Topic: International Economics, Development & Immigration

Senate GOP Bill Doesn’t Extend TPS. It Guts It

President Trump announced on Saturday that he had a new plan to open government that includes “a three-year extension of temporary protected status or TPS.” But as in the case of DACA—for reasons I explained here—the actual legislation that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell introduced to implement his proposal does not extend TPS. Rather, it ends it as it exists now, and replaces with an entirely different program with much more restrictive criteria.

Temporary protective status, or TPS, is granted to nationals of country where the government feels it could not, at one time or another, send people back to due to a crisis in those countries, such as a war or natural disaster. Cribbing a lot from what I’ve already written about the DACA provisions of this bill, here is a list of the changes to TPS in the bill:

  1. Ends TPS for 5 of the 9 TPS countries: Under President Trump, the government has terminated TPS for Nepal, Sierre Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Sudan, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Yet only the last four nationalities will benefit from this bill at all (p. 1256). To treat this bill as if it reverses Trump’s decisions is incorrect. It maintains the majority of them—notably for Africans who President Trump denigrated in a White House meeting last year.
  2. TPS recipients will lose their jobs: TPS extensions of work authorization are automatically extended but p. 1271 of this bill requires TPS recipients to apply for an entirely new work authorization (p. 1277), meaning that unless courts protect them, there will be a major gap in work eligibility. This is especially true because the government can take a year to enact this new program, virtually guaranteeing that everyone with TPS right now will lose their jobs.
  3. TPS recipients must reapply for initial status: When the government extends TPS, renewals of status are free. But this legislation requires a fee to apply to continue in status (p. 1265). Reapplying for initial status also requires that they reprove their eligibility, which is a costly process and often requires hiring an attorney.
  4. Much higher evidentiary burden: Reapplying will become even more onerous because p. 1256 increases the evidentiary standard to prove eligibility to receive TPS from a “preponderance of the evidence” to “clear and convincing.” The only higher standard of proof in the law is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” People win multi-million judgments based on the preponderance of the evidence standardClear and convincing is often used for cases like withdrawing life support. In the immigration context, USCIS explains that preponderance of the evidence is usually the standard—meaning that “even if the director has some doubt as to the truth,” he should approve “if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is ‘probably true’ or ‘more likely than not.’” Clear and convincing is used rarely for cases like “to rebut the presumption of a prior fraudulent marriage” (i.e. for applicants the government has reason to be suspicious of). TPS recipients proving that they entered before 2011 or that they resided continuously, for example, just became much more difficult under this legislation.
  5. Massively Increases TPS Application Cost: P. 1243 contains a fine or penalty but rebrands it as a $500 “security fee” to pay for Trump’s “wall.” This is despite the fact that many TPS recipients entered legally and were stranded after hurricanes or earthquakes hit their home countries. This fine comes on top of the normal fees for processing the application, and it essentially increases the cost of the $50 application for TPS status by tenfold. It basically doubles the $495 cost of an extension of TPS work authorization.
  6. Minimum income requirement: P. 1261 would require that TPS recipients prove—again by clear and convincing evidence—that, unless they are a student, they can maintain an income of at least 125 percent of the poverty level during their time in the United States. TPS now has no such requirement. That means retirees, stay-at-home mothers, disabled people, etc. would not be eligible for TPS anymore.
  7. Pay back legally-obtained tax credits: In one of the most bizarre provisions, p. 1262 requires TPS applicants to pay to the U.S. Treasury the value of any legally-obtained tax credits that they have received. This could be thousands of dollars that have already been spent. Not only is this provision not in TPS, it is totally unprecedented in immigration law and would massively increase the cost for many applicants, particularly those with children.
  8. Bars those with pending criminal charges: TPS requires a conviction of a felony or two or more misdemeanors committed in the United States, not a mere charge for any offense at all. Many misdemeanors include minor traffic offenses. But p. 1260 renders anyone with a pending charge ineligible for the new status, even though a conviction for a single misdemeanor wouldn’t make the person ineligible anyway. Given that there’s only a six-month window to apply, this would prevent people from being able to apply at all.
  9. Bars employment “contrary to the national interest”: TPS applicants would now have to prove—by clear and convincing evidence—that their employment would not be “contrary to the national interest” (p. 1271). This provision is bizarre since the purpose of authorizing their employment is that they need to be able to support themselves, which should be always in the national interest, but under the Trump administration, the government may not see it this way.
  10. Keeps TPS recipients from getting permanent residence: Illegal immigrants who also entered illegally cannot adjust their status to legal permanent residence even if they are eligible due to (typically) a marriage to a U.S. citizen. They need to register a legal entry first. Tens of thousands of illegal immigrants received legal permanent residence in this manner under DACA, which offers a similar status to TPS. P. 1273 bars this practice by deeming such entries not a legal “admission” for purposes of adjusting status.
  11. The new status cannot be extended: Unlike TPS, this new status could never be extended by a future administration. All applications must be filed in a 6-month window (p. 1263), and the status would expire after 3 years (p. 1270).
  12. All illegal immigrants are banned from TPS in the future: P. 1275 would create a permanent change to the TPS program, banning anyone who is not lawfully present in the United States from TPS going forward. In other words, no future administration could ever use TPS to grant legal status to someone in the country illegally, even if deporting them was simply not an option.

