Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

Price, Sessions Force Trump’s Hand on Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments

In a recent op-ed at The Federalist, I argued Donald Trump has serious leverage over both Republicans and Democrats in Congress when it comes to ObamaCare:

President Trump can force Republicans and Democrats back to the negotiating table, and get a bill that keeps his promises to fully repeal Obamacare and to protect people with preexisting conditions…by simply undoing the illegal actions by his predecessor, which he has also already promised to do.

One of those illegal actions is the illegal exemption from ObamaCare that President Barack Obama granted members of Congress and their staffs.

Another is the illegal “cost-sharing” subsidies President Obama began issuing – and that President Trump is still issuing – to insurers participating in ObamaCare’s Exchanges. In a case where the House of Representatives challenged the payments, a federal judge ruled that issuing those payments “violates the Constitution” and ordered them to stop, pending appeal. The Obama administration was pursuing an appeal, but the Trump administration has not indicated whether it would continue to appeal that ruling or enforce the judge’s order. Trump must do one or the other.

Two of President Trump’s cabinet picks have practically forced his hand on this issue.

When the federal district-court judge issued her ruling striking down the cost-sharing subsidy payments, Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price was a Republican member of Congress. He issued a statement endorsing the ruling:

Today, Congressman Tom Price, M.D. issued the following statement after a federal judge ruled in favor of House Republicans’ lawsuit against Obamacare, saying that the Administration does not have the power to spend money on “cost sharing reduction payments” to insurers without an appropriation from Congress:

“The ruling proves a momentous victory for the rule of law and against the Obama Administration’s overreach of Constitutional authority,” said Congressman Tom Price, M.D. “This historic decision defies the Obama’s Administration’s ask that the courts disregard the letter of the law and reasserts Congress’s power of the purse as defined by our nation’s founders in Article One of the Constitution.”

“In recent weeks, we’ve seen insurers announce that they will exit the exchange markets in 2017, further deteriorating patients’ access and choice to health care plans that they want. This is yet again proof that Obamacare is on an unsustainable path, and House Republicans must remain committed to repealing and replacing this law. As a member of the Health Care Task Force, I’m honored to be working with my colleagues to advance positive, patient-centered solutions to the challenges in our health care system.”

Price has made clear his view that Congress did not appropriate funding for these payments, and that continuing to make them would constitute executive overreach and violate the rule of law. If President Trump chooses to appeal the lower-court ruling, he would put Price in a situation where he would have to help implement a policy that he considers unconstitutional. Price arguably would have to resign.

Yesterday, Trump’s attorney general Jeff Sessions expressed his view that the payments are unconstitutional and that the lawsuit challenging those payments “has validity to it.” If Trump chooses to appeal the lower-court ruling, Sessions would be the guy who carries out that appeal. It would be…awkward for him to defend a policy he believes to be unconstitutional. If Trump asks him to do so, Sessions too may have to resign.

Continuing President Obama’s illegal cost-sharing reduction payments could cost President Trump two cabinet officials.

A Surprisingly Easy Supreme Court Win for Religious Nondiscrimination?

The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Both of these religion clauses have been made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The continuing question is how they interact with one another – the play in the joints,” the Supreme Court has called it – in particular regarding when the government can treat religious institutions differently than secular ones, and when it must do so to avoid endorsing or entangling itself with religion.

Yesterday the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, which involves a Missouri program that provides subsidies to construct playground flooring out of recycled old tires. Trinity Lutheran Church runs a daycare center that had a playground open to the public, so it applied for a grant under the competitive program – and was denied solely because it’s a church. Missouri defended its position by citing a state constitutional provision that prohibits state funds from going to support religion. (For more on these Blaine Amendments, see this summary.) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the state denial, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and Cato filed a brief supporting the church.

