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#### Transcript 

*This transcript was generated using AI automation and may contain minor formatting or transcription errors. Please refer to the original audio to verify specific quotes or context.*

Cato Weekly Podcast

**Host:** Rikki Schlott 
**Guest:** Thomas Berry, Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute

**Cold open (news clips):** The U.S. Supreme Court begins a new term following a summer-long recess shaped by legal battles over the Trump administration’s policy agenda. Yesterday, the Supreme Court underscored a principle that’s in part of the Constitution of the United States of America from the very beginning. Even the most powerful president in the world cannot rewrite the Constitution to win an argument about economics. The Supreme Court has rejected a Colorado law that bans conversion therapy for minors, citing a breach of the First Amendment. The court is now hearing arguments in a landmark case that could impact the Fourth Amendment. Justices must now weigh the legality of geofence warrants and whether investigators are justified in scanning cell phone data in hopes of finding a suspect or a person of interest.

**Rikki Schlott:** The Supreme Court has wrapped up another term with cases covering everything from presidential powers and tariffs to voting rights, free speech, criminal procedure and limits to the administrative state. Many of the cases this year circled a few central questions. Who gets to make rules? How much power does the executive branch have? And what limits does the Constitution put on that power? I’m Rikki Schlott and this is the Cato Weekly Podcast. Today I’m joined by Thomas Berry, Director of the Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies. He’s also the Editor-in-Chief of the Cato Supreme Court Review, which is currently available on Cato’s website. Welcome, Tommy.

**Thomas Berry:** Thanks for having me.

**Rikki Schlott:** So you helped draft this year’s Cato Supreme Court Review. What stood out to you the most in this term?

**Thomas Berry:** Well, I mean, we had blockbusters for sure. We had conflicts about presidential power, as you said. Overall, I was quite happy with how the term came out. Not every single decision. But I think what’s striking is that it really put to the lie this notion or this conventional wisdom that had started to develop that the court would be too deferential to the Trump administration or that you can just look at which president appointed a justice to determine which way they’re going to vote. And it really wasn’t predictable. You had justices appointed by President Trump voting against him in both birthright citizenship and tariffs. You had interesting mixed ideological alignments. You had an eight-to-one decision in an extremely controversial culture war adjacent free speech case, the Chiles case. So it just showed that it’s very different from a legislature. It’s different from an executive agency. The justices are reaching independent decisions based on legal principles, not policy or ideology.

**Rikki Schlott:** Interesting. And so obviously it seems like the administration features pretty heavily in the caseload from this past term. How uncommon is that in the scheme of history? And is that just a feature of Trump’s personality and leadership style?

**Thomas Berry:** Unfortunately, it’s becoming increasingly common, especially in the 21st century. We’ve reached a point now where Congress is passing fewer and fewer laws, fewer and fewer specific statutes. Presidents are trying to do more unilaterally, either based on claims of core inherent presidential powers or sometimes implausible claims that a really old statute gave them a power no one had discovered anymore. The more often presidents try to do that, the more conflicts will go to the courts. We saw it certainly under Obama. He said, I have a pen and a phone. I don’t have to go to Congress.

**Barack Obama (archival clip):** We are not just going to be waiting for legislation in order to make sure that we’re providing Americans the kind of help that they need. I’ve got a pen and I’ve got a phone.

**Thomas Berry:** We saw it a lot under Biden when it came to COVID reactions, things like the nationwide eviction moratorium, the student loan forgiveness.

**News clip:** In December, we’ll see the expiration of many protections for U.S. citizens from the pandemic. We’re talking eviction moratoriums, unemployment benefits, and student loan deferments, just to name a few.

**Thomas Berry:** And we’re seeing it, I think, even more under Trump, who came in thinking he was going to be FDR, trying to do more in his first hundred days than we’ve seen in nearly a century.

**Rikki Schlott:** And one sort of common conception that I hear is that the administration’s just sort of deciding to do things unilaterally and then let the courts figure it out later. How true is that? And how much do you think that assumption is baked into the way that they make laws or pass policy?