Once again, this legislation should not be described as an extension of TPS when, in fact, it guts the program for existing recipients and removes it as an option for many future immigrants as well. This legislation does not follow through on the president’s promise.

Senate GOP Bill Doesn’t Extend DACA. It Guts It

This weekend, President Trump promised to an “extension” of DACA for the “700,000 DACA recipients brought here unlawfully by their parents at a young age many years ago.” But the Senate bill that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell introduced to implement his deal does not extend DACA but rather replaces it with a totally different program that will exclude untold thousands of Dreamers who would have been eligible under DACA. It is important to remember that all of these requirements are for less than 3 years of relief from deportation and work authorization, not a pathway to citizenship.

Here is a list of some of the changes:

  1. Requires Dreamers to reapply: P. 1235 requires Dreamers already in good standing in DACA to reapply for status, even though DACA would have allowed them simply to renew their status without refiling all of their paperwork and evidence. This requirement is a substantial burden, and most applicants will end up having to hire immigration attorneys to fulfill it.
  2. Much higher evidentiary burden: P. 1235 increases the evidentiary standard for Dreamers to prove their eligibility to receive DACA from a “preponderance of the evidence” to “clear and convincing.” The only higher standard of proof in the law is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” People win multi-million judgments based on the preponderance of the evidence standard. Clear and convincing is often used for cases like withdrawing life support. In the immigration context, USCIS explains that preponderance of the evidence is usually the standard—meaning that “even if the director has some doubt as to the truth,” he should approve “if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is ‘probably true’ or ‘more likely than not.’” Clear and convincing is used rarely for cases like “to rebut the presumption of a prior fraudulent marriage” (i.e. for applicants the government has reason to be suspicious of). Dreamers proving that they entered before June 2007 or that they resided continuously, for example, just became much more difficult under this legislation.
  3. Imposes a Monetary Fine/Doubles Application Cost: DACA, the Dream Act, and other proposals to legalize Dreamers have usually left off the monetary fine for being in the country illegally that proposals to legalize other immigrants have customarily had. This is because no one—including Trump—blames Dreamers for being in the country illegally. They were brought here as children. Yet this bill does contain a fine or penalty but rebrands it as a $500 “security fee” (p. 1243). This fine comes on top of the normal fees for processing the application, and it essentially doubles the cost of the currently $495 application. According to the Migration Policy Institute’s analysis of why eligible Dreamers didn’t apply for DACA, not having $500 cash was the number 1 reason. Anecdotes from Dreamers themselves support this.
  4. “Public charge” rule: P. 1238 applies the public charge ground of inadmissibility in INA 212(a)(4) to Dreamers—something DACA did not require. While DACA recipients are currently ineligible, and would remain ineligible under this bill, for almost all federal benefits, the Trump administration’s pending public charge rule would ban anyone who is even 5 percent dependent on any level of government, even state or local aid, from receiving legal status. This could include numerous Dreamers in states such as California and New York, which offer state benefits to Dreamers. Dreamers in DACA have grown up in America since a very young age and have lived in the country for over a decade. They are Americans. Treating them as if they are new immigrants does not represent the view of most Americans.
  5. Minimum income requirement: P. 1239 would further require that Dreamers prove—again by clear and convincing evidence—that, unless they are a student, they can maintain an income of at least 125 percent of the poverty level during their time in the United States. DACA had no such requirement, and it would result in banning numerous Dreamers currently in DACA.
