# Who Can Lead a Divided South Korea? 

Early elections will decide the country’s future relationship with Washington.

May 6, 2025 • Commentary 

By [Doug Bandow](https://www.cato.org/people/doug-bandow) 

This article appeared in [*Foreign Policy*](https://foreignpolicy.com/) on May 6, 2025.

It took longer than expected, but South Korea’s Constitutional Court finally pushed the flaming wreckage of Yoon Suk-yeol’s presidency overboard. His illegal declaration of martial law in December, [apparently intended to be far more brutal](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/14/yoon-suk-yeol-impeachment-martial-law-south-korea-right-wing/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921) than it turned out, revived [terrible memories](https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/korea-s-dark-history-of-martial-law) of the past and directly led to his ouster.

The election of his successor is set for [June 3](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/timeline-what-to-expect-as-south-korea-prepares-for-june-3-snap-election/), almost two years early. The liberal opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is expected to triumph, led by former party leader Lee Jae-myung, a [controversial figure](https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/South-Korea-election/South-Korea-presidential-aspirants-jostle-ahead-of-June-3-vote) who was [nearly assassinated](https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/lee-jae-myung-head-of-south-korean-opposition-party-is-stabbed-f9ac661f?mod=article_inline) last year.

However, no one expected Yoon’s self-immolation. Another political surprise is possible—and the consequences for the Korean Peninsula could be significant.

The decision has set the stage for another run by Lee, who narrowly lost to Yoon three years ago. Polls favor the opposition, and Lee [won](https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1194702.html) an overwhelming primary victory in late April. However, he faces several [legal charges](https://koreapro.org/2025/03/acquitted-but-not-cleared-lee-jae-myung-still-faces-legal-jeopardy-in-2025/) that [could preclude](https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10452049) his candidacy. In March, the Seoul High Court overturned his sole conviction, reinstating his eligibility to run, but the Supreme Court [overturned](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250501000453315?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_content=20250501&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyNewsBrief2025May1&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief) that verdict on May 1, returning it for the lower court’s reconsideration. He has vowed to remain in the race, but the unresolved cases could [complicate](https://koreapro.org/2025/03/acquitted-but-not-cleared-lee-jae-myung-still-faces-legal-jeopardy-in-2025/) his presidency if he is elected.

Early elections will decide the country’s future relationship with Washington.

The outcome of the leadership contest within the ruling People Power Party (PPP) is less predictable. The country’s acting president for the past few months—Han Duck-soo, seen by many as a [stabilizing figure](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/acting-president-emerges-as-top-conservative-as-ppp-scrambles-to-avoid-collapse/)—has resigned and [announced](https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/han-duck-soo-launches-presidential-bid-vowing-tough-but-open-north-korea-policy/?login=recaptcha&popup=signin) his candidacy. A disillusioned former PPP legislator, Yoo Seong-min, also [announced](https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10464948) an independent run.

As in 2017, after the similar ouster of conservative President Park Geun-hye, the ruling party remains divided. Members only [agree on preventing](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-15/opinion/editorials/Opposing-Lee-Jaemyung-alone-wont-win-the-presidency/2284762) Lee’s election. On Saturday, the PPP narrowly chose Kim Moon-soo, a former cabinet minister who opposed Yoon’s ouster, over Han Dong-hoon, a former party leader who supported Yoon’s impeachment, as its candidate. But Kim then [announced](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250506004151315?section=national/politics) on May 6 that he was suspending his campaign for now—saying that the party was too divided—and instead looking to form a unity ticket with Han Duck-soo.

Although Lee has a [growing edge](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/beyond-party-lines-voter-blocs-crumble-as-south-korea-faces-presidential-vote/) in public polling, in the 2022 contest, the lead flipped back and forth and ended with a photo finish.

