Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 38 January 31, 1996

Foreign Policy Briefing

NATO Expansion and the
Danger of a Second Cold War

by Stanley Kober

Stanley Kober is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary

The strong showing by Communists and ultranationalists in Russia's parliamentary elections emphasizes that the current political environment in that country is extremely delicate. It is vital that the United States and its West European allies not take any action that might make an already bad situation worse. Enlarging NATO to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe would be an especially unwise step. Enlargement would undermine Russia's beleaguered democrats, intensify Russian suspicions about Western intentions, and play into the hands of militaristic elements that argue that Moscow must restore the Soviet empire to protect Russia's security.

Expanding NATO would also require the United States to extend security commitments to the new members--commitments that neither the United States nor the West European powers are prepared to fulfill. Reliable security guarantees must be based on more than verbal declarations, which means that Washington would be pressured to station conventional forces in the new member states. The Russians have emphasized that they would regard that as a provocation requiring countermoves on their part. NATO expansion, therefore, would risk recreating the division of Europe.


The triumph of Communists and ultranationalists in the Russian elections of December 17, 1995, brings into question the widespread hopes for a more peaceful post-Cold War world. The Communists' strength is especially worrisome. In their election campaign, they proclaimed the "restoration of the union state [i.e., the Soviet Union], our historic fatherland," as their goal.(1) According to Yegor Gaidar, the original architect of Russia's reforms under President Boris Yeltsin, the revitalized Communist Party is steering "not towards social democracy but towards national socialism," an ominous phrase for anyone familiar with European history.(2)

The current political environment in Russia is delicate, to say the least. Not only the results of the elections for the Duma, but the subsequent appointment of hardliner Yevgeny Primakov as the new foreign minister, suggest that Moscow's policy toward the West will be increasingly assertive, if not confrontational. It is vital that the United States and its West European allies not take any action that might make an already bad situation worse. Enlarging NATO to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe would be an especially provocative step. Enlargement would undermine Russia's already beleaguered democrats, intensify Russian suspicions about Western designs to weaken their country, and play into the hands of militaristic elements that argue that Moscow must restore the Soviet empire to protect Russia's national security. Expanding NATO would also require the United States to extend security commitments to the new members--commitments that could prove very dangerous.

Creating a New Division of Europe?

When the Berlin Wall came down, there were hopes that the peaceful reunification of Germany would also mean the end of the division of Europe. "If [the Helsinki process] were to speed up and intensify, it could . . . grow into something that could fulfill the purpose of a peace conference or peace treaty like a definite punctuation point after the Second World War, the cold war, and the artificial division of Europe," Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel told the Polish Sejm (parliament) in January 1990. "Then both military pacts could be dissolved, and with that the process of an all-European integration could be started."(3)

The Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and the Soviet Union itself disintegrated. The military threat to Western Europe was gone. Yet NATO, which had been created to provide protection against that threat, endured. To survive, however, it had to find a new threat, and it did: instability. Although NATO was no longer needed to guard Western Europe against an aggressive Soviet Union, supporters of the alliance argued, it should extend the stability it provided Western Europe to the new democracies of the former Soviet bloc. Significantly, that new mission was encouraged by Havel. "There are more twists and turns along the paths of history than we thought of in the moments when we were savoring the first enchantment by the sweeping changes we had witnessed or taken part in," he admitted ruefully to the NATO Council in March 1991. Acknowledging that his country could not become a regular member of NATO for the time being, he nevertheless warned about "the disquieting signals coming from the Soviet Union and the threat which instability there may pose to Europe" and urged the alliance not to shirk its "tremendous responsibility" to protect the new democracies. "What the people in the East have valid reasons to fear, the West should fear as well."(4)

Those fears will now be reinforced by the outcome of the Russian elections. Countries that previously were expressing their desire to join NATO can now be expected to press their demands more urgently. Similar arguments will be heard from their Western supporters, who will insist on the need to extend NATO's security guarantee to avoid any misunderstanding on Moscow's part that NATO will come to the aid of the newly independent states. Anything less, it will be claimed, would simply be a new Yalta, the surrender of helpless countries to a Russian sphere of influence.

