# *In re Section 301 Forced Labor Cases* The impact of these tariffs is as large or larger than most policies previously invalidated by the Supreme Court on major questions grounds. September 17, 2026 • Legal Briefs By [Ilya Somin](https://www.cato.org/people/ilya-somin), [Thomas A. Berry](https://www.cato.org/people/thomas-berry), and Michael W. McConnell [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-09/FILED%20Section%20301%20Amicus%20Brief_26-3555_2026-09-11.pdf) Learn more about [Cato’s Amicus Briefs Program](/about/cato-amicus-program). In February 2026, the Supreme Court invalidated the massive tariffs that President Trump attempted to impose under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). But that decision did not end Trump’s efforts to unilaterally impose onerous tariffs. He has sought to recreate sweeping tariffs using other statutes. Most recently, he has sought to impose 10–12.5% tariffs on imports from 60 US trading partners by using Section 301 of the Tariff Act of 1974. The new tariffs were enacted under the pretext of combatting goods produced by “forced labor.” Two groups of small businesses and 25 state governments, led by the state of Oregon, have filed lawsuits in the US Court of International Trade challenging the legality of the Section 301 tariffs. Cato, Stanford Law Professor Michael McConnell, and Professor Ilya Somin, our B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies, have filed an amicus brief opposing the new Section 301 tariffs. We thank Daniel Wolff, Alexander Schaefer, and Joshua Claybourn of Crowell & Moring for assistance in drafting and filing the brief. Part I of our brief explains that Section 301 grants limited authority to impose tariffs in response to specific “unreasonable or discriminatory” government policies by “a foreign country” that “burden\[\] or restrict\[\] United States commerce.” It is not a blank check for whatever tariffs the executive branch may want to impose against dozens of countries around the world. Part II outlines why, if there is any ambiguity about whether Section 301 authorizes these massive tariffs, the major questions doctrine requires that the issue be resolved against Defendants. That doctrine obliges Congress to “speak clearly” when it assigns to the executive “decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” The impact of these tariffs is as large or larger than most policies previously invalidated by the Supreme Court on major questions grounds. And the tariff power is not exempt from major questions scrutiny on the supposed ground that it is a “foreign affairs” power. Part III shows that if Section 301 did grant the President the power he claims, it would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which constrains the transfer of legislative power to the executive. If Defendants’ interpretation of Section 301 were correct, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) could impose unlimited tariffs on virtually any imports from any country at any time. Such a sweeping delegation of a core congressional power would violate the requirements that (1) Congress not make “boundless” delegations of the power to tax, and (2) “\[t\]he ‘guidance’ needed is greater when an agency action will ‘affect the entire national economy’ than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue.” The Court of International Trade should invalidate these tariffs as not authorized by Section 301. [![In re Section 301 Forced Labor Cases_pubcover](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/serial_cover_phone/public/2026-09/In%20re%20Section%20301%20Forced%20Labor%20Cases_pubcover.jpg?itok=9f5twgi4)](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-09/FILED%20Section%20301%20Amicus%20Brief_26-3555_2026-09-11.pdf) ### Download This Legal Brief ##### *In re Section 301 Forced Labor Cases* [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-09/FILED%20Section%20301%20Amicus%20Brief_26-3555_2026-09-11.pdf) ##### About the Authors [![ilya-somin-cropped.jpg](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2023-04/ilya-somin-cropped.jpg?itok=J1IxBVI7)](/people/ilya-somin) ##### [Ilya Somin](/people/ilya-somin) Professor of Law, George Mason University, and B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute [ ](https://x.com/ilyasomin) [![Thomas Berry](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2026-02/2025-10-16-Thomas%20Berry-sq_0.jpg?itok=SW7WagUw)](/people/thomas-berry) ##### [Thomas A. Berry](/people/thomas-berry) Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute [ ](https://x.com/Thomas_A_Berry) [ ](mailto:tberry@cato.org) ##### Michael W. McConnell Stanford Law Professor [![Creative Commons License](/build/cato_2020/images/creative-commons.svg)](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/). [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2026-09/FILED%20Section%20301%20Amicus%20Brief_26-3555_2026-09-11.pdf)