# Defending the Endangerment Finding Rescission 

Fall 2026 • Regulation 

By Benjamin Zycher 

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In separate articles in the Summer 2026 issue of *Regulation*, Jonathan Adler and Henry Miller criticize the Environmental Protection Agency’s recent rescission (EPA 2026) of its previous finding (EPA 2009) that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from vehicles and engines regulated under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Their arguments are deeply problematic.

***Adler*** / In his article, Adler repeatedly refers to GHG emissions from “motor vehicles” rather than emissions from “new” motor vehicles (and engines); “new” in this context means not preowned. Those are what are regulated under Section 202(a). (He clearly understands that distinction in that he quotes accurately from two court decisions that refer to “new motor vehicles.”) He then argues that the CAA “merely requires that the EPA administrator ‘reasonably anticipate’ negative effects on health or welfare, effects that the CAA defines to include effects on climate, ‘economic values,’ and ‘personal comfort and well-being.’ ”

Nowhere does he ask whether those purported negative effects would satisfy a de minimis threshold, the relevance of which the EPA itself noted in its 2009 finding (p. 66506): “To be sure, any finding of a ‘contribution’ requires some threshold to be met; a truly trivial or de minimis ‘contribution’ might not count as such” (emphasis added). EPA (2009) then shunted that aside, stating, “The Administrator therefore has ample discretion in exercising her reasonable judgment.”

The argument that GHG emissions from section 202(a) vehicles would satisfy a de minimis threshold—that “negative effects on health or welfare” are reasonable to anticipate—is preposterous. Achievement of net zero GHG emissions by the entire US economy by 2050 would reduce global temperatures in 2100 by about 0.104–0.137°C, applying the EPA’s climate model under assumptions that exaggerate the effects of reduced GHG emissions. That impact would be virtually undetectable because the standard deviation of the surface temperature record is about 0.1°C. EPA (2009) then falsely claims that Section 202(a) vehicles emit 23.5 percent of all US GHG emissions; in fact, that is the percentage produced by all US vehicles. Even if we assume the 23.5 percent number, the year 2100 temperature effect of eliminating those GHG emissions would be roughly 0.024–0.032°C, an effect obviously not significant statistically, undetectable, and irrelevant in terms of policy formulation. And the effects of GHG emissions from Section 202(a) vehicles would be vastly smaller.

Adler then argues, correctly, that the 2007 Supreme Court ruling in *Massachusetts v. EPA* is the law of the land, giving the agency the authority to regulate GHG emissions. But if the EPA has authority—as distinct from a requirement—to regulate, then it also has the authority not to regulate. Adler seems to be arguing that the agency may not change its mind:

> It does not matter if the EPA (again) believes the *Massachusetts* decision was wrong and the CAA was never meant to apply to greenhouse gases. The Court has given the act a definitive interpretation to the contrary, and the Court rarely reconsiders its own prior statutory interpretations. If the Court got a statute wrong, that is a mistake for Congress to fix.

This argument conflates two distinct issues: (1) whether GHG emissions are covered by the CAA—whether the EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions—and (2) whether the EPA is required to do so—that is, whether GHG emissions from Section 202(a) vehicles “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”

Adler then notes:

> Section 111 of the Clean Air Act … only applies to emissions from sources that “cause or contribute significantly” to the air pollution at issue, suggesting the EPA need not—indeed, perhaps, cannot—regulate sources of de minimis contributions under that provision. The absence of any such qualification in Section 202, however, is a mortal blow to the EPA’s position.”

That argument cannot be correct. In the context of Section 202(a), “cause or contribute significantly” is replaced with “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Is Adler ignoring this language, or is he actually arguing that GHG emissions yielding temperature effects almost literally equal to zero nonetheless can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”? “Reasonably anticipate” as a legal matter cannot mean merely to “assert.” It must mean that there is some rational basis for a finding. Is Adler arguing that the phrase “reasonably anticipate” imposes no constraint whatever?

