Even limited conscription is an extraordinarily bad idea. It would be wildly unfair to those drafted, taking only a few thousand of the four million Americans who turn 18 every year. Compulsion would foster both avoidance and evasion—remember Dick “I had other priorities” Cheney? That in turn would require an expensive enforcement regime, extravagantly so given the very few people to be impressed. Since conscription would fill any unmet “needs,” the armed services would be tempted to inflate their requirements and devote less effort to meeting recruiting objectives.
Plenzler also tried moral blackmail, arguing that “military service is an important responsibility of citizenship.” Defending the nation might be such a responsibility, but not patrolling the globe, playing international social engineer, guarding corrupt authoritarians, and using war for mundane economic and political ends, which account for most of the Pentagon’s activities. Moreover, military service isn’t the only way to help protect the homeland. Conscription is the wrong answer to a very simple problem.
Washington expects the armed services to do far too much. The military’s official manpower objectives should not be taken as a given, as if one of the Ten Commandments. Moving to conscription would make war too easy, allowing any administration to quickly crank up personnel levels to prosecute another unpopular and stupid war, like Vietnam, or more recently Iraq and Afghanistan.
Plenzler’s tiny draft would not inhibit promiscuous war-making because so few people would be taken. The likelihood that the children of influential policymakers would be drafted is infinitesimal and would not likely inhibit the foreign policy establishment’s enthusiasm for war. (A better idea would be “a targeted draft enlisting the children of Pentagon brass and members of Congress,” but even that would have to be much broader, dragooning Washington’s most enthusiastic warmongers, to have much effect.)
The best way to address recruiting shortfalls would be to reduce manpower objectives. First, policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches should abandon the pursuit of primacy and shed rather than share burdens best carried by other states. George observed that soldiers are stationed in more than 140 countries. It beggars belief that most or even a majority of these deployments serve an important let alone a vital U.S. interest.
Europe is richer and possesses a much greater population than Russia. The continent should take over its own defense. The Middle East matters less internationally and especially to the U.S. Friendly states, most notably Israel and the Gulf monarchies, should cooperate to balance against potentially more aggressive states, such as Iran. South Korea is well able to defend against its impoverished northern neighbor at least in conventional terms. And friendly Asian states, including Japan and India, are capable of constraining potential Chinese aggression.
Second, Washington should adapt its force structure to changing geopolitics. Army strength should be shifted to reserve units. The likelihood of U.S. involvement in a massive land war in either Asia or Europe is minuscule—at least, launching a ground campaign against either China or Russia would be idiotic, even criminal. Genuine defense resources should be concentrated on sea and air power, which are less people-intensive. Making such a shift would be difficult politics at home, but perhaps no harder than reinstating conscription.
Third, the American people should decide how much they are prepared to spend and risk to achieve proposed foreign ends. Washington should have the interests of Americans at its core. What potential conflicts are worth fighting, especially ones that could go nuclear? Is a national security state, including coercive military service, consistent with the freedom values that make America worth defending? The costs of one or another endless military interventions likely outweigh any plausible gain. Attracting enough recruits for even a more limited foreign policy might still be difficult and expensive. However, it would be easier to ask America’s young to defend a democratic republic than to advance a reckless empire.
Whatever Washington seeks to do internationally, it requires leaders “who can articulate our purposes both for the American people and the armed forces.” Equally important, those purposes must be legitimate. Dragging one’s countrymen into an unnecessary war is bad. Forcing one’s countrymen to fight in an unnecessary war is unforgivable. Conscription is no solution to the challenges facing the nation’s volunteer military.