# Nukes for New Years? 

However we interpret his incoherent statements, Trump is likely to preserve the current U.S. nuclear policy, which funds the modernization of nuclear triad at excessive expense.

December 30, 2016 • Commentary 

By [Benjamin H. Friedman](https://www.cato.org/people/benjamin-friedman) 

This article appeared on *[Huffington Post](http://www.huffingtonpost.com)* on December 30, 2016. 

With hasty tweets about nuclear weapons, cryptic support for arms racing, and overwrought spokesmen struggling to explain, president-elect Trump horrified the national security commentariat [anew](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/can-realists-escape-trump-16498) last week. Complaints centered on his willingness to [embrace](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world/trump-nuclear-arms-race-russia-china.html) the expense and danger of heightened nuclear competition, [abandon](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/donald-trump-frightening-tweet-nuclear-weapons) “decades of bipartisan policy aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons around the world,” and jettison the [commitment](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf) in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to “work toward the cessation of the nuclear arms race” and eventual “nuclear disarmament.”

It’s sensible to be [concerned](http://www.salon.com/2016/12/27/donald-trumps-irresponsible-nuclear-weapons-tweets-pure-whimsy-or-prelude-to-apocalypse/) [by](http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/311827-nuclear-experts-trump-tweets-could-provoke-global-crisis) a president rash enough to undertake nuclear diplomacy through [tweets](https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/812764662500622336) he doesn’t even bother to proofread. But the furor is partly misdirected. However we interpret his incoherent statements, Trump is likely to preserve the current U.S. nuclear policy, which funds the modernization of nuclear triad at excessive expense.

Prediction is tough, of course, especially when it comes to a novice politician who avoids policy specifics and unfettered contact with media. So, like Sovietologists dissecting shifts in Pravda propaganda, analysts today guess at the Trump administration’s direction by monitoring @realDonaldTrump’s tweets. So it went last week when the next president [tweeted](https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/811977223326625792?ref_src=twsrc%255Etfw): “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes” \[sic\].

Jason Miller, Trump’s spokesperson, muddied the waters by [claiming](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/23/a-reason-trump-could-alter-his-stand-on-nuclear-weapons-pentagon-chief-nominee-james-mattis/?utm_term=.ca4ab233060e) that: “President-elect Trump was referring to the threat of nuclear proliferation and the critical need to prevent it — particularly to and among terrorist organizations and unstable and rogue regimes.” Miller didn’t say why improving the U.S. arsenal would discourage proliferation rather than encourage it, as standard logic suggests.

However we interpret his incoherent statements, Trump is likely to preserve the current U.S. nuclear policy, which funds the modernization of nuclear triad at excessive expense.

One of those missing his point was his boss, who [reportedly](http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-nuclear-arms-race-russia-232944) told MSNBC the next day: “Let it be an arms race … we will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all,” apparently in reference to the Russians. Another Trump spokesperson (Miller having [resigned](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/sex-scandal-behind-jason-millers-sudden-exit-from-trump-team-reports-say/article/2610377) in the interim) then tried to square the circle by [arguing](http://www.mediaite.com/online/there-is-not-going-to-be-an-arms-race-spicer-already-at-odds-with-trumps-nuclear-comments/) on the Today Show that Trump’s tweet aimed to deter nuclear weapons states from building more. Trump followed with a tweet [castigating](https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/812764662500622336) NBC for leaving out the part of his “nuclear qoute \[sic\]” about the world coming to its senses to prevent whatever he was suggesting.

Speculation quickly swirled. Was Trump [one-upping](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qQ17UnJk_Y) Vladimir Putin’s [speech](https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-calls-strengthening-russias-military-nuclear-potential-101800687.html) earlier in the day calling for Russia to “strengthen” its nuclear forces? Was he calling for the deployment of more warheads? Does that mean eliminating limits set by the 2010 New START [treaty](https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm)? Did Trump mean to [contradict](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/23/a-reason-trump-could-alter-his-stand-on-nuclear-weapons-pentagon-chief-nominee-james-mattis/?utm_term=.9213031d053b) his Secretary of Defense nominee, who suggested last year that it might be sensible to go from a triad to a dyad? Overall, the nuclear kerfuffle was vintage Trump communication: a cavalier, contradictory muddle, only now applied to the nation’s coercive threats of mass destruction.

