Media accounts that describe the April summit meeting between President Clinton and Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto as marking a historic change in the U.S.-Japanese alliance are erroneous. Although the United States agreed to consolidate its military bases on Okinawa, overall U.S. troop levels in Japan will remain the same. There was no hint of an eventual drawdown in those forces, much less that Washington would insist that Japan assume responsibility for its own defense.

The two alleged changes in Tokyo's policy are equally tepid. Japan merely agreed to sell nonlethal supplies to U.S. forces in peacetime; there is no commitment to provide military materiel, nor is there an obligation to provide even nonlethal items in wartime. Tokyo's vague promise to conduct a review of the constitutional ban on involvement in collective defense missions appears likely to produce few changes in Japan's military posture. At most, it might lead to Japanese logistical support for U.S. military operations during an East Asian crisis. There is no indication whatsoever that the Japanese military ever intends to fight alongside American forces unless Japan itself is attacked. Despite the official and media hype, the summit agreements do not alter Japan's status as a U.S. military dependent.

Introduction

The military alliance between the United States and Japan is based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Even most defenders of the alliance admit, however, that there is little mutuality to the alliance; the security relationship has been overwhelmingly a one-way proposition. The United States has an obligation to defend Japan against aggression from any source. Japan, on the other hand, has no reciprocal obligation to the United States. Indeed, Tokyo's responsibilities under the treaty are limited to helping U.S. forces defend Japanese territory.

That unequal relationship has come under increasing attack by policy experts in the United States in recent years.[1] Although the Clinton administration remains wedded to the existing policy of regarding Japan as a security dependent, two recent crises in East Asia have underscored the problems with that policy and have placed the alliance under strain.

America as East Asia's Lone Ranger

The first incident occurred in the summer of 1994 at the height of tensions over North Korea's nuclear program. U.S. officials considered a variety of measures to halt Pyongyang's apparent drive to achieve a nuclear-weapons capability, including the imposition of an economic embargo enforced by a multilateral naval blockade. There were understandable concerns that North Korea might react to such coercive measures by igniting military hostilities on the Korean peninsula, and Washington therefore attempted to line up support from its friends and allies in the region. The Clinton administration reportedly approached the Japanese government about providing minesweepers to assist the U.S. effort in the event of trouble. Although such a mission hardly required Japan to assume a high-profile military
role, Tokyo apparently rebuffed the U.S. request, contending that article 9 of Japan's constitution prohibits action by the nation's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) unless Japan itself is attacked.[2]

It became even more evident during the confrontation between China and Taiwan in late 1995 and early 1996 that the United States could not count on Japan for assistance. As Washington moved elements of the Seventh Fleet into position near the Taiwan Strait and warned the mainland regime not to use force, Tokyo's policy consisted largely of urging Beijing and Taipei to exercise restraint. Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama stated that Tokyo was not in a position to approve or disapprove of U.S. moves to deploy warships near the strait, and Foreign Ministry officials repeatedly evaded questions about whether Japan would back the United States in a showdown.[3] Tokyo's "support" for Washington consisted of an official expression of "understanding" of the reasons for the U.S. deployment.[4] It appeared that the SDF would remain on the sidelines in the event of a Sino-American conflict, and it was not clear that the United States would even be allowed to use its bases in Japan for operations against China.

American Discontent and the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit

Tokyo's lack of cooperation during the North Korean crisis went largely unnoticed in the United States, but Japan's de facto neutrality concerning the tensions between Beijing and Washington received attention and attracted negative comments.[5] The resulting discontent helped prod administration policymakers to seek a more equal alliance relationship. At the same time, members of Japan's political elite began to voice concern that if Tokyo appeared to be merely standing on the sidelines while the United States incurred grave costs and risks in its mission to preserve stability in East Asia, American public support for the alliance could vanish. Hisahiko Okazaki, a former ambassador to Thailand and one of Japan's leading foreign policy thinkers, warned bluntly, "If American boys are dying for Taiwan and we don't help, we destroy the alliance."[6] Yoshinori Ono, secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party's Research Commission on Security, made a similar point. "If Japan did nothing and stood by with folded arms under that situation [a war in East Asia], voices saying the Japan-U.S. security pact is useless would pour out of the United States. If that happens, it would not only result in aggravating Japan-U.S. relations, but would also lead to the situation of Japan having to build up and possess its own defense capabilities."[7] Ono emphasized, however, that he advocated providing only limited logistical assistance. "Of course, the Self-Defense Forces must not go so far as to send troops to Taiwan in exercise of force."[8]

The U.S. goal of a greater Japanese defense contribution supposedly bore fruit at the summit meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in mid-April. That belief is erroneous, however. The asymmetrical nature of the U.S.-Japanese alliance has not been altered in any fundamental way by the agreements signed at the summit, despite comments in the Japanese and American press hailing the results as "historical," "far-reaching," and "a landmark moment." What Japanese and American leaders succeeded in doing was to create the illusion of meaningful change rather than the reality.