But unless NATO includes all the newly independent states in one big expansion, something no NATO leader has endorsed because of its obvious impracticality, NATO expansion will itself be a new Yalta, and Europe will again be divided into two hostile military blocs. The line will move farther east, to be sure, and additional countries will fall on the Western side, but some of their less fortunate eastern neighbors will fall into a Russian sphere of influence, and still other countries will be reduced to uncomfortable buffers. "Russia is being provoked" by NATO expansion, the president of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, has warned. "The president of Belarus does not want his people to be trapped between two opposing blocs."(5)

The Illusion of Cost-Free NATO Enlargement

Those realities are being ignored by proponents of NATO expansion, who seem to think that security guarantees are enforced by mere declarations. "Ever since we created these states [in Central Europe], we have intermittently offered them security guarantees that we can now, finally, give them at virtually no cost," claims a British journalist.(6) But it is absurd to argue that security guarantees can be extended at no additional cost. "A reasonable estimate is that the alliance-wide, 10-year `out of pocket' cost for a satisfactory program probably will fall in the range of $10-50 billion," admits RAND analyst Richard L. Kugler, a supporter of enlargement. "This estimate, it is noteworthy, assumes that NATO refrains from stationing large forces in East Central Europe and that improvements to the ECE infrastructure are relatively austere. If either of these assumptions are violated in major ways, the cost could rise far higher-- up to $100 billion or more."(7)

But how is NATO--or more precisely, the United States-- supposed to defend the Central and East European countries if troops are not deployed forward? That problem is implicitly recognized in NATO's September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. "The presence of Allied Forces on the territory of other members contributes to strengthening the Alliance's ability to perform its fundamental security tasks, fostering Alliance cohesion and expressing solidarity and confidence," the study states. "It allows a threat or an attack to be countered earlier, and provides more time to prepare and deploy reinforcements." Like Kugler, the study notes that forward deployment would be expensive and then adds that "there also is a risk that it could give a misleading impression of Alliance concerns."(8)

In other words, forward deployment might lead Russians to believe that NATO expansion is aimed against them. But what other conclusion could they possibly reach, especially if Russia is excluded? Unfortunately, the arguments for NATO expansion are frequently characterized by dishonesty or wishful thinking, as promoters try to come up with public rationales that will not offend Russia. Some proponents may actually believe that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia. But Havel in 1991 put his finger on the issue driving NATO expansion: fear, the fear of what instability in Russia may mean for Europe.

East European Fears and Russian Political Turmoil

An honest debate must begin with the recognition that Havel and others who, like him, favor NATO expansion have good reason to be afraid. The hopes for the post-Cold War world rested on the emergence of democracy in Russia. Those hopes now look increasingly questionable, as democracy has become associated in the minds of the Russian people with impoverishment and national humiliation.(9) "`Democracy' has become a dirty word," London's Observer reported in May 1995, noting that Russia's most respected polling institute had found that up to 70 percent of Russians are yearning for a "firm hand"--some guarantee of stability and order. According to the head of the institute, Yuri Levada, a third of the population was ready for a military or KGB-style dictatorship, while only a quarter was resolutely against the idea.(10) Sergei Kovalev, who until recently was the head of Russia's Human Rights Commission, agrees with Levada's assessment. "The danger that Russia will become a police state has become very real," he warns. In his opinion, Russia's leaders are trying to replace communism with an extreme form of Russian nationalism and are increasingly bold about the legitimacy of pursuing national interests beyond the borders of Russia.(11)

Ironically, although supporters of NATO expansion can be expected to use the election results to promote their objective, the vocal campaign for enlargement may have contributed to the triumph of the Communists and nationalists. "The question of NATO expansion will be exploited in the internal political battle in Russia and this will not make life easier for me and those who share my views in an election year," Yegor Gaidar, the leader of the reformist party Russia's Choice, predicted nearly a year ago. "Our political opponents will use NATO expansion to spread hysteria and xenophobia among the Russian population. I think that in their deliberations our partners in the West and in Eastern Europe should remember that the democrats are not the only actors on the political stage in Russia."(12) Gaidar's party, which was supposed to sweep to victory in the parliamentary elections in December 1993, finished an anemic second. The results were worse in the December 1995 balloting; it failed even to clear the 5 percent hurdle for membership in the new Duma.