He then argues in effect that it is not proper for an agency “to stake a major rulemaking on the Supreme Court’s willingness to reject stare decisis.” Again, he is conflating two distinct issues: (1) whether Massachusetts v. EPA was decided correctly, and (2) whether the 2009 EPA endangerment finding is consistent with objective analysis and the evidence both before and since. Even if we assume that Massachusetts v. EPA was decided correctly and will not be overturned, that has nothing to do with whether the 2009 endangerment finding itself is sound.

Adler then makes three arguments to the effect that reversing the endangerment finding would be unwise:

- He writes, “Should the *Massachusetts* holding be undone, however, placing greenhouse gases and climate change concerns beyond the scope of the law, there would no longer be any basis to bar \[climate lawsuits\] from federal court.” Apart from the fact that reversing *Massachusetts v. EPA* is not required for a reversal of the endangerment finding, there are several such lawsuits even with *Massachusetts v. EPA*, and one of the central issues is whether they belong in state or federal court.
- He also writes, “Congress may have put an end to CAA waivers for California greenhouse gas emission standards for new motor vehicles through the Congressional Review Act, but if greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles are no longer subject to CAA regulation, it is not clear why any such waiver would be required, or why such standards could only be adopted by California—though other statutes may still preclude state standards that operate as *de facto* fuel efficiency requirements” (emphasis added). He here answers his own question: The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 includes an explicit preemption provision: “When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.” The only way to control vehicle GHG emissions is with fuel economy standards, whether direct or indirect.
- Adler further writes: “The endangerment finding itself is no obstacle to the relaxation or rescission of existing greenhouse gas emission regulations, including those imposed on motor vehicles. The relevant statutory text provides ample basis for ending regulation of such emissions from stationary sources, and there are strong legal arguments having nothing to do with endangerment that the EPA lacks the statutory authority to push automakers toward the production and promotion of electric cars.” He cannot be serious; with the 2009 endangerment finding in force, efforts to end regulation of GHG emissions will confront litigation monstrous in scale and effect. Why else would we now observe massive litigation against the 2026 rescission?

That argument cannot be correct. In the context of Section 202(a), “cause or contribute significantly” is replaced with “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Is Adler ignoring this language, or is he actually arguing that GHG emissions yielding temperature effects almost literally equal to zero nonetheless can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”? “Reasonably anticipate” as a legal matter cannot mean merely to “assert.” It must mean that there is some rational basis for a finding. Is Adler arguing that the phrase “reasonably anticipate” imposes no constraint whatever?

He then argues in effect that it is not proper for an agency “to stake a major rulemaking on the Supreme Court’s willingness to reject *stare decisis*.” Again, he is conflating two distinct issues: (1) whether *Massachusetts v. EPA* was decided correctly, and (2) whether the 2009 EPA endangerment finding is consistent with objective analysis and the evidence both before and since. Even if we assume that *Massachusetts v. EPA* was decided correctly and will not be overturned, that has nothing to do with whether the 2009 endangerment finding itself is sound.

***Miller*** / Miller begins his argument with a reference to the “robust” “scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change.” Apart from the reality that the phrase “scientific consensus” is a contradiction in terms, only someone who knows little about the literature on anthropogenic climate change can believe such balderdash. Merely consider the recent official United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change disavowal of the most extreme GHG scenarios (the most important of which is “representative concentration pathway 8.5, or RCP8.5); until now they commonly were defined as “business as usual,” but now they “have become implausible.” In the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), every adverse climate effect of increasing GHG concentrations viewed by the IPCC as likely for 2050 or 2100 was driven by RCP8.5 (Table 12.12 of the “Physical Science Basis” chapter), even though the IPCC itself in the AR6 argued that “the likelihood of high emissions scenarios such as RCP8.5 or SSP5‑8.5 is considered low.”

Note first that the EPA (2009) analysis of future GHG emission scenarios is characterized by some nontrivial confusion: “Atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases will … continue to climb, and thus lead to ever greater rates of climate change.” The asserted parameter “rates of climate change” is wholly unclear, but to the extent that it means some sort of acceleration in the observed effects of additional emissions, it is incorrect because the effects of additional emissions are smaller at higher atmospheric concentrations of GHG than at lower ones, and at current concentrations are effectively zero.

