# Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 1: A Brief Look Back and the Way Forward The Federal Reserve System has morphed since its founding and is now too involved with our economic decisions. The Fed should operate with transparency and predictability while minimizing interference in private markets. April 18, 2025 • Publications By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) ![Reforming the Fed Reserve (no text)](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/aside_3x/public/2025-04/Reforming%20Fed%20Reserve_0.jpg?itok=FP84B9tQ) #### [Reforming the Federal Reserve](https://www.cato.org/reforming-federal-reserve) 9-part series - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 1: A Brief Look Back and the Way Forward](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-1-brief-look-back-way-forward) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 2: Enforcing Rules-Based Monetary Policy](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-2-enforcing-rules-based-monetary-policy) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 3: Restoring Sensible Asset Purchases](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-4) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 4: Ending the Interest on Reserves Program](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-5) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 5: Preventing Fiscal Dominance](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-8-preventing-fiscal-dominance) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 6: Responsible Last Resort Lending](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-6) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 7: A Glance at Interventions in Payment Services](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-3-a-glance-at-interventions-in-payment-services) By [Nicholas Anthony](https://www.cato.org/people/nicholas-anthony) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 8: Shrinking Regulatory Authority](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-7) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) - ##### [Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 9: Dispelling Myths About the Fed](/publications/reforming-federal-reserve-part-9-dispelling-myths-about-fed) By [Norbert J. Michel](https://www.cato.org/people/norbert-michel) and [Jai Kedia](https://www.cato.org/people/jai-kedia) [ Return to Series Home ](https://www.cato.org/reforming-federal-reserve) [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-01/Reforming-the-Federal-Reserve.pdf) Created in 1913, the Federal Reserve is one of the most misunderstood and controversial arms of the US government. The Fed’s harshest critics blame it for virtually every economic disturbance, and some want to eliminate it.[1](#_ednref1) Yet its staunchest supporters want to expand its powers to help the government directly fund all sorts of economic activity. Regardless of their preferences, both critics and supporters must admit that the Fed has many responsibilities Congress never intended when establishing it. The Fed is now tasked with achieving specific macroeconomic goals, providing fiscal support to the federal government, regulating thousands of banks and other financial institutions, engaging in credit allocation to private institutions, and operating core components of the payment and settlement system.[2](#_ednref2) It is undeniable that, with these increased responsibilities, the government has become more involved in people’s economic decisions. While many policymakers still debate whether increasing government involvement or expanding economic freedom is the best way to create more economic opportunity and prosperity, few bother to extend this debate to the provision of money. Some economists even argue for *increased* centralization and government control of money despite acknowledging that the “biggest threat to the value of the currency is often the government itself.”[3](#_ednref3) And some even want to force people to use central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) so that the government can more easily charge “deeply negative interest rates.”[4](#_ednref4) Still, decades of experience have demonstrated that poorly executed monetary policy can have severe consequences, and that the government’s actual record of monetary stewardship is poor.[5](#_ednref5) Ideally, Congress would make monetary policy more transparent and predictable by shrinking the Fed’s discretionary authority while also allowing private currencies to compete with the dollar. Such reforms would provide a powerful check on the government’s ability to diminish the quality of money. This paper is the first in a series that discusses the Fed’s many roles, why they should be more limited, and how they can be curtailed. ## The Fed Was Not Created for Modern Monetary Policy Monetary policy as it is known today was not even possible in the Fed’s early decades. Until the 1930s, Federal Reserve notes were freely convertible into gold. Under that system, the quantity of dollars, their purchasing power, and monetary conditions generally were ultimately determined by the supply of and demand for gold rather than Fed policy. Although the Fed did have some influence, especially in the short run, in the longer run the system was self-regulating. For many reasons, including poorly designed rules and regulations, banks during the pre-Fed era were unable to freely issue notes (paper currency).