During the November 2010 election, a number of Minnesota voters were greeted at the polls with threats of criminal prosecution just for wearing hats, buttons, or shirts bearing the images, slogans, or logos of their favorite political causes (typically not relating to the Republican or Democratic parties). Election officials cited Minnesota Statute § 211B.11, which makes it a misdemeanor to wear a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia” to the polls on election days. While there is no definition of “political” in the statute, an Election Day Policy distributed before the election explained that the statute bans any material “designed to influence or impact voting” or “promoting a group with recognizable political views.” After several of their members were forced to cover up or remove clothing or accessories deemed to be political — in the sole discretion of an election official — a group of organizations and individuals brought suit to challenge the state law on the grounds that it unlawfully stifles core First Amendment-protected speech. The federal district court dismissed the suit, finding that § 211B.11 satisfied the lesser degree of judicial scrutiny to which viewpoint-neutral speech restrictions are subject. On appeal, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the law’s constitutionality, citing precedent permitting bans on active campaigning at polling sites and extending that reasoning to allow prohibitions even on passive political expression. Those challenging the law have now asked the Supreme Court to review their case. Cato joined the Rutherford Institute on a brief supporting them, arguing that the Minnesota law’s absolute ban on “political” materials at polling sites is an unconstitutional restriction of core First Amendment speech. Protecting the right of the people to advocate political causes is one of the primary purposes of our constitutional protections for the freedom of speech, so government restrictions in this area must be narrowly drawn and for a truly compelling reason, regardless of the type of forum where the ban applies. While the Eighth Circuit relied on precedent permitting bans on campaigning at polling sites, prohibiting inert political expression at these locations doesn’t serve a similar interest; passive expression simply doesn’t pose the same threats to elections — intimidation and chilling of voters — that active campaigning can. Accordingly, § 211B.11 cannot pass strict scrutiny; in legal terms, the restrictions it imposes are simultaneously under-inclusive, over-inclusive, and overly broad.