EPA (2009) states, “For the year 2030, projections of the six greenhouse gases show an increase of 25 to 90 percent compared with 2000 emissions.” The European Union’s Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) shows global GHG emissions (in carbon dioxide–equivalent units) in 2000 at 36,175.2 million metric tons, and 53,206.4 mmt in 2024. That is an increase of 47.1 percent. But, as EPA (2009) recognized, it is atmospheric concentrations that are relevant for anthropogenic climate change. Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Global Monitoring Laboratory show an increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide from 369.7 parts per million in 2000 to 427.4 ppm in 2025, or 15.6 percent. An increase of 25 percent from 2000 to 2030 would require carbon dioxide concentrations that year of about 462.1 ppm, or 34.7 ppm higher than in 2025. That implies an annual average increase over 2025–2030 of over 6.9 ppm. The single largest increase in the NOAA historical data was 3.5 ppm in 2024.

Accordingly, it is obvious that the EPA (2009) GHG scenarios have proven substantially incorrect in the context of the ensuing data, and that an endangerment finding based upon them cannot be supported. In a detailed analysis, Pielke (2025) examines the nine scenarios used in the 2009 endangerment finding. The radiative forcings implied by the nine scenarios range from 4.2°C to 9.2°C. Pielke concludes:

> These nine scenarios are heavily skewed to very high levels of 2100 radiative forcing, with two even more extreme than RCP8.5. Eight of the nine project a central estimate of global average temperature increase to 2100 (above pre-industrial) of greater than 3 degrees Celsius—a value today viewed to be unlikely.

Notwithstanding Miller’s assertions, there is no evidence—none—of a climate “crisis.” More to the point, Miller fails to examine the projections of climate phenomena used by EPA (2009) to justify its finding that GHG emissions—from Section 202(a) vehicles—can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Every one of them is inconsistent with the evidence both in the years leading to 2009 and after.

***Ozone ambient levels*** / According to EPA (2009), “Increases in ambient ozone are expected to occur over broad areas of the country.” But the EPA website currently shows a 26 percent decline in the ozone national trend for 1980–2009, and ambient ozone levels have declined since then (EPA 2026).

***Hurricanes and floods*** / EPA (2009) states, “The evidence concerning how human-induced climate change may alter extreme weather events also clearly supports a finding of endangerment, given the serious adverse impacts that can result from such events and the increase in risk, even if small, of the occurrence and intensity of events such as hurricanes and floods.” Further, “there is the potential for hurricanes to become more intense (and even some evidence that Atlantic hurricanes have already become more intense).”

Projections of future weather events—EPA (2009) uses “may alter”—are not “evidence.” With respect to hurricanes, the satellite data show no long-term trends either in numbers or intensities since 1973 (Maue, n.d.). With respect to the intensity of Atlantic hurricanes, the data show an increase since the late 1960s, but that clearly is driven by three outlier years: 2005, 2010, and 2020 (Buchholz 2025). Accordingly, it is difficult to believe that the increase is statistically significant, and EPA (2009) had only the 2005 data available; does Miller believe that one year of observations is sufficient to draw inferences about climate phenomena? And the EPA offered no analysis of the degree to which anthropogenic emissions (or increasing atmospheric concentrations) of GHG were responsible; that would be impossible based upon one year of data. Does Miller believe that there are no natural variations in the intensities of Atlantic hurricanes?

With respect to flooding, the IPCC’s AR6 (p. 1568) states: “The SREX (Seneviratne et al., 2012) assessed low confidence for observed changes in the magnitude or frequency of floods at the global scale. This assessment was confirmed by AR5 (Hartmann et al., 2013).” For the United States, flooding over the past century is uncorrelated with increasing GHG concentrations (Hirsch & Ryberg 2011).

***Heat waves*** / EPA (2009, p. 66497) refers to “increases in average temperatures, which increase the likelihood of heat waves.” The data show little trend in the number of “hot” days over the period 1895–2017; 11 of the 12 years with the highest number of such days occurred before 1960 (Spencer 2018, Fig. 5). In the EPA heat wave index, there is a sharp increase during the 1930s, but no other trend is visible for the 1895–2021 period (OWID, n.d.).