Tepid Change: The Reduced U.S. Presence on Okinawa

Certainly the initiatives announced by the United States did not suggest a fundamentally different security relationship with Japan. Washington did agree to close or downsize 11 military installations on Okinawa and return to Japan approximately 20 percent of the land now occupied by U.S. forces (some one-fifth of Okinawa's territory). That concession was designed to pacify Okinawans who had become increasingly hostile to the massive U.S. presence--especially after the fall of 1995 when three American servicemen raped a 12-year-old girl. Yet the overall number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan is slated to remain at its current level (approximately 47,000). Units from the bases earmarked for closure will be moved to other installations on Okinawa or elsewhere in Japan.

In other words, Washington merely agreed to execute a modest geographic reshuffling of its deployments. There was nothing in that action that even hinted at an eventual drawdown of U.S. forces, much less a major change in America's security policy toward Japan, such as an insistence that Tokyo assume responsibility for its own defense. It would be an act of charity to call the revisions in Washington's policy "cosmetic."

Inflated Expectations about Japan's New Role

Alliance advocates on both sides of the Pacific generally concede the point that U.S. posture did not change
substantially, but they insist that the changes in Japan's role were far more dramatic. Prime Minister Hashimoto declared in a toast during President Clinton's visit, "This year, we are taking the first steps toward a new era."[9] Echoing that theme, Hatsuhisa Takeshima, chief commentator for Japan's NHK television network, saw the changes in Japan's defense policy as "heralding a new beginning." Japan and the United States were "about to start a new relationship."[10] Columnist Charles Krauthammer contended that the summit agreements were a "momentous beginning" that signaled "Japan's historic turn toward active military cooperation with the United States." Those measures begin to "enlist Japan as partner--junior, but finally partner--with the United States in policing the Pacific."[11]

Such conclusions were premature, if not wildly overstated. The Joint Declaration on Security signed by Clinton and Hashimoto was a study in contrasts that underscored the continuing asymmetry of the U.S.-Japanese military relationship. America's obligations tended to be specific and substantive, while Japan's were couched in often meaningless generalities. Thus, the United States "reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan."[12] Similarly, the leaders "confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security."[13] Conversely, Japanese defense capabilities were to be used in "appropriate roles" in the post-Cold War security environment; cooperation between the two countries was to be based on a combination of "appropriate defense capabilities" of Japan's SDF and U.S. units; and Japan would provide "appropriate contributions" for the maintenance of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.[14] In none of those contexts did negotiators ever define the term "appropriate."

Proponents of the alliance contended that Tokyo had made two especially important policy changes. First, the two governments signed an agreement concerning the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services. The document affirmed that Japan would for the first time agree to provide assistance--including transport, communications, food, and clothing--to U.S. forces taking part in military exercises with Japan or participating in United Nations' peacekeeping operations. That change was less meaningful than it might appear, however. Such assistance was limited to peacetime, and munitions and other military materiel were excluded.[16] There was no commitment that Japan would provide even nonlethal supplies in wartime.

Moreover, the term "provide" was applied in a grudging and parsimonious fashion. Article IV of the agreement specified, "If the receiving Party cannot return the supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity as the supplies provided in a condition that is satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall reimburse in the currency specified by the providing Party."[17] In other words, Japan essentially agreed to sell nonlethal supplies to U.S. forces--and choose which side of the currency exchange rate was the most favorable to Tokyo's interests. That commitment represented something less than a historic breakthrough. It was at best a half-hearted, meager concession--apparently a quid pro quo for Washington's willingness to relinquish some of the valuable land occupied by its bases on Okinawa.

Japan's other "concession" received even more praise from American officials and commentators. Clinton and Hashimoto agreed to "initiate a review" of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, a review that would include "studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan."[18] Japanese leaders have consistently argued that article 9 of the country's constitution permits only individual self-defense, not involvement in collective defense missions. Thus, if Japan itself came under attack, the SDF could respond and even launch retaliatory strikes. But if a breach of the peace occurred elsewhere in East Asia, the SDF would be barred from becoming involved, even in a supporting role. That would be true even if the conflict was clearly detrimental to Japan's security interests.