**Thomas Berry:** And unfortunately, it’s becoming increasingly true. I think the administration knew hardly any of its policy priorities would be able to get through Congress. Despite Republican majorities, the 60-vote threshold in the Senate meant that any really controversial bill would not be able to be passed. Trump has certainly proposed tariff bills, but none of them were passed, just like Biden proposed a student loan forgiveness bill that was unable to pass through the 60-vote threshold. Conventional wisdom, you might assume that if a president’s party controls both houses of Congress, the Senate, and the House, that they would likely pass bills that he would agree with and that he’d be able to get his policies enacted via statutes that way. But in practice, the Senate has the filibuster, which means that you don’t even have a vote on a proposed piece of legislation. You don’t end debate until by Senate rules, 60, not 51, but 60 members of the Senate vote to end a debate. So in practice, even though the normal rules of any legislature are that a bill passes if you get a majority, you don’t get to that vote unless you have 60, a super majority out of 100. Rarely does a president have 60 senators of the same party. The last time we saw that was at the very beginning of the Obama administration in 2009 and 2010, when lots of pieces of very major legislation were indeed passed. Ever since then, we’ve had fewer than 60 of each party, and so it’s become much more difficult for presidents to get legislation. So because of that, presidents are increasingly focusing on their efforts on executive orders and knowing right away that they’re going to be challenged. And it was very clear even before Inauguration Day that Trump and his lawyers had thought about how are they going to phrase these executive orders and how are they going to try to defend them in the courts.

**Rikki Schlott:** So I want to circle back to something you said in the beginning about whether or not the court is deferential to the president. And I think that that’s a pretty common view of a lot of people that in the Trump administration, he assumes that the Supreme Court’s in his back pocket. How true is that, or why do you think that’s not as much the case as maybe the typical person might believe?

**Thomas Berry:** The conventional wisdom started to develop really in calendar year 2025, the first year of this Trump administration, when most of the cases reaching the Supreme Court were on what’s called the emergency docket, sometimes called the shadow docket. The difference there is that it’s a much shorter timeline. So they’re not holding oral argument. They’re not having the months and months of briefing. They’re deciding things quickly within a week. And they’re deciding at a preliminary stage. So they’re not usually deciding the merits. Is this constitutional or is it not? They’re just deciding what’s the status quo going to be while this litigation plays out. And the Trump administration was indeed winning. The vast majority of the cases decided on that shadow docket, on that emergency docket.

**Rikki Schlott:** And what makes the case particularly go to that docket?

**Thomas Berry:** Well, anyone can ask them to act on an emergency basis. It’s up to the Supreme Court to decide whether to do anything, whether to reverse the lower court. And there is a legitimate criticism that the court has become increasingly more open to those requests from the federal government. Anytime a federal action is paused by a lower court, the Supreme Court is likely to review it on an emergency basis and decide preliminarily based on our gut, based on first impressions, do we think the lower court was right or wrong? If they think the lower court was right or wrong, they might reverse that status quo, allow the administrative action to continue at least until it continues to be litigated. But most of the decisions where the Trump administration won were kind of on technicalities, like which court did you file in? Is it moot yet? Did the right person sue or not? We didn’t get those core constitutional or statutory disputes until 2026.

**Rikki Schlott:** And so how has Trump reacted to some of the decisions that have come out against his favor?

**News clip:** The Supreme Court struck down most of President Trump’s global tariffs today in a six to three decision that is a major blow to his economic agenda.

**Donald Trump (archival clip):** The Supreme Court’s ruling on tariffs is deeply disappointing and I’m ashamed of certain members of the court, absolutely ashamed for not having the courage to do what’s right for our country.

**Thomas Berry:** Well, as is often the case for Trump, he’s much more willing to be in your face and criticize jurists to their name than any previous president, which I do not think is a good precedent to be setting. But nonetheless, that’s why we have life tenure and salary protection for judges and justices. It means as much as Trump can rail against his three appointees, Gorsuch, Barrett, Kavanaugh, as much as he can say, I made a mistake, I regret appointing him, there’s nothing he can do. In fact, he was sitting in the front row in the birthright citizenship case. I attended oral arguments there and I saw him glowering, but it doesn’t make a difference. He’s not arguing, government officials show up to those things all the time, but they can’t intimidate the justices because they have life tenure and that’s the beauty of the system.