[6](#_ednref6) As a result, they often had no choice but to part with high-powered reserves instead of issuing more notes. To alleviate this problem, banks tried various arrangements, including the establishment of clearinghouses that served as centrally located markets for banks to acquire reserves.[7](#_ednref7) Still, none of these arrangements proved sufficient to always allow banks, either directly or with clearinghouses’ help, to supply enough paper currency to meet the public’s needs.[8](#_ednref8) Instead of loosening restrictions on the banks’ ability to issue notes, Congress chose to establish the Federal Reserve System with the stated goal of providing the “elastic currency” needed to fill the gaps.[9](#_ednref9) In establishing the Fed, Congress nationalized services previously performed by private clearinghouses, giving the federal government more control over the supply of money.[10](#_ednref10) After 1933, the gold standard was abandoned in stages, and monetary policy now involves deliberately and directly regulating the supply of fiat money with the aim of economic stabilization.[11](#_ednref11) ## The Fed Controls the Monetary Base The US monetary framework has evolved considerably and, unlike in the early 1900s, the economy’s *base* money is now a fiat currency controlled by the US government. Specifically, the Fed is now the monopoly supplier of the base money used in the US economy.[12](#_ednref12) That is, the Fed is the sole supplier of the money upon which all other mediums of exchange in the economy are based.[13](#_ednref13) This relationship limits how Congress can change the Fed because the supply of the base is no longer directly tied to market forces, as it was when money was directly convertible into precious metals. Regardless of how beneficial many monetary reforms might be, eliminating the Fed without consideration for the monetary base would be economically disruptive. The monetary base is sometimes referred to as high-powered money because an increase in the base allows banks to create more money. Private banks also hold base money as reserves to serve as a source of currency for customers’ cash withdrawals and to settle accounts with other banks. The greater the availability (or the lower the cost) of reserves, the more loans and deposits banks can create and administer.[14](#_ednref14) Thus, managing the relationship between the publicly supplied base and broader, privately created money is how the Fed conducts monetary policy.[15](#_ednref15) Still, this limited relationship between the base and privately supplied money serves as a cautionary tale for policymakers. Although the monetary base is a key part of the larger money supply, most money in the United States is created by the private sector. In fact, private banks generally have created most of the money used in the United States, with that share fluctuating around 90 percent of the total US money supply for decades.[16](#_ednref16) This fact serves as a warning for those who view the Fed as an all-powerful institution that can actively fine-tune economic outcomes. The Fed does not have direct control over the broader money supply, prices, unemployment, or even lending activity. It *influences* private economic activity by altering the cost or availability of the monetary base. Provided that the fiat US dollar remains the base currency in the US economy—as well as the world’s most sought-after reserve currency and favored settlement medium for international trade—some government entity must administer its supply. It does not follow, however, that the current monetary policy framework is optimal or that people should be prevented from using other forms of privately created money. Moreover, monetary policy cannot be viewed as wholly divorced from fiscal policy. The federal government’s fiscal operations can, at the very least, make it more difficult for the Fed to successfully conduct monetary policy. ## The Fed Supports Fiscal Operations The Federal Reserve Act originally authorized the Fed to purchase US government securities. However, the intent was for the Fed to operate mainly by purchasing privately issued securities such as bankers’ acceptances, trade acceptances, and bills of exchange.[17](#_ednref17) There was, in fact, a general view that regular Fed purchases of federal debt would be seen as “lending to the crown.”[18](#_ednref18) With the onset of World War I, this view changed. By 1920, Treasury securities made up 60.6 percent of the Fed’s holdings. By 1934, the share was 100 percent.[19](#_ednref19) The Fed now serves a broader fiscal-agent role than first envisioned, providing the federal government with various services related to federal debt, including conducting the auctions in which the US Treasury sells its debt securities.[20](#_ednref20) Prior to World War II, the market for US Treasury securities was much less robust than it is today, so Federal Reserve purchases of Treasurys gave more direct support to the US government’s efforts to finance its operations.[21](#_ednref21) While the federal government can easily sell debt without direct central bank support, the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy remains a critical factor in determining the overall price level in the economy.[22](#_ednref22) Large amounts of deficit-financed expenditures, for instance, can induce inflation and make monetary policy goals difficult to achieve.