Alliance supporters were ebullient about the change announced at the summit. Michael Green, an analyst for the Institute for Defense Analysis in Washington, insisted that the move marked a dramatic shift in Japan's attitude toward defense issues. The declaration clearly demonstrates "that the Japanese government endorses a larger role in security with the United States," Green argued. "In Japan, to publicly say that you'll study it is significant."[19]

Obstacles to Change
Perhaps. The review does have the potential--but only the potential--for causing a meaningful change in Japan's security role. But as those who have witnessed Japanese delay and obfuscation on trade and other issues can testify, a commitment to "initiate a review" is not necessarily all that meaningful. Such discussions may go on for years without tangible results and may in fact simply be a stalling tactic to deflect U.S. pressure for greater burden sharing.

Even if the review is sincerely undertaken, there is no guarantee that it will produce a more active Japanese military posture. Two of the three major political parties (Hashimoto's Liberal Democratic Party and the main opposition New Frontier Party) are deeply divided on the issue, and the LDP's principal partner in the current coalition government, the Social Democratic Party headed by former prime minister Tomiichi Murayama, is firmly opposed to changing or reinterpreting article 9. There is certain to be widespread public opposition as well. Because the United States has long encouraged Japan to be a U.S. military dependent, the Japanese people have not since 1945 had to think seriously about security issues or Japan's political and military role in the international arena. That comfortable dependency has bred a strong strain of romantic pacifism that will be difficult to overcome. More than two generations of Japanese political leaders have done little to discourage such impractical attitudes or to prepare the public for a debate on a new, more assertive security role. Equally important, the U.S. alliance remains firmly in place, thereby creating every incentive for the Japanese people to endorse a continuation of Tokyo's free-riding policy. The reaction of one Japanese citizen to the summit is all too typical. It would be easier to pay America as if it were a mercenary force than for Japan itself to become a strong military power, the woman contended. "We don't want our own military. No parent wants to send their own child off to war." Apparently, it is all right for American parents to send their children off to war on Japan's behalf, however.

Unfortunately, that attitude is not confined to (arguably unsophisticated) members of the general public; it also infects Japan's opinion-shaping elite. The woman's viewpoint was not much different from that expressed a few months earlier by the influential newspaper Asahi Shimbun, which argued that Japan should "aim at being a conscientious-objector nation." If large numbers of Japanese worried that a refusal to embrace a more robust military role might mean the end of the alliance with the United States, there would be a greater likelihood of a positive response to Hashimoto's initiative. But there is little evidence of widespread fear about losing the alliance. Once again, Washington's policy has undercut whatever bargaining leverage the United States might have had. U.S. leaders scarcely miss an opportunity to reassure the Japanese (and everyone else in the region) that the alliance is the key-stone of America's East Asian policy and that U.S. troops will remain in Japan indefinitely. Given Washington's strategy of preemptive diplomatic surrender, the Japanese people and their representatives in the Diet might be excused if they conclude that there will be no serious penalty if the review process drifts along without producing a substantive policy change.

**Japan's Distorted Conception of a Security Partnership**

Even if Tokyo does eventually alter or reinterpret article 9, the change may prove to be quite limited. Hashimoto emphasized that the study was to determine "what we can and cannot do" to make the bilateral security arrangement more effective in a crisis. Japanese policy experts have spoken cryptically of a "partial" application of the right to collective defense. Indeed, the joint declaration includes several troubling ambiguities that suggest that Tokyo is contemplating something less than a revolution in its security policy. For example, it is not clear what is meant by the phrase "in the areas surrounding Japan." A liberal interpretation could mean that SDF units would be available for action throughout the western Pacific and even on the Asian mainland. A restrictive interpretation, on the other hand, might mean nothing more than a meager expansion of Japan's existing obligation to help defend its own territory.

Less than a week before the summit, Seiroku Kajiyama, who is secretary general of the LDP as well as chief cabinet secretary in the current government, had called for a study of ways in which Japan could cooperate with the United States against threats close to Japanese territory. He emphasized, though, that he did not envision any change in Japan's ban on collective defense. Since Kajiyama's reference to "threats close to Japanese territory" is suspiciously similar to the subsequent language of the joint declaration, it is possible that U.S. and Japanese negotiators have rather different ideas about the scope of the policy change the review should produce.