Those who dismiss Gaidar's warning typically dispute his assessment of the political situation, claiming that the West's hesitation is actually undermining the democrats in Russia. "Some Russian leaders have privately indicated that they would not be averse to the proposed arrangement--though their freedom of choice is narrowing as Russian nationalists, feeding on continued American ambiguity, become more vocal," former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued.(13)

The problem with that argument is evident in Brzezinski's acknowledgement that Russians who support NATO expansion do so privately, while those who oppose it do so publicly. Since Russians are now able to vote, political leaders must appeal to them to gain office. When Clinton administration officials, for example, dismiss hard-line statements by Yeltsin and other officials as merely designed for public consumption, they completely misunderstand the situation: if Russian leaders believe such statements are necessary to obtain public support, we should be more worried, not less. When political leaders say one thing in private to reassure foreigners and another in public to gain popularity with voters, it is an extremely guileless or gullible (or easily flattered) foreigner who takes the private sentiments as the more meaningful.

Indeed, the strained effort by supporters of enlargement to identify Russians who share their views has been embarrassing. Brzezinski, for example, mentioned Dmitri Trenin, a foreign policy analyst, on the basis of an article he wrote in Moscow's New Times in October 1994.(14) It is therefore worth quoting what Trenin wrote in that same journal in December 1994.

The worst variant is an early admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary to NATO, or one of these countries, Poland, for instance. In this case, one can expect a sharp political crisis in Russia and, as a result, a revision of Russian foreign policy on the whole, a departure from the present policy of close interaction and partnership with the West.

In these conditions, quite moderate politi- cians will favor a remilitarization of the coun- try. . . . The formation of a military and politi- cal alliance within the [Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States] . . . will become a priority trend of post-Soviet integration. Europe will be split again.(15)

If that is the assessment of a prominent Russian who is supposedly receptive to NATO expansion, one can readily imagine the attitude of less friendly members of Russia's policy and political elites.

Include Russia in NATO?

Some advocates of enlargement who are concerned about Moscow's reaction suggest that the West can offer the possibility of NATO membership to Russia itself or, failing that, an alternative arrangement that is as good as membership. The problem with NATO membership for Russia, however, is that despite Clinton administration efforts to keep the option open, several members of the alliance have already expressed their opposition.(16) Some prospective members of NATO have likewise objected to Russia's membership. Lithuania has even expressed concern that Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace (much less Moscow's inclusion in NATO) means that Russian troops must be allowed to participate in military exercises on Lithuanian territory.(17)

Consequently, most advocates of NATO expansion favor providing Russia with alternate arrangements but not membership in NATO itself.(18) The problem with that scheme is twofold. First, Russians are not impressed by the argument, to paraphrase a television commercial, that it's just as good as NATO. "We are opposed to the expansion of NATO and there can be no deals on this question," Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev bluntly stated last September.(19) The second problem, ironically, is that some prospective new members reject even that modest outreach to Russia. Estonia's foreign affairs minister told NATO in March 1995 that his country opposes a special program for Russia as part of an arrangement to facilitate the membership of other countries in the alliance.(20)

The Problem of Making a NATO Commitment Credible

A popular argument for rapid NATO expansion is, if we are unwilling to expand now when Russia is weak, will we be willing to expand when Russia is stronger? "If Russia can veto NATO membership now, when it is in need of economic support, what will it veto when it has been strengthened through reform and American economic assistance?" Henry Kissinger has asked.(21)

Those who make that argument, however, typically also insist that, to assuage Russian fears, NATO should do nothing as it expands that would appear provocative. Thus, Kissinger adds that "Russia could easily be given additional assurances, for instance, that no foreign troops would be stationed on the soil of new NATO members."(22) But such an assurance only leads to a rephrasing of his original question: if Russia can veto forward deployment when it is weak, what will it be able to veto when it is strong?

