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#### Transcript 

*This transcript was generated using AI automation and may contain minor formatting or transcription errors. Please refer to the original audio to verify specific quotes or context.*

Unintended Consequences

**Hosts:** Paul Matzko and Peter Van Doren

**Paul Matzko:** Welcome to Unintended Consequences, a podcast about what can go wrong with government regulation. I’m your host, Paul Matzko, and with me as always is Peter Van Doren, the editor of Regulation Magazine. Now, I found today’s topic especially interesting because it’s yet another case of a regulatory system that has vast consequences for millions of Americans, running up bills to the tune of billions of dollars, and yet I hadn’t ever heard of it before. It comes from the cover article for Regulation, titled “A New ‘Fresh Hell’ for Surprise Medical Bills” by David Hyman and Benedic Ippolito, which is rooted in one particular cause of the soaring cost of health care in America today. Medical bankruptcies are responsible for an incredible 66% of all individual bankruptcies in the U.S., and much of that time, it starts with a surprise medical bill. But there’s a very particular definition. When I say surprise medical bill, I don’t just mean I got sick, I got cancer, I didn’t expect it. There’s a particular definition beyond that. What is that, Peter?

**Peter Van Doren:** Surprise medical bills come from practitioners in two situations. One is emergency room visits, where you don’t check whether someone’s in-network or not because you’re dying. Two, even when you have elective surgery, there are anesthesiologists and other people who treat you in a hospital that you’ve never seen and then bill you. And surprise, surprise, sometimes they’re radiologists, for example, you know, specialties that read images, or anesthesiologists that put you to sleep. You’ve never met them, they’re part of the team, and then you get a bill and it’s out of network, right? It’s two, three, four, five, $6,000, and you go, oops.

**Paul Matzko:** Yeah, yeah. So the hospital itself might be in-network, and other parts, other doctors, aren’t.

**Peter Van Doren:** Oh, yeah. Your surgery has been pre-approved, but certainly ER, some insurance policies require pre-approval for ER visits, which strikes me as kind of an oxymoron, right? That’s only a Seinfeld episode to do that.

**Paul Matzko:** I’m sympathetic to that. My son had appendicitis last year, required surgery, and ultimately the hospital stay racked up, you know, nearly $200,000 of bills. So, you know, my insurance covered most of that, but even so, I got the five digits just on my part of that bill. Now, you know, if I’d had worse insurance or been between plans, that would have been disastrous, I’d be part of the statistic. But what I recall about this moment was he’s groaning in the most pain I’ve ever seen him in. It’s midnight. I’m rushing to the emergency room, and then I’m pacing the halls of the emergency room while he’s getting scanned and stuff, trying to figure out through some, you know, Byzantine phone tree on the phone with Aetna, trying to figure out if this hospital’s in-network. They want to transfer him to a pediatric hospital. Are they in-network? It’s impossible to tell. And so I just, you know, that’s the last thing you want to be worried about in that moment.

**Peter Van Doren:** Even if you try your best, ambulance rides and helicopter rides are often not included, right, in any plan. So by definition, the ambulance transfers you to an in-network place or out of network, and you can get hit with the bill that way. So there’s nothing you can really ultimately do to prevent it from happening to you, potentially. Even if you’re conscientious.

**Paul Matzko:** Even if you’re conscientious, which I think you and I are probably high on the conscientious scale. And this is a clearly dysfunctional system, and it hits a lot of people. And so there’s public pressure and political pressure to do something about these surprise bills on both the state and federal level. And apparently, Congress did something.

**Peter Van Doren:** This, you know, voters, this matters in elections. So Congress did something. And what they did was not crazy, right? It made sense at the time.

**Paul Matzko:** The No Surprises Act is what it’s called, right?

**Peter Van Doren:** Back in 2020, they’re borrowing from a precedent. From sports arbitration, right? It’s literally that concept, which is, you know, the team offers you blah and you want blah plus a lot. And then an arbitrator decides between, there’s no middle ground. The arbitrator has to choose one or the other of the offers. And it works in sports, and Congress said, well, okay, let’s do it. And at the time, Cato had an article saying it was a good idea, and Cato had an article saying it was a bad idea. And we’re now hearing from the guys at the time who said it was a bad idea and wouldn’t work, and now they’re back to say, I told you so. At the time, I actually thought they were a little skeptical. They were too skeptical, and I thought the arbitration would work. It made sense to me at the time, and I was wrong.

