Topic: Law and Civil Liberties

SCOTUS Needs To Check the Long Arm Of State Court Jurisdiction

Many of the problems with litigation under our federal system, as I’ve noted before, arise when state courts can reach out to project their power onto litigants and disputes outside their borders. Public choice economics suggests that when courts are answerable to the political and legal classes of a single state only–say, California or Montana–they might not be ideally responsive to the interests and due process rights of out-of-state parties who have been compelled by force to show up and defend a lawsuit. Even if state judges and juries manage to avoid the temptation of “home cooking”–dishing out tastier outcomes to down-home litigants and lawyers than to outsiders–the remains the wider problem of forum-shopping, in which–even if no forum intends to act other than impartially–lawyers can bring an action in whichever of multiple available forums is most gainful for their side and unwelcome for their opponent.

A great deal, therefore, hangs on when state courts can compel absent parties to show up and defend a lawsuit. When may a state assert jurisdiction over a distant party even though it lacks one of the relatively uncontroversial grounds for doing so, such as that the events being sued over happened within its borders? 

And here there has been good news to report in recent years. Our system relies largely on the federal judiciary to police overreaching by state courts in their jurisdictional claims, and after decades of irresolution, the U.S. Supreme Court has lately been getting much more serious and confident about drawing the right sorts of lines. Importantly, it has done so with support from both liberal and conservative wings of the Court. In the most significant recent case, Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for a unanimous Court, with only Justice Sotomayor writing a separate concurrence. (The case dealt with an international as distinct from interstate claim of jurisdiction, but made precedent for both). 

But some states have pushed back against Daimler, which may be why the Court granted review of two cases on which it will hear oral argument tomorrow, April 25. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, California courts took jurisdiction over hundreds of cases from other states alleging side effects from the drug Plavix, even though the other cases had no particular connection with California other than that their lawyers wanted to convoy them in along with the actual California cases. In BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, Montana opened its doors to litigation against a railroad based elsewhere over injuries that did not occur within Montana. 

It seems unlikely that the Court will declare a change of heart and back off its 2014 near-unanimity. Helpfully, the Trump Justice Department has filed an amicus brief arguing that the California Supreme Court overstepped the line when (over a dissent from three of its members) it found jurisdiction over the out-of-state drug cases. Still, lawyers will be looking at the possibility that some distinctive sub-pattern in one or both of tomorrow’s cases (such as federal law’s recognition of the railroad industry as having a distinctively national workforce) might justify carving out an exception to its rule.

The stronger outcome would be for a united Court to say unambiguously, about its Daimler holding: we said it, and we meant it. 

Will Republicans Expand ObamaCare?

Back when the GOP was selecting its nominee for president last year, I warned my Republican friends that on ObamaCare, Donald Trump might be worse than Hillary Clinton:

Good ol’ partisanship would stop Hillary Clinton from expanding ObamaCare even a little. A faux opponent like Trump could co-opt congressional Republicans to expand it a lot.

I even quipped that a President Trump might sell out ObamaCare opponents for 10 feet of border wall.

It looks like my prediction was eerily accurate. Even as the House Republican leadership and President Trump claim they are moving legislation that would repeal and replace ObamaCare (it wouldn’t), Trump is offering to expand ObamaCare in return for Democratic cooperation in funding a new border wall.

ObamaCare requires participating insurers to offer more comprehensive coverage to low-income enrollees, with the understanding that Congress would compensate insurers for that added cost. The thing is, the Democratic Congress and president that enacted ObamaCare never appropriated funding for those so-called cost-sharing subsidies. President Obama initially recognized the lack of an appropriation, but then began issuing those subsidies anyway–because ObamaCare would have collapsed if he hadn’t.

By that time, Republicans had taken over the House of Representatives, and they sued the Obama administration in federal court for encroaching on Congress’ power of the purse by spending federal funds without an explicit appropriation. A federal judge sided with the House. She ruled that paying those cost-sharing subsidies “violates the Constitution,” and ordered that they stop, pending an appeal, which the Obama administration timely filed.

That was the state of play when President Trump took office. His administration now has three choices.