In short, if NATO's commitment is to be expanded, something tangible must be done to make good on that obligation. During the Cold War, 300,000 U.S. troops were deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, then the frontline state, to provide conventional defense and underline Washington's determination to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary. And even then, the American commitment was questioned. "It is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide," the very same Henry Kissinger asserted in 1979. "European allies should not keep asking us to multiply assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or that if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization. Our strategic dilemma isn't solved with reassurances."(23)

What Kissinger said then would seem to be even more appropriate today. NATO is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, its security guarantee to the East Europeans must have tangible value; it must be more than a declaration. "The extension of an empty or half-hearted security guarantee will not only do nothing for Central and Eastern Europe: it will also mean the end of NATO," NATO's former secretary general, Willy Claes, acknowledged on October 4, 1995. "Once one Ally's security is no longer the same as another's, the trust and solidarity on which NATO is based would soon crumble."(24) On the other hand, advocates of NATO expansion do not, as a rule, discuss what is necessary to give the guarantee tangible support. In particular, they do not address the question of why, if it was necessary to put large numbers of American troops in Germany as part of the American guarantee during the Cold War, it is not necessary to put American troops in new NATO members to protect them and make the security commitment credible.

The answer one typically hears is that NATO expansion is not directed against Russia. But that answer, even if it is sincerely expressed, is not serious--and frequently it is not even sincere. Kissinger, for example, has even suggested that NATO's original purpose had nothing to do with the containment of Russia.

It is instructive to compare the current approach with that of Dean Acheson when NATO was founded. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the secretary of state was asked whether the Soviet Union had reason to fear NATO. His reply was: "Any nation which claims that this treaty is directed against it should be reminded of the biblical admonition that 'the guilty flee where no man pursueth.'"(25)

Are we supposed to win the Russians' trust by telling them NATO expansion is not directed against them because NATO itself was never directed against them? Are we to assume the Russians are that gullible? Apparently we are also to assume that they never read statements by prominent Americans to the contrary--for example, Kissinger's speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom last March. "Russia is a great power that has expanded for 400 years. . . . Four hundred years of foreign policy indicate a certain proclivity," he said to laughter from his audience. "Our problem is to encourage Russia to stay within its borders."(26)

The Alarming Locarno Precedent

The effort to expand NATO recalls the errors that attended an attempt earlier in this century by the great powers to extend security guarantees: the Locarno Treaty. In 1925, as now, the fiction was publicly maintained that the security guarantees were not directed against anybody; they were designed to benefit everybody in Europe. "In the light of these treaties we are Europeans only," the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, proclaimed, and his German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, agreed that Locarno represented a "European idea."(27)

German nationalists, however, regarded Locarno as an anti-German humiliation. Locarno and the atmosphere it generated produced a comforting if misleading and short- lived feeling of understanding and comradeship among the democratic forces, according to historian Bruce Frye. Already by 1927, a more insistent revisionist campaign began to demand a reduction in reparations payments and the end of the French occupation of the Rhineland.(28


Ironically, Locarno, which British foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain hailed as "the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace," turned out to be a bridge between the two world wars.(29) In March 1936 Hitler ordered his army into the Rhineland, a blatant violation of Locarno. Although France could have evicted the German forces without any British assistance, its government did not want to act without London's approval. Yet when the French asked the British government to fulfill its commit- ments under Locarno, they were rebuffed. "If there is even one chance in a hundred that war would follow from your police operation, I have not the right to commit England," the French foreign minister claimed Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin told him. "England is not in a state to go to war."(30)

Germany's subsequent depredations of Austria and Czechoslovakia also went unopposed. Moreover, even when France and Britain went to war against Germany after it invaded Poland, they were unprepared to give effective assistance to the Poles. Western military impotence as German divisions overran Poland should serve as a reminder of the folly of extending security guarantees casually.