[23](#_ednref23) Moreover, if the Fed monetizes too much federal debt, it can also induce inflation. Regardless, the role of the Fed in monetizing debt is not new, nor will it cease unless Congress handcuffs the Fed’s discretionary abilities. ## Constraining the Fed and Expanding Individual Liberty The Fed is unnecessarily enmeshed in many tasks beyond Congress’s original intent for the central bank. For example, the Fed regulates thousands of banks and other financial institutions, and it holds the reserves of all commercial banks and many other financial institutions.[24](#_ednref24) As a result, the Fed has a conflict of interest in lending to firms under its regulatory purview. Instead, Congress could require one of the other federal banking regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to execute the Fed’s regulatory functions.[25](#_ednref25) Since its creation, the Fed has also progressively taken over parts of the payments system that originated with private sector innovations such as check clearing and settlements. The Fed has also involved itself in direct credit allocation, sometimes by creating ad hoc lending facilities or by making so-called emergency loans.[26](#_ednref26) Congress should curb the Fed’s ability to lend in this manner because the Fed can implement monetary policy without lending directly to individual firms, which, among other things, exacerbates the “too big to fail” problem and imperils the broader financial system. To fulfill its function as lender of last resort, the Fed can expand open-market operations and provide liquidity to the entire system, allowing banks to access that liquidity through the (private) federal funds market.[27](#_ednref27) These other functions can sometimes complicate the implementation of monetary policy, and they are not essential. Regardless, the Fed should not be relied on to successfully fine-tune the economy—no group of government officials should be expected to do so. In an ideal world, Congress would not have created a central bank or expanded the government’s role in money to the degree that it has. Nonetheless, within the existing monetary system, some sort of central authority remains necessary to administer the supply of base money. Merely getting rid of the Fed without creating a new authority would be economically disruptive because it would effectively mean getting rid of the dollar. It does not follow, however, that the current arrangement is optimal even for monetary policy. For instance, restricting the Fed’s operations so that monetary policy is transparent and predictable would ensure that the Fed disrupts individuals’ economic decisions much less than it does currently, thus more closely approximating a free enterprise system. The best way for Congress to achieve this goal would be to require the Fed to follow a policy rule.[28](#_ednref28) Of course, as the several rounds of government expenditures after the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate, even if Congress constrains the Fed with a monetary policy rule, Congress can still induce inflation through fiscal policy. Thus, Congress should enact long-term reforms that fix the nation’s unsustainable fiscal path.[29](#_ednref29) Additionally, to ensure that the Fed cannot monetize excessive debt at its own discretion, Congress should limit the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and restrict the Fed from purchasing anything other than short-term Treasury securities. ## Conclusion The operational history of the Federal Reserve is marred with poor policy decisions. However, if the monetary system of the United States remains based on the fiat US dollar, a government entity is required to determine the amount of that currency available in circulation. Yet the Fed, with activities ranging from emergency lending to financial regulation, does far more than simply managing the supply of the monetary base. The Fed serves the US public best when it does less, not more. The ideal Federal Reserve System would operate with more accountability, transparency, and predictability while minimizing interference in private markets. Rejecting increased government intervention in favor of expanding free enterprise is the best way to reduce needless economic uncertainty, help Americans create more economic opportunity, and improve living standards. This briefing paper is the first in a series that will examine the Fed’s various functions and propose reforms to ensure that it operates in a manner consistent with limited government and a free-market economy. [![Reforming the Federal Reserve Full Cover](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/serial_cover_phone/public/2026-01/reforming-the-fed-full-book-cover.png?itok=z1Ghoblw)](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-01/Reforming-the-Federal-Reserve.pdf) ### Download This Publication ##### Reforming the Federal Reserve, Section 1: A Brief Look Back and the Way Forward [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-01/Reforming-the-Federal-Reserve.pdf) ##### About the Authors [![Norbert Michel Cropped](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2025-01/norbert-m-cropped.jpg?itok=8WIx97Dk)](/people/norbert-michel) ##### [Norbert J. Michel](/people/norbert-michel) Vice President and Director, Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives, Cato