872 (Author at Cato Institute) https://www.cato.org/rss/people/872 en Andrei Illarionov discusses 20 years of Putin in power on PRI’s The World https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-20-years-putin-power-pris-world?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Fri, 09 Aug 2019 10:27:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-20-years-putin-power-pris-world?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov's comments on the current crisis in Georgian-Russian relations are cited on DNI.ru https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionovs-comments-current-crisis-georgian-russian?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mon, 22 Jul 2019 09:44:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionovs-comments-current-crisis-georgian-russian?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the current crisis in Georgian-Russian relations on VOA Georgian https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-current-crisis-georgian-russian-relations?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Wed, 17 Jul 2019 13:29:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-current-crisis-georgian-russian-relations?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the current crisis in Georgian-Russian relations on VOA https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-current-crisis-georgian-russian-0?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mon, 15 Jul 2019 09:40:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-current-crisis-georgian-russian-0?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Putin’s New Term—From Brezhnev to Stalin https://www.cato.org/putins-new-term-brezhnev-stalin?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov <p>As was widely expected, on Sunday Vladimir Putin was once again reinstalled (reconfirmed, re-enthroned) in the Kremlin. The term “elected” cannot be used in this case since nothing that happened on March 18, 2018, or in the months leading to this date, qualifies for the internationally recognized basic standards of the term “election.” &#13;<br /> &#13;<br /> In full control of the Kremlin for more than 18 years, Putin has already been at the top of the Russian state longer than any other Russian or Soviet leader in the last century—including Leonid Brezhnev—and is now left to compete only with the three-decade reign of Joseph Stalin.&#13;<br /> &#13;<br /> The official numbers of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) gave Putin 76.7% of the vote with a turnout of 67.5%, making up almost 52% of Russia’s electorate. According to the CEC, the official number of people who voted for Putin was 56.4 million. However, Sergei Shpilkin, the renowned expert in electoral statistics, has estimated that ballot stuffing this year amounted to at least 10 million. In each of the three previous cases of “presidential elections” (in 2004, 2008, 2012) Shpilkin and his colleagues calculated the number of added (falsified) votes at between 8.8 and 14.6 million. &#13;<br /> &#13;<br /> Whatever the actual level of Putin’s public support, the official numbers provide Putin with a level of legitimacy that Russian presidents never had before. The real question that now arises is how he is going to use it.&#13;<br /> &#13;<br /> The general consensus is that Putin’s policy on the domestic front would be a still further tightening of his grip on the last remnants of civil society, a further destruction of the already almost-fully-destroyed rule of law, meager—if any—meaningful economic reforms, and definitely a new level of ideologization of Russian society based on anti-liberal, conservative, Orthodox religious values. Russia’s level of political rights and civil liberties in previous years has been sliding down to non-free status. Now its status is just one notch above the very bottom in Freedom House’s political freedom index, meaning that it is close to the level of the totalitarian regimes of Cuba and North Korea. Given Putin’s persistence and Russia’s rapid political deterioration, it is rather hard not to expect that Russia will soon sink to the lowest level in the political freedom index.&#13;<br /> &#13;<br /> As for Putin’s possible foreign policy in the coming years, we can get a hint of it based on a number of his recent statements, comments, and interviews. It appears that Putin’s traditional interest in disturbing Russia’s immediate neighbors and grabbing pieces of land in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine has been visibly redirected towards Belarus, since Mr. Lukashenko’s dictatorship—lacking any serious foreign allies except for Russia—seems to be particularly vulnerable to absorption. In addition, the Russian “czar” has started to look for more ambitious targets beyond the borders of the former Soviet republics. Recently, his attention has been directed towards his key adversary—the United States—and the most irritating part for him <em>within</em> the United States, its democratic political system. In the documentary movie “The World Order, 2018,” which was prepared by the Kremlin propaganda team before the March presidential vote, Putin firmly articulated his two approaches to the United States: to be emphatically positive towards president Trump and to show strong “disappointment with the unpredictable [democratic] political system” of the United States.