get those cards and letters going.
Call all your buddies in OSD and call all your buddies across the river and say, 'Hey! You've got an Army out there you're going to use more than you want to use it in coming years, and you've got an Army out there that is really cheap.'"\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Adm. Donald Pilling, the Navy's QDR point man, argued that at a minimum the Navy must maintain its current 12-carrier fleet and should move to acquire 14 carriers.\textsuperscript{53}

**Implications of the QDR for Weapons Procurement**

From the beginning, some people viewed the QDR as a way to increase the Pentagon's budget to modernize the forces by buying new weapons. That goal was confirmed by newly installed Secretary of Defense Cohen, who argued that the Pentagon needed to increase procurement funding for new weapons "as soon as possible, not 10 years from now. I think the immediate challenge is getting the necessary increases within the next two to three years."\textsuperscript{54}

Much of the procurement budget, however, is devoted to producing Cold War-style armaments and weapons with capabilities vastly exceeding the threat. Much of the procurement budget is slated for weapons that were conceived to meet the Soviet threat. According to Greg Bischak, former director of the National Commission of Economic Conversion and Disarmament, "At least $56 billion of the $398 billion five year procurement and research budget is slated for such Cold War weapons as the Seawolf submarine, Commanche helicopter, B-2 bomber, and C-17A aircraft. Another $43 billion is for developing and buying advanced weaponry, including the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, which have capabilities far exceeding those of potential foes."\textsuperscript{55} Other systems, such as M1A2 battle tanks or CVN-77 class aircraft carriers, might also be considered relics of the Cold War.

Indeed, the QDR's reluctance to kill any major weapons program was yet another aspect of its timidity. The review reduced only the numbers purchased for each major system. For example, it did not kill any of the three redundant fighter aircraft programs. The closest it came to instituting a major change was reducing the planned purchase of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets from 1,000 to 548. The ultimate number of F/A-18E/Fs, however, could be either higher or lower than 548, depending on how soon the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) comes online. Thus, to some extent, the F/A-18E/F and the JSF are in competition with each other. The Navy retains the option of buying as many
as 785 F/A-18E/Fs. The total purchase of the JSF was reduced from 2,978 to 2,852. Also, the planned buy of F-22 Raptor fighters was reduced from 438 to 339 (that is, from four to three wings). The planned buy of V-22 tilt rotor transport aircraft for the Marine Corps was reduced from 425 to 360, but its production was accelerated.

The cost of weapons programs always grows faster than budgets, and a broken accounting system prevents planners from appreciating the destructive effects of those asymmetric growth rates. According to Franklin Spinney, a veteran analyst in the DoD Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the long-range modernization program will not produce enough weapons to modernize even the smaller forces of the post-Cold War era: "The real cause of the production/inventory mismatch is that the unit costs of buying and operating the new weapons will continue to increase much faster than the budgets for those weapons, even if budgets exceed Cold War levels early in the next century."

The disparity between plans and fiscal reality was confirmed by the General Accounting Office in a September 1997 report:

DoD's aircraft investment strategy may be unrealistic in view of current and projected budget constraints. . . . DoD's planned funding for the 17 aircraft programs in all but 1 year, between fiscal year 2000 and 2015, exceeds the long-term historical average percentage of the budget devoted to aircraft purchases and, for several of those years, approaches the percentages of the defense budget reached during the peak Cold War spending era of the early to mid-1980s. Compounding these funding difficulties is the fact that these projections are very conservative. They do not allow for real program cost growth, which historically has averaged at least 20 percent, nor do they allow for the procurement of additional systems, although DoD is considering replacing KC-135, C-5A, F-15E, F-117, EA-6B, and S-3B aircraft.

Failure to acknowledge that reality will force military officials to shift money from accounts that pay to operate and maintain forces to those that pay for the procurement of new weapons. Such a shift is likely to create a real readiness crisis. Indeed, a recent report by the Congressional Budget Office found that the Pentagon needs to cut as much as $11 billion out of the current $93 bil-
lion operations and maintenance (O&M) budget by the year 2002 if it hopes to find the added $15 billion it wants for military procurement accounts. Because the "easy savings" in O&M already have been achieved through force reductions, further savings will be difficult, especially because current spending trends point to increased requirements for O&M of up to $18 billion by 2002.18

By cutting tactical aviation programs only modestly, the QDR accepted the assumption that continuing modernization in order to maintain "air dominance" is critical. By "modernizing," the QDR meant buying new systems such as the F-22 and JSF. It ignored the modernization of existing aircraft, such as the F-15 and F-16, that already dominate the skies and will do so for years to come.