**Rikki Schlott:** So you genuinely think that that is effective and there’s no sort of subversive influence that he has by being so angry in response.

**Thomas Berry:** I don’t and I think we saw the benefits of that with these decisions. The judiciary was able to rule against the executive branch in several of these cases without any retribution other than harsh words and mean tweets. And that’s, I think every judge takes an oath to be unbiased knowing that they have this really unique protection, that they’re the only members of the federal government who have life tenure.

**Rikki Schlott:** So I want to hone in on one specific case here, which is Trump v. Slaughter. And I want you to tell me what are the basics, what was at stake and what was the outcome?

**Thomas Berry:** Sure, so this goes to the constitutionality of what are called independent agencies, which are a pretty novel invention. They really only became common in the New Deal era as is the case of so much of the federal government that exploded in power, the administrative state, the alphabet soup of agencies that we all know and love. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC, the National Labor Relations Board, the NLRB, the Federal Communications Commission, the FCC, most of them were not invented until the New Deal era. And the idea, the justification for these new agencies was that they should be technocratic, not political. Typically they have five members and what’s unique about them is unlike the cabinet, the famous members that we all know, Secretary of Defense, Treasury, State, unlike the cabinet, they can’t be fired at will by the president. That’s very unusual for the executive branch. The notion is you elect a president, the president appoints all the cabinet members he wants and some people below the cabinet level. And then if they aren’t aligned with this policy, he fires them. Not true for these independent agencies with five members. The idea for those is that they would have terms longer than a president’s term, five years, seven years, something like that. And when a new president came into office, he could not fire the ones who were already sticking around. So you would usually have two or three, usually two appointed by the prior president. So you’d get two Democratic appointees under Trump or two Republican appointees under Biden. And the problem there is you have people who seem to be exercising executive power, who are doing a lot of the same stuff that the cabinet agencies are doing, but they’re not directly accountable to the president. If they do something and it’s unpopular, the president can say, my hands are tied, I’m legally unable to fire them. So the question in Trump v. Slaughter was, is that kind of scheme constitutional or does it violate the core concept that all of the executive power is vested in the president and he has to be able to supervise the entire executive branch.

**Rikki Schlott:** And so what was the outcome of that case?

**Thomas Berry:** The outcome is that the Supreme Court agreed with Trump that he does indeed have the core executive power and authority to fire all the members of these independent agencies at will. So now if he doesn’t like a particular person on the SEC, or in this case, the Federal Trade Commission, the FTC, he can simply say you’re fired. He doesn’t have to say you are sleeping on the job or you are embezzling funds or any of those types of things. He can simply say I’m going to fire you for policy disagreements. Now the upside of that for democratic accountability is you can now blame Trump or any future president for something that that agency does. Take the FCC, for example, when they go and try to punish Jimmy Kimmel, Trump can no longer say, my hands are tied, I can’t fire the chairman, Brendan Carr. Now he can fire him.

**Rikki Schlott:** What about the downsides of that? I mean, I think I could probably come up with a few. What are the sort of concerns around that decision?

**Thomas Berry:** Well, from a libertarian point of view, the biggest concern is just the amount of power wielded by these agencies. So it’s probably true, and Justice Gorsuch noted this in his concurrence in the case, that Congress would not have invented these agencies in the first place had it known that eventually they would no longer become independent. So now you have agencies with a lot of discretion. The FCC can make life really painful for any given broadcaster. The FTC can make life really painful for two companies that want to merge with each other. You have a lot of discretion now under the direct control of one person, one president. In my view, though, the problem isn’t the unitary executive, so-called. The problem isn’t that the lack of independence. The problem is that they have too much power. So Congress should go back to the drawing board and say, okay, now that these are just agencies like any other cabinet department, are we still comfortable with how much discretion they have? If not, let’s rein it in and bring some of that power back to Congress.

**Rikki Schlott:** Sure. And so I want to move now to tariffs, which have obviously been one of the major questions of the second Trump term. And before I ask you how the Supreme Court has actually addressed that issue, I want to understand a little bit how Trump has gone about enacting this policy without Congress.