Standard atmospheric physics theory does not predict that increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHG will yield an increase in average (or record) high temperatures. Instead, we should expect to see a rise in average low temperatures, essentially because the warming effects for the most part are predicted for the coldest, driest air masses in the northern hemisphere—eastern Asia and western North America—in the winter. Koonin (2024) notes that for the United States for 1900–2019, “the average coldest temperature of the year has clearly increased since 1900, while the average warmest temperature has hardly changed over the last sixty years and is about the same today as it was in 1900.”

Since 2005, NOAA has maintained the US Climate Reference Network, comprising 114 meticulously maintained temperature stations spaced more or less uniformly across the lower 48 states, 21 stations in Alaska, and two stations in Hawaii. They are placed to avoid heat island effects and other such distortions as much as possible. The reported data show no trend over the available 2005–2025 period.

***Net mortality & morbidity*** / According to EPA (2009):

> The impact on mortality and morbidity associated with increases in average temperatures, which increase the likelihood of heat waves, also provides support for a public health endangerment finding. There are uncertainties over the net health impacts of a temperature increase due to decreases in cold-related mortality, but some recent evidence suggests that the net impact on mortality is more likely to be adverse, in a context where heat is already the leading cause of weather-related deaths in the United States.

Yet, EPA (2009) failed to say what that “recent evidence” is. *The Lancet* has published three major studies on net mortality caused by heat and cold (Gasparrini et al. 2015; Zhao et al. 2021; Masselot et al. 2023). Each found vastly larger net mortality from cold. Accordingly, any asserted increase in mortality caused by higher temperatures—which to some degree are driven by some combination of anthropogenic and natural phenomena—must be offset by reductions in net mortality from reduced cold. Walkowiak et al. (2025) found that “colder-than-optimal temperatures had a greater effect on mortality than warmer ones.” Referring to several studies, Lomborg (2016) notes, “In the U.S. about 9,000 people die from heat each year but 144,000 die from cold.”

***Wildfires, flooding, drought*** / EPA (2009) states, “Across the sectors, the potential serious adverse impacts of extreme events, such as wildfires, flooding, drought, and extreme weather conditions provide strong support for” an endangerment finding. With respect to wildfires, the annual number of US wildfires shows no trend since 1985 (NIFC, n.d.). The number of US wildfires has declined sharply since 1926, and acreage burned has declined even more sharply since the preindustrial period 1500–1800, but it has increased since 1983 (NIFC 2001). That latter trend is likely the result of perverse forest management practices, particularly in government forests (CBO 2022). Could Miller, or anyone, explain why increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHG would engender wildfire effects vastly greater in government forests than in private ones?

Global acreage burned declined 24 percent for 1998–2015, as reported by NASA (Ramsayer 2017). On global wildfires, Doerr and Santin (2016) concluded:

> The data available to date, however, do not support a general increase in area burned or in fire severity for many regions of the world. Indeed, there is increasing evidence suggesting that there is overall less fire in the landscape today than there has been centuries ago, although the magnitude of this reduction still needs to be examined in more detail.

With respect to drought, the Palmer Drought Severity index for the contiguous 48 states shows no trend since 1895. Vicente-Serrano et al. (2022) report, “Meteorological droughts do not show any substantial changes at the global scale in at least the last 120 years.”

***Food production*** / EPA (2009) claims, “The body of evidence points towards increasing risk of net adverse impacts on U.S. food production and agriculture over time, with the potential for significant disruptions and crop failure in the future.” However, FAO (n.d.) reports that global per-capita food production increased by over 40 percent from 1980 to 2024. In the United States, production increased 13.9 percent.

