1055 (Author at Cato Institute) https://www.cato.org/rss/people/1055 en Trump’s Conspiracy Theory About ‘The Server’ Threatens Election Security https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/trumps-conspiracy-theory-about-server-threatens-election-security Julian Sanchez <div class="lead text-default"> <p>Donald Trump is still searching for “The Server.” On Friday morning, the president phoned in to his favorite cable news program, “Fox &amp; Friends,” to make a series of false claims about the cyberattack on the Democratic National Committee’s computer systems perpetrated by Russian hackers, as part of their elaborate efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. After the attack, claimed Trump, the DNC “gave the server to CrowdStrike, which is a company owned by a very wealthy Ukrainian. I still want to see that server. The FBI has never gotten that server. That’s a big part of this whole thing.”</p> </div> , <div class="text-default"> <p>Every part of what Trump said was false — including the claim that the California-based cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, hired by the DNC when it discovered the infiltration of its systems, is owned by a “wealthy Ukrainian.” But “the server” has been a long-running obsession of the president’s. He has referenced it repeatedly on Twitter, in media interviews, while standing onstage next to Russian President Vladimir Putin and, more recently, in his July 25 phone conversation with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky.</p> <p>That refrain is troubling, most of all because it shows that Trump is fixated on a conspiracy theory that his own national security advisers have denounced as “<a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.reuters.com_article_us-2Dusa-2Dtrump-2Dimpeachment-2Dconspiracies-2Dex_the-2Dfictional-2Dnarratives-2Ddriving-2Dtrumps-2Dukraine-2Dpressure-2Dcampaign-2DidUSKBN1XV2B0&amp;d=DwMGaQ&amp;c=RAhzPLrCAq19eJdrcQiUVEwFYoMRqGDAXQ_puw5tYjg&amp;r=wS_UFddb9ofxwptgzWHTgKCCT667_Mq8K1T4PUhGhY8&amp;m=jnOB8Ic8dh0HeH0H3VpARghqiEBBipKh84NWZze_7Cw&amp;s=pJ3KbI8UxvWLuecqti913_Nvj0rqOfy2Bu3ujDfRBpw&amp;e=">completely debunked</a>.” These theories allege that there is a server that the DNC refused to turn over to the FBI, purportedly to conceal evidence that would disprove the intelligence community’s consensus that Russia was responsible for the hack. According to some versions of the theory, another country (perhaps Ukraine) was the true culprit; in others, the theft of thousands of DNC emails later published by WikiLeaks was an “inside job.” The unifying theme, however, is a desire to exonerate Russia of the crime.</p> <p>Trump’s obsession with the server suggests either that he is unwilling to seek reliable information from the government’s own intelligence and law enforcement agencies or that he disbelieves what they tell him, even on questions where there is no ambiguity or doubt. This goes well beyond healthy skepticism and into the realm of dangerous dysfunction: A president who refuses to accept intelligence assessments he prefers not to believe cannot make sound decisions, and over time this creates pressure to politicize intelligence — with agencies flattering the president’s preconceptions to remain relevant.</p> <p>Even Trump’s staunchest allies in Congress have been unwilling to follow their leader down this rabbit hole. In the course of House impeachment hearings, GOP legislators have sought to justify Trump’s desire to investigate putative “election interference” by Ukraine — citing such “interventions” as a 2016 newspaper op-ed written by Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States that criticized some of Trump’s foreign policy statements. None were prepared to acknowledge, let alone justify, the actual investigation Trump had requested: an inquiry into CrowdStrike and the supposedly missing DNC email server. Yet as the testimony of E.U. Ambassador Gordon Sondland made clear last week, the references to CrowdStrike and the server were not limited to a single call. In the weeks after the exchange between the two leaders, Sondland testified that he had continued pressuring Ukrainian officials to publicly announce the probes Trump had demanded, one of which he repeatedly described as an investigation of “the DNC server.”</p> <p>Republicans’ reluctance to address this directly is unsurprising. When former National Security Council adviser Fiona Hill suggested in her testimony during Thursday’s hearings that some Republicans had accepted a “false narrative” exonerating Russia of election interference, those in the room reacted with uniform outrage, pointing to a bipartisan House Intelligence Committee report acknowledging Russian culpability. Though their umbrage was justified, none of them acknowledged that the president’s obsession with the server is inextricably bound up with the very “false narrative” they had angrily rejected.</p> <p>The server conspiracy theory is baseless for at least five reasons.