Moreover, the result is likely to trigger new rounds of bitter political combat. Yoon’s trial for insurrection charges began on [April 14](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250414002752315). If Lee wins, he will face demands to punish the newly minted opposition. DPK Secretary-General Kim Yun-duk has [insisted](https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/04/07/UJYWRUGOV5AXFB2TECX4MHNRCI/) that the PPP should expel Yoon and discipline lawmakers who supported the former president. Other partisans even advocate breaking up the PPP.

However, radical Yoon enthusiasts, such as [Pastor Jeon Gwang-hoon](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/a-nation-holds-its-breath-photo-report-from-yoon-suk-yeols-final-day-in-office/), continue to [blame](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/south-koreas-ruling-party-outlines-seven-point-vision-to-reclaim-moderates/) left-wing conspiracies for Yoon’s fall and [urge](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-06/national/socialAffairs/Rallies-celebrate-denounce-Yoons-impeachment-in-downtown-Seoul/2278812) political resistance to “save our liberal democracy.” If the PPP wins, then Yoon, who has [remained politically active](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-06/national/politics/Yoons-public-messages-spark-PPP-concern-that-ousted-president-still-playing-politics-/2278798), [might reemerge](https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1191155.html) publicly. He [was greeted](https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/04/13/SFNOR5ATFFGR7BPLEYKJYEQXOQ/) by thousands of followers when he moved from the presidential residence to his personal home. However, the DPK would continue to maintain a stranglehold on the National Assembly, though without the two-third majority necessary to override presidential vetoes.

Whatever the result, there will be pressure for constitutional reform, particularly to reduce presidential power. An editorial in the *Korea JoongAng Daily* [contended](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-08/opinion/editorials/Constitutional-reform-is-the-true-end-to-the-rebellion/2279431) “blame for the current dysfunction does not rest solely with one man” or party. DPK National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik [is pushing](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-08/opinion/editorials/Constitutional-reform-is-the-true-end-to-the-rebellion/2279431) for a constitutional referendum, arguing in April that “\[a\]dvancing democracy is important, but preventing its destruction is more urgent.” Lee has reportedly [indicated support](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-07/opinion/editorials/A-timely-push-for-constitutional-reform/2278799) for strengthening the premier post but opposed doing so alongside the upcoming election. Hong Joon-pyo, who ran in the PPP primary but ultimately lost and announced his retirement, also [called](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-14/national/politics/Daegu-Mayor-Hong-declares-presidential-candidacy-predicts-showdown-with-DPs-Lee/2284749) for constitutional reform, though it would likely differ substantially from a DPK program.

Left and right disagree significantly on domestic issues. The PPP long promoted more conservative economic and social policies. In early April, the party released a program [drafted](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/south-koreas-ruling-party-outlines-seven-point-vision-to-reclaim-moderates/) to recapture the political center. Yet Lee also has sought to moderate his image. He asserted that in comparison to the previous race, “I feel a lot more responsibility,” and [declared](https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-korea-lee-jae-myung-impeachment-leader-58f34272) that he is “a realist” and [even](https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/lee-jae-myung-makes-no-mention-of-north-korea-as-he-launches-presidential-bid/) a “centrist conservative.” In launching his campaign, Lee [focused](https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10463221) on economics: “Everywhere you look in the country, so many are suffering financially.”

However, no matter how bitter, such battles are irrelevant to Washington. Indeed, many U.S. analysts showed [little concern](https://www.blueroofpolitics.com/post/tbr-weekly-update-week-1-april-2025/) with Yoon’s [authoritarian tendencies](https://koreapro.org/2024/12/yoons-martial-law-crisis-exposes-beltway-think-tank-blind-spots/), and [some repeated](https://www.foxnews.com/world/south-korea-presidential-ouster-part-chinese-strategy-expand-regional-influence-expert-says) his fevered claims of Chinese and North Korean subversion. Most American policymakers focus on foreign policy and generally favor South Korea’s conservatives. Yoon was a favorite of the Biden administration, the relationship highlighted by his 2023 state visit and [karaoke rendition](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-E6Bk-JHvo&t=2s) of “American Pie.”