&#13;<br /> &#13;<br /> Otherwise, in his interview with NBC anchor Megan Kelly, Putin appeared even more decisive—by naming (unprecedentedly) five times the most crucial problem for him and his key partner (president Trump): namely, the United States political system and the United States Congress. He blamed Congress for all of America’s alleged crimes, such as intervention into Russian internal affairs, different accusations of Russia, proclaiming Russia as an enemy, and the introduction of sanctions against Russia—something that Putin has never done before. It remains to be seen what particular instruments he is ready to apply towards this enemy—intervention into congressional elections this Autumn, cyber-attacks, propaganda, blackmail, or otherwise. But having seen Putin’s approach for years, it is hard not to foresee that one of the main targets of his aggressive foreign policy—either open, or clandestine, or both—in the coming years is going to be the democratic political system of the United States, with the United States Congress at its center.</p> Wed, 21 Mar 2018 13:09:50 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/putins-new-term-brezhnev-stalin?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses Russia's 126th ranking in the 2017 Human Freedom Index on VOA Russia https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-russias-126th-ranking-2017-human-freedom?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mon, 29 Jan 2018 11:40:00 -0500 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-russias-126th-ranking-2017-human-freedom?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Is Ukraine on the Right Course? https://www.cato.org/events/ukraine-right-course?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mikheil Saakashvili, Sergei Nosenko, Kateryna Smagliy, Andrei Illarionov <p>Nearly four years have passed since Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity brought down the corrupt government of Viktor Yanukovych. The revolution inspired widespread support and generated hope for a better future; yet Ukrainians’ expectations are far from being met. The economy has shrunk by 16 percent; the authorities have devalued the currency and defaulted on debt; living standards have plummeted; and growth remains weak. Levels of corruption and of political and civil liberties have hardly changed. The government’s unwillingness to reform has frustrated Ukrainians and foreign allies alike. Join us to hear a panel of experts explain Ukraine’s trajectory, make policy recommendations, and discuss prospects for change.</p> Wed, 06 Dec 2017 12:00:00 -0500 Mikheil Saakashvili, Sergei Nosenko, Kateryna Smagliy, Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/events/ukraine-right-course?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss The Impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on the Scope and Size of Government in the West https://www.cato.org/events/impact-bolshevik-revolution-scope-size-government-west?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Vito Tanzi, Amity Shlaes, Andrei Illarionov, Marian L. Tupy <p>Before the outbreak of World War I, government spending as a share of gross domestic product in the developed world averaged 13 percent and the role of public officials in the lives of the citizenry was restricted to a few core functions, including justice and national defense. At the dawn of the 21st century, average government spending among rich countries stood at 44 percent of gross domestic product and the scope of government had grown immensely. Please join us as our panel looks at the influence of the Bolshevik Revolution on intellectuals, policymakers, and the public debate in the West concerning the proper role of government and its subsequent growth.</p> Thu, 19 Oct 2017 16:24:00 -0400 Vito Tanzi, Amity Shlaes, Andrei Illarionov, Marian L. Tupy https://www.cato.org/events/impact-bolshevik-revolution-scope-size-government-west?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Terror, Propaganda and the Birth of the “New Man”: Experiences from Cuba, North Korea, and the Soviet Union https://www.cato.org/events/terror-propaganda-birth-new-man-experiences-cuba-north-korea-soviet-union?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Lankov, Yuri Pérez, Andrei Illarionov, Marian L. Tupy <p>Communist totalitarian regimes that sprang up after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 did not aim simply to change social and economic relations between individuals and the state. They aimed to transform human nature in order to create a “New Man.” The New Man’s behavior and beliefs would adhere to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. He would be free of selfishness and base instincts such as nationalism and class consciousness. He would be austere, disciplined, hardworking, and willing to sacrifice himself for the common good. But man is not a blank slate. The incompatibility of communist ideas and human nature necessitated a massive expansion of propaganda, to brainwash those who could be influenced, and terror, to eliminate those deemed irredeemable. Please join us as our panel looks at the means that the communist state employed and the continued application of those “novel” techniques today.</p> Mon, 16 Oct 2017 12:57:00 -0400 Andrei Lankov, Yuri Pérez, Andrei Illarionov, Marian L. Tupy https://www.cato.org/events/terror-propaganda-birth-new-man-experiences-cuba-north-korea-soviet-union?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the U.S. air strike on Syria on Sky News https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-us-air-strike-syria-sky-news?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mon, 10 Apr 2017 13:07:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-us-air-strike-syria-sky-news?