# Giving Trump More Tariff Powers Is a Bad Idea 

The Sanctioning Russia Act will give the president another way to tax allies.

July 31, 2026 • Commentary 

By [Clark Packard](https://www.cato.org/people/clark-packard) 

This article appeared in the [*Washington Post*](https://washingtonpost.com) on July 31, 2026.

Across two administrations, President Donald Trump has abused nearly every tariff statute on the books, unilaterally taxing allies and adversaries under legal justifications that strain credulity. The levies have triggered a wave of lawsuits, multiple of which the administration has already lost.

But Trump, irresponsible as he has been, did not create this problem. Congress did. For more than half a century, Congress has delegated broad tariff powers to the president with few limitations. If the president has run wild, it’s only because lawmakers took away the guardrails.

The Senate is preparing to hand the White House yet another tariff authority. The [Russia sanctions bill](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2026-07-16_final_bill_text.pdf) championed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R‑South Carolina) before his death earlier this month would authorize duties as high as 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas by volume. China would qualify, but so could Japan, India, France and Belgium. The tariffs would also apply to the top five facilitators of sanctions evasion. The legislation has been [endorsed by Trump](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/13/politics/trump-russia-sanctions-graham).

Whether Washington should squeeze the countries indirectly bankrolling Russia’s war against Ukraine is a question best left to national security experts. Congress ought to be asking a narrower question: What happens when *this president* has open-ended tariff discretion? The answer isn’t pretty. Since 2018, Trump has declared the importation of the following products a national emergency, a threat to national security or both: [upholstered furniture](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/06/2025-19482/adjusting-imports-of-timber-lumber-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states), kitchen cabinets, bathroom vanities, [dishwashers](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/16/2025-11067/implementation-of-duties-on-steel-pursuant-to-proclamation-10896-adjusting-imports-of-steel-into-the) and [auto parts](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/03/2025-05930/adjusting-imports-of-automobiles-and-automobile-parts-into-the-united-states). Now Trump [is threatening Canada](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/17/trump-canada-wildfire-tariffs.html) with tariffs in response to wildfire smoke.

The Supreme Court [ruled in February](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_4gcj.pdf) that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act confers no tariff authority on the president. Within days of the decision, the White House pivoted to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — an obsolete law intended to address an inflexible global financial system of another era — and reimposed a 10 percent global tariff. The U.S. Court of International Trade [invalidated the Section 122 tariffs](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.gibsondunn.com/section-122-global-tariffs-invalidated-by-the-court-of-international-trade-ruling-and-next-steps/) in May, and the tariffs expired last week. So, the administration made [sweeping allegations](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/07/24/tariffs-forced-labor-trump-supreme-court/a2db70ec-879f-11f1-9cec-0fb26676f07e_story.html) of forced labor in 60 countries to justify replacement levies under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

The Russia bill is riddled with the same ambiguity the president has exploited in these other laws. The tariff authority expires in five years, but what happens to the tariffs imposed under the bill? The legislation does not say. What data determines which countries rank among the five largest importers of Russian fuel? The bill does not specify that, either — a real problem, since Russian energy moves through murky intermediaries, and rankings shift depending on which numbers are consulted.

The Sanctioning Russia Act will give the president another way to tax allies.

Tariff exemptions for allies are also not automatic. Countries can avoid the duties if they have taken “significant steps” to reduce their imports of Russian natural gas, but only the U.S. trade representative decides whether a country has met that threshold. Trump could direct the trade representative to set the tariff rate at 100 percent for one buyer of Russian energy and zero for another. That unchecked authority gives Trump leverage in disputes unrelated to Ukraine. With [trade negotiations](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.reuters.com/markets/emerging/an-emboldened-india-holds-out-better-terms-us-trade-talks-2026-07-13/) between the United States and India underway, the Trump administration could wield the threat of tariffs in discussions over farm exports, digital taxes or drug prices.

Members of Congress unmoved by the erosion of their Article I powers should at least consider their own self-interest. Trump’s tariffs are [unpopular at home](https://archive.is/o/MgKpr/https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/ABC-News-Washington-Post-Ipsos-Poll-February-2026) and have provoked retaliatory levies abroad that have punished American farms, factories and small businesses. Elected officials have refused to curb the administration’s tariff authority and have offered little assistance to their struggling constituents. That isn’t a ticket to winning reelection.

There are more responsible ways to draft this bill. Congress could add an expiration date to the tariff authority or require a vote before any duties take effect. Lawmakers could cap the tariff rate far below 100 percent or specify how the largest importers of Russian energy are determined. But the cleanest solution is to impose sanctions without giving Trump another tariff power to abuse.

##### About the Author 

[![Clark Packard Square headshot](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2022-03/ClarkPackard_sq2.jpg?itok=6QwVlh1V)](/people/clark-packard) 

##### [Clark Packard](/people/clark-packard)

Research Fellow, Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Institute

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