A sudden buildup and 1950s style arms racing would certainly be a big departure. But, besides the verb “expand,” there’s little [reason](http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/the-trump-administration-will-be-hawkish/) to expect the Trump administration to push the arsenal beyond what’s already planned, which means thorough improvement and continued arms racing of a sort.

The Obama administration set plans to [modernize](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization) all three legs of the nuclear triad — four if you count [new](https://warisboring.com/it-s-decision-time-for-the-air-force-s-new-nuclear-cruise-missile-51832637571d#.4nxcx32ob) air-launched nuclear-armed cruise missiles along with the bombs carried by aircraft, ballistic missiles on submarines, plus the land-based kind — at a [cost](http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/are-u-s-nuclear-forces-unaffordable/publication) of over three hundred billion dollars over a decade. Republicans basically support that plan. A boost in modernization funding was part of the [price](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/overwrought-start-4498) that the administration paid to win a few Republican votes needed to pass the New START treaty.

U.S. support for the disarmament provisions of the NPT is broad because the provisions are shallow. The treaty doesn’t set benchmarks on the road to disarmament or punish failure to disarm. The United States has nonetheless [slashed](http://thebulletin.org/2016/march/united-states-nuclear-forces-20169232) its nuclear arsenal by more than 80 percent since its Cold War heights, through deals with the Soviet Union and Russia. Still, the number and mix of U.S. nuclear forces is quite similar to what the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review [proposed](https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/95_npr.htm). If the United States is now moving toward disarmament, it’s doing so asymptotically.

Arms racing is vastly diminished from Cold War heights, at least in the [sense](https://www.cato.org/blog/arms-race-myth) of competitive accumulation of missiles and warheads. Qualitatively, however, it’s another story. As my Cato colleagues and I noted in a 2013 [report](https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/the_end_of_overkill_wp_web.pdf), the goal of destroying enemy nuclear forces still governs U.S. nuclear doctrine and weapons design. The public rationale for the U.S. nuclear arsenal is assured second strike — to survive an enemy’s attempted first strike and thus ensure deterrence. That story has always obscured a preemptive, first-strike logic, which says that suicidal threats on behalf of allies are not credible, so the U.S. arsenal must be capable of threatening enemy nuclear arsenals to prevent their territorial aggression.

Today, thanks to [precision](https://www.amazon.com/Inventing-Accuracy-Historical-Sociology-Technology/dp/0262631474) targeting, conventional weapons can now [aid](http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf) the hunt for enemy nuclear forces. In arms-race [theory](https://www.amazon.com/Wizards-Armageddon-Stanford-Nuclear-Age/dp/0804718849), that threat should cause capable rivals like Russia and China to expand and diversify their arsenals to ensure their survival against a U.S. first strike. That occurs to an extent, with each nation doing things like deploying mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed submarines. But neither country has raced to develop these capabilities in large numbers. One reason is probably that they, sensibly, [don’t](http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/835/correspondence.html?breadcrumb=%252Fexperts%252F566%252Ftom_sauer) [buy](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215) the first-strike logic of deterrence, believing instead that a smaller, vulnerable force is [enough](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/nuclear-myths-and-political-realities/9EF3533A2C5DDEFBADB0563BC86EE2F7). Another likely restraint on their arms racing is their limited desire to threaten U.S. allies and test the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats.

The result is that U.S. deterrent threats are in good shape; the balance of terror is robust, not [delicate](http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html). Indeed, a far smaller U.S. arsenal deployed on bomber aircraft and submarines or even a submarine-based monad would suffice to serve the threats backing U.S. alliances. Nor would a dyad or monad face a real threat of preemption by an enemy strike, as hawks claim.

The president-elect has a lot on his plate. He should cease the nuclear weapons talk, at least until he can discuss deterrence strategy with his Secretary of Defense and consider whether we still need a triad. If you’re into upsetting the establishment and improving nuclear policy, that’s a place to start.

##### About the Author 

[![Media Name: bfriedman.jpg](/sites/cato.org/files/styles/author_picture/public/authors/crops/bfriedman.jpg?itok=UyPM4WKV)](/people/benjamin-friedman) 

##### [Benjamin H. Friedman](/people/benjamin-friedman)

Policy Director, Defense Priorities