# *Trump v. Slaughter* Removal protections for executive officers unlawfully expand the power of the administrative state. October 17, 2025 • Legal Briefs By [Thomas A. Berry](https://www.cato.org/people/thomas-berry), [Brent Skorup](https://www.cato.org/people/brent-skorup), and Alexander Xenos [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-10/Trump%20v.%20Slaughter_Final.pdf) Learn more about [Cato’s Amicus Briefs Program](/about/cato-amicus-program). In recent decades, “independent” federal agencies have accumulated vast executive power, including the power to investigate, adjudicate, and impose severe financial penalties for regulatory violations. Yet courts still treat these agencies—like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Communications Commission—as if they were mere “judicial or legislative aids” from a bygone era. On that basis, officials within these agencies have been wrongly insulated from presidential removal. Now the Supreme Court has an opportunity to abate the decades-long “leakage” of executive power to unelected, removal-protected officials. Doing so will help preserve the Constitution’s separation of powers scheme. In March 2025, President Donald Trump notified FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter that he was removing her from office. The FTC Act permits removal of Commissioners only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” President Trump did not invoke any of these grounds. Slaughter sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and, relying on *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States* (1935)*,* the district court ordered her reinstated. The D.C. Circuit denied the government’s request for a stay on the same grounds. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and decide whether the FTC’s removal protections violate Article II and whether *Humphrey’s Executor* should be overturned. The government has asked the Court to overrule *Humphrey’s Executor*, and Cato has filed an *amicus* brief in support. Our brief explains that the U.S. Constitution creates a separation of powers that is a fundamental safeguard of liberty. The Framers, having seen the dangers of blended powers, designed a system in which legislative, executive, and judicial powers remain distinct. The Constitution vests “the executive Power” solely in the President and requires him to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” For the President to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities, he generally must have the authority to remove his principal subordinates. But the 1935 Court upheld for-cause removal protections for FTC Commissioners in *Humphrey’s Executor* on the ground that they “occup\[y\] no place in the executive department and … exercise\[\] no part of the executive power.” That premise was wrong in 1935 and is indefensible today. The modern FTC brings enforcement actions, issues binding rules, adjudicates disputes, and even engages in foreign-affairs functions—all quintessentially executive powers. Furthermore, the Constitution permits no “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” categories of authority. After *Humphrey’s Executor*, independent agencies amassed vast power, forming a “fourth branch” of government that combines executive, lawmaking, and judicial functions. Although later cases have confined *Humphrey’s Executor*’s reach, lower courts continue to treat it as binding. The Court should hold that the Constitution forbids such removal restrictions and overrule *Humphrey’s Executor*. Doing so would restore some accountability to the electorate and safeguard individual liberty. [![Trump v. Slaughter cover](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/serial_cover_phone/public/2025-10/Trump%20v%20Slaughter%20cover.png?itok=7n9l5RUT)](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-10/Trump%20v.%20Slaughter_Final.pdf) ### Download This Legal Brief ##### *Trump v. Slaughter* [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-10/Trump%20v.%20Slaughter_Final.pdf) ##### About the Authors [![Thomas Berry](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2026-02/2025-10-16-Thomas%20Berry-sq_0.jpg?itok=SW7WagUw)](/people/thomas-berry) ##### [Thomas A. Berry](/people/thomas-berry) Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute [ ](https://x.com/Thomas_A_Berry) [ ](mailto:tberry@cato.org) [![Brent Skorup cropped](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2024-05/Brent%20Skorup%20cropped.jpg?itok=5Witkb6w)](/people/brent-skorup) ##### [Brent Skorup](/people/brent-skorup) Former Legal Fellow, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies ##### Alexander Xenos Legal Associate [![Creative Commons License](/build/cato_2020/images/creative-commons.svg)](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/). [ Download PDF ](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2025-10/Trump%20v.%20Slaughter_Final.pdf)