That’s when things got weird. The high court agreed to hear the case back in January 2016, but then Justice Antonin Scalia died. Even though briefing proceeded apace, the case wasn’t scheduled for argument before the end of the term in June. When the argument calendar was released for the new term that started in October, Trinity Lutheran was still not there. The conventional wisdom was that the justices must have thought that there would be a 4-4 deadlock. But then lo and behold in early February – days after Neil Gorsuch’s nomination – two other cases that had been granted at the same time as Trinity were scheduled for argument in March. A couple of weeks after that, when Gorsuch’s confirmation was by no means assured, the Court released its April calendar, which did include this religious-liberty case.

Was the Court simply confident that Gorsuch would take his seat in time, or did the chief justice think it unseemly to hold the case through another entire term? Either way, Gorsuch was indeed sworn in on April 10 – but that wasn’t the end of the drama. Late last week, the new governor of Missouri, Eric Greitens, changed the policy at issue, announcing that, going forward, religious organizations would be eligible for the scrap-tire subsidies, among other grants administered by the state’s department of natural resources.

The Court then asked the parties to submit letter-briefs about whether this latest development mooted the case or otherwise affected it. They both agreed that the argument should proceed, that the issue was a live one – in part because the governor’s policy decision could be reversed at any time and in part because lawsuits were expected over the reversal of course anyway. Curiously, the lawyer allowed by the state to argue for the old policy was the former solicitor general, who had been swept out of office along with the rest of the attorney general’s political appointees when Josh Hawley (a personal friend of mine, and a friend of Cato) was elected in November.

In any event, the argument proceeded apace and went very well for the church. Justice Anthony Kennedy opened the questioning by expressing concern for the use of religious status to deny government benefits. It was mostly downhill from there for the state, as Justice Samuel Alito launched into a devastating series of hypotheticals regarding Homeland Security funds for terrorism-prevention, grants to rebuild religious structures damaged in the Oklahoma City bombing, and other government transfers to pay for certain non-devotional expenses. Justice Stephen Breyer also got into that mix, questioning how provision of police, fire, and other public health protections okay but making playgrounds safe was not. Even Justice Elena Kagan, at first appearing skeptical of the church’s position, acknowledged her discomfort with the burden Missouri had placed on a constitutional right. Justice Gorsuch stayed quiet until the very end of argument, when he expressed bewilderment at how the Court was supposed to draw the line the state’s lawyer was suggesting between “general” or “universal” programs and “selective” ones like the scrap-tire grant here.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor were the only ones suggesting opposition to the church’s free-exercise and equal-protection arguments, and they were also the only ones who seemed inclined to see problems of mootness or “adversariality” after the change in state policy. That’s surprising, because if indeed the case is headed to a 7-2 resolution, then it would’ve been 6-2 without Gorsuch and there was no need to hold it for so long.  

Anyhow, my basic position remains what it was when this saga began: Missouri isn’t required to have a scrap-tire grant program, but once it created one, it must open it to all without regard to religious status.

(For more case background and commentery, see the case’s SCOTUSblog page, read the argument transcript, and listen to my Federalist Society teleforum that will be posted soon.)

Adult Rights for Adult Businesses

An ordinance of the City of Sandy Springs, Georgia, prohibits the sale of sex toys. Businesses and individuals have challenged this statute as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in controlling their consensual, sexual behavior in the privacy of their homes. The district court and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ordinance given the Eleventh Circuit precedent of Williams v. Attorney General (2004), which upheld an Alabama sex-toy-sales ban.

Cato has now joined the DKT Liberty Project on a brief to the entire (en banc) Eleventh Circuit asking it to overturn Williams, which is inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Windsor (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) (the DOMA and same-sex marriage cases, respectively). Williams had relied on Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), where the Supreme Court declared that for a right to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, its specific articulation must be “deeply rooted in our history and traditions” or “fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty.”

Williams upheld the law after finding no history or traditions concerning sex toys, though the Fifth Circuit disagreed in 2008 in striking down a similar Texas restriction. Windsor and Obergefell then raised the protection of rights concerning private sexual intimacy and Obergefell described this right as “fundamental.” Obergefell also explicitly rejected the Glucksberg test, at least as applied to sexual intimacy, as “inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights.”