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the Russian government and its citizens on KKSF's The Bob Zadek Show https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-russian-government-its-citizens-kksfs?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Sun, 09 Apr 2017 11:37:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-russian-government-its-citizens-kksfs?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss What Went Wrong? Russia 25 Years after the Fall of the Soviet Union https://www.cato.org/events/what-went-wrong-russia-25-years-after-fall-soviet-union?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov, Ian Vásquez <p>December 2016 marks the 25th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 independent post-Soviet states, including Russia. The political elite of the new Russia was to play a key role in a peaceful end of the communist empire that threatened nuclear Armageddon for almost half of a century. The world greeted the entry of an independent democratic Russia onto the international stage with genuine enthusiasm and great hope. Some even believed that the world was entering a promising new era. Twenty-five years later, Russia’s autocratic regime has effectively destroyed the domestic political opposition, media freedom, and independent courts. In foreign affairs, Russia has engaged in military aggressions in neighboring Georgia and Ukraine, and is actively involved in the civil war in Syria. It is meddling in the internal affairs of European countries and, some suspect, even the United States. Join us to hear our panelists discuss what went wrong and where Russia is likely headed.</p> Tue, 13 Dec 2016 12:58:00 -0500 Andrei Illarionov, Ian Vásquez https://www.cato.org/events/what-went-wrong-russia-25-years-after-fall-soviet-union?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Annexation of Crimea is a Iitmus Test for Russian Opposition https://www.cato.org/commentary/annexation-crimea-iitmus-test-russian-opposition?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov <div class="lead text-default"> <p>Russian journalist Aider Muzhdabayev once said "Tell me to whom Crimea belongs, and I'll tell you who you are." This phrase is like a test in the main issue in Russia's most important discussion at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union.</p> </div> , <div class="text-default"> <p>The discussion he started is one not only about Crimea and not even about Crimea per se. Not only about Ukraine. And not about Russian-Ukrainian relations. This is a discussion about Russia. About what it should be.</p> <p>This is about the rules under which contemporary Russian society should live and the principles according to which the new Russian state should act — both a/poad and within the country.</p> <p>Three legal principles and three major political forces in contemporary Russia.</p> <p></p> </div> , <aside class="aside--right aside pb-lg-0 pt-lg-2"> <div class="pullquote pullquote--default"> <div class="pullquote__content h2"> <p>When a free democratic state with the rule of law is created in Russia, such a relatively minor problem as the return of Crimea to its legal owner can be resolved relatively quickly and easily.</p> </div> </div> </aside> , <div class="text-default"> <p>Based on their responses to the Crimea test, Russian politicians and public figures have fallen into three distinct groups based on different beliefs.</p> <p>The first belief is that force not limited by any law or morality, or "Might makes right." This is a Mafia principle. This is a principle that has been repeatedly demonstrated by Vladimir Putin and his Kremlin entourage, a principle widely popularized by the regime's propagandists.</p> <p>The second principle is one of bashful populism hiding behind unlimited (non-liberal) democracy. "Whatever the majority desires is right." People who hold these beliefs might admit that all possible laws and norms have been violated, that a crime has been committed, and even condemn the crime; but if the majority wants the crime's results to be preserved, they will not do anything to stop it, protect the victim, return what was stolen, punish the criminal.</p> <p>This is the principle of recognizing the fait accompli resulting from the crime, the principle of subordinating one's actions to the mob's instincts. This principle is being promoted by opposition figures Alexei Navalny, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and columnist Yulia Latynina and has been supported by their supporters and construed by them in many ways.</p> <p>The third principle is the rule of law and liberal democracy. "You can only do what doesn't violate the legitimate rights of others, both people and states." Basically, if a crime was committed, one needs to do their best to stop the crime, protect the victim and punish the criminal. If necessary, one should spend a lot of effort and time or even sacrifice one's life for that.</p> <p>This is the principle of the rule of law. It is supported, for example, by journalists and politicians Arkady Babchenko, Vitaly Portnikov, Boris Vishnevsky, Andrei Piontkovsky, Garry Kasparov and many others, including this author.</p> <p>What follows falls into three categories of responses: crime and encouragement, crime and bashful recognition and crime and punishment.</p> <p>Three European (and universal) development paths.