**Paul Matzko:** But we need to fill in the details of what went wrong. So you get a surprise bill. It’s a crazy amount of money, and in theory, what then happens is the provider submits one number, and the insurance company submits another number, and then it goes to this arbitrator who has to pick one or the other. And the question is, how do they make that decision, right?

**Peter Van Doren:** The arbitrator has to have criteria. It includes things like the quality of the doctor, like, in other words, the doctor who has a full PhD versus a nurse practitioner or something, or who’s a specialist versus a non-specialist, prior rates charged at that hospital. Like if they charged $5,000 for an MRI, and the next time they’re charging $100,000, they’d say, this pushes us towards the smaller number. And so it’s factored like that, right? At the time, the legislation, everyone involved in the rule implemented by HHS, the rule was, you should use the median in-network charge for that procedure as a guideline for your decision. Then a series of court decisions threw that out. In effect, the practitioner knew they could highball, and then let’s see if we win or not. You and I could say, take this podcast, right? How much do you charge, and how much do I charge? And then we go to arbitration, and Paul says $29,000, and Peter says $200,000 or something, right? And then somebody has to pick, and in these arbitrations, basically, the practitioners have been winning most of the awards because the courts threw out the median in-network number as a guideline. So one of us says, I’m an expert, I’m the best in the world at doing blah. And the arbitrators get paid in a way that makes them not want to get everyone angry, right? They don’t really care, but the practitioners are recurring, whereas the hospitals aren’t always. And so, in effect, the incentives, once that median was thrown out by the courts, the game was a game, and everyone has exploited the game. The practitioners have exploited the game and made unbelievable amounts of money.

**Paul Matzko:** I thought it was interesting. In fact, our authors kind of throw out the reference, the oblique reference to Loper Bright, because apparently what happened was there was this list of criteria. Initially, HHS, Health and Human Services, had said, look, we’re going to go with the default. The most important criterion is this median in-network cost. But that was a decision not stipulated in the law, which had a longer list. This was a decision, an administrative decision by HHS, to keep rates reasonable. But then along comes Loper Bright, which says agencies can’t do things that the law doesn’t explicitly stipulate. And we’re generally pro-Loper Bright as a way of keeping the administration, reining in the out-of-control regulators, but guess what? But in this case.

**Peter Van Doren:** We needed the out-of-control regulator in this case. Just to keep the system halfway functional.

**Paul Matzko:** So I thought that was kind of fun because it cuts against our priors.

**Peter Van Doren:** I think “hoist on our own petard” would be the correct phrase.

**Paul Matzko:** That’s going to lead to a surprise medical bill for you. And an ER stay, I’m afraid.

**Peter Van Doren:** The petard, yes. It’s hard. It’s poison. It’s code 90786, attended a Renaissance festival and was hoisted on a petard.

**Paul Matzko:** You know, we laugh, but there probably is a medical code for it.

**Peter Van Doren:** No, there is. I’m sure, you know, a knight in shining armor attacked you.

**Paul Matzko:** So we’re in the state where the system that was designed for a relatively small number of cases, my understanding is it was like 20,000 cases a year that they were expecting to be, you know, arbitrated, has gone to 2.6 million as of last count.

**Peter Van Doren:** That’s a hundred X more than they expected. Yeah, yeah. Precisely because we were saying everyone sees the opportunity.

**Paul Matzko:** And my understanding too is there’s kind of a private equity role here where, as soon as they saw the arbitrage opportunity, firms have bought radiology and anesthesiology practices because, my God, you can print money, right?

**Peter Van Doren:** Yeah, yeah. And they give very high fixed salaries to the participating doctors and then the private equity people make the profits.

**Paul Matzko:** Which I suppose we end up in a, and we tend to be relatively fine with private equity, more so than maybe, you know, other folks, but you hate the game, not the player, I suppose. We created a system that created malincentives that they’re taking advantage of.

**Peter Van Doren:** Right, correct.

**Paul Matzko:** So how do the authors, we’re five years into this, you know, No Surprises Act regime. What’s their assessment for a fix?