Williams also misinterpreted Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which in striking down a ban on homosexual sodomy made clear that it wasn’t merely the right to perform “a particular sexual act” that was in question in these intimacy cases, but the infringement of rights regulating “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, in the most private of places, the home.” Lawrence also made clear that state assertion of a “morality” interest isn’t a sufficient justification for limiting the right to adult sexual intimacy. Lawrence held that, as to “whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these [moral] views on the whole society,” the answer is no.

Legislative Takings Are Still Takings

The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause states that the government may take no property for public use without just compensation. Unfortunately, local governments often see the Takings Clause not as a fundamental safeguard of liberty so much as an inconvenient obstacle getting in the way of preferred policy outcomes.

One way cities have devised to avoid their obligations to provide just compensation is to condition issuance of land-use permits on landowners’ surrendering property rights the government would otherwise have had to pay for (what’s a little extortion between friends). That’s exactly what the City of West Hollywood is attempting to do with a zoning ordinance that requires developers who build multi-unit housing to either (1) sell or rent a percentage of that housing at below-market prices or (2) pay an “in lieu” fee that the city calculates using a formula created by statute.

Shelah and Jonathan Lehrer-Graiwer sought a permit to build an 11-unit development and elected to pay the in-lieu fee under protest, later challenging it as an unconstitutional taking. The trial court, following binding state-court precedent, found in favor of the city, and the California Court of Appeals affirmed. Now the property owners seek U.S. Supreme Court review.

Cato, joined by Reason Foundation and the National Association of Home Builders, and with the assistance of Antonin Scalia Law School’s Supreme Court clinic, has filed a brief supporting that request.

Under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), the government may not require a property owner to surrender a constitutional right (here, to just compensation for a taking of private property) in exchange for permit approval unless there’s an “essential nexus” between the conditions and an alleged harm that would be caused by the development. The conditions must also be roughly proportional to the expected impact.

A Response to Scott Alexander

Scott Alexander (SA) has provided advice to the free speech movement in general and to a student group at Harvard University in particular. If you want more people, especially on the liberal left or within the social justice movement, to support free speech, he says, then you should not invite speakers just because they are controversial.

SA picks AEI scholar and social scientist Charles Murray as an example. In March, protesting students at Middlebury College shut down Murray when he was invited to speak and debate a local professor. SA defends Murray’s right to speak, but says that if a college invites him or any other controversial speaker it should be because they are interested in his ideas, not because they want ”to invite a generic offensive person and he fits the bill.”

Does SA really believe that the motives behind an invitation to a controversial speaker make any difference to people who believe that he or she shouldn’t be allowed to speak at a given college? I doubt it. To them, the speaker (in this case Charles Murray) is the problem, it’s not whether the organizers had a sincere interest in Murray’s ideas or just were looking for ”the ugliest and most hateable person” they could find.

Allison Stanger, the professor at Middlebury who was supposed to debate Murray, has deep disagreements with Murray and planned to take his arguments apart as best as she could. It didn’t matter to the students. They didn’t want to have Murray in person at the college.

And by the way, there is no such thing as ”a generic offensive person.” The sense of offense and insult is always in the eye of the beholder, it’s not something one can measure in any objective way. What is offensive to SA, may sound like sweet poetry to someone else. (Recall the U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s remark that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”) Even within the same religious or ethnic or political community, there may be different perceptions of what is offensive to the group and its members. This remark may seem banal. But we should keep in mind its truth at a time of grievance fundamentalism when people play the offense card to silence voices whose opinions they don’t like. This truth is especially important for the academic world whose business is knowledge production.

SA has criticized the Open Campus Initiative on Harvard University for wanting to raise awareness of free speech by inviting controversial speakers. It later turned out that the student group’s intention was to promote ”ideological diversity for the student body where it is believed to be lacking,” not just to pick the most controversial speakers. They also said that later on that they would invite speakers from the left.