  6. Pay back legally-obtained tax credits: P. 1239 requires Dreamers to pay to the U.S. Treasury the value of any legally-obtained tax credits that they have received. Not only is this provision not in DACA, it is totally unprecedented in immigration law and would massively increase the cost for many applicants, particularly those with children.
  7. Excludes Dreamers who ever claimed to be U.S. citizens: Unlike DACA, P. 1238 also applies the ground of inadmissibility in INA 212(a)(6)(C) for those Dreamers who ever claimed to be a U.S. citizen. This is an exceptionally common phenomenon because many Dreamers don’t ever realize that they are here illegally until they claim otherwise.
  8. Excludes Dreamers with removal orders: Unlike DACA, P. 1238-9 would ban Dreamers who are in the country illegally due to a prior order of removal. Given that the whole point of DACA and similar programs are to give people here illegally legal status, this provision makes little sense and is solely designed to keep out Dreamers.
  9. Excludes Dreamers not in DACA: Nearly half of all Dreamers have dropped out of DACA or never applied in the first place, possibly due to fear of what Presidents Trump or Obama would do with their information or for costs or other reasons. Moreover, other Dreamers “age-in” to the program when they turn 15 (younger immigrants cannot apply). P. 1239 makes it clear that anyone not currently in DACA cannot apply—another huge change from the DACA program.
  10. Keeps Dreamers from getting permanent residence: Illegal immigrants who also entered illegally cannot adjust their status to legal permanent residence even if they are eligible due to (typically) a marriage to a U.S. citizen. They need to register a legal entry first. DACA allowed them to travel and reenter, which permitted tens of thousands to receive legal permanent residence. P. 1252 bars this practice by deeming such entries not a legal “admission” for purposes of adjusting status.
  11. Dreamers cannot renew status: P. 1240 grants a 3-year status that cannot ever be renewed. This is a huge departure from DACA, which—despite giving just a 2-year status—has allowed renewals for 7 years already.

These are just some of the many changes that the bill makes to the DACA program. Commentators should not describe this bill as “extending DACA” or even extending that status of DACA recipients. This is an entirely new program and an entirely new status.

Trump’s $8.7 Billion Price for 3 Years of DACA & TPS Values Full Legalization at $2 Trillion

President Trump offered Democrats a new deal to reopen the government this weekend. The main components would see the president get nearly $8.7 billion for the wall and immigration enforcement and Democrats in Congress get to temporarily reverse his decisions to end legal protections for immigrants with DACA and Temporary Protective Status (TPS). Democratic leadership in the House and Senate have already rejected the offer, and while it is unlikely to pass the Senate and even less likely to pass in the House, the Senate will vote on his proposal anyway this week.

Based on Trump’s comments on Saturday and the White House outline, the legislation would:

  • extend status for three years for a million immigrants already in DACA and TPS (mainly immigrants stranded in the United States after earthquakes in El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti);
  • spend $5.7 billion to construct as much as 234 miles of massive border barriers at a cost of $24.4 million per mile;
  • spend another $2.95 billion to:
    • inspect for drugs at ports of entry;
    • hire 75 deportation judges to speed up the currently slow deportation process;
    • employ 2,750 more Border Patrol and “law enforcement” agents (i.e. deportation ICE agents); and
    • fund medical inspections and “temporary housing” (i.e. detention of migrants);
    • change immigration law to allow immediate deportations of children from Central America; and
    • provide a very limited pathway to apply for status in their home countries.