**Peter Van Doren:** Basically, they say the kind of common sense obviousness, which is everyone has to be in network, full stop, and through law. In other words, you do it through Medicare and Medicaid first, and you do it through Obamacare plans first, and then the privates, you know, basically will have to follow. And because federal reimbursement is such a big part of everything, which we disagree with, but that gives Congress the leverage to sort of say hospitals will not be paid under any federal program unless they have a rule which says everything within their doors, every person acts as if they’re in-network. And if they do not want to do that, then the thing they provide, radiology or anesthesiology, becomes part of the bundled fee that the hospital gets in, you know, knee and hip replacements. There are many procedures now where hospitals have a bundled fee from Medicare or Medicaid. Not a line item or a hundred different ones. Correct. And so that leverage is what Congress would use to rein in this practice.

**Paul Matzko:** But we’re waiting on Congress to do lots of things. I mean, I suppose it’s, we’re faced with kind of a series of unpalatable choices here. I mean, there’s no ideal, like, straightforward, here’s the free market option, other than, I mean, because I think our authors make the point which is that the big meta problem above all of this is that there’s a lack of competition in healthcare. If you’ve got radiologists in the community who are doing things you don’t like and billing things in a way that nobody likes, are there enough radiologists so that you could find ones who would not do that, right? That’s what libertarians would tend to argue, that we hope for somebody to defect from badness so that customers are better served, but as our opponents say, \[unclear\]. We’re kind of speculating when we say that.

**Peter Van Doren:** I think it’s a good speculation to get you thinking about how markets work or whatever, but it is a stretch to go from where we are to that thing. And so in the meantime, even our libertarian-leaning authors say Congress has got to do something about this.

**Paul Matzko:** And I think Cato has, at the margin, moved healthcare in a more market-friendly way with our health savings accounts and support for, what’s it called?

**Peter Van Doren:** Direct primary care, non-insurance, concierge medicine. Getting rid of licensure, right? I mean, allowing lower-cost practitioners to compete with higher-cost ones without the state interfering in those practices, yes.

**Paul Matzko:** But as our healthcare colleagues, as Mike Cannon and others would tell you, it’s chipping away at a mountain. I mean, there’s so many malincentives baked in by regulatory fiat that it really is hard to move the ball when the whole system is kind of dysfunctional. Now, I am kind of concerned. So let’s say we’re five years into this system. It’s already starting to break down. What are the potential long-term negative consequences? We’ve set up a series of incentives now. For example, we created a massive new incentive for private equity buying radiologists and other, especially, providers. So could this cause even further concentration in healthcare provision? Does it increase the number of non-network providers? There’s an incentive for folks to just get rid of the network system.

**Peter Van Doren:** If it’s not fixed, the short run is everyone stops being in network because being out of network is so lucrative. And the people who don’t become out of network look like losers that are playing the game in a way that their spouses will say, all our friends are making a gazillion dollars a year and you’re playing a good game, but we got to pay our loans back for med school and blah, blah, blah. So in the short run, the pressure is to defect in a bad way. The question that you’re asking is a more subtle one, which is, if we do this proposed procedure recommended by the authors, are there hidden downsides to that? The hidden downside is hidden. Yeah, and so I mean, I don’t have anything obvious to me that’s wrong with their solution. It will, in other words, some providers will resist, right? Because they’re now making a lot of money. I’m going to say, in Maryland, this isn’t a big deal where we live. It’s much more the thing in the South and the West, where there’s private hospitals and this and that and the other thing. So the question, I mean, you’re asking the right question and I’m kind of at a loss for what’s going to go wrong with this solution.

**Paul Matzko:** What caught my attention about this article was the sense to which we have yet another, and these are, we tend to pick these for the podcast, another example of a submerged regulatory system that relatively few people in the general public are aware of, and it’s creating the kinds of incentives that we can look back in 20 years and wonder at how it fundamentally transformed things. I’m always interested in this, whether it’s like the 401(k), someone discovered this little unintended tax, and it becomes America’s primary retirement system even though it was not intended to be. Exactly. And these little small regulatory tweaks, when they create big enough incentives, you fast forward and, let’s say, we didn’t mean for that to happen. And this feels like it has that kind of potential, that our system of primary employer provision of healthcare, with a government provision of Medicaid and Medicare, has shambled along in its current form more or less since World War II, for 80 years. And this is the kind of thing that could fundamentally break that, potentially. I don’t know for sure, but if no one’s in network.