Even today, U.S. analysts [express concern](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qR9SUzA5gqo) about the DPK’s and Lee’s leftward international tilt. However, both Korean parties seek good relations with the United States. The left has long challenged the United States’ military presence and support for the country’s martial rulers, but liberal presidents—Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in—have consistently backed the alliance.

The toughest issue facing Seoul and Washington is likely to be the future of the relationship and host nation support. U.S. President Donald Trump made his [first call](https://koreapro.org/2025/04/han-and-trump-discuss-trade-and-defense-in-first-call-since-trumps-re-election/?popup=signin&login=recaptcha) to the acting South Korean leader, Han, in early April—more than two months into Trump’s term. They apparently talked about a variety of economic and trade issues, as well as Seoul’s host nation support.

Although Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth [affirmed](https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4049075/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseths-call-with-republic-of-korea-actin/) U.S. support for the alliance in the days after his confirmation, Trump previously raised the possibility of withdrawing the U.S. garrison and advocated hiking South Korean payments to $10 billion annually, a nearly eightfold increase. He has long doubted the necessity of continued military support for South Korea, which is [vastly stronger than North Korea](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/12/us-south-korea-military-spending-sma/). Moreover, Trump has targeted Seoul with higher tariffs, which he views as justified by South Korean free riding on defense.

Whoever is elected will resist paying more, but Trump is likely to be more insistent in his second term. He might be even more inclined to downgrade defense ties if he reestablishes relations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Such a course could fuel popular support for a South Korean nuclear weapon, [something that Yoon once suggested](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/04/south-korea-yoon-impeachment-constitutional-court-ruling/). Progressives have typically opposed the idea, but some DPK members are [now debating](https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20250221/131075313/2) the issue, and the party is reportedly considering backing plans for peaceful nuclear reprocessing, seen by some as a form of nuclear hedging. Although Washington has traditionally opposed such a course, Trump spoke favorably of such a possibility.

The two Korean parties differ more markedly in their view of South Korea’s place in the world. Moon, the DPK president who served from 2017 to 2022, was committed to improving relations with North Korea alongside with Trump. Moon also sought to maintain friendly ties with China—despite Beijing’s fierce opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile systems in South Korea, which took place partially during his administration—while presiding over an almost total breakdown in relations with Japan.

Yoon made a policy 180 in all three areas. He took a much [tougher stance](https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/what-yoon-suk-yeols-removal-means-for-south-koreas-relationship-with-the-north/) toward North Korea, including by criticizing Pyongyang’s human rights abuses. Indeed, Yoon made regime change a de facto South Korean objective. He also made little effort to warm relations with Beijing, though he avoided criticizing its human rights record. Most important, he ignored South Korean public opinion and warmed ties with Japan, earning almost universal approbation in Washington.

If Kim wins, then he is likely to maintain these policies. However, if Lee is elected, he would almost certainly change South Korea’s diplomatic relations with its neighbors, potentially significantly. In so doing, the liberal Lee might end up closer to Trump than Biden. In February, Lee even [praised](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/yoon-lee-jae-myung-korea/) Trump, saying that he “would do anything to defend America’s own interests. … It’s something we should learn from.” Whether sincere or not, the remarks will likely win Trump’s approval.

Lee, like others on the left, would be likely to seek an opening with Pyongyang. However, his attitude toward seems more pragmatic than that of Moon. In April, the former [said](https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/lee-jae-myung-makes-no-mention-of-north-korea-as-he-launches-presidential-bid/) that “\[n\]o ideology or belief can stop the changes of the times. A proactive and forward-looking pragmatism that stands on reality … will determine the future.” In announcing his candidacy, he did not even explicitly mention North Korea, in contrast to his two prior runs.