</p> <p>First, the server <a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.thedailybeast.com_trumps-2Dmissing-2Ddnc-2Dserver-2Dis-2Dneither-2Dmissing-2Dnor-2Da-2Dserver&amp;d=DwMGaQ&amp;c=RAhzPLrCAq19eJdrcQiUVEwFYoMRqGDAXQ_puw5tYjg&amp;r=wS_UFddb9ofxwptgzWHTgKCCT667_Mq8K1T4PUhGhY8&amp;m=jnOB8Ic8dh0HeH0H3VpARghqiEBBipKh84NWZze_7Cw&amp;s=82zGy84fYKgq0C6PYJbS7V2oRYm2eKR4HELkKkb4lLg&amp;e=">doesn’t even exist</a>. The DNC relies on a cloud-based email system consisting of some 140 physical servers. And as Robert S. Mueller III’s report on Russian interference explained, the military unit behind the cyberattacks “compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network,” as well as another 29 owned by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.</p> <p>Second, it is not unusual that the FBI did not cart off the physical machines affected by Russian attack. As a rule, law enforcement does not seize the property of crime victims unless it’s necessary, and when it comes to digital evidence, it is often unnecessary. In this case, the company CrowdStrike provided the FBI with digital images of the hacked DNC computers. Asking why the FBI didn’t take the physical computers is like wondering why someone has emailed you a file rather than shipping you their entire laptop.</p> <p>Third, the information most useful to the FBI would be in the images created by CrowdStrike <em>during</em> their efforts to expel the foreign intruders. Examining the computers after the fact — after the dust had settled and the hackers’ malware had been removed — would have provided far fewer insights than observing them in action.</p> <p>Fourth, it is clear from both the Mueller report and the special counsel’s indictment of Russian officials charged with the hack that forensic evidence from DNC computers was a relatively small piece of the puzzle. The evidence of Russian responsibility for the hack is both overwhelming and derived from many sources: It is not based merely on analysis of the DNC’s servers.</p> <p>Fifth and finally, one element of the theory seemingly original to Trump is the odd and inexplicable notion that CrowdStrike is a Ukrainian company. The firm — which was not only hired by the DNC but also by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee when its computer network was penetrated — is based in California. One of its co-founders was born in Russia, not Ukraine, but he moved to the United States as a teenager nearly 25 years ago.</p> <p>As all of that makes clear, Trump’s conspiratorially minded ideas about the server aren’t just baseless or unfounded — they’re provably wrong. Indeed, his concerns are obviously and comically irrelevant to anyone who understands digital forensics. If Trump cared to ask, any one of hundreds of technical experts who work for the FBI or other government agencies could explain why the theory is nonsensical.</p> <p>Despite all of that, Trump has still gone to bizarre lengths to ascertain the effectively fictional server’s whereabouts. During his July 25 call with Zelensky, he asked the Ukrainian president to “find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine, they say CrowdStrike … The server, they say Ukraine has it.” That request was, in effect, a declaration that he so distrusts U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies that he would prefer to rely on Ukraine’s. Like his more explosively troubling request for an investigation of Biden, it was an attempt to get a foreign power to publicly validate and lend credibility to a politically useful conspiracy theory, which U.S. intelligence officials, and even his GOP allies, have refused to do.</p> <p>Perhaps even more concerning, the obsession with the server is a sign that Trump continues to reject the unanimous conclusion — again, not only of the U.S. intelligence community but of Republicans in Congress — that Russia was responsible for the DNC attacks. This does not bode well for efforts to secure our elections against another attack in 2020 — a topic Homeland Security officials have apparently been warned not to raise in Trump’s presence, lest it anger the president. Election security is a hard problem under the best of circumstances — and harder still when the boss refuses to acknowledge the problem exists.</p> </div> Mon, 25 Nov 2019 11:32:40 -0500 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/trumps-conspiracy-theory-about-server-threatens-election-security The Impeachment Inquiry Begins https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/impeachment-inquiry-begins Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>Julian Sanchez addresses some common objections raised during the first week of presidential impeachment proceedings.</p> Sat, 16 Nov 2019 09:54:23 -0500 Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/impeachment-inquiry-begins Julian Sanchez discusses 2020 election security on WWL's First News with Tommy Tucker https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-2020-election-security-wwls-first-news-0 Thu, 24 Oct 2019 11:00:43 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-2020-election-security-wwls-first-news-0 Julian Sanchez’s tweet on US Attorney General William Barr cited on NPR’s On the Media https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchezs-tweet-us-attorney-general-william-barr-cited-nprs Mon, 07 Oct 2019 14:30:39 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchezs-tweet-us-attorney-general-william-barr-cited-nprs What Is and Is Not Required of Whistleblowers? https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/what-not-required-whistleblowers Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>A claim that has made the rounds this week in conservative media goes like this: Until recently, would-be whistleblowers needed firsthand knowledge of wrongdoing in order to see their claims advanced. The problem with the claim is this: It's wrong. Julian Sanchez comments.