Institute [ ](https://x.com/norbertjmichel) [![jai-kedia-cropped.jpg](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2023-07/jai-kedia-cropped.jpg?itok=In6dB8gW)](/people/jai-kedia) ##### [Jai Kedia](/people/jai-kedia) Research Fellow, Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives, Cato Institute [ ](https://x.com/jaikedia) Show Endnotes Hide Endnotes ##### Notes [1](#_edn1). “[Rep. Massie Introduces Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act to ‘End the Fed’](https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395707),” press release, Congressman Thomas Massie, March 5, 2025. [2](#_edn2). “[Why Elon Musk Is Wrong About the Federal Reserve](https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=412795),” press release, US House Committee on Financial Services Democrats, December 27, 2024. [3](#_edn3). Kenneth S. Rogoff, [*The Curse of Cash: How Large-Denomination Bills Aid Crime and Tax Evasion and Constrain Monetary Policy*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691178363/the-curse-of-cash?srsltid=AfmBOopohV1ibwXqIOrPZyCg9Mzo0Pb2Ru_h-yxl8LNIOeZd9YrIpHM6) (Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 19. [4](#_edn4). The idea is that negative interest rates (e.g., penalties for people who fail to spend “enough” during downturns) would help improve monetary policy. Kenneth Rogoff, “[COVID Coin?](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/covid19-impact-on-rise-of-central-bank-digital-currency-by-kenneth-rogoff-2020-08),” *Project Syndicate*, August 5, 2020. [5](#_edn5). George Selgin et al., “[Has the Fed Been a Failure?](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304),” *Journal of Macroeconomics* 34, no. 3 (September 2012): 569–96. [6](#_edn6). George Selgin, “[New York’s Bank: The National Monetary Commission and the Founding of the Fed](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/new-yorks-bank-national-monetary-commission-founding-fed),” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 793, June 21, 2016. [7](#_edn7). Richard H. Timberlake, “[Clearing House Currency](https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/cato/v34i2/f_0031474_25522.pdf),” *Cato Journal* 34, no. 2 (Spring/​Summer 2014): 303–14. [8](#_edn8). For additional information on how government regulations prevented the supply of money from being sufficiently elastic prior to the creation of the Fed, see George Selgin, “[The Suppression of State Banknotes: A Reconsideration](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00039.x),” *Economic Inquiry* 38, no. 4 (October 2000): 600–15; and George Selgin, “[Accommodating Changes in the Relative Demand for Currency: Free Banking vs. Central Banking](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1988/1/cj7n3-4.pdf),” *Cato Journal* 7, no. 3 (Winter 1988): 621–41. [9](#_edn9). Of course, even though the pre-1913 monetary system was unstable, it does not follow that the creation of the Federal Reserve System was the best solution. Indeed, the Federal Reserve Act made it easy to produce an expansive currency, but not one that would easily contract when additional currency was not needed—even though the framers of the Fed did use the term “elastic currency.” See George Selgin, “[A Prescient Fed Critic](https://www.cato.org/blog/prescient-fed-critic),” *Cato at Liberty* (blog), Cato Institute, September 5, 2015. [10](#_edn10). Member banks were able to borrow at the Fed’s discount window to turn illiquid loans into liquid currency, thus providing a mechanism to produce an “elastic” currency. See David C. Wheelock, “[Overview: The History of the Federal Reserve](https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/federal-reserve-history),” Federal Reserve History, September 13, 2021. [11](#_edn11). A fiat currency is one that is not convertible (or pegged) to a physical commodity like gold or silver. Instead, the currency is “backed” by nothing more than the issuing government’s promise to issue more of it. [12](#_edn12). The “monetary base” refers to the total quantity of the Fed’s own dollar liabilities, consisting mainly of Federal Reserve Notes and banks’ deposit balances with the Fed (i.e., reserve balances). [13](#_edn13). Fundamentally, all other dollars (e.g., commercial bank deposits) represent the base dollars into which they can be converted. [14](#_edn14). A future briefing paper in this series will address how the Fed manages the supply of base money, operations that became quite different after the 2008 financial crisis. See George Selgin, [*Floored!: How a Misguided Fed Experiment Deepened and Prolonged the Great Recession*](https://www.cato.org/books/floored-how-misguided-fed-experiment-deepened-prolonged-great-recession) (Cato Institute, 2018). [15](#_edn15). The degree to which increases in the monetary base lead to increases in private money supply is called the money multiplier effect and occurs as banks loan out base money, which in turn is deposited in other banks and financial institutions. These banks then continue the chain of lending and depositing, resulting in a greater than one-for-one increase in private money because of increased base money. The Fed has limited control over the money multiplier, and the scale of the effect has decreased significantly over time. [16](#_edn16). This calculation takes the currency in circulation (part of the monetary base) out of the broader M2 money supply category. M2 