A few months earlier, Lee [commented](https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/south-koreas-opposition-leader-calls-for-renewed-dialogue-with-north-korea/) that the “breakdown of inter-Korean relations due to a rigid North Korea policy, along with Pyongyang’s deepening alignment with Moscow, has heightened military tensions, further undermining prospects for peace as diplomatic channels erode.”

He sounded like a hawkish dove: “Now more than ever, we must maintain a firm military readiness posture and strengthen our capacity to respond to North Korea’s nuclear threats,” he added. “At the same time, we must keep communication channels open and pursue dialogue efforts in parallel.” During his previous campaign, he [backed](https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-south-koreas-nuclear-ambitions-subside-next-five-years) weapons programs as well as South Korea taking over operational control of its military from the United States.

Moreover, Pyongyang has given no indication that it is inclined to engage a Lee government. Nevertheless, if Trump makes another go at Kim Jong Un, Lee’s comments in February indicate that he [hopes](https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/south-koreas-opposition-leader-calls-for-renewed-dialogue-with-north-korea/) to sync with Washington: “As President Trump signals his willingness to engage in U.S.-North Korea talks, our government must urge North Korea to return to dialogue and ensure that South Korea is not sidelined in these discussions.” Of course, success wouldn’t come easy.

Lee has also previously urged warmer relations with China, and his aides [say](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3305998/who-south-koreas-presidential-front-runner-lee-jae-myung) that he wants to repair relations. Lee and other progressives once suggested revisiting the decision to allow deployment of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system in 2017, which triggered a sharp deterioration in relations between Seoul and Beijing. However, he has made no recent mention of the issue.

Public opinion among South Koreans remains sharply negative toward the People’s Republic of China, although there is [speculation](https://www.blueroofpolitics.com/post/will-china-lift-sanctions-against-south-korea/) that Beijing plans to encourage investment by dropping the informal sanctions that it introduced in response to the THAAD deployment. It would be easier for Lee to move forward if Trump eventually struck a trade deal with Beijing. In contrast, if Trump refused to negotiate trade relief with Seoul, a Lee government could align the South Korean economy closer to China’s. Indeed, this will likely be [China’s objective](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/south-koreas-domestic-tumult-risks-being-exploited-china) while building international resistance to Washington’s trade policies.

On relations with Tokyo, Lee has bitterly attacked Yoon, [claiming](https://www.segye.com/newsView/20230318505351) that the latter chose “the path of a lackey of Japan,” However, of late, he has urged good relations with regional powers, including Tokyo, with which he [said](https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10462469) in April that ties are “very important” and [pledged](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3305998/who-south-koreas-presidential-front-runner-lee-jae-myung) to “strengthen trilateral cooperation.” Although he may demand more of Japan—something that even South Korean diplomats told me they sought under Yoon—Lee is unlikely to actively downgrade relations.

Finally, Lee might share Trump’s skeptical view of Europe’s importance. Yoon appeared to be much taken at being the first South Korean president to attend a NATO meeting. However, Lee has [complained](https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-korea-lee-jae-myung-impeachment-leader-58f34272) that Yoon “keeps wanting to get dragged” into the Russia-Ukraine imbroglio. He seems more likely to take a practical view of cooperation with the alliance’s European members, who are unlikely to do much to aid South Korea in a conflict.

Although a young democracy, Seoul demonstrated greater sensitivity to executive abuses by removing Yoon than the United States did by reelecting Trump. The Korean people [rallied](https://www.yahoo.com/news/chris-hayes-says-south-korea-041712832.html) to defend democratic governance in what some have referred to as a “reverse Jan. 6.” Lee [contended](https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10463221) that the “peaceful revolution led by the South Korean people will be a model for democracies around the world.”

That may be the case—but right now, the United States will be more focused on what happens on a divided Korean Peninsula.

##### About the Author 

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##### [Doug Bandow](/people/doug-bandow)

Senior Fellow, Cato Institute

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