</p> <p>Given that Putin, Navalny and Khodorkovsky have proclaimed and regularly emphasized their allegiance to the European way of life, it's worth mentioning that all these principles are absolutely European and quite modern. Sicilian Mafia, the totalitarian mobilization of Mussolini and Hitler and the rule of law in Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian and continental traditions — all of them are exclusively European phenomena. That is why a solemn proclamation of the European choice does not rule out a subsequent Mafia state or totalitarian development path, which are quite European in their origin.</p> <p>In response to the crimes that have been committed or are being committed by the Kremlin — stealing Crimea, invading Donbas, raping Ukraine, Navalny, Khodorkovsky and Latynina have proposed labeling these as crimes but at the same time recognizing their results, as well as simultaneously refusing to resist these crimes and to punish those who committed them.</p> <p>How can one explain the position of those who refuse to return Crimea?</p> <p>There are three explanations possible.</p> <p>The first one is claiming to be a realist. Khodorkovsky said: "I know quite well what is real in Russia and what is not." Of course, this is not the approach of aggressors and Mafiosi. This is the position of underdogs. This is the attitude of slaves and serfs.</p> <p>This is the position of peasants kneeling before bandits and giving them their rice, barley, wives and daughters.</p> <p>This is one's attempt to persuade himself and others to recognize the new reality.</p> <p>Crimea has been annexed — it can't be returned. Yukos has been confiscated — it can't be returned. Someone is under house arrest, his freedom has been taken away — it can't be returned. This is the philosophy of appeasing aggressors, Mafiosi, bandits and terrorists. This is a political point of no return for former opposition leaders.</p> <p>The second explanation is that such a position is based on imperialist and chauvinist views. If people who refuse to return Crimea instead insist that Yukos cannot be confiscated but Crimea can, that one person's liberty and property cannot be seized but another person's can, and that burning Jews is unacceptable but cracking down on Central Asian immigrants is natural, this is evidence of pure imperial chauvinism.</p> <p>This is acknowledgment of a fundamental, deep spiritual affinity between those who refuse to return Crimea and those who supported Russia's aggression in Crimea. The only difference between them is the degree of hypocrisy that they demonstrate.</p> <p>The third explanation may that those who support legalization of Crimea's annexation also support "democratic tyranny", i.e. allowing the majority to solve any issues by a vote. According to this view, not only public issues but also private ones can be solved by those who don't have a right to solve them.</p> <p>If neighbors decide to register a new resident at an apartment despite the owner's objections, if a Communist Party committee does not authorize a divorce, if a majority votes that property stolen by the government should not be returned, one should follow those decisions made by democratic tyranny.</p> <p>Regardless of the form it takes, refusal to return Crimea has nothing to do with liberalism, rule of law and a strategic program for introducing rule of law and liberal democracy in Russia.</p> <p>Should Crimea be returned?</p> <p>It is beyond any doubt that Russia should return Crimea to Ukraine? All arguments used by enemies of such a return are not only easily refutable but also irrelevant.</p> <p>The way of Crimea's transfer from the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 does not matter at all.</p> <p>The past economic failures (real or imaginary) of Ukraine and Crimea do not have any relevance whatsoever for the Anschluss of Crimea, and its return can't depend on Ukraine's possible economic successes or Russian economic failures in the future.</p> <p>For justifications of the Crimean Anschluss, the fact that most of the peninsula's population are ethnic Russians does not matter either. Nor does the presence of a German speaking majority in Austria and Switzerland give Germany any grounds for annexing those territories.</p> <p>The issue of Crimea's jurisdiction is not a subject of negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the E.U. because neither Russia nor the E.U. have any legal rights to Crimea. Moreover, talks between a robber and its victim before the triumph of justice are absolutely absurd — any talks can only be started after everything stolen is returned to the victim.</p> <p>The issue of Crimea's jurisdiction is within the competence of only one subject of international law — the owner of that territory, namely Ukraine. Only this subject, and no one else, has necessary legal rights to change this territory's jurisdiction.</p> <p>The only case allowing a Russian political or public figure to support refusal to return Crimea to Ukraine would be the Ukrainian state's clear and unequivocal renunciation of its rights to Crimea.</p> <p>When and how will Crimea be returned to Ukraine?</p> <p>Khodorkovsky believes that "only a dictator can return Crimea to Ukraine in the upcoming decades." History says otherwise.</p> <p>Kuwait, which was annexed by Iraq, was freed seven months after the annexation. Kuwait's sovereignty was recognized by post-Saddam Hussein Iraq (not a dictatorship).</p> <p>The 1938 Anschluss of Austria was declared null and void in five years in the Allies' Moscow Declaration of Oct. 30, 1943. Austria's sovereignty was re-established in 1945.