</p> Tue, 01 Oct 2019 12:17:37 -0400 Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/what-not-required-whistleblowers Julian Sanchez’s comments from the CNN article, “Fact check: Trump and other Republicans falsely claim whistleblower rules changed just before Ukraine complaint,” are cited on WWTN’s The Phil Valentine Show https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchezs-comments-cnn-article-fact-check-trump-other Mon, 30 Sep 2019 11:06:23 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchezs-comments-cnn-article-fact-check-trump-other Trump White House Mulls Monitoring the Mentally Ill for Future Violence https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/trump-white-house-mulls-monitoring-mentally-ill-future-violence Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>The White House’s potential plan to use consumer tech to monitor those deemed mentally ill for potential violence already has some bipartisan support. The problem is that it won't work. Julian Sanchez comments.</p> Mon, 16 Sep 2019 10:17:34 -0400 Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/trump-white-house-mulls-monitoring-mentally-ill-future-violence Julian Sanchez discusses recent developments regarding James Comey on KURV's The Drive Home https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-recent-developments-regarding-james-comey Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:58:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-recent-developments-regarding-james-comey A Case Study in Warrants for Location Data https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/case-study-warrants-location-data Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>An assault in Manhattan leads a prosecutor to get a warrant for cellphone location data from Google. Is this how it's supposed to work? Julian Sanchez comments.</p> Tue, 20 Aug 2019 11:05:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/case-study-warrants-location-data What Makes a Qualified Director of National Intelligence? https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/what-makes-qualified-director-national-intelligence Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>How does a Director of National Intelligence do a good job? Julian Sanchez discusses the new nominee for the job, Rep. John Ratcliffe.</p> Thu, 01 Aug 2019 17:02:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/what-makes-qualified-director-national-intelligence Julian Sanchez discusses John Ratcliffe's nomination for Director of National Intelligence on Spectrum News https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-discusses-john-ratcliffes-nomination-director-national Mon, 29 Jul 2019 10:39:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-discusses-john-ratcliffes-nomination-director-national Julian Sanchez discusses the Mueller testimony on WWL's The Newell Normand Show https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-testimony-wwls-newell-normand Thu, 25 Jul 2019 11:03:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-testimony-wwls-newell-normand Julian Sanchez discusses the DHS's use of facial recognition technology on C-SPAN's Washington Journal https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-discusses-dhss-use-facial-recognition-technology-c Sun, 14 Jul 2019 10:16:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-discusses-dhss-use-facial-recognition-technology-c Julian Sanchez's upcoming Washington Journal appearance is promoted on C-SPAN https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchezs-upcoming-washington-journal-appearance-promoted-c Sat, 13 Jul 2019 10:14:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchezs-upcoming-washington-journal-appearance-promoted-c Artificial Intelligence and Counterterrorism: Possibilities and Limitations https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/artificial-intelligence-counterterrorism-possibilities-limitations Julian Sanchez <div class="lead text-default"> <p>My thanks to the chair, ranking member, and all members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to speak to you today.</p> </div> , <div class="text-default"> <p>As a firm believer in the principle of comparative advantage, I don’t intend to delve too deeply into the technical details of automated content filtering, which my copanelists are far better suited than I to address. Instead I want to focus on legal and policy considerations, and above all to urge Congress to resist the temptation to intervene in the highly complex — and admittedly highly imperfect — processes by which private online platforms seek to moderate both content related to terrorism and “hateful” or otherwise objectionable speech more broadly. (My colleague at the Cato Institute, John Samples, recently published a policy paper dealing still more broadly with issues surrounding regulation of content moderation policies, which I can enthusiastically recommend to the committee’s attention.