The parallels with NATO expansion today are too obvious to ignore. "Locarno made Britain the arbiter of Europe's peace," but "it was an illusory guarantee," observes historian Sally Marks. "The British army was small and much of it was stationed in Palestine, India, and the other outer reaches of Empire. What was left available to Europe was militarily laughable."(31)

To be sure, U.S. forces are not laughable; they are without question the most powerful the world has ever seen. But as were the British forces, they are stretched to cover too many commitments. "If present trends continue, we will have too much capacity for wars we are not likely to fight and not enough for military scenarios we could be confronted with," worries the Democratic Leadership Council.(32) It is symptomatic of the problem that at the same time the United States is emphasizing the need to expand its commitments under NATO, it is building up its forces, not in Europe, but in the Persian Gulf.(33)

"NATO cannot long survive if the borders it protects are not threatened while it refuses to protect the borders of adjoining countries that do feel threatened," Kissinger has written.(34) But how are we supposed to protect those borders when we are reducing our capabilities? In particular, how can we protect the countries that are most likely to be threatened, such as the Baltics, if NATO decides to expand?(35) Even though American conventional forces are far superior to Russia's capabilities, it is difficult to imagine how the United States could defend small countries that actually border Russia.

Cornering the Russian Bear

A far-reaching public and congressional debate on NATO expansion is overdue.(36) A meaningful debate must begin with the recognition that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to be admitted to NATO because they are afraid of Russia, and given developments in that country, their fears are not wholly unjustified. The issue is whether NATO expansion is the proper way of addressing their fears or whether it would make the situation worse. A proper answer to that question must address two issues.

First, how will NATO expansion affect Russia? Despite the assurances of the advocates of expansion, there can be no serious question that expansion would evoke a hostile reaction from Moscow. "NATO . . . is emerging as the defining foreign policy issue in Russia today," reports the Observer. "Nothing else incites such anti-Western rhetoric from the politicians." Former general Alexander Lebed, a leading contender to succeed Yeltsin as president, maintains that NATO expansion would require the creation of a countervailing military bloc by Russia and the cancellation of conventional and nuclear arms agreements. "A similar precedent was created in Poland in 1939," he has said, equating NATO expansion into Poland with the threat posed to Russia by Hitler's occupation. "The price of that precedent was 50 million lives. We won't get away with only 50 million today."(37)

Given that sort of reaction, verbal declarations of NATO support will not suffice to make good on the NATO guarantee, which leads to the second question: what will the United States--and it will be the United States, not its European allies--do to make good on that guarantee? Americans would have to ask, for example, how much they would be willing to spend on increased conventional forces.

A Nuclear Tripwire

Perhaps more to the point, how much risk of nuclear escalation is the United States willing to assume? Despite the assurances of some defense experts that the requirements for nuclear deterrence in an expanded NATO will be "radically different and smaller than during the Cold War," the opposite is likely to be the case.(38) "We deem the strategic nuclear forces as the most important guarantor for safeguarding the military security of Russia and its allies," Defense Minister Pavel Grachev wrote in 1993, hinting strongly that Russia would use its nuclear weapons first, if necessary. "The essence of containment may reside in a timely and adequate retaliatory reaction to the actions undertaken by an aggressor who is preparing to attack," he continued. "Steps of solving the problem depend upon a readiness to inflict a strike against a possible opponent at any time with a damage not acceptable for him."(39)

That threat was made explicit by a Russian journalist with good Defense Ministry connections after NATO's study on enlargement was published in September 1995.

Russia's future reaction to any attempt to deploy foreign troops near its borders (including such a move under the guise of conducting maneuvers) is quite predictable. It will be exactly the same as Washington's reaction in 1961 [sic], when our troops landed in Cuba. First there will be a blockade (if the geographic location of the future conflict zone allows this), then an ultimatum demanding an immediate troop withdrawal and, if the ultimatum is not complied with, a preventive strike that would deprive the adversary of offensive capabilities.(40)

Given Russia's conventional military weakness relative to NATO, such a strike presumably would have to be nuclear.(41) Perhaps such threats are a bluff and are not to be taken seriously, but those who would dismiss them out of hand should recall Kissinger's warning of 10 years ago:

If it were not for nuclear weapons it is likely that there would have been a war between us and the Soviets. So it is almost certainly true that nuclear weapons have preserved the peace. It is also true that if we continue the strategy that has got us these 40 years of peace, that some catastrophe somewhere along the line is going to happen and therefore the big problem of our period is to build on this long period of peace we have a structure that is different from the preceding one.(42)


Whatever else NATO expansion may signify, it is certainly not building a structure different from what existed before. "Why are you sowing the seeds of mistrust?" Yeltsin asked NATO members in December 1994, adding that Europe was in danger of plunging into "a cold peace."(43) The Russian elections--and the subsequent replacement of Kozyrev with Primakov as foreign minister--are an urgent warning about the deterioration of the relationship between Russia and the West. At this delicate time, the United States and its NATO partners should be wary of doing anything that would make the situation worse, especially if they have no serious intentions of backing up their verbal commitments. Security is not guaranteed by mere pledges: if NATO is expanded, a new confrontation becomes institutionalized, and the United States will be pressured by its European allies (old and new) to shoulder the additional burdens and risks. In particular, we must recognize that NATO entails a commitment to escalate to nuclear war, and as Kissinger pointed out, our luck may not hold forever.

We should not underestimate the danger of the current situation. "Maybe the Cold War was in fact the Cold Peace," muses Andrei Filipov, a foreign affairs expert in Russia's increasingly influential Communist Party. "Maybe what we have now is a Cold War."(44) If Filipov is right, the original Cold War will have been mild compared with what lies ahead.

The emergence of an anti-Western Russian political leadership would obviously lead to an escalation of global tensions, and nowhere would that effect be more pronounced than in Europe. At the same time, it is important to recognize that Russia does not at present pose a credible conventional military threat to Western Europe, nor is it likely to for some time, given the condition of the Russian military and economy. Moreover, the major West European powers can do much to protect their own security if a new threat does emerge.

The Central and East European countries have greater reason to worry about a resurgent Russia. The pertinent question, however, is whether NATO expansion would improve or worsen their security. At the moment, Russian armed forces have their hands full with Chechnya, Tajikistan, and a number of lesser problems on the federation's periphery. NATO expansion might have the perverse effect of diverting Russia's attention from those problems to the situation on its western border. "You shouldn't try to intimidate, to stick a fist under someone's nose and tell them to behave," General Lebed has warned with regard to NATO expansion. "It is a mistake to taunt a bull with a red cape."(45)

An especially dangerous flashpoint is the Baltic region. Although Russia's armed forces are too weak to attack Western Europe, they could still overpower the tiny Baltic republics. Eitvydas Bajarunas, an official with Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worries that Russian pressure would increase on countries excluded from NATO expansion. He argues that countries with no immediate prospect of membership need some other type of commitment, such as associate member status. If NATO does not create such arrangements, Bajarunas warns, "enlargement will reduce and not improve security in Europe as a whole."(46)

That is the inherent dilemma of NATO expansion, and it brings us back to Locarno. Security guarantees are more than verbal declarations; they must be backed up with real forces and determination. That lesson is being ignored, and a major confrontation may be forming as a result. NATO diplomats are reportedly telling the Baltic republics that their applications for membership in the alliance are a guarantee against any possible new invasion by Russia.(47) But that is exactly the opposite of what the Russians are saying. "If NATO agrees to admit the Baltic republics, Russian Federation Armed Forces will immediately be moved into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania," Komsomolskaya Pravda reported about a new Russian defense doctrine adopted in September 1995. "Any attempt by NATO to stop this will be viewed by Russia as the prelude to a world nuclear catastrophe."(48)

If such Russian statements are not a bluff, NATO's expansion could well provoke the most serious crisis in Europe since the onset of World War II. The East European countries are understandably worried about political developments in Russia, but the prospect of NATO membership's providing them with reliable protection against Russian expansionism is a cruel and dangerous illusion.


(1) Quoted in Adrian Karatnycky, "Socialism with a Fascist Face," Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1995, p. A18.

(2) Quoted in Victoria Clark, "Vote Communist for God and Empire," Observer (London), December 10, 1995, p. 19.