**Peter Van Doren:** It turns out we need anesthesiologists because surgery without anesthesia is sort of not a good idea, and you need radiologists to read your images. So if these specialties defect from the proposed solution, which is they all go to a convention and they say, none of us, we’re not going to participate, we’re not going to do the median in-network fee that was tried. But I don’t know, that seems, I mean, again, I haven’t interviewed anesthesiologists that I’ve used.

**Paul Matzko:** I’ll add another layer of speculation just for fun, which is, well, we talked about radiology, and one of the interesting things about radiology is it’s where AI medicine has kind of hit first, and a few years ago—

**Peter Van Doren:** Reading images and catching false positives. It’s better than people.

**Paul Matzko:** Yeah, it now outperforms human doctors, and there was a prediction by an LLM founder five years ago where he said you shouldn’t even go to school for radiology, young medical school students, because your job’s going to be replaced. And the exact opposite happened because of AI use in radiology. The demand for radiologists, both the number of them and their compensation, has actually skyrocketed because of the demand.

**Peter Van Doren:** I didn’t know that.

**Paul Matzko:** Yeah, because of induced demand. Before it was really expensive to get a radiology scan, and now it’s far less expensive, so more doctors prescribe them, more people get them. So the absolute volume has skyrocketed, which means that even if it replaced some attributes of a radiologist—

**Peter Van Doren:** Plus, you do this game where, yeah, someone has to check the AI checker, right? In other words, it spits out things that have to be declared to be not false positives before you call the patient and blah, blah, blah. It’s just reduced the set of false positives, which is certainly true for breast cancer. I mean, for lots of imaging, there’s just too much imaging and too many procedures that people go through that aren’t necessary because we now find, quote, things that we didn’t used to know were even there.

**Paul Matzko:** But if you take that same mechanism and apply it to more and more medical specialties, and if that’s the pattern, it could do interesting things to the kind of, again, the fundamental structure of, like, there’s not enough radiologists to go around. So you go to the radiologist that’s near you and you don’t really have any other real options, especially if you live in a kind of healthcare desert. So there’s no competition there, there’s no price pressure then, there’s no transparency pressure. We’re in a mess. But it’s possible in the future where all of this, where AI medicine means a significant increase in the access to provision.

**Peter Van Doren:** Interesting, yeah. I don’t know, I don’t know.

**Paul Matzko:** This is just a layer of speculation, but there’s a big exogenous force coming for medicine as well, and who knows if that’s a greater force than—

**Peter Van Doren:** Oh, but it’s going to end the world in 10 years anyway, so.

**Paul Matzko:** That’s right. Right, according to today’s news. Will Skynet provide for your radiology experience before it kills us all? That’s our show, but I have a special request for you if you’re still listening. We would like to run a mailbag episode to tackle the questions about regulations that you may have. Have you ever wondered why your state or local or federal government has some particular rule and what its often negative effects on your community might be? Well, send us an email at [ucpodcast@​cato.​org](mailto:ucpodcast@cato.org). Again, that’s [ucpodcast@​cato.​org](mailto:ucpodcast@cato.org). Thank you for listening. Please leave a review on your podcast platform of choice, that helps more people find us. Thank you to Sudona Lamar for producing, and until next time, be well.

Unintended Consequences • November 19, 2026 

# Surprise Medical Bills: The Fix That Made Things Worse 

In this podcast episode, Paul and Peter discuss how the law designed to protect patients from surprise medical bills has created unintended consequences, encouraging healthcare providers to leave insurance networks and charge higher prices.

Drawing on the [Regulation article](https://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2026/new-fresh-hell-surprise-medical-bills) “A New Fresh Hell for Surprise Medical Bills” by David Hyman and Benedic Ippolito, they explore how the law’s arbitration system distorted incentives—and what reforms could help fix the problem.

[![Creative Commons License](/build/cato_2020/images/creative-commons.svg)](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) 
This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/). 

##### Featuring 

[![Paul Matzko](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2021-01/Paul%20Matzko.jpg?itok=CSzwMD2U)](/people/paul-matzko) 

##### [Paul Matzko](/people/paul-matzko)

Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute

[![Peter Van Doren](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2021-01/Peter%20Van%20Doren.jpg?itok=H1lphT-7)](/people/peter-van-doren) 

##### [Peter Van Doren](/people/peter-van-doren)

Senior Fellow and Editor of *Regulation*

[ 

](mailto:pvandoren@cato.org)