The review also proposed cutting the planned Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) purchase from 19 to 13. JSTARS is an aircraft that uses radar to detect moving targets on the ground such as tanks. JSTARS is one of the few weapons programs that could benefit all military services in joint operations. Such a capability is needed far more than the acquisition of F/A-18E/F or F-22 fighters. Cutting JSTARS more substantially than the F-A/18 or F-22 could be taken as a sign that interservice cooperation is more rhetoric than fact.59

You Can't Please Anyone

Ultimately, even some military officials and defense experts were dissatisfied with the QDR. Fogleman argued, "What I think we needed, but did not occur in this QDR . . . was that after every major conflict we've had in this country in the 20th century, our nation has generally stopped and examined how we're going to utilize military manpower in the postconflict period. We have not done that for the end of the Cold War so it has led us to a propensity to continue to salami slice [programs] and do things the way we've always done in the past."

Richard Perle, a Reagan administration DoD official, conceded that "the QDR is an extremely important missed opportunity. It is, by and large, business as usual." Similarly, Andrew Krepenevich, an NDP member said, "Frankly, I'm afraid the QDR has put us on a path where three to four years from now the military will be facing the same problem it has today, but it will be worse."

It did not take long for some of the QDR recommendations to become history. In June 1997 the Army announced
that it had reached agreement with the Guard and Reserves to postpone the bulk of the proposed 45,000 personnel reductions until after the year 2000. Although all of the cuts to the active forces--15,000 personnel--will go through in the next three years as planned, the Guard will give up only 17,000 people instead of 38,000 and the Army Reserves only 3,000 instead of 7,000. The Army also reduced cuts in civilian personnel. They are now slated to be cut by only 17,400 instead of 33,700 by FY 2006.

Similarly, Congress firmly rejected the proposal to hold two more rounds of military base closings, thus denying the Pentagon the estimated $2.7 billion in savings that such closures were expected to yield. Personnel reductions are logically connected to further base closures. The fact that Congress refused to consider further rounds of closings has made planned personnel reductions even more difficult.

The National Defense Panel Report

If the QDR failed to break free of political and bureaucratic constraints, what about the report of the NDP, which was supposed to rise above the fray and give an independent, alternative view?

On December 1, 1997, the NDP released its final report, "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century." As its title implied, the report called for a broad transformation of military and national security institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020. It correctly expressed concern that the two-war scenario "has become a means of justifying current forces. This approach focuses significant resources on a low-probability scenario." Logically, if the panel members truly believed that rhetoric, they should have offered an alternative to the two-war scenario as a criterion for sizing forces and some recommendations for force cuts. But the panel did not do so.

The NDP noted that "effective deterrence of potential nuclear adversaries can be maintained at the reduced levels envisioned by START III and beyond." Commendably, the panel also noted that some of the Cold War "legacy" weapons the Pentagon wants to procure or upgrade, such as the M1A1 tank (the NDP called for a 30- to 35-ton tank), Crusader advanced field artillery system, RAH-66 Commanche helicopter, and another new Nimitz class aircraft carrier, will not be appropriate for meeting future asymmetric threats--that is, rogue nations; terrorism, information
warfare; missile proliferation; and nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation. In the panel's words, "The procurement budgets of the services are focused primarily on current systems and do not adequately support the central thrust of their visions." The NDP failed, however, to demonstrate how any other conventional military system would be adequate to meet those threats.

The NDP called for reducing the planned buy of tactical fighters but giving each an increased payload of accurate weapons. Yet, it did not call for canceling any of the major programs--the F-A/18E/F, F-22, or Joint Strike Fighter.

Another interesting recommendation dealt with the need to examine the U.S. alliance structure. But the NDP did not call for dropping any alliances, an inexplicable omission given the prominent debate over the administration's desire to expand NATO.

