# Turkey Is a US Ally, but Should Not Be a Trusted One 

U.S. policymakers often operate under the assumption that sending more weapons to allies and strategic partners provides Washington leverage over the recipients. Turkey serves as the latest example that the opposite is true.

December 31, 2023 • Commentary 

By [Jordan Cohen](https://www.cato.org/people/jordan-cohen), [Jonathan Ellis Allen](https://www.cato.org/people/jonathan-ellis-allen), and [Nardine Mossad](https://www.cato.org/people/nardine-mossad) 

This article appeared in *[The Hill (Online) ](https://thehill.com/)* on December 31, 2023. 

Turkey is once again quietly fighting against the United States’s policy goals even as it looks for more U.S. weapons. As the conflict between Israel and Gaza erupted, Turkey [escalated](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/12/worlds-eyes-gaza-turkey-attacks-syrias-kurds-again) its attacks against civilians in Northern Syria. These attacks are the latest example of how Turkey’s antagonistic behavior has created [tension](https://metropoll.com.tr/upload/content/files/1908-eu-and-nato-section-tp-mar22.pdf) with the U.S.

Nonetheless, the U.S. will continue to send weapons and security assistance to its NATO ally, in part with the hope that such reassurances and arms sales will provide the U.S. with leverage over Turkey. Unfortunately, U.S. support for Turkey does the opposite of providing leverage and simultaneously hurts American security while destabilizing a region that Washington seems unable to ignore.

For example, Turkey [bought](https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/turkey-the-s400-and-the-f35) the S‑400 (a Russian air defense system that threatens Washington’s F‑35 program), nearly upended NATO by [threatening](https://www.aei.org/op-eds/did-turkey-just-threaten-war-on-greece/#:~:text=Speaking%20at%20a%20rally%20in,Greek%20Prime%20Minister%20Kyriakos%20Mitsotakis.) to invade [Greece](https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/251/the_eu_and_the_eastern_mediterranean_how_to_deal_with_turkey), almost [hit](https://apnews.com/article/syria-turkey-shot-down-06b5b407e91ffb3d41096bbfe5f1ef75) U.S. troops in Syria, became the [safe-haven](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/07/muslim-brotherhood-turkey-survival/) for the Muslim Brotherhood after it was kicked out of Egypt, served as a [financing arm](https://www.wsj.com/finance/u-s-leans-on-turkey-to-stop-supporting-hamas-and-russia-de61f6ce) for Hamas and [Russia](https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian-pows-describe-nightmare-of-combat-in-ukraine-4dd492b5), and is [engaging](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/erdogan-i-cannot-accept-hamas-as-a-terror-group/) in a battle of [threats](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-02/erdogan-defends-hamas-amid-us-concerns-over-turkey-s-support) with Israel over Ankara’s support for Hamas.

Importantly, not all of these things are actually bad for U.S. security. For example, letting Finland and Sweden into NATO [certainly needs to receive pushback](https://www.cato.org/commentary/case-against-finland-joining-nato) in the U.S. Furthermore, attempting to [prevent](https://www.foxnews.com/world/turkeys-erdogan-slams-un-security-council-as-israel-protection-council) Israel from waging a war against Hamas that results in attacks across the globe is also probably something that helps the U.S. avoid another war.

U.S. policymakers often operate under the assumption that sending more weapons to allies and strategic partners provides Washington leverage over the recipients. Turkey serves as the latest example that the opposite is true.

Regardless, while Turkey also does things that neither hurt nor harm the U.S. security but anger Washington — such as [helping](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-12/us-sanctions-china-turkey-and-uae-firms-for-supporting-russia) Russia avoid sanctions — it also often act in ways directly against U.S. interests. For example, by serving as a [key funding](https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/11/20/inside-hamass-sprawling-financial-empire) [hub](https://www.ft.com/content/d2483bf8-fce6-4bf6-b5db-7e30f1d922ce) for Hamas and [allowing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-12/us-sanctions-china-turkey-and-uae-firms-for-supporting-russia) ISIS [safe haven](https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/11/turkey-continues-to-implement-a-revolving-door-policy-for-release-of-isis-suspects/) in Turkey, Ankara is engaging in actions that will convince U.S. policymakers to commit resources and troops to the region. Relatedly, its aggressive campaign in Syria is [increasingly](https://www.npr.org/2023/10/05/1204009210/u-s-shoots-down-armed-drone-flown-by-nato-ally-turkey) endangering the lives of U.S. troops.