It’s not a fair deal, as Trump can spend the rest of his life basking in the shadow of his vanity project, but the immigrants get only a 3-year reprieve from the de facto deportation orders that Trump himself issued when he canceled their statuses. A permanent status is the only fair trade for a permanent wall. 

Moreover, President Trump’s annual price for letting the immigrants remain is about $2.9 billion ($8.7 billion/3 years), placing the price of lifetime protections at about $190 billion ($2.9 billion times 65 years). DACA and TPS recipients represent less than 10 percent of the entire illegal immigrant population. If Democrats give Trump his price for these immigrants, they would be accepting a valuation of permanent legalization for all illegal immigrants of about $2 trillion. And that is without any pathway to citizenship, more deportations, and fewer protections for children at the border.

Trump’s deal might be his best official offer yet, as it drops his demands for cuts to legal immigration, but it is so far from anything reasonable or politically feasible that it seems like it is more a product of negotiations within the White House—between Jared Kushner, Mike Pence, and Stephen Miller—than between Democrats and Republicans in Congress.

What the Government Is Doing to “Solve” Its “Humanitarian Crisis” at the Border

In his oval office speech, President Trump had this to say about immigrants:

This is a humanitarian crisis — a crisis of the heart and a crisis of the soul. Last month, 20,000 migrant children were illegally brought into the United States — a dramatic increase. These children are used as human pawns by vicious coyotes and ruthless gangs. One in three women are sexually assaulted on the dangerous trek up through Mexico. Women and children are the biggest victims, by far, of our broken system. This is the tragic reality of illegal immigration on our southern border. This is the cycle of human suffering that I am determined to end.

Here’s what his administration is doing to protect these women and children:

Previously, the administration had separated women from their children in order to criminally prosecute them for entering the country illegally.

New Immigrants Are More Culturally Different than They Used to Be

Native-born American concerns about immigration are primarily about how immigration will affect the culture of the country as a whole and, to a lesser extent, how the newcomers will affect the economy.  One’s personal economic situation is not a major factor.  It’s reasonable to assume that the degree of cultural difference between native-born Americans and new immigrants affects the degree of cultural concern.  Thus, Americans would likely be less concerned over immigrants from Canada or Singapore than they would be over immigrants from Egypt or Azerbaijan. 

A large team of psychologists recently created an index of the cultural distance of people from numerous countries around the world relative to the United States.  The index is constructed from responses to the World Values Survey as well as linguistic and geographical distances.  Their index includes numerous different psychological facts such as individualism, power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation, indulgence, harmony, mastery, embeddedness, hierarchy, egalitarian, autonomy, tolerance for deviant behavior, norm enforcement, openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, creativity, altruism, and obedience.  These are all explained in more detail in the paper.

Their paper has an index where lower numbers indicate a culture more similar to that of the United States while a higher number indicates a culture more distant from that of the United States.  As some extreme examples, Canada’s cultural distance score is 0.025 and Egypt’s is 0.24. 

Using the cultural distance index, I calculated the cultural distance of the stock of immigrants in the United States in 2015 from native-born Americans.  I then compared the cultural distance of the stock to the cultural distance of the flow of immigrants who arrived in 2012-2015.  The immigration figures come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau.  If the stock of immigrants in 2015 was more culturally similar to native-born Americans than the flow, then the recent flow is more culturally distinct.  If the stock of immigrants in 2015 was more culturally different from native-born Americans than the flow, then the recent flow is less culturally distinct. 

Table 1 shows the results.  The immigrant flow in 2012-2015 is more culturally different from native-born Americans than the stock of immigrants was in 2015.  In other words, today’s newest immigrants are more different than those from the relatively recent past.  Relative to the stock, the cultural distinctiveness of the flow in 2012-2015 was greater by about one-fourth of a standard deviation.  In other words, the stock of American immigrants in 2015 was very culturally similar to people from Trinidad and Tobago (0.099) while the flow of new immigrants who arrived from 2012-2015 more similar to Romanians (0.11).

Table 1

Cultural Distance of Immigrants Relative to Native-Born Americans

  Cultural Distance
Immