

## 53. Asian Defense Commitments

### ***The U.S. government should***

- withdraw American military forces from South Korea over the next four years and terminate the mutual defense treaty at the end of that period;
- begin a six-year phased pullout of American troops from Japan, beginning with forces on Okinawa;
- replace the bilateral U.S.-Japanese defense treaty with an agreement that allows emergency base and port access and maintains joint military exercises and intelligence cooperation;
- drop proposals for enhanced defense ties with the Philippines and Singapore and eliminate the AUSMIN agreement with Australia;
- promote regional security cooperation through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other appropriate institutions;
- expand economic and limited security ties with China while pressing Beijing to accelerate democratic, human rights, and market reforms and to resolve international disputes peacefully;
- drop Washington's implicit defense guarantee to Taiwan but sell Taipei any weapons it deems necessary for its defense; and
- Remain aloof from other flashpoints that could turn into war, such as those on the Indian subcontinent.

After the end of World War II the United States established an extensive forward military presence and fought two wars in East Asia as part of its strategy to contain communism. The Cold War ended nearly a decade ago, but America's defense posture has changed little. The administration is committed to keeping at least 100,000 military personnel in East Asia and the western Pacific, apparently forever. The Pentagon's infamous

1995 assessment of security policy in East Asia (the so-called Nye Report) made the astonishing assertion that “the end of the Cold War has not diminished” the importance of any of America’s regional security commitments.

Indeed, Washington has been *increasing* U.S. military ties, pushing a new security treaty with the Philippines, for instance, and offering an implicit defense guarantee to Taiwan against China. The United States has also meddled on the Indian subcontinent, penalizing both India and Pakistan, without effect, in an attempt to thwart their nuclear ambitions. Rather than expand America’s military presence in Asia at a time when credible security threats against the United States are diminishing, Congress should use its budgetary and legislative authority to initiate a phased withdrawal of American forces from Korea and Japan and prepare to center Washington’s reduced military presence in the central Pacific rather than East Asia.

### ***Changed Threat Environment***

American policy in the Far East has succeeded. For five decades Washington provided a defense shield behind which noncommunist governments throughout East Asia were able to grow economically (despite their recent setbacks) and democratically. Japan is the world’s second-ranked economic power; Taiwan’s dramatic jump from poverty to prosperity forced the leaders of the communist mainland to undertake fundamental economic reforms. South Korea now outstrips its northern antagonist by virtually every measure of national power. After years of failure, the Philippines seems to be on the path of prosperity, while countries like Thailand have grown dramatically and will eventually recover from their temporary economic travails.

Serious threats to America’s allies and interests have essentially disappeared. There is no more Soviet Union; a much weaker Russia has neither the capability nor the will for Asian adventurism.

Elsewhere real, tough-minded communism has dissolved into a cynical excuse for incumbent officeholders to maintain power. A decade after the Tiananmen Square massacre, China is combining support for greater economic liberty with respect for greater individual autonomy. So far Beijing’s military renewal has been modest and China has been assertive rather than aggressive, though its saber rattling at Taiwan remains of concern.

Southeast Asia remains roiled by economic and political instability, but such problems threaten no one outside the immediate region. Only North Korea remains a potential threat, but it is no replacement for the Soviet Union. Pyongyang is bankrupt and starving, essentially friendless, and, despite its willingness to wave the threat of an atomic bomb to gain respect, will only fall further behind the South.

Some analysts privately, and a few publicly, say that Japan poses a potential threat to regional peace. However, Tokyo has gained all of the influence and wealth through peace that it had hoped to attain through war and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere in the 1930s.

Moreover, the lesson of World War II remains vivid to most Japanese: in recent years the nation has been convulsed by political debates over such modest actions as sending medical personnel to the Gulf War, providing peacekeeping troops to the UN operation in Cambodia, and authorizing military participation in civilian rescues. Even mainstream politicians committed to a somewhat more assertive posture have routinely sacrificed military spending to budget concerns.

### ***Rethinking American Strategy***

So far neither the Clinton administration nor Congress seems to have noticed the many dramatic changes. U.S. taxpayers spent roughly \$13 trillion (in current dollars) and sacrificed 113,000 lives to win the Cold War. With the dramatic diminution of security threats and the equally dramatic growth of allied capabilities, the American people should no longer be expected to surrender more dollars and risk more lives to police East Asia for as long as friendly states believe it to be convenient. However much it might be in the interest of other nations for Washington to defend them—and what country would not naturally desire that the world's remaining superpower subsidize its defense?—it is not in America's interest to do so.

Unless the administration acts, Congress should take the lead in adjusting U.S. overseas deployments. Legislators should reduce the defense budget as well as overall force levels and foreign deployments; Washington should develop a comprehensive plan for the phased withdrawal of all forces currently stationed in East Asia and the termination of U.S. defense guarantees to allied nations.