**Donald Trump (archival clips):** In a few moments, I will sign a historic executive order instituting reciprocal tariffs on countries throughout the world. Reciprocal. That means they do it to us, and we do it to them. Very simple. Can’t get any simpler than that. I imposed a 50 percent tariff on foreign copper, and as a result, Arizona’s historic copper corridor is roaring back to health. I used these tariffs, took in hundreds of billions of dollars to make great deals for our country, both economically and on a national security basis.

**Rikki Schlott:** I know that many at Cato believe that this should be under the jurisdiction of Congress and not the president, but how has Trump tried to circumvent that?

**Thomas Berry:** Absolutely. So this is an example where Trump is looking for old, vague statutes and trying to find new powers hiding within them that no one ever found before. The Constitution is absolutely clear. You need statutory authority to enact a tariff. Article 1 of the Constitution says which powers are granted to Congress, specifically Article 1, Section 8. One of those powers is that Congress may lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. In other words, tariffs, among other things. There is no dispute that you need some statute. The question is how old and how vague can it be? What Trump has done is one after another, his lawyers have gone and found old statutes and tried to find new powers in them. In this particular case, it was a statute called IEEPA, I‑E-E-P‑A, and that gave the president the power to, among other things, regulate importation, but no one had ever used it to impose tariffs before. So the question was, if Congress gives you a power in some circumstances to regulate importation, is that a tariff power?

**Rikki Schlott:** Okay, so tell me what the court did in response to this question and what the implications are.

**Thomas Berry:** So the court held 6–3 that IEEPA does not grant the authority to enact tariffs. There were some differences in approaches between the different justices in the majority. The three more conservative Republican appointed justices applied a doctrine that’s become increasingly important called the major questions doctrine. This came up a lot in Biden era decisions as well, striking down student loan forgiveness, for example. And this is essentially a judicial doctrine created for this exact problem, which is that presidents have, with increasing frequency, gone hunting for old statutes that might have texts that on the surface looks really, really broad, but common sense suggests that Congress never intended for it to be used so broadly. And the idea behind this, it’s sometimes called a canon of interpretation, C‑A-N-O‑N, the idea behind this canon or this doctrine is that for a judge to interpret the intent of Congress in good faith, they have to consider that context and consider how controversial or not controversial was this, how much power would this be giving to the president? Was anyone thinking about this type of power or not? And all of that evidence pointed to IEEPA not being a tariff statute because when Congress does grant the president to impose tariffs, it does so with way more guidelines and guardrails, which are not present in IEEPA.

**Rikki Schlott:** And so I know the court also took up some issues of constitutional rights, including speech and criminal procedure. How did they deal with these issues and what were the outcomes there?

**Thomas Berry:** Well, I was struck particularly in the Chiles v. Salazar case. I was struck positively that the court did not focus on the culture war aspect of this and really focused on first principles of the First Amendment.

**Rikki Schlott:** So can you give us the background of why that case came to the court in the first place?

**Thomas Berry:** Sure. So Colorado passed a law that essentially attempted to ban so-called conversion therapy, which is a controversial term and a controversial practice. Conversion therapy can run the gamut from physical electroshock therapy in the worst examples to simply talking to a psychologist. And in general, it might be, for example, to take someone who’s gay and try to convert them to being straight or take someone who’s transgender and try to convert them to being cisgender. Very controversial. A lot of people think it’s pseudoscience or it’s abusive. So Colorado banned it across the board. The issue was the statute was written so broadly that it applied even to nothing but just talking. So if you go to a therapist and you say, I’m feeling same-sex attraction and I don’t want to, can you talk to me about how I might be able to change this? The therapist might talk you through it and might agree and might try to give you what you want purely through talking. In that situation, the law would say, you’re running afoul of it. That’s a violation. You’re committing a crime. The question was, does that aspect of the prohibition violate the First Amendment when the only thing that’s happening is a conversation? Even though a lot of people might think that conversation is misguided, that doesn’t really matter. In general, the government is not allowed to pass a law that looks at a particular goal or a particular viewpoint or even just a particular subject matter and says, that’s off limits. You’re not allowed to talk about it. And that’s how it got to the Supreme Court. And by eight to one vote, only Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was in dissent. The Supreme Court said, yeah, this violates the First Amendment because you took a viewpoint you don’t like, a viewpoint to change someone’s sexual attraction or transgender status. You took that viewpoint and you say, you’re banned from supporting it. You’re banned from discussing it. And as the majority noted, a state on the other side, a conservative state, could just as easily have passed a law in the reverse. And that’s why the principle is more important than the particular application.

**Rikki Schlott:** Interesting. And so what other actual day-to-day impacts might that ruling have aside from the literal issue of conversion therapy?

**Thomas Berry:** It could have big impacts, especially on so-called professional speech, people who talk for a living, not just therapists, but dieticians, even interior decorators, people who give you advice. There are people who blog about pet health care, even potentially lawyers. There’s ongoing litigation about to what extent can a state ban college-educated volunteers from giving super basic legal advice on the theory that they’re not licensed and therefore it’s a crime. It’s the unauthorized practice of law. In all of these situations, the court has stressed it doesn’t matter that it’s so-called professional speech. Doesn’t matter that they’re doing it for money. Doesn’t matter that it’s their job. It’s still speech. And the First Amendment is still relevant. So states now have a high bar to justify any law that either bans or puts some hurdle like you need a license before you can do a job that’s just speech. And that’s a good thing because a lot of these laws are essentially getting in the way of people simply wanting to give advice.

**Rikki Schlott:** Sure. And what about the issue of criminal procedure? How did that come up in the court this term?

**Thomas Berry:** Well, one of the biggest cases was about the Fourth Amendment and searches and seizures specifically in the tech context called Chatrie. The Supreme Court with increasing frequency has been dealing with the problem of searches and seizures when the police either try to find a criminal or simply pull someone over or stop someone on the street. They want to look through your phone. They want to look through what’s on your person. All of those searches and seizures come under the jurisdiction or imply the Fourth Amendment which is the constitutional amendment that bans unreasonable searches and seizures. Not a lot to go on from that word unreasonable. So judges have a lot of leeway to figure out what’s reasonable and what’s unreasonable especially now in the technology age. And the Supreme Court has been increasingly changing or shifting its doctrine to take account of that fact that new technology means new concerns about the extent to which the government can find out everything about your life by searching your technology. For example, before we had smartphones there was a doctrine that said when the police stop you temporarily or arrest you they can look through your wallet without it getting a warrant. Maybe that made sense at the time but then they started looking through your smartphone without a warrant and then the courts realized, hey, wait a minute there’s about a billion times more info in my smartphone that there is in my wallet. Does it still make sense to allow searches without a warrant? And the Supreme Court said, no it doesn’t still make sense. And in general they’ve been trending I think in the right direction of having a higher bar on searches without a warrant when the issue is technology because of how much information is implicated. A couple of years ago the Supreme Court said that when you use a cell phone tower data to figure out where someone was basically GPS style based on where their cell phone said they were that’s most likely a search and that you have to in general get a warrant for it or have a strong justification why you didn’t. And then this term in a case called Chatrie they went further for location data. This is the kind of thing that we often give tech companies without totally realizing we’re doing it. If you have Google Maps on your phone you click a little permission and you’re like, yeah, yeah, whatever take all my data.

**Rikki Schlott:** Yeah, my favorite thing is like how Apple Maps is now like you’ve recently visited this place when I looked it up and I’m like, oh glad you know that.

**Thomas Berry:** People don’t realize how much data they’re handing over and usually the button will say it won’t work unless you give us this permission. So at this point it’s become so good that it’s not just they know what block you’re on they know what building you’re on and they know what floor of the building you’re on and they know what room you’re in in the building. Imagine the government having that data. They know are you visiting the dentist’s office or the doctor’s office or the bank within the skyscraper. So what they increasingly did was there’s a bank robbery in this case they had no leads they went to Google and they said show us everyone who had location search on who was within three blocks of this within this two hour span and they gradually narrow it down until they figure out who was most likely did it based on their location history. Question is, is that a search? Now under the pre-cell phone era the Supreme Court had said when you give your voluntary information to another business in general you’ve given up any reasonable expectation of privacy in that data but here the Supreme Court said maybe that made sense in the old rotary phone days doesn’t make a lot of sense here where this is literally an accounting of where you are every minute of your life and so we’re going to treat this as a search which I think was the right decision.

**Rikki Schlott:** Interesting and I mean obviously we can’t even anticipate what sort of technologies might be used to track us or perform those searches and seizures in the future. So how does that decision potentially guide future lines of where we decide that this is too unreasonable this isn’t at all is there anything that might be kind of a guidepost going forward with new technology?

**Thomas Berry:** Every piece of new technology is different it seems like there’s no real clear standard other than the court tries to generally reach an equilibrium or Professor Orin Kerr is called it equilibrium adjustment of about the same amount of privacy that we had in the pre-technology era which seems right to me. There is an alternate approach that we argued for in our friend of the court brief our amicus brief that Justice Gorsuch actually quoted his concurrence that just focuses on data as property and to me that would be a lot more simple and straightforward to simply say that any piece of data that another company is holding for you still remains your property at least under the terms of service that almost all of them offer and so just like looking through your bank accounts or a savings deposit box or anything else you can just ask was this your property? Yes you don’t have to go into a balancing test or a reasonable expectation of privacy. Unfortunately the majority is more of a balancing test and that means it’s less predictable but the principle as best as I understand it from this is simply the more data you’re giving over and the more it seems like you can’t get through daily life without giving over that data the more likely it is that the court is going to be sympathetic to people whose data is turned over to the government.

**Rikki Schlott:** And so now I just want to finish off by directing us towards the future. I’m curious in this upcoming term what do you expect to come down the pipeline for the Supreme Court and are there any cases or issues that you’re most interested in seeing them address?

**Thomas Berry:** Yeah so one recurring theme in the last couple of years has been the Seventh Amendment civil jury right. So everybody knows not everybody but a lot of people know about the criminal jury right very important to us here at the Cato Institute but equally important is what if the government sues you? They can’t throw you in jail when they sue you but they can take millions of dollars from you and often they can take away your license to practice your business and we were talking about the administrative state earlier with these independent agencies with increasing frequency they would sue people for alleged violations and adjudicate did you violate it or not in an administrative law judge with no jury. In a case called Jarkesy from two years ago the Supreme Court said that violates the Seventh Amendment civil jury right. That’s a claim at common law when you get sued for alleged fraud and when the government tries to fine you to punish you. I very much agreed with that decision we filed an amicus brief but there’s a lot of unanswered questions left about the Seventh Amendment. Where do you draw the line between core common law cases punitive cases that fall in that heartland of the Seventh Amendment versus more unique exceptions that traditionally were decided by the executive branch alone and one of those fuzzy lines is immigration. So there’s a case this year called Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards where we filed an amicus brief where to have workers to have immigrant visas work on your farm. You have to agree that you’re going to have certain safety standards. A farm allegedly fell short of those standards and was sued by the Department of Labor and the question is were they entitled to a jury. This is kind of a conflict between two competing doctrines. There’s a long history of no jury when the government asserts you violated immigration law at the border when they say you’re not entitled to come in we’re going to kick you out at the border no jury needed but this was a violation within the United States and it’s not about were you allowed did these people cross the border illegally it’s about was your farm too dangerous which sounds a lot like a typical common law claim. So our amicus brief said wants to draw a bright line rule if the alleged violation occurred within the United States not at the border the Seventh Amendment does apply and you get a jury right. That’s one important case. Another one that’s pretty fun facts or not fun for the person involved but easy to understand is a case called Jouppi coming out of Alaska where a small pilot who would take people on rides throughout the small towns of Alaska took a woman on a ride it turned out she had a six pack of beer in her groceries and he took her to a city that banned alcohol entirely so violated the law and under the rules at the time when he was found guilty of this violation he was punished not only with a fine but with the loss of his small plane which I think was worth something like 90,000 dollars for one six pack of beer. Now one of the constitution says you cannot impose excessive fines. What does excessive mean? It’s a fuzzy standard overall but there’s a particular unanswered question here. Excessive in terms of the crime in the abstract or excessive in terms of the crime of what this particular guy did. So the crime he violated it’s the same crime whether it’s one six pack or whether you’re rum running for 10 years and you’re taking gallons and gallons of whiskey into the city. So if you’re asking what could he have done to violate the law maybe a 90,000 fine doesn’t seem excessive but if you say what did he do and the only thing that was proven was one six pack then it definitely seems excessive. So that’s what the Supreme Court is going to decide when you’re calculating excessiveness is it the crime in the abstract or the crime this particular person actually committed?