(3) Vaclav Havel, "The Future of Central Europe," New York Review of Books, March 29, 1990, p. 19.

(4) "President Havel's Address to the NATO Council," NATO Review, April 1991, pp. 31-35.

(5) Quoted in Ian Mather, "Belarus Fears NATO's Move East wards," European (London), March 10, 1995, p. 4.

(6) Barbara Amiel, "The Need for NATO," National Review, May 1, 1995, p. 38.

(7) Richard L. Kugler, "Defense Program Requirements," in NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options, ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington: National Defense University, 1995), p. 192.

(8) Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, paragraph 54, Internet at

(9) Those who argue that the high turnout in the December 17 election indicates irreversible support for democratic procedures should look at the November 1932 elections in Germany. Eighty percent of eligible voters went to the polls, the Nazi party won 33 percent of the vote, and German democracy quickly ceased to exist. See Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), p. 983.

(10) Victoria Clark, "D-Word Becomes Dirtiest in Russia," Observer (London), May 14, 1995, p. 18.

(11) Quoted in Georgie Anne Geyer, "Insights at the Sakharov Archives," Washington Times, September 24, 1995, p. B4.

(12) Quoted in Flemming Rose, "Gaidar: NATO No Threat to Russia," Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen), April 18, 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Central Eurasia, April 20, 1995, p. 18.

(13) Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1995): 36.

(14) Ibid., p. 40n 3.

(15) Dmitri Trenin, "NATO without Russia Equals CSCE," New Times, December 1994, p. 47.

(16) See, for example, Bruce Clark, "Ruhe Raises Polish Hopes over NATO," Financial Times, July 19, 1994, p. 2; and Bruce Clark, "NATO Rallies to Call of `Expand or Die,'" Financial Times, September 29, 1994, p. 2, for German and British views on the impossibility of Russian membership in NATO.

(17) "Lithuanian Fear," New Europe (Athens), October 1, 1995, p. 5.

(18) See Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," Washington Post, December 19, 1994, p. A27; Brzezinski, pp. 35-36; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1995): 50-51; and Karsten Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: A Holistic Approach," SAIS Review (Summer-Fall 1995): 134-36.

(19) Quoted in "Kyrgyz, Russians Agree," New Europe (Athens), October 1, 1995, p. 38.

(20) Report by Tallinn Radio, March 1, 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Central Eurasia, March 2, 1995, p. 72.

(21) Henry Kissinger, "Be Realistic about Russia," Washington Post, January 25, 1994, p. A19.

(22) Ibid.

(23) Henry Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years," Survival (November-December 1979): 266.

(24) Willy Claes, Speech delivered to the National Press Club, October 4, 1995, Internet at

(25) Kissinger, "Be Realistic about Russia."

(26) Quoted in Martin Sieff, "President's Policy on Russia Faulted as Too Optimistic," Washington Times, March 5, 1995, p. A9.

(27) Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain and the Dictators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 92.

(28) Bruce B. Frye, Liberal Democrats in the Weimar Republic (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), pp. 128-29.

(29) Quoted in Seton-Watson, p. 92.


30) Quincy Howe, The World between the Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), p. 5811.

(31) Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace (New York: St. Martin's, 1976), p. 72.

(32) "Reviewing the Troops," New Democrat, January-February 1996, p. 7.

(33) Dana Priest and John Lancaster, "Slimming Elsewhere, U.S. Builds Muscle in Gulf," Washington Post, November 18, 1995, p. A1.

(34) Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now."

(35) In this regard, it must be emphasized that the Baltics are already the subject of Russian warnings. See "Russia and NATO: Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy," Nezavisimaya Gazeta [Independent Newspaper], June 21, 1995, p. 1, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Central Eurasia, June 23 1995, p. 14.