</p> <p>Sudetenland, which was annexed by Germany, was returned to Czechoslovakia as a result of the Potsdam conference seven years after the annexation. It was democratic, not authoritarian, Germany that renounced its rights to Austria and Sudetenland.</p> <p>When a free democratic state with the rule of law is created in Russia, such a relatively minor problem as the return of Crimea to its legal owner can be resolved relatively quickly and easily.</p> </div> Mon, 10 Nov 2014 09:42:00 -0500 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/commentary/annexation-crimea-iitmus-test-russian-opposition?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss The Transition from Communism 25 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Lessons for Non-Free Societies - Panel 2: Institutional Transition: Slow and Difficult, but Not Impossible https://www.cato.org/events/transition-communism-25-years-after-fall-berlin-wall-lessons-non-free-societies-0?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Ian Vásquez, Dalibor Rohac, Andrei Illarionov, Mikheil Saakashvili <p>Following the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, communist governments crumbled throughout the Soviet bloc. By late December 1991, the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist. The pace of transition from communist dictatorship to democracy and market economics was uneven. Some countries experienced high rates of economic growth and rapid return to political freedom, while others remained stuck in poverty and authoritarianism. Which reforms worked and which did not? What were the pre-conditions for a successful transformation and what lessons can non-free societies learn from the experiences of former communist countries?</p> Wed, 15 Oct 2014 14:28:00 -0400 Ian Vásquez, Dalibor Rohac, Andrei Illarionov, Mikheil Saakashvili https://www.cato.org/events/transition-communism-25-years-after-fall-berlin-wall-lessons-non-free-societies-0?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on Dukascopy TvRu https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-dukascopy-tvru?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mon, 17 Mar 2014 12:15:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-dukascopy-tvru?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on Wochit.tv https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-wochittv?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Mon, 17 Mar 2014 12:14:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-wochittv?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on hromadske.tv https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-hromadsketv-0?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Sun, 16 Mar 2014 12:23:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-hromadsketv-0?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on Pershyi Natsionalnyi's Shuster Live https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-pershyi-natsionalnyis?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Fri, 14 Mar 2014 12:21:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-pershyi-natsionalnyis?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on TCH Headline Ukraine News https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-tch-headline-ukraine?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Fri, 14 Mar 2014 11:59:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-tch-headline-ukraine?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine at the Emergency Economic Summit for Ukraine https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-emergency-economic?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Thu, 13 Mar 2014 12:29:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-emergency-economic?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on The Ukrainian TRK https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-ukrainian-trk?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Sun, 09 Mar 2014 12:14:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-ukrainian-trk?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on Ukrainian Television https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-ukrainian-television?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Sun, 09 Mar 2014 12:10:00 -0400 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-ukrainian-television?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the crisis in Ukraine on CNBC World's The Call https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-crisis-ukraine-cnbc-worlds-call?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Fri, 07 Mar 2014 13:02:00 -0500 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-tv/andrei-illarionov-discusses-crisis-ukraine-cnbc-worlds-call?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the crisis in Ukraine on BBC Radio 5's Up All Night https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-crisis-ukraine-bbc-radio-5s-all-night?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Fri, 07 Mar 2014 13:01:00 -0500 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-crisis-ukraine-bbc-radio-5s-all-night?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Andrei Illarionov discusses the situation in Ukraine on Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen (SRF) https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-schweizer-radio-und?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss Fri, 07 Mar 2014 12:04:00 -0500 Andrei Illarionov https://www.cato.org/media-highlights-radio/andrei-illarionov-discusses-situation-ukraine-schweizer-radio-und?utm_source=author&amp%3Butm_medium=rss&amp%3Butm_campaign=rss