**Rikki Schlott:** And I want to zoom out one last time before I let you off the hook here and ask you just generally as you look forward to the next couple years or even the next decade what constitutional questions do you think are going to be most central to the cases that the Supreme Court sees and are you optimistic that they will come out on the side of liberty ultimately?

**Thomas Berry:** The Supreme Court has been holding the line overall quite well on reining in executive power as we’ve talked about in these cases like the tariffs one. I think the trickiest ones and the ones where the government has the most success is when they claim executive national security privileges when they try to throw in that element and they tried to do this in the tariffs unsuccessfully but they have also done this in other cases successfully especially when it comes to immigration. The problem is if the administration starts to see this as a get out of jail free card they’ll throw it into every case. There’s litigation in the DC circuit about Anthropic where they’re claiming that an AI company is a national security threat. When litigation occurred over the supposed arch that they’re trying to build they said oh we’re going to put snipers on the top so now it’s a national security issue. When they tried to ban TikTok and a lawsuit claimed that that was a first amendment violation they said no it’s a national security concern. We’re concerned about hackers. So yes the executive branch historically has gotten more deference when the issue is national security. That’s understandable. That’s part of the core powers of the presidency and the executive branch is to deal with foreign affairs but courts can’t just be naive and can’t just accept those arguments that face value if the administration is going to make them in every single case. So I think the supreme court and lower courts need to start developing stricter standards and perhaps be a little less naive or a little less accepting and face value and not just assume that every time the administration claims national security that that’s actually what’s going on. They’re pretty good in some contexts like the first amendment for example of sniffing out pretext which is where you say you’re doing it for one reason but it looks an awful lot like you’re doing it a different reason like you don’t like someone’s speech. They kind of have to do the same thing for other executive power as well. Even if the executive branch says we’re doing this because we’re worried about an attack are you actually doing this because you have some domestic policy concern and you’re looking for any way to justify it.

**Rikki Schlott:** Thank you Tommy and thank you all for listening to the Cato Weekly Podcast. If you enjoyed today’s discussion please subscribe and leave a review wherever you get your podcasts. To read the full Cato Supreme Court review including an analysis of the 2025 to 2026 term and a look ahead at the October 2026 term visit Cato​.org. The Cato Weekly Podcast is a production of the Cato Institute dedicated to advancing individual liberty limited governments free markets and peace. Join us next time for more insights and conversations on the issues shaping our world.

Cato Weekly Podcast • November 10, 2026 

# Is the Supreme Court Holding Trump Accountable? 

From Trump’s tariff powers to police access to cellphone location data, the Supreme Court’s latest term tackled major questions about the limits of government power and the protection of individual rights.

Rikki Schlott sits down with Thomas Berry, director of Cato’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, to break down the term’s biggest cases. They discuss executive power, independent agencies, free speech, government surveillance, and the constitutional battles still ahead.

Cato Supreme Court Review: [https://www.cato.org/supreme-court-review/2025–2026](https://www.cato.org/supreme-court-review/2025-2026)

Producer: Barbara Galletti 
Post Production: Sedona LaMarre 
Audio Engineer: Cecil Sherman 
Director of Photography: Darren Walker 
Assistant Producer: Shaneen Gevorgiz 
Motion Graphics: Jonathan Fields 
Original Music: Cecil Sherman 
Executive Producer: Kristina Kendall

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##### Featuring 

[![Thomas Berry](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2026-02/2025-10-16-Thomas%20Berry-sq_0.jpg?itok=SW7WagUw)](/people/thomas-berry) 

##### [Thomas A. Berry](/people/thomas-berry)

Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute

[ 

](https://x.com/Thomas_A_Berry) [ 

](mailto:tberry@cato.org) 

[![Rikki Schlott cropped](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2026-03/rikki-schlott%20Cropped.jpg?itok=Le-Wt6aA)](/people/rikki-schlott) 

##### [Rikki Schlott](/people/rikki-schlott)

Media Fellow

[ 

](https://twitter.com/RIKKISCHLOTT)