The starting point for a new Asian strategy is disengagement from the Korean peninsula, the only international flashpoint that could easily involve the United States in war. Although North Korea remains unpredictable

and potentially dangerous, the Republic of Korea (ROK) should be able to defend itself. The South now possesses twice the population, around 29 times the gross domestic product, and a vast technological lead over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Even in the midst of a recession, the ROK is well able to spend whatever is necessary to make up for the withdrawal of 37,000 American troops. The North could then choose to engage in meaningful arms control or lose an inter-Korean arms race.

The potential for a DPRK nuclear bomb is unnerving; but despite disquieting events such as its recent failed satellite launch, Pyongyang has so far lived up to the 1994 nuclear accord. Washington should fulfill that agreement, while working with China, Japan, and Russia to encourage continued DPRK compliance. Washington should also lift trade sanctions against North Korea and normalize diplomatic relations—modest concessions that would offer the North ongoing benefits in return for maintaining a peaceful course. Although we should remain cautious about any promises by Pyongyang, engagement offers greater prospects of success than does plunging the peninsula into a new cold, or possibly hot, war. There are no good options if Pyongyang ultimately attempts to develop an atomic bomb, and a continued American conventional military presence is certainly not one. U.S. ground forces in the South would become nuclear hostages, enhancing the North's leverage over America.

### *Time for a Setting Sun*

Washington should follow a similar strategy in Japan, which no longer faces a serious threat. Whatever residual dangers to Japan remain or might arise in the future, from, say, an aggressive China, could be met by a modest Japanese military buildup. Of course, many of Japan's neighbors have long viewed Washington's presence more as an occupation force to contain Tokyo than to contain Moscow. But the Japanese do not possess a double dose of original sin; their nation, along with the rest of the world, has changed dramatically over the last half century. The Japanese people have neither the desire to start another conflict nor the incentive to do so, having come to economically dominate East Asia peacefully.

Moreover, Tokyo is unlikely to accept a permanent foreign watchdog, and tensions will grow as the lack of other missions for the U.S. forces becomes increasingly obvious. Popular anger is already evident in Okinawa, where American military facilities occupy one-fifth of the island's land mass. Washington should develop a six-year program for the with-

drawal of all U.S. forces from Japan, starting with those in Okinawa. At the end of that period Washington and Tokyo should replace their mutual defense treaty with a more limited agreement providing for emergency base and port access, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing.

The United States need not expand base access elsewhere in the region. Washington should drop proposals for a new bilateral military agreement with the Philippines, as well as proposals to increase defense cooperation with Singapore. The United States has suffered no damage attributable to the closing of its bases in the Philippines, which had become expensive anachronisms, earlier this decade. Instead of upgrading U.S. military ties, Washington should be transferring security responsibilities to its allies and friends.

Even less relevant is the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) accord, which went into deep freeze in 1984 after New Zealand blocked port access by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered American ships, and the annual Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN). ANZUS, created in the aftermath of World War II, was directed less at containing the Soviet Union, which had no military presence in the South Pacific, than at preventing a new round of Japanese aggression. But since Tokyo had been decisively defeated and completely disarmed, later to be fully integrated into the Western alliance, ANZUS was outmoded the day it was signed.

Which leaves AUSMIN. But Australia faces no meaningful threats to its security. An attack by a serious military power—China, India, Vietnam—is a paranoid fantasy. Anyway, Canberra, blessed with splendid isolation and economic prosperity, can easily provide whatever forces it deems necessary to defend itself.

Washington should simply discard AUSMIN. Australia and America should maintain mutually beneficial military cooperation, such as intelligence sharing and emergency port access. At the same time, Canberra should enhance its own military role in the region.

### ***Regional Security Cooperation***

Indeed, the United States should encourage expanded regional security discussions. Either through ASEAN or another organization, smaller countries throughout East Asia should develop a cooperative defense relationship with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and especially Japan.

Fear of the latter ignores five decades of dramatic changes. Tokyo could do much to improve regional security. A measured military buildup,

focused on defensive weapons and conducted in consultation with its neighbors, would help prevent the creation of a dangerous vacuum following the departure of American forces, as feared by proponents of continuing U.S. dominance. Washington's position should be that of a distant balancer, leaving its friends to handle their own affairs but poised to act if a hegemonic threat arises that allied states cannot contain.

The United States could aid the creation of a more effective regional security framework by encouraging the peaceful resolution of various boundary and territorial disputes. None presently seem likely to lead to war, but all impede better bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Washington should offer its good offices to help mediate the Japanese–South Korean squabble over the Takeshima/Tokdu islands, the Japanese-Russian quarrel over the “northern territories” (Sakhalin island), and the multifaceted dispute involving China and several other countries that claim the Paracel and Spratly islands to help dissipate international tensions. Most important, the United States should make clear that resolution of those (and other similar) controversies is up to the interested parties, not America.