***Water quality*** / According to EPA (2009), “Water resources across large areas of the country are at serious risk from climate change, with effects on water supplies, water quality, and adverse effects from extreme events such as floods and droughts.” GAO (n.d.) offers several studies of water quality trends for the United States, and there is no simple answer to the question of whether those trends are positive or negative because there are many variables (salinity, sediment concentrations, contaminants, etc.) to consider. Moreover, many such variables have little or nothing to do with anthropogenic climate change. At the most general level, GAO (n.d.) reports, “Over the past 50 years, the nation’s water quality and drinking water have improved, but threats to water quality and safety remain.” There is no support in official analyses that “water resources across large areas of the country are at serious risk from climate change.”

***Sea levels & coastal storms*** / According to EPA (2009), “Public health is expected to be adversely affected by an increase in the severity of coastal storm events due to rising sea levels.” Further, “The evidence concerning adverse impacts in the areas of water resources and sea level rise and coastal areas provides the clearest and strongest support for an endangerment finding, both for current and future generations.”

A recent US Department of Energy draft report (subsequently withdrawn for legal reasons) provides the latest evaluation of sea levels along US coasts (Climate Working Group 2025). It offers this summary analysis:

> Since 1900, global average sea level has risen by about 8 inches. Sea level change along U.S. coasts is highly variable, associated with local variations in processes that contribute to sinking and also with ocean circulation patterns. The largest sea level increases along U.S. coasts are Galveston, New Orleans, and the Chesapeake Bay regions—each of these locations is associated with substantial local land sinking (subsidence) unrelated to climate change. Extreme projections of global sea level rise are associated with an implausible extreme emissions scenario and inclusion of poorly understood processes associated with hypothetical ice sheet instabilities. In evaluating AR6 projections to 2050 (with reference to the baseline period 1995–2014), almost half of the interval has elapsed by 2025, with sea level rising at a lower rate than predicted. U.S. tide gauge measurements reveal no obvious acceleration beyond the historical average rate of sea level rise.

These data do not support the EPA (2009) assertion that “the most serious potential adverse effects are the increased risk of storm surge and flooding in coastal areas from sea level rise and more intense storms.”

Miller complains that the EPA now has redefined “air pollutant,” which is an irrelevant argument in that the issue is not whether GHG emissions are “pollutants,” but instead whether they can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” As an aside, a certain minimum atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, generally assumed to be about 150 ppm, is necessary for life itself. At what higher concentration does carbon dioxide suddenly become a “pollutant?” Miller does not tell us. Nor does he tell us why water vapor—by far the most important GHG in terms of the radiative properties of the troposphere—is not also a “pollutant.” Is it because ocean evaporation is a natural process? So are volcanic eruptions, the emissions from which are “pollutants” by any definition.

Miller’s assertion that “Section 202(a) explicitly applies to motor vehicle emissions, as they are a large source of air pollutants,” is incorrect: Section 202(a) applies only to “new” vehicles and engines. Somewhat inconsistently, he then asserts that the trivial effect of Section 202(a) GHG emissions—or all vehicle emissions or all US emissions—is irrelevant because “climate change is an inherently cumulative phenomenon.” This is irrelevant: The issue is not whether all global GHG emissions can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” The issue is whether emissions subject to regulation under the CAA satisfy that legal requirement. The obvious answer is “No.”

Miller then endorses the “social cost of carbon” parameter (SC-GHG) as “substantial by virtually any serious economic accounting.” This is more balderdash. Merely by raising the analytic discount rate to 5 or 7 percent from the absurd 2.5 percent figure used by the Biden administration while changing no other parameter, the SC-GHG falls from about $125 per metric ton to about $35 and less than $7, respectively. At $35, the social cost of GHG emissions per gallon of gasoline would be about 31¢; at $7 it would be about 6¢. Are those “social costs” “substantial”?

Even that ignores such benefits of increasing carbon dioxide concentrations as the net decline in mortality from heat and cold, increased agricultural productivity, and planetary greening. For many reasons, the “social cost of carbon” is a fundamentally dishonest parameter (Zycher 2025); it has been used to justify policies that yield undetectable climate effects.

Note also that the SC-GHG as estimated by the Biden administration mischaracterizes the effects on gross domestic product of rising GHG concentrations as projected in the central integrated assessment models; they are much smaller than commonly asserted. In the Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy (DICE) Model, for which William Nordhaus won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2018, global GDP in 2100 varies by about 3 percent across policy scenarios, including no climate policies at all—a figure that is both very small and almost certainly not statistically significant given the variations inherent in economic forecasting, the magnitude of annual changes in global economic growth, and the number of years remaining before the end of this century. Per-capita consumption varies only by about 1.3 percent across policy scenarios—also a very small number and almost certain not to be statistically significant.

The IPCC—even in its most alarmist analyses—arrives at a conclusion very close to that reported in the DICE analysis. IPCC (2018, Ch. 3) finds that the damage from anthropogenic climate change unmitigated by policy initiatives will reduce global GDP by 2.6 percent by 2100. In other words, if we assume, conservatively, global GDP growth of, say, 2 percent per year, climate change unmitigated by policy initiatives would shift the global GDP growth path backward by about 15.6 months, an approximate reduction magnitude observed commonly during economic recessions. By 2100, the IPCC projects that individual incomes on average will be at least 400 percent greater than is the case today, so that climate change unmitigated by policy initiatives would make individuals in 2100 “only” 398 percent wealthier than individuals today.

Miller’s argument that “Policy Should Be Based on Science, Not Politics” is confused. Science, whatever the disagreements and controversies, can tell us about the workings of the natural world; it tells us nothing about the unavoidable tradeoffs inherent in policymaking. Policymaking is, therefore, political by its very nature. His assertion that “the 2009 endangerment finding did not emerge from ideology” is comedy gold: That politics did not infect decision-making by an Obama EPA led by Lisa Jackson is preposterous. But Miller, without realizing it, has debunked “attribution science,” arguing that EPA (2026) “has constructed a legal standard that demands what atmospheric physics cannot deliver: a clean, isolated causal chain from one vehicle category to a measurable global outcome.”

***Conclusion*** / The 2026 EPA rescission of the 2009 EPA endangerment finding is fully justified. The 2009 analysis was confused in several dimensions, dishonest, inconsistent with the data on climate phenomena before and after 2009, and inconsistent with the EPA’s own climate model. If the phrase “arbitrary and capricious” does not apply to the 2009 endangerment finding, then it is devoid of meaning. The dissenting arguments from Adler and Miller, respectively, do nothing to challenge that conclusion.

## Readings

- Adler, Jonathan H., 2026, “Can the EPA Withdraw the Endangerment Finding?” *Regulation* 49(2): 35–37.
- Buchholz, Katharina, 2025, “Number of Major Hurricanes Over the Atlantic Rises,” *Statistica*, Aug. 29.
- Climate Working Group, 2025, “A Critical Review of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate,” US Department of Energy, July 23.
- CBO (Congressional Budget Office), 2022, *Wildfires*, [https://​www​.cbo​.gov/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​/​58212](https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58212).
- Doerr, Stefan H., and Cristina Santín, 2016, “Global Trends in Wildfire and Its Impacts: Perceptions versus Realities in a Changing World,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* 371(1696): 20150345.
- EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 2009, “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,” *Federal Register* 74(239): 66496–66546.
- EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 2026, “Ozone Trends,” last updated February 19, [https://​www​.epa​.gov/​a​i​r​-​t​r​e​n​d​s​/​o​z​o​n​e​-​t​rends](https://www.epa.gov/air-trends/ozone-trends).
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), n.d., “Production Indices,” FAOSTAT, accessed August 5, 2026, [https://​www​.fao​.org/​f​a​o​s​t​a​t​/​e​n​/​#​d​a​ta/QI](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QI).
- GAO (Government Accountability Office), n.d., “Water Quality and Protection,” accessed August 5, 2026, [https://​www​.gao​.gov/​w​a​t​e​r​-​q​u​a​l​i​t​y​-​a​n​d​-​p​r​o​t​e​ction](https://www.gao.gov/water-quality-and-protection).
- Gasparrini, Antonio, Yuming Guo, Masahiro Hashizume, et al., 2015, “Mortality Risk Attributable to High and Low Ambient Temperature: A Multicountry Observational Study,” *Lancet* 386(9991): 369–375.
- Hirsch, R.M., and K.R. Ryberg, 2011, “Has the Magnitude of Floods across the USA Changed with Global CO2 Levels?” *Hydrological Sciences Journal* 57(1): 1–9.
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2018, *Global Warming of 1.5°C*.
- Koonin, Steven E., 2024, *Unsettled (Updated and Expanded Edition): What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters*, BenBella Books.
- Lindzen, Richard, and William Happer, 2026, “The Untold Science of GHGs Demonstrates the Climate-Related Disclosure Rule Must Be Rescinded,” Comment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, August 3.
- Lomborg, Bjørn, 2016, “An Overheated Climate Alarm,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 6.
- Masselot, Pierre, Malcolm Mistry, Jacopo Vanoli, et al., 2023, “Excess Mortality Attributed to Heat and Cold: A Health Impact Assessment Study in 854 Cities in Europe,” *Lancet Planetary Health* 7(4): e271–81.
- Maue, Ryan N., n.d., “Global Tropical Cyclone Activity,” *Climate Atlas*, accessed August 5, 2026, [https://​cli​mat​las​.com/​t​r​o​p​ical/](https://climatlas.com/tropical/).
- Miller, Henry I., 2026, “The EPA Betrays Its Own Mission,” *Regulation* 49(2): 32–34.
- NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center), n.d., “Wildfires and Acres: Total Wildland Fires and Acres (1983–2025),” accessed Aug. 6, 2026, [https://​www​.nifc​.gov/​f​i​r​e​-​i​n​f​o​r​m​a​t​i​o​n​/​s​t​a​t​i​s​t​i​c​s​/​w​i​l​d​fires](https://www.nifc.gov/fire-information/statistics/wildfires).
- NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center), 2001, *Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy*.
- OWID (Our World in Data), n.d., “Annual Heat Wave Index in the United States,” accessed August 5, 2026, [https://​our​worldin​da​ta​.org/​g​r​a​p​h​e​r​/​h​e​a​t​w​a​v​e​-​i​n​d​e​x-usa](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/heatwave-index-usa).
- Pielke, Roger, Jr., 2025, “Emissions Scenarios, CWG Fact Check 1,” *Honest Broker*, August 3.
- Ramsayer, Kate, 2017, “Researchers Detect a Global Drop in Fires,” NASA Earth Observatory, June 30.
- Rohli, Robert V., and Anthony J. Vega, 2017, *Climatology*, 4th Ed., Jones and Bartlett Learning.
- Spencer, Roy W., 2018, “Summer Causes Climate Change Hysteria,” *Roy Spencer, PhD* (blog), July 3, [https://​www​.drroyspencer​.com/​2​0​1​8​/​0​7​/​s​u​m​m​e​r​-​c​a​u​s​e​s​-​c​l​i​m​a​t​e​-​c​h​a​n​g​e​-​hyste…](https://www.drroyspencer.com/2018/07/summer-causes-climate-change-hysteria/).
- Vicente-Serrano, Sergio M., Dhais Peña-Angulo, Santiago Beguería, et al., 2022, “Global Drought Trends and Future Projections,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A* 380(2238): 20210285.
- Walkowiak, Marcin Piotr, Dariusz Walkowiak, and Jarosław Walkowiak, 2025, “Evolving Threats in an Unforgiving Climate: Impact of Non-Optimal Temperatures on Life Expectancy,” *Population and Environment* 47: article 10.
- Zhao, Qi, Yuming Guo, Tingting Ye, et al., 2021, “Global, Regional, and National Burden of Mortality Associated with Non-Optimal Ambient Temperatures from 2000 to 2019: A Three-Stage Modelling Study,” *Lancet Planetary Health* 5(7): e415–e425.
- Zycher, Benjamin, 2024, “Comment Submitted to the State of Montana Public Service Commission,” April 8.
- Zycher, Benjamin, 2025, “A Critique of Professor Cass R. Sunstein on the Social Cost of Carbon,” American Enterprise Institute, March.

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##### Benjamin Zycher 

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