Nonetheless, the U.S. continues [extensive](https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/) economic cooperation, [delivery](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/blinken-turkish-counterpart-discussed-us-assistance-after-earthquakes-2023-02-09/) of humanitarian aid and agreeing to [arms sales](https://securityassistance.org/arm-sales/) and [security assistance](https://securityassistance.org/security-sector-assistance/) that have been valued at nearly $478 billion since President Biden took office. However, because U.S. policymakers place such a heavy emphasis on maintaining all alliances — but especially NATO —Washington has accepted Ankara’s actions, even those that directly contradict U.S. interests.

In many ways, when it comes to U.S. weapons purchases, Turkey is the ultimate practitioner of “reverse leverage,” which [occurs](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/2022-arms-sales-risk-index#arms-sales-who-gets-leverage-against-whom) when arms sales create a relationship in which the U.S. feels it has become dependent on the recipient — whether for security, strategic or economic needs — and the recipient exploits this relationship to continue undertaking policies that endanger U.S. security while still receiving American weapons. In Turkey’s case, it uses its position as a NATO ally and a country in the Middle East to receive U.S. weapons.

For example, Turkey is once again evaluating whether it should approve of Sweden joining NATO. Now, in exchange for its vote, Turkey wants a [simultaneous](https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/12/08/erdogan-sweden-nato-f16/) sale of the U.S.-produced advanced F‑16 aircraft and [drone cameras](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-12-08/turkey-says-canada-us-linking-drone-camera-exports-to-sweden-nato-membership) from Canada.

This is not the first time Turkey leveraged its membership in the alliance for advanced weapons systems. When NATO member states were voting in 2023 to allow Finland to become part of the alliance, Turkey was one of a few countries considering its vote. After Turkey voted to allow Finland’s membership, the Biden administration began considering [selling](https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-administration-throws-support-behind-potential-f-16-sale-turkey-2022-06-29/) Turkey F‑16 fighter jets. This decision has long been debated, especially because Turkey [frequently](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/cancel-turkeys-f-35s-and-maybe-its-nato-membership-well/149684/) [threatens](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/11/18/dont-give-turkey-an-f-16-consolation-prize/) to collaborate with Russia and sometimes follows through when it feels the U.S. is not providing the weapons that it wants.

Turkey is clearly a risky partner that often ignores U.S. goals and then calls in for a chit to receive U.S. weapons. The Cato Institute’s Arms Sales Risk Index [ranks](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/2022-arms-sales-risk-index#mapping-risk) Turkey as one of the 15 riskiest U.S. weapons recipients. The State Department’s 2022 human rights report on Turkey [identifies](https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkey/) it as an increasingly authoritarian state that restricts “the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms” as well as having “significant human rights issues” that include arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, detention of innocent persons and acts of transnational reprisal against individuals living outside of Turkey. Moreover, the Cato Institute and Fraser Institute’s Human Freedom Index [finds](https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf) that Turkey’s levels of freedom in a variety of factors have decreased significantly since 2000.

Nonetheless, despite demonstrating time and again that it is not a reliable ally, Turkey continues to receive millions of dollars’ worth of U.S. weapons to buy a loyalty that it has proved unwilling to show. Instead of punishing its increasingly autocratic ally by cutting sales to Turkey, the U.S. has continued to work under the assumption that *more* sales will provide it with better leverage.

U.S. policymakers often operate under the assumption that sending more weapons to allies and strategic partners provides Washington leverage over the recipients. Yet, Turkey serves as the latest example that the opposite is true. In Turkey’s case, the weaker ally is dictating U.S. policy. Consequently, reevaluating how the relationship functions between Turkey and the U.S. needs to be a Biden administration foreign policy goal.

##### About the Authors 

[![Jordan Cohen cropped portrait](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2023-05/jordan-cohen-Cropped.jpg?itok=1iRlZzqH)](/people/jordan-cohen) 

##### [Jordan Cohen](/people/jordan-cohen)

Former Policy Analyst, Cato Institute

[ 

](https://twitter.com/jbcohen92) 

[![jonathan-allen-cropped.jpg](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/2023-11/jonathan-allen-cropped.jpg?itok=evfpj-SD)](/people/jonathan-ellis-allen) 

##### [Jonathan Ellis Allen](/people/jonathan-ellis-allen)

Research Associate, Cato Institute

##### [Nardine Mossad](/people/nardine-mossad)

Research Associate