The end of Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union allows Washington to take a more balanced position vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China (PRC). Washington should continue to promote good political relations; expand the military dialogue; push for a freer trade regime, including Beijing's inclusion in the World Trade Organization; and encourage additional economic reform.

However, the United States need not fear bruising the PRC's sensitivities when discussing China's foreign arms sales, human rights abuses, and attempted bullying of Taiwan. America should speak frankly on those issues, though Congress should resist pressure to limit trade with and investment in China. While nothing is inevitable, extensive economic ties offer what is probably the most powerful tool for weakening central communist control in the PRC.

Congress also needs to take the lead in repairing flawed administration policy toward the Republic of China (ROC). Relocated to Taiwan after the communist victory on the mainland in 1949, the ROC still claimed to be the legitimate government of all China until the late 1980s. Seven years after Richard Nixon made his historic trip to the PRC in 1972, the United States dropped diplomatic recognition of the ROC. Many other nations followed suit. Since then Taiwan has existed uneasily at the periphery of global politics—an economic powerhouse but a diplomatic midget.

The ROC's behaving increasingly like a sovereign state caused the PRC to rattle its sabers—or, more accurately, test its missiles—in early

1996. Beijing's threats led Washington to respond with a warning of "grave consequences," meaning military intervention, should hostilities erupt.

Unfortunately, the Clinton policy package increases the threat of war. The United States opposes self-determination by a people who have built a highly successful capitalist and democratic society and seems to be moving to deny that community the ability to defend itself, and yet Washington hints that it would intervene if war broke out.

Washington does not have sufficient interests at stake to risk war with nuclear-armed China over Taiwan. However, Washington, after making clear that it believes the status of Taiwan, whether reunified with the mainland or independent, is up to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to decide, should sell the ROC whatever weapons, such as attack submarines, Taipei desires to purchase for its own defense.

The United States should avoid other dangerous flashpoints where it has only tangential security interests, if that. Washington should, for instance, stop meddling on the Indian subcontinent. Threats before and sanctions afterwards predictably did not deter India and Pakistan from joining the nuclear club. America did, however, manage to damage relations with both nations.

Instead of attempting to micromanage regional affairs (Washington long tilted toward Pakistan; the Pentagon even drew up contingency plans for war against India a decade ago), the United States should cultivate good relations with both countries. At the same time it should encourage the two states to peacefully settle their dispute over Kashmir, which threatens to ignite a fourth Indo-Pakistan war. Washington should view India, which possesses the world's second largest population and a sizable military, as an important future counterweight to China. A new regional balance of power would allow the United States to further distance itself from incendiary but localized squabbles.

## ***Conclusion***

Asia, particularly East Asia, is likely to grow more important to the United States in coming years. That makes it essential that Washington simultaneously reduce the military burden on the American economy and force its trading competitors to bear the full cost of their own defense. Otherwise, U.S. firms will be less able to take advantage of expanding regional economic opportunities. More important, the United States will be more secure if friendly powers in the region, instead of relying on America, are able and willing to contain nearby conflicts.

Jettisoning antiquated alliances and commitments and reducing a bloated force structure do not mean the United States would no longer be an Asian-Pacific power. After bringing its forces home from South Korea and Japan, America should center a reduced defense presence around Wake Island, Guam, and Hawaii. The United States would remain the globe's strongest military power, with the ability to intervene throughout East Asia if necessary. However, American policy would be dictated by the interests of the American people, not of the populous and prosperous security dependents that Washington has accumulated throughout the region.

### ***Recommended Readings***

- Bandow, Doug. "America's Obsolete Korean Commitment." *Orbis* (Fall 1998).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Free Rider: South Korea's Dual Dependence on America." Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 308, May 19, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Okinawa: Liberating Washington's East Asian Military Colony." Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 314, September 1, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington: Cato Institute, 1996).
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Let Taiwan Defend Itself." Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 313, August 24, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Managing a Great Power Relationship: The United States, China and East Asian Security." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 21, no. 1 (March 1998).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Washington's Smothering Strategy: American Interests in East Asia." *World Policy Journal* 14, no. 4 (Winter 1997–98).
- Johnson, Chalmers, and E. B. Keehn. "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 4 (July–August 1995).
- Layne, Christopher. "Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia." *National Journal* 43 (Spring 1996).
- Olsen, Edward A. "A Northeast Asian Peace Dividend." *Strategic Review* (Summer 1998).
- Sieff, Martin. "Passage to India." *National Review*, June 22, 1998.
- Zich, Arthur. "Okinawa, Seoul: Are the Bases Needed?" *Impact* 12 (March 1997).

—Prepared by Doug Bandow