<a id="#refer-1" href="#endnote-1"><sup>1</sup></a>)</p> <p>The major social media platforms all engage, to varying degrees, in extensive monitoring of user-posted content via, a combination of human and automated review, with the aim of restricting a wide array of speech those platforms deem objectionable, typically including nudity, individual harassment, and — more germane to our subject today — the promotion of extremist violence and, more broadly, hateful speech directed at specific groups on the basis of race, gender, religion, or sexuality. In response to public criticism, these platforms have in recent years taken steps to crack down more aggressively on hateful and extremist speech, investing in larger teams of human moderators and more sophisticated algorithmic tools designed to automatically flag such content.<a id="#refer-2" href="#endnote-2"><sup>2</sup></a></p> <p>Elected officials and users of these platforms are often dissatisfied with these efforts — both with the speed and efficacy of content removal and the scope of individual platforms’ policies. Yet it is clear that all the major platforms’ policies go far further in restricting speech than would be permissible under our Constitution via state action. The First Amendment protects hate speech. The Supreme Court has ruled in favor of the constitutional right of American neo-Nazis to march in public brandishing swastikas<a id="#refer-3" href="#endnote-3"><sup>3</sup></a>, and of a hate group to picket outside the funerals of veterans displaying incredibly vile homophobic and anti-military slogans.<a id="#refer-4" href="#endnote-4"><sup>4</sup></a></p> <p>While direct threats and speech that is both intended and likely to incite “imminent” violence fall outside the ambit of the First Amendment, Supreme Court precedent distinguishes such speech from “the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence,”<a id="#refer-5" href="#endnote-5"><sup>5</sup></a> which remains protected. Unsurprisingly, in light of this case law, a recent Congressional Research Service report found that “laws that criminalize the dissemination of the pure advocacy of terrorism, without more, would likely be deemed unconstitutional.”<a id="#refer-6" href="#endnote-6"><sup>6</sup></a></p> <p>Happily — at least, as far as most users of social media are concerned — the First Amendment does not bind private firms like YouTube, Twitter, or Facebook, leaving them with a much freer hand to restrict offensive content that our Constitution forbids the law from reaching. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that principle just this month, in acase involving a public access cable channel in New York. Yet as the Court noted in that decision, this applies only when private determinations to restrict content are truly private. They may be subject to First Amendment challenge if the private entity in question is functioning as a “state actor” — which can occur "when the government compels the private entity to take a particular action" or "when the government acts jointly with the private entity."<a id="#refer-7" href="#endnote-7"><sup>7</sup></a></p> <p>Perversely, then, legislative efforts to compel more aggressive removal of hateful or extremist content risk producing the opposite of the intended result. Content moderation decisions that are clearly lawful as an exercise of purely private discretion could be recast as government censorship, opening the door to legal challenge. Should the courts determine that legislative mandates had rendered First Amendment standards applicable to online platforms, the ultimate result would almost certainly be more hateful and extremist speech on those platforms.</p> <p>Bracketing legal considerations for the moment, it is also important to recognize that the ability of algorithmic tools to accurately identify hateful or extremist content is not as great as is commonly supposed. Last year, Facebook boasted that its automated filter detected 99.5 percent of the terrorist-related content the company removed before it was posted, with the remainder flagged by users.<a id="#refer-8" href="#endnote-8"><sup>8</sup></a> Many press reports subtly misconstrued this claim. The <em>New York Times</em>, for example, wrote that Facebook’s “A.I. found 99.5 percent of terrorist content on the site.”<a id="#refer-9" href="#endnote-9"><sup>9</sup></a> That, of course, is a very different proposition: Facebook’s claim concerned the ratio of content removed after being flagged as terror-related by automated tools versus human reporting, which should be unsurprising given that software can process vast amounts of content far more quickly than human brains. It is <em>not</em> the claim that software filters successfully detected 99.5 percent of all terror-related content uploaded to the site — which would be impossible since, by definition, content not detected by either mechanism is omitted from the calculus. Nor does it tell us much about the false-positive ratio: How much content was misidentified as terror-related, or how often such content appeared in the context of posts either reporting on or condemning terrorist activities.</p> <p>There is ample reason to believe that such false positives impose genuine social cost. Algorithms may be able to determine that a post contains images of extremist content, but they are far less adept at reading contextual cues to determine whether the purpose of the post is to glorify violence, condemn it, or merely document it — something that may in certain cases even be ambiguous to a human observer. Journalists and human rights activists, for example, have complained that tech company crackdowns on violent extremist videos have inadvertently frustrated efforts to document human rights violations<a id="#refer-" href="#endnote-"><sup>10</sup></a>, and erased evidence of war crimes in Syria.<a id="#refer-11" href="#endnote-11"><sup>11</sup></a></p> <p>Just this month, a YouTube crackdown on white supremacist content resulted in the removal of a large number of historical videos posted by educational institutions, and by anti-racist activist groups dedicated to documenting and condemning hate speech.<a id="#refer-12" href="#endnote-12"><sup>12</sup></a></p> <p>Of course, such errors are often reversed by human reviewers — at least when the groups affected have enough know-how and public prestige to compel a reconsideration. Government mandates, however, alter the calculus. As three United Nations special rapporteurs wrote, objecting to a proposal in the European Union to require automated filtering, the threat of legal penalties were “likely to incentivize platforms to err on the side of caution and remove content that is legitimate or lawful.”<a id="#refer-13" href="#endnote-13"><sup>13</sup></a> If the failure to filter to the government’s satisfaction risks stiff fines, any cost-benefit analysis for platforms will favor significant overfiltering: Better to pull down ten benign posts than risk leaving up one that might expose them to penalties. For precisely this reason, the EU proposal has been roundly condemned by human rights activists<a id="#refer-14" href="#endnote-14"><sup>14</sup></a> and fiercely opposed by a wide array of civil society groups.<a id="#refer-15" href="#endnote-15"><sup>15</sup></a></p> <p>A recent high-profile case illustrates the challenges platforms face: The efforts by platforms to restrict circulation of video depicting the brutal mass shooting of worshippers at a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand. Legal scholar Kate Klonick documented the efforts of Facebook’s content moderation team for The New Yorker<a id="#refer-16" href="#endnote-16"><sup>16</sup></a>, while reporters Elizabeth Dwoskin and Craig Timberg wrote about the parallel struggles of YouTube’s team for <em>The Washington Post</em><a id="#refer-17" href="#endnote-17"><sup>17</sup></a> — both accounts are illuminating and well worth reading.</p> <p>Though both companies were subject to vigorous condemnation by elected officials for failing to limit the video quickly or comprehensively enough, the published accounts make clear this was not for want of trying. Teams of engineers and moderators at both platforms worked around the clock to stop the spread of the video, by increasingly aggressive means. Automated detection tools, however, were often frustrated by countermeasures employed by uploaders, who continuously modified the video until it could pass through the filters. This serves as a reminder that even if automated detection proves relatively effective at any given time, they are in a perennial arms race with determined humans probing for algorithmic blind spots.<a id="#refer-18" href="#endnote-18"><sup>18</sup></a> There was also the problem of users who had — perhaps misguidedly — uploaded parts of the video in order to condemn the savagery of the attack and evoke sympathy for the victims. Here, the platforms made a difficult real-time value judgment that, in this case, the balance of equities favored an aggressive posture: Categorical prohibition of the content regardless of context or intent, coupled with tight restrictions on searching and sharing of recently uploaded video.</p> <p>Both the decisions the firms made and the speed and adequacy with which they implemented them in a difficult circumstance will be — and should be — subject to debate and criticism. But it would be a grave error to imagine that broad legislative mandates are likely to produce better results than such context-sensitive judgments, or that smart software will somehow obviate the need for a difficult and delicate balancing of competing values.</p> <p>I thank the committee again for the opportunity to testify, and look forward to your questions.</p> <h2>Notes</h2> <p><a href="#refer-1" id="#endnote-1"><sup>1</sup></a> John Samples, “Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media” (Cato Institute) <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/whygovernment-should-not-regulate-content-moderation-social-media#full">https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/whygovernment-should-not-regulate-content-moderation-social-media#full</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-2" id="#endnote-2"><sup>2</sup></a> See, e.g., Kent Walker "Four steps we’re taking today to fight terrorism online" Google (June 18, 2017) <a href="https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/four-stepswere-taking-today-fight-online-terror/">https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/four-stepswere-taking-today-fight-online-terror/</a>; Monika Bickert and Brian Fishman "Hard Questions: What Are We Doing to Stay Ahead of Terrorists?" Facebook (November 8, 2018) <a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/staying-ahead-of-terrorists/">https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/staying-ahead-of-terrorists/</a>; “Terrorism and violent extremism policy" Twitter (March 2019) <a href="https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/violent-groups">https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/violent-groups</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-3" id="#endnote-3"><sup>3</sup></a> <em>National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie</em>, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)</p> <p><a href="#refer-4" id="#endnote-4"><sup>4</sup></a> <em>Snyder v. Phelps</em>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)</p> <p><a href="#refer-5" id="#endnote-5"><sup>5</sup></a> <em>U.S. v. Brandenburg</em>, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)</p> <p><a href="#refer-6" id="#endnote-6"><sup>6</sup></a> Kathleen Anne Ruane, “The Advocacy of Terrorism on the Internet: Freedom of Speech Issues and the Material Support Statutes” Congressional Research Service Report T44646 (September 8, 2016) <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44626.pdf">https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44626.pdf</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-7" id="#endnote-7"><sup>7</sup></a> <em>Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck</em>, 17–1702 (2019)</p> <p><a href="#refer-8" id="#endnote-8"><sup>8</sup></a> Alex Schultz and Guy Rosen "Understanding the Facebook Community Standards Enforcement Report" <a href="https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/understanding_the_community_standards_enforcement_report.pdf">https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/understanding_the_community_standards_enforcement_report.pdf</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-9" id="#endnote-9"><sup>9</sup></a> Sheera Frenkel, "Facebook Says It Deleted 865 Million Posts, Mostly Spam" <em>New York Times</em> (May 15, 2018). <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/facebook-removal-posts-fakeaccounts.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/facebook-removal-posts-fakeaccounts.html</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-10" id="#endnote-10"><sup>10</sup></a> Dia Kayyali and Raja Althaibani, “Vital Human Rights Evidence in Syria is Disappearing from YouTube” <a href="https://blog.witness.org/2017/08/vital-human-rightsevidence-syria-disappearing-youtube/">https://blog.witness.org/2017/08/vital-human-rightsevidence-syria-disappearing-youtube/</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-11" id="#endnote-11"><sup>11</sup></a> Bernhard Warner, "Tech Companies Are Deleting Evidence of War Crimes," <em>The Atlantic</em>, (May 8, 2019). <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/facebookalgorithms-are-making-it-harder/588931/">https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/facebookalgorithms-ar…</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-12" id="#endnote-12"><sup>12</sup></a> Elizabeth Dwoskin, "How YouTube Erased History in Its battle against White Supremacy," <em>Washington Post</em> (June 13, 2019). <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/13/how-youtube-erased-historyits-battle-against-white-supremacy/?utm_term=.e5391be45aa2">https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/13/how-youtube-erased-historyits-battle-against-white-supremacy/?utm_term=.e5391be45aa2</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-13" id="#endnote-13"><sup>13</sup></a> David Kaye, Joseph Cannataci, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin “Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism” <a href="https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24234">https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24234</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-14" id="#endnote-14"><sup>14</sup></a> Faiza Patel, "EU ‘Terrorist Content’ Proposal Sets Dire Example for Free Speech Online" <em>Just Security</em>, <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/62857/eu-terrorist-content-proposalsets-dire-free-speech-online/">https://www.justsecurity.org/62857/eu-terrorist-content-proposalsets-dire-free-speech-online/</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-15" id="#endnote-15"><sup>15</sup></a> "Letter to Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs on the Proposed Regulation on Terrorist Content Online," <a