There are several problems with SA’s reasoning. Let me deal with a few.

Government Can’t Shut Down Public Recording That Doesn’t Interfere with Law Enforcement

A group called People Helping People heard of potential civil rights abuses and harassment occurring at Border Patrol checkpoints in Arizona—interior ones, not right at the border—so started a campaign to monitor such activity. The Border Patrol then decided to prohibit any recording within 150 feet of their location, which includes the public roadside.

A federal district court found that the new rule was a valid time, place, or manner restriction on First Amendment-protected activity. Cato, with the assistance of the UCLA Law School First Amendment Clinic and noted scholar Eugene Volokh, has filed an amicus brief asking the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to reverse that ruling.

Recording of law enforcement officers engaged in the public performance of their duties promotes the free discussion of government affairs. The roadside in this case is a “traditional public forum” of the sort that the Supreme Court has held to be required to be open to First Amendment-protected activities. The Border Patrol even got a permit that requires that the facilities be “maintained in a manner that will not interfere with the reasonable use of the public right-of-way.” The government cannot choose to shut down such a forum when it is still being used as a public thoroughfare.

There is also evidence that the Border Patrol closed this area specifically in retaliation for People Helping People’s First Amendment activities; new barriers were added within hours of the start of the monitoring program, making it significantly harder to film, and passers-by were told that the barriers were there only to exclude protesters.

The restriction is also not valid because it does not leave open “alternative channels of communication,” as the Supreme Court has required. In McCullen v. Coakley (2014), the Supreme Court struck down a 35-foot buffer zone around an abortion clinic because it burdened more speech than was necessary to advance the government’s interest. A 150-foot buffer zone burdens even more speech, entirely preventing the recording of law enforcement officers, rather than merely regulating the means of doing so.

Even if this were not a public forum, the Border Patrol’s policy constitutes viewpoint discrimination because it allowed observers who were critical of People Helping People to enter the enforcement zone and record. At base, this restriction is unreasonable because there is no articulable reason to prohibit recording from a public roadside that doesn’t interfere with the Border Patrol’s activities.

When the Ninth Circuit takes up Jacobson v. Department of Homeland Security later this spring/summer, it should reverse the district court and strike down the Border Patrol’s buffer zone.

GAO Weighs In On “Countering Violent Extremism”

The ongoing controversy and litigation over the Trump administration’s “Muslim ban” has reignited a debate that has raged since the 9/11 attacks: Who commits more domestic terrorism–violent Salafists or traditional “right wing” extremists? According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, it’s the latter and by a very wide margin. From p. 4 of GAO’s report:

Of the 85 violent extremist incidents that resulted in death since September 12, 2001, far right wing violent extremist groups were responsible for 62 (73 percent) while radical Islamist violent extremists were responsible for 23 (27 percent). 

But as researchers at the Georgia State recently reported, media coverage of terrorist incidents makes it seem as if terrorism is almost exclusively perpetrated by Muslims:

We examined news coverage from LexisNexis Academic and CNN.com for all terrorist attacks in the United States between 2011 and 2015. Controlling for target type, fatalities, and being arrested, attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 449% more coverage than other attacks. Given the disproportionate quantity of news coverage for these attacks, it is no wonder that people are afraid of the Muslim terrorist. More representative media coverage could help to bring public perception of terrorism in line with reality.

That incident-media reporting disconnect is matched by another: the notion that Arab/Muslim-Americans are more susceptible to radicalization, and thus to becoming terrorists, and that there are a discreet set of reliable indicators that will tell authorities who is or is not more likely to become a terrorist. 

The same month the Georgia State researchers released their terrorism-media bias findings, the Brennan Center released a report on the state of the debate and federal “countering violent extremism” (CVE) programs. Citing dozens of empirical studies and recognized experts in the fields of criminology, psychology, and intelligence, the report states “Extreme or radical views are often assumed to lie at the heart of terrorism. But evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in, nor support, violence.”