That probability was heightened by Kajiyama's blunt statement the day after the summit that Japan will maintain its traditional interpretation that the use of the right of collective defense is prohibited under the constitution. Hashimoto and the leaders of the other coalition parties confirmed the point on April 22, when they agreed to maintain
the ban on collective defense. [26]

It is also unclear what the term "bilateral cooperation" will eventually mean. The available evidence suggests that Japan's idea of cooperation is likely to be confined to logistical support for U.S. military missions. The dominant theme of statements by Japanese officials and policy experts during and after the summit was that allowing collective defense would enable Japan to provide greater "rear support" for U.S. forces in an emergency. [27] Two weeks earlier, a senior Defense Agency official, who favored a reconsideration of the constitutional bar against collective defense, provided a graphic insight into the Japanese leadership's warped conception of an equal military partnership with the United States. The official warned that an irreparable breach might occur in the alliance "if the SDF did not give logistic support to the U.S. military at a time of emergency on the Korean peninsula." [28] Television commentator Taro Kimura offered a more colorful interpretation, but one that was substantively similar. "Until now, we were housing the sheriff. But this week the sheriff turned around and said, 'Here, now you're deputy sheriff.'" Kimura admitted that the United States was still in charge but that now Japan "can supply the food, ready the horse, and even hold the gun for the sheriff." [29]

U.S. officials conceded privately that Japan was "far from ready to send troops into battle alongside U.S. forces." [30] When asked what help the United States could anticipate from Japan, in light of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit, if a conflict were to break out in East Asia, former assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye had very limited expectations. "If there were a war in Korea, I'm confident that we would have Japanese support, the use of Japanese bases, and help with supplies and so forth." Nye added that if the conflict were instead in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, Washington would expect--and in his judgment would need--"considerably less" support from Tokyo. [31]

Japan's Defense Doctrine

The summit agreements must also be viewed in the context of Tokyo's National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995. That document shows no sign of an intention to adopt a more activist military policy. Indeed, some of its provisions point in the opposite direction. An assessment by defense analyst Keiichiro Nakashizuka noted one especially retrograde passage:

Although the previous national defense program adopted in 1976 noted that Japan "should prevent [foreign invasion] on its own," the phrase has been deleted in the new policy. Instead, the new program states that "Japan should prevent [foreign invasion] under appropriate cooperation with the United States and by fully and systematically using its defensive power," indicating Japan's intention to depend more heavily than before on the United States' deterrent force. [32]

Nakashizuka was not the only analyst who was upset by the tone and direction of the National Defense Program Outline. Hiroomi Kurisu, former chairman of the Joint Staff Council, gave a blistering assessment. "The outline entirely lacks the determination to defend our own country." He concluded that underlying the heightened emphasis on the U.S. deterrent "is the major premise that defense power will be cut back." Describing that idea as "preposterous," Kurisu noted that the outline also stated that security arrangements would become the basis for securing the U.S. presence needed to preserve peace and stability in the region. "This represents an idea that Japan need not do anything more than furnishing bases and bearing the cost," he concluded. Kurisu added that the outline should "describe what our side ought to do actively in order to maintain peace in our neighboring countries," but it "totally fails" to address that issue. [33]

It is true that the defense program outline was adopted more than four months before the Clinton-Hashimoto meetings. Nevertheless, unless there was a sea change in Japanese strategic thinking during that interval, it is likely that American policymakers and opinion shapers are expecting far more from the review of the collective defense option than is likely to emerge. Japan shows no intention of abandoning its status as an American security dependent.

Washington's Sterile Japan Policy

The impetus for meaningful change is unlikely to come from Tokyo, because for both the Japanese public and the political leadership the current arrangement is an extremely good deal. In essence, the United States volunteers to maintain order in East Asia, which greatly benefits Japanese interests, at America's own risk and expense. That policy
amounts to a multi-billion-dollar annual defense subsidy to Japan; Japanese officials and policy experts privately (and sometimes publicly) admit that without the U.S. alliance and troop presence Tokyo's defense budget would have to increase by 50 to 100 percent--by $24 billion to $48 billion a year. But the benefits to Japan are not merely financial. The U.S. security shield spares Japan a difficult and divisive domestic debate about adopting a more expansive security role to protect the country's vital interests. It also spares Japan and its neighbors having to come to grips with the legacy of Japan's brutal aggression in the 1930s and 1940s. Given those multiple benefits, Tokyo is not likely to undertake any more security responsibilities than absolutely necessary to pacify American public opinion and prevent a rupture of the alliance.