The NDP's main emphasis was on increased research, development, and procurement of "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) technologies to equip light, agile U.S. forces--for example, the "Army after Next." The panel noted that new technologies would be needed so that those forces could deploy worldwide on short notice to cope with what it foresaw as a wide range of threats in the new millennium. To support that new force, the NDP recommended developing new tactics, new high-technology weapons, and an electronic infrastructure.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of the NDP Report**

The panel's principal criticism of the QDR was that it failed to go far enough in revising U.S. force structure and modernization plans. In its assessment of the QDR, the NDP noted, in a model of understatement, that "there is insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other." The NDP also rebuked the Pentagon for failing to recognize the implications of its own logic--namely, that the lack of a serious conventional threat should spur the DoD to abandon its strategy of preparing for two major regional conflicts.
**Overemphasis on Military Means**

In a more telling criticism, the NDP noted that a major limitation of the overall national strategy was its overemphasis on military means. The NDP argued that "greater attention needs to be given to the important role played by other elements of national security establishment." For example, the panel argued that effective use of diplomacy can make important contributions to achieving U.S. security goals.

The NDP would have done well to dwell on that point. Because the QDR itself notes that the two-war scenario is not very likely, it added many small-scale contingencies as "asymmetric threats" and "wild-card" scenarios to the list of threats. It did so to justify more investment in RMA high technology. Yet questions remain about how the Pentagon would use advanced bombers, fighters, missiles, and other new arms to stop, for example, international organized crime, information warfare, and famine.

**Risks to DoD's Plan**

The NDP also found that DoD's plan to modernize weapons had more risk than the QDR acknowledged. It found the funding necessary to attain the goal of spending $60 billion annually on weapons procurement beginning in 2001 rests on several key assumptions:

- Two Base Relignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds will occur, yield the necessary savings in future years, and be affordable.

- Projected savings from service provision by the private sector and the privatization of DoD functions will be realized through the infrastructure reform program, which faces many legislative challenges.

- The Army's plans for its Reserve components will be successful and not require unplanned funding.

- Reform of DoD's complex regulations for procuring weapon systems will continue to yield efficiencies and savings.

- DoD funding will remain at a constant $250 billion, despite budget pressures.
The NDP found "each of these assumptions to be somewhat tenuous. Collectively, they represent a budget risk which could potentially undermine the entire Defense Strategy."

With regard to nuclear weapons, the NDP recommended reducing U.S. nuclear forces to START II force levels even if the Russian duma failed to ratify the treaty. It also found that nuclear strategy is not integrated into the overall strategy and nuclear arms control is not directly addressed.

**Flaws in the NDP Report**

Contrary to its congressional mandate, the NDP failed to assess a variety of possible force structures through the year 2010, including the QDR's revised defense program through the year 2005. The NDP was concerned that the two-war scenario was being used to justify the existing force structure but offered little analysis of that structure and no alternatives to it.

Also, the NDP report, like the QDR before it, was unduly pessimistic. Although the panel could not point to specific future antagonists, it nevertheless called for a "transformation" of U.S. military forces to cope with a wide range of asymmetric threats. Like the QDR, the NDP report downplayed or ignored the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. military over all prospective opponents and the growing U.S. share of world military spending. (Military spending by the so-called rogue states, usually cited as potential threats, combined has been only about $18 billion annually.) The panel also ignored the fact that the United States spends a far greater percentage of its GDP on the military than do its chief economic competitors.

Furthermore, achieving the NDP's "transformation" would require spending an additional $5 billion to $10 billion beyond what the QDR planned annually on weapons procurement. Despite the fact that even the force envisioned by the QDR is likely to exceed available budgets, the NDP failed to offer any specifics about how to afford such additional spending beyond those measures called for by the QDR. The panel merely endorsed the QDR-proposed base closings and business reforms. It is especially troubling that the Pentagon is looking at those same initiatives to provide the savings needed to increase its procurement budget by the 25 percent already planned. If
strategy is indeed the art of the possible, then the NDP fails the test of how one affords getting from here to there."

One indicator of how little the NDP report bothered the DoD was Secretary Cohen's comments to Congress on the report. The secretary disagreed only with the NDP criticism of continuing to size U.S. forces for a two-war scenario. Admittedly that was the NDP's most significant conclusion. Yet the NDP also made other recommendations, such as reducing the numbers of some weapons purchased. Secretary Cohen ignored such recommendations and instead provided a lengthy list of all the experiments, advanced exercises, and concept and technology demonstrations under way at the Pentagon. In effect, he approved the NDP report but disagreed with its major conclusion and ignored other important conclusions.