  1. It can declare that it agrees with the court’s ruling and enforce the court order. This would mean ending the illegal payments that are the only reason ObamaCare is still on the books. If Trump ends those illegal subsidies, it is likely that even more insurers will announce they are leaving the Exchanges. As I have written elsewhere, taking this step would create even more pressure on Congress to repeal ObamaCare, particularly the law’s community-rating price controls that are causing health insurance markets to collapse.
  2. It can appeal the lower court’s ruling. This is the strategy the Obama administration pursued. It would be an awkward step given that Trump’s attorney general Jeff Sessions and Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price have each stated they believe these payments are unconstitutional.
  3. It can ask Congress to appropriate the subsidies. This may be the most politically awkward option of all. It would mean the first legislative change that congressional Republicans and the Trump administration make to ObamaCare would not be to repeal it, but to expand it. Funding cost-sharing subsidies would mean Republicans would be providing more money for ObamaCare than a Democratic Congress did at the height of its power.

According to Reuters, the Trump administration has chosen option #3:

President Donald Trump put pressure on Democrats on Sunday as U.S. lawmakers worked to avoid a government shutdown, saying Obamacare would die without a cash infusion the White House has offered in exchange for their agreement to fund his border wall…

Spending legislation will require Democratic support to clear the Senate, and the White House says it has offered to include $7 billion in Obamacare subsidies to help low-income Americans pay for health insurance, if Democrats accept funding for the wall.

Don’t Compel Doctors to Promote State-Favored Programs

Like all states, California has licensed medical centers of every kind. One particular type, often known as a “crisis pregnancy center,” provides pregnancy-related services with the goal of helping women to make choices other than abortion. Based on opposition to these centers, the California legislature enacted a law requiring licensed clinics “whose primary purpose is providing family planning or pregnancy-related services” to deliver to each of their clients the following message: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.” But the law also creates an exception for clinics that actually enroll clients in these programs—so, in effect, it applies only to clinics that oppose the very program they must advertise.

Several of these crisis pregnancy centers sued to block the law, arguing that it violated their First Amendment rights by forcing them to express a message to which they are opposed. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the law, holding that it regulates only “professional speech” and therefore should be reviewed under a more deferential standard, rather than the normal strict judicial scrutiny that applies to laws compelling speech. The centers have petitioned the Supreme Court to review their case; Cato has filed a brief supporting that petition.

Internet Speech 2016: More Regulation Needed?

Election law expert Nathaniel Persily has written an interesting article about the Internet and the 2016 election. The problems Nate (and others) see in 2016 will inform the debate about free speech now and in future elections.

Persily notes that the 2016 campaign saw an “online explosion of campaign-relevant communication from all corners of cyberspace.” Here’s his description of the Trump campaign’s social media efforts:

Employing traditional web-based communication, event promotions, new apps, native advertising (in which web ads are designed to look like articles in the publication containing them), and new uses of social media, the campaign launched 4,000 different ad campaigns and placed 1.4 billion web impressions (meaning ads and other communications visible to individual users)…the campaign targeted 13.5 million persuadable voters in sixteen battleground states, discovering the hidden Trump voters, especially in the Midwest, whom the polls had ignored.”

Trump himself tweeted a great deal, having 13 million followers by election day. But the mainstream media also picked up the tweets and prompted wide discussion and attention to them. Trump garnered about $4 billion in free media during the primaries and the general election, an astonishing sum. The new media thus drove the agenda for the mainstream media; in the past, the latter shaped the agenda for everyone.

From a First Amendment perspective, 2016 saw more speech by more people than previous elections. The election also showed that you can win the White House without dominating fundraising, an outcome that weakens the case for campaign finance regulation. Both results seem good for free speech.

However, Nate Persily is a learned and sensible analyst, and his concerns about 2016 merit our attention.

Supreme Court Reaffirms the Presumption of Innocence

On Wednesday, the Supreme Court decided a relatively small but important case out of my home state of Colorado. Colorado, like many states, imposes certain monetary penalties and costs on convicted defendants. Those can include court costs, docket fees, and payments into victim restitution funds. What happens, however, if a defendant’s conviction is later overturned, either by a higher court or on a re-trial? Can the once-convicted defendants easily get their money back, as would seem to be only fair? Not in Colorado, which is (was) unique in requiring that exonerated defendants go to court again to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence before they could get their money back. Thankfully, the Supreme Court, in a 7-1 opinion (Justice Gorsuch only began participating in cases in the last two weeks), held that Colorado’s “Exoneration Act” violates the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Nelson v. Colorado is a combination of two different cases. One concerned Shannon Nelson, who was convicted by a jury of two felonies and three misdemeanors arising from the alleged sexual and physical abuse of her four children. Nelson conviction was reversed on appeal, however, and on retrial she was acquitted of all charges. In the course of her ordeal, Nelson paid $8,192.50 in costs and fees.

Louis Madden, the petitioner in the other case, was convicted of patronizing a child prostitute and third-degree sexual assault. His conviction was later overturned by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the state declined to retry the case. Madden paid the state $1,977.75 in the course of his legal troubles.

Although Madden and Nelson were innocent of their crimes in the eyes of the law–remember everyone is innocent until proven guilty by a legally proper trial (Cato’s brief in the case focused on the deep historical roots of the presumption of innocence)–they were faced with having to prove their innocence in a subsequent civil proceeding if they were to get their money back. Instead, they went all the way to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was unconstitutional to require them to do anything more to prove their innocence.

Writing for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made fairly short work of Colorado’s law. “The sole legal basis for these assessments was the fact of Nelson’s and Madden’s convictions,” she wrote, and “absent those convictions” Colorado has “no legal right to exact and retain petitioners’ funds.” Once the convictions were erased, “the presumption of their innocence was restored” and “Colorado may not presume a person adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary exactions.”

Eighteen Years After Columbine, What Have We Learned About Spree Shootings?

Eighteen years ago today, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris walked into Columbine High School and murdered 12 students and a teacher, as well as injuring dozens more people. The mayhem ended when the two killers took their own lives as police closed in.

The massacre, perpetrated with guns and rudimentary explosives, created a political firestorm. Music, video games, and especially guns became lightning rods for outrage and demands for new legislation. The controversy re-energized gun control advocates and spawned Michael Moore’s award-winning anti-gun film Bowling for Columbine. Hundreds of new gun control bills were introduced, although few became law.

Subsequent school shootings, such as Virginia Tech in 2007 and Newtown, Connecticut in 2012, have generated similar cycles of gun control fervor followed by demands for new laws, but the fundamental debate remains the same: what can we do to effectively mitigate the risk of such tragedies?

In 2015 David Kopel attempted to answer this question by analyzing the efficacy of the types of gun control proposals that are so common after school shootings, including magazine bans, universal background checks, and assault weapons bans. He found little evidence that gun control legislation has been or could be effective at preventing spree shootings.

From the summary:

Although universal background checks may sound appealing, the private sale of guns between strangers is a small percentage of overall gun sales. Worse, the background check bills are written so broadly that they would turn most gun owners into criminals for innocent acts — such as letting one’s sister borrow a gun for an afternoon of target shooting.

Magazine bans are acts of futility because the extant supply is enormous. Today, magazines of up to 20 rounds for handguns, and 30 rounds for rifles, are factory standard, not high-capacity, for many of the most commonly owned firearms. These magazines are popular with law-abiding Americans for the same reason they are so popular with law enforcement: because they are often the best choice for lawful defense of one’s self and others.

Gun-control advocates have been pushing for a ban on assault weapons for more than 25 years. This proposal is essentially a political gimmick that confuses people. That is because the term is an arbitrarily defined epithet. A federal ban was in place between 1994 and 2004, but Congress declined to renew it after studies showed it had no crime-reducing impact.

What has occasionally proven effective at stopping spree shootings is the armed self-defense of would-be victims or bystanders.  Kopel notes, for instance, that shootings at Pearl High School in Mississippi and at Appalachian School of Law in Virginia were halted by armed bystanders.

Highly motivated killers who plan their attacks weeks or months in advance (as Klebold and Harris did) have an inherent advantage over their unarmed victims, and are unlikely to ever be deterred by criminal penalties. The best examples of these crimes being stopped in their tracks are examples of armed defense, not legislative preemption.

Notably, the Columbine tragedy did produce one effective policy change, but it wasn’t about guns. 

At the time of the shooting, standard police procedure for an active shooting situation was for the officer on the scene to cordon off the area and await the arrival of a SWAT team or other specialized unit to handle the crisis.

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