If constructive change is to occur, the impetus will have to come from Washington. Unfortunately, current U.S. policy not only tolerates but encourages Japanese free riding and dependency. Following the summit, senior U.S. officials emphasized that they did not expect Japanese troops to be fighting alongside U.S. forces in an East Asian conflict, nor did they desire such a commitment.[34]

That is not an atypical attitude. American opinion leaders frequently act as though the highest priority of U.S. policy in East Asia should be to discourage Japan from playing a more active military role. Any manifestation of a more assertive Japanese policy, according to the conventional wisdom, would alarm neighboring countries and disrupt regional stability. Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland epitomized that attitude when he praised the Clinton administration's increasingly vigorous East Asian policy. "The president's trip highlights America's readiness to flex its muscles against North Korea or China, if it must, as well as a determination to protect Japan fully, to prevent Japan from going it alone." [35] Earlier, former assistant secretary of defense Chas. Freeman warned that if the United States did not come to Taiwan's aid, "many Japanese would demand that they take over their own defense."[36] That, Freeman stressed, would be a most alarming development.

The position adopted by Hoagland, Freeman, and others who seek to smother Japan has very disturbing implications.[37] In essence, they believe that if aggression in East Asia (from China, North Korea, or any other source) must be repelled, it is better that American forces suffer the resulting casualties than for Japanese forces to do so. (Indeed, the comments of the "senior officials" following the summit suggest that Washington would oppose, not only a scenario according to which Japanese troops might incur casualties in place of American troops, but also one according to which Japanese troops would incur casualties alongside U.S. troops.)

That strategy can best be described as an exercise in masochism. By keeping Japan dependent, the United States has created an artificial power vacuum in East Asia that Washington has then insisted on filling. In other words, the United States volunteers to be on the front lines of every East Asian military crisis. As a prosperous, capable, and conservative great power, Japan would normally be the primary stabilizer in the region and bear the costs and risks of doing so. It would also serve as the principal strategic counterweight to an increasingly assertive China.

The Requirements of a New Policy

A wholly new American policy is needed. Instead of being content with marginally greater Japanese "support" for America's East Asian military missions--even assuming that such a change will actually emerge from the review promised at the summit--Washington should gradually withdraw the security blanket of the U.S. troop presence and the "mutual" security treaty. That change would finally create the necessary incentive for Japan to play a regional political and military role commensurate with its status as a great power. Washington's long-term objective ought to be a role reversal, whereby Japan--if it believes its security requires it--would assume primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the peace in East Asia. The United States would provide support for Tokyo's efforts if a particular incident involved a threat to important American interests.

Such a policy change would go beyond burden sharing to burden shifting. It would minimize costs and risks to the American people--in marked contrast to the expensive and perilous policy of the United States' acting as military point man throughout East Asia. Implementing that new policy, though, will require far more than the illusion of change created by the smoke and mirrors of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit.

Notes


4. "Official Shows 'Understanding' of U.S. Carrier's Move," Yomiuri Shimbun, March 12, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report--East Asia, March 12, 1996, p. 5. The official was Sadayuki Hayashi, administrative vice minister of foreign affairs. Once the crisis had safely receded, however, National Security Council senior director of East Asian affairs Sandy Kristoff reported that Prime Minister Hashimoto "expressed his appreciation for the deployment of U.S. naval forces off the coast of Taiwan during the recent tensions in that region." Quoted in "Clinton Says U.S. and Japan Stand 'Side by Side,'" White House Bulletin, April 17, 1996, p. 3.


6. Quoted in Friedman.


8. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.
15. In addition to the specific changes, some pundits and policy experts also attach great significance to language in the joint declaration that the parties consider the alliance important, not only for common security objectives, but "for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century." "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security," p. 2. By agreeing to that language, Japan supposedly attested to its willingness to be a U.S. security partner throughout the Asia-Pacific region. But there is little evidence to support such a conclusion. Japanese leaders have stated for years that the mere existence of the alliance contributes to overall regional stability. Moreover, the focus has always been on the stabilizing effect of the U.S. troop presence and security role, not Japan's contribution. The language of the joint declaration does not commit Japan to a more active partnership--much less one that covers all of the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, Japanese officials later emphasized that their definition of "Asia-Pacific" is the same as their long-standing definition of the "Far East"--the term used in, among other places, the Mutual Security Treaty. The later term, they reiterated, applies only to "areas north of the Philippines, around Japan and surrounding waters, South Korea and Taiwan." "More on Tokyo Retaining Collective Self-Defense Ban," Kyodo News Service, April 22, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report--East Asia, April 22, 1996, p. 8.


17. Ibid., p. 3.


19. Quoted in Harris and Sullivan.


29. Quoted in Jordan and Sullivan.


34. Sullivan and Harris.


37. For more detailed discussions of the long-standing American desire to smother any independent security initiative by Japan, see Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington: Cato Institute, 1992), pp. 47-71; and Carpenter, "Paternalism and Dependence," pp. 7-8, 13-15.