(36) Initially, the issue was dominated by proponents of expansion, but it has now begun to receive more critical scrutiny. Criticisms of NATO expansion include Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington: Cato Institute, 1994); Pat Buchanan, "Leading Us Down a Primrose Path," Washington Times, January 14, 1994, p. A19; "Don't Rush to Expand NATO," editorial, New York Times, November 30, 1994, p. A22; B. J. Cutler, "Reasoning behind Recalcitrant Russia," Washington Times, December 11, 1994, p. B1; Ronald V. Dellums, "Expansion of NATO Is Road to Instability," San Jose Mercury News, December 26, 1994, p. 7B; Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO--And Split Europe," New York Times, November 27, 1994, p. E11; Ted Galen Carpenter, "Conflicting Agendas and the Future of NATO," Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (December 1994): 143-64; Fred C. Ikle, "How to Ruin NATO," New York Times, January 11, 1995, p. 21; David J. Kramer, "No Need to Expand NATO," Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 1995, p. 19; Ian Davidson, "NATO Looks East," Financial Times, April 12, 1995, p. 14; Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995): 9-13; Charles A. Kupchan, "It's a Long Way to Bratislava," Washington Post, May 14 1995, p. C1; Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival (Spring 1995): 34-52; Jonathan Dean, "Losing Russia or Keeping NATO: Must We Choose?" Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 3-7; Daniel Nelson, "New NATO Allies Lack Civil Controls," Defense News, June 5, 1995, p. 27; Tasos Kokkinides, "Partnerships for Peace: Drifting into Secrecy," British American Security Information Council Occasional Paper no. 11, June 7, 1995; Sam Nunn, "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World," Vital Speeches of the Day, July 15, 1995, pp. 583-86; Susan Eisenhower, "Why Bait the Bear?" Washington Post, July 18, 1995, p. A21; R. T. Davies, "Should NATO Grow?--A Dissent," New York Review of Books, September 21, 1995, pp. 74-75; Tasos Kokkinides and Susannah Dyer, "Arming Central and Eastern Europe," British American Security Information Council Occasional Paper no. 12, September 27, 1995; Martin Butcher, Tasos Kokkinides, and Daniel Plesch, "Study on NATO Enlargement: Destabilizing Europe," British American Security Information Council Report 95.2, November 29, 1995; Bill Bradley, "Eurasia Letter: A Misguided Russia Policy," Foreign Policy 101 (Winter 1995-96): 81-97; and Daniel T. Plesch and Sami Fournier, "East Embroiled in NATO's Arms," Nation, December 25, 1995, pp. 826-29. A review of the debate on NATO expansion may be found in Stanley Kober, "The United States and NATO Expansion," Transition, December 15, 1995, pp. 6-10.

(37) Quoted in Victoria Clark, "West Panics at Yeltsin Decline," Observer (London) October 29, 1995, p. 21.

(38) Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival (Spring 1995): 31.

(39) Pavel S. Grachev, "Actual Problems of the Construction and Preparation of the Armed Forces of Russia at the Contemporary Phase," Military Thought, no. 6 (1993): 5, 7-8. Emphasis added.

(40) Pavel Felgengauer, "NATO Expansion--An Unsuccessful Compromise," Sevodnya [Today], September 28, 1995, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, October 25, 1995, p. 10.

(41) Indeed, the newspaper New Europe, which follows events in the former Soviet Union very closely, reported that Yeltsin's threats of war if NATO expands are "probably nuclear." "IMF Threatens Ukraine over Russian Gas Debt," New Europe (Athens), December 17, 1995, p. 1.

(42) "An Interview with Henry A. Kissinger: `We Were Never Close to Nuclear War,'" Washington Post, August 11, 1985, p. L8. Emphasis added.

(43) Quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split Continent Again," New York Times, December 6, 1994, p. A10.

(44) Quoted in Clark, "West Panics at Yeltsin Decline," p. 21.

(45) Quoted in Stephen F. Cohen, "If Not Yeltsin: Four Voices of the Russian Opposition," Washington Post, December 3, 1995, p. C3.

(46) Eitvydas Bajarunas, "A View from Lithuania," in NATO Enlargement, pp. 112-13.

(47) "Brazauskas Seeks Entrance into Western Alliances," New Europe, December 17, 1995, p. 12.

(48) Aleksandr Lyasko, "Doctrine Is New, but Looks Old," Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 29, 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Central Eurasia, October 3, 1995, p. 22.

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