includes bank deposits. [17](#_edn17). David Marshall, “[Origins of the Use of Treasury Debt in Open Market Operations: Lessons for the Present](https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2002/1qepart5),” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago *Economic Perspectives* 26, no. 1 (February 2002): 45–54; and Arthur Reynolds, “[Early Functioning of the Federal Reserve System](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1014513?seq=1),” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 99 (January 1922): 74–79. [18](#_edn18). Many public banks that eventually became central banks were created to assist their government’s borrowing needs, a fact that was not unknown in 1913. See George Selgin, “[Central Banks as Sources of Financial Instability](https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_14_04_01_selgin.pdf),” *Independent Review* 14, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 485–96; and George Selgin, “[One Sentence, or, Unpacking the Truth About the Founding of the Bank of France](https://www.cato.org/blog/one-sentence-or-unpacking-truth-about-founding-bank-france),” *Cato at Liberty* (blog), Cato Institute, January 21, 2016. [19](#_edn19). David Marshall, “[Origins of the Use of Treasury Debt in Open Market Operations: Lessons for the Present](https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2002/1qepart5),” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago *Economic Perspectives* 26, no. 1 (February 2002): 48. [20](#_edn20). “[Treasury Debt Auctions and Buybacks as Fiscal Agent](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/treasury-debt-auctions-and-buybacks-as-fiscal-agent),” Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and Paula V. Hillery and Stephen E. Thompson, “[The Federal Reserve Banks as Fiscal Agents and Depositories of the United States](https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0400lead.pdf),” *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, April 2000. [21](#_edn21). Prior to 1951, government debt management and monetary policy were directly connected; in 1951, the US Treasury and the Fed agreed to separate them. Many scholars feel this accord set the foundation for “independent” monetary policy. See Jessie Romero, “[The Treasury-Fed Accord, March 1951](https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/treasury-fed-accord),” Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013. [22](#_edn22). Eric Leeper, “[Fiscal Dominance: How Worried Should We Be?](https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/fiscal-dominance-how-worried-should-we-be),” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, April 3, 2023. [23](#_edn23). In such a case, the Fed would have to be willing to tighten its policy stance (i.e., increase its rate target) sufficiently to prevent inflation. Historically, the Fed has been hesitant to act in such a manner. [24](#_edn24). Prior to 1980, only commercial banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System were required to hold reserves with the Fed, and by 1980, less than 40 percent of all commercial banks were members of the system. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 required all banks to hold their reserves at the Fed. See Kenneth J. Robinson, “[Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, March 1980](https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/monetary-control-act-of-1980),” Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013. [25](#_edn25). Norbert Michel, “[There Are Many Ways to Fix Bank Regulation—Here’s a Start](https://www.cato.org/blog/there-are-many-ways-fix-bank-regulation-heres-start),” *Cato at Liberty* (blog), Cato Institute, December 16, 2024. [26](#_edn26). Norbert Michel, “[The Fed’s Failure as a Lender of Last Resort: What to Do About It](https://www.heritage.org/report/the-feds-failure-lender-last-resort-what-do-about-it),” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 2943, August 20, 2014. [27](#_edn27). Marvin Goodfriend and Robert G. King, “[Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking](https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_review/1988/er740301),” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond *Economic Review 74* (May/​June 1988): 3–22; and Anna J. Schwartz, “[The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window](https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/conferences/homer/homer92.pdf),” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis *Review* 74, no. 5 (September/​October 1992): 58–69. [28](#_edn28). Jai Kedia and Norbert Michel, “[A Comprehensive Evaluation of Policy Rate Feedback Rules](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/comprehensive-evaluation-policy-rate-feedback-rules),” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 987, January 14, 2025. [29](#_edn29). Romina Boccia and Dominik Lett, “[The Threat of Fiscal Dominance: Will the US Resort to Money-Printing to Finance the Rising Debt Challenge?](https://www.cato.org/blog/threat-fiscal-dominance-will-us-resort-money-printing-finance-rising-debt-challenge),” *Cato at Liberty* (blog), Cato Institute, April 4, 2024. [![Creative Commons License](/build/cato_2020/images/creative-commons.svg)](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/). [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-01/Reforming-the-Federal-Reserve.pdf)