Thinking outside the Box

Both the QDR and the NDP failed to break out of the box of bureaucratic orthodoxy, although the NDP clearly came closer to doing so. Both reports endorsed the purported need for weapons modernization, albeit the NDP advocated buying more high-technology RMA-type weaponry. Even if all of the required budget assumptions necessary for increasing the DoD procurement budget to $60 billion a year actually became reality and the Pentagon could redress its weapons funding shortfall, it would still face a larger problem. DoD has failed to consider--as detailed in the section on flaws in the QDR--how internal budget constraints shape strategy over the long term.

Of course, real "outside the box" thinking would conclude that none of that is really a problem. In a world in which the conventional threat has lessened, the United States could easily reduce its forces by the modest amount envisioned in the QDR. Even greater force reductions could be achieved if the United States were to adopt a national security strategy of being a "balancer of last resort," instead of using its military forces to attempt to "shape" the international order. Thus, the military budget could be cut substantially by significantly reducing force structure.

Such a changed role in the world would not only permit cuts in forces but would also allow for significantly different personnel and weapons choices. If the United States chose to respond militarily only to threats to its vital interests, it could rely more heavily on reserve
forces. If forces were restructured in accordance with such a strategy, the active Army could be reduced to one corps of four to six divisions. That force would give the United States more than enough combat power to defeat all likely threats in the world today. Such a force would also provide a foundation on which the Pentagon could ultimately rebuild a ground force of three corps—the force it had during the Cold War—if the international security environment turned malevolent.

The QDR and the NDP report testify to the problems facing those who wish to maintain a superpower military establishment in the future. Given the radically changed nature of the international system, people who want to preserve the option of using military force to respond at a moment's notice to the more diffuse threats of the future will find that something has to give. Either they relinquish the idea that the United States is compelled to police the world and start delineating true vital interests with specificity, or they must face the reality that the demands of using the military to combat the "instability" of the next millennium will be forever unaffordable.

Because the QDR, like its predecessors, did not question the underlying strategic logic of U.S. "foreign policy, its results are similarly unsatisfying." Given the administration's unquestioned approval of continued global military activism under its doctrine of "engagement and enlargement," it is not surprising that the QDR fell short. No matter how many defense reviews are conducted, if the United States continues a foreign policy of global and seemingly limitless intervention, only incremental changes will be made to the excessively large force structure and defense budget.

Notes


12. Although the cuts mandated by the QDR will lower Air Force active personnel numbers by 26,900 to 355,000, the potential for even deeper cuts exists. A GAO study noted that three separate initiatives have identified the potential to replace as many as 75,000 military personnel with less costly civilian employees or contractors. See General Accounting Office, "Force Structure: Potential Exists to Further Reduce Active Air Force Personnel," NSIAD-97-78, March 1997, p. 7.

13. In late October 1997 the Marine Corps announced that it was nearly ready to make force structure cuts that would eliminate 5,300 to 7,800 positions in the active force between now and 2001 and some 4,000 in the reserves between now and 2004. The intention behind that realignment would be to raise the manning level of remaining units from the current 85 percent to approximately 90 percent (or more). The Corps would not go below its personnel allocation of 172,200 in the QDR.


20. For details, see Lawrence J. Korb, "Start with Logic to Put the Pentagon on a Businesslike Footing," Los Angeles Times, November 25, 1997.


tary Strategy turned to the only thing it had left, the specter of "instability." In its 30 pages, the National Military Strategy used "instability" and "stability" 18 times. Taken from CDI Question of the Week, November 13, 1997.


37. Ibid., p. 5.


44. The Army received support for its view when the GAO came out with a report stating, "It does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support force at this time because this could increase the Army's risk of carrying out current defense policy." General Accounting Office, "Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy with Some Risks," NSIAD-97-66, February 1997, p. 3.


63. Bradley Graham, "Army Postpones Some Guard Cuts to Ease Dispute: Resistance to Reductions Is Dropped after


68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. iii.


80. The genesis of this policy was first publicly laid out by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs, in a speech titled "From Containment to Enlargement" to the Johns Hopkins University School of