href="https://cdt.org/files/2018/12/4-Dec-2018-CDT-Joint-LetterTerrorist-Content-Regulation.pdf">https://cdt.org/files/2018/12/4-Dec-2018-CDT-Joint-LetterTerrorist-Content-Regulation.pdf</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-16" id="#endnote-16"><sup>16</sup></a> Kate Klonick, “Inside the Team at Facebook That Dealt With the Christchurch Shooting,” <em>The New Yorker</em> (April 25, 2019), <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/inside-the-team-at-facebook-that-dealt-with-the-christchurch-shooting">https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/inside-the-team-at-facebook-that-dealt-with-the-christchurch-shooting</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-17" id="#endnote-17"><sup>17</sup></a> Elizabeth Dwoskin and Craig Timberg "Inside YouTube’s Struggles to Shut Down Video of the New Zealand Shooting — and the Humans Who Outsmarted Its Systems," <em>Washington Post</em> (March 18, 2019), <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/18/inside-youtubes-struggles-shutdown-video-new-zealand-shooting-humans-who-outsmarted-itssystems/?utm_term=.6a5916ba26c1">https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/18/inside-youtubes-struggles-shutdown-video-new-zealand-shooting-humans-who-outsmarted-itssystems/?utm_term=.6a5916ba26c1</a></p> <p><a href="#refer-17" id="#endnote-17"><sup>18</sup></a> See, e.g., Hossein Hosseini, Sreeram Kannan, Baosen Zhang, and Radha Poovendran "Deceiving Google's Perspective API Built for Detecting Toxic Comments," <em>Arvix</em> (February 2017), <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08138">https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08138</a></p> </div> Tue, 25 Jun 2019 13:19:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/artificial-intelligence-counterterrorism-possibilities-limitations Julian Sanchez testifies at the hearing, “Artificial Intelligence and Counterterrorism: Possibilities and Limitations,” at the Committee on Homeland Security https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-testifies-hearing-artificial-intelligence Tue, 25 Jun 2019 12:38:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-testifies-hearing-artificial-intelligence Julian Sanchez discusses antitrust investigations against the tech giants on KDMT’s Business for Breakfast with Jimmy Sengenberger https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-antitrust-investigations-against-tech Tue, 04 Jun 2019 11:50:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-antitrust-investigations-against-tech Julian Sanchez participates in the event, "Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Board on the USA Freedom Act," on C-SPAN 2 https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-participates-event-privacy-civil-liberties-oversight Fri, 31 May 2019 10:34:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-participates-event-privacy-civil-liberties-oversight Julian Sanchez discusses 2020 election security on WWLs First News with Tommy Tucker https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-2020-election-security-wwls-first-news Tue, 07 May 2019 11:44:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-2020-election-security-wwls-first-news The Mueller Report Is Out (Mostly) https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/mueller-report-out-mostly Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>The long-awaited Mueller report into Russian meddling in U.S. elections is now available in a redacted form. Julian Sanchez discusses what's new in the report and how Congress could use the information.</p> Tue, 23 Apr 2019 17:46:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/mueller-report-out-mostly Julian Sanchez discusses the Mueller Report on KURV's The Drive Home https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-report-kurvs-drive-home Thu, 18 Apr 2019 11:49:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-report-kurvs-drive-home Julian Sanchez discusses the Mueller Report on WTOP Radio https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-report-wtop-radio Thu, 18 Apr 2019 11:48:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-report-wtop-radio Julian Sanchez discusses the arrest of Julian Assange on WBAL’s The Yuripzy Morgan Show https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-arrest-julian-assange-wbals-yuripzy Thu, 11 Apr 2019 11:05:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-radio/julian-sanchez-discusses-arrest-julian-assange-wbals-yuripzy Julian Sanchez discusses the Mueller investigation on ABC24's Weekend Breakfast (Australia) https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-investigation-abc24s-weekend Sat, 30 Mar 2019 09:35:00 -0400 Julian Sanchez https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/julian-sanchez-discusses-mueller-investigation-abc24s-weekend The Mueller Report Arrives (Sorta) https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/mueller-report-arrives-sorta Julian Sanchez, Caleb O. Brown <p>Attorney General William Barr has released a brief description of the findings of Robert Mueller in his investigation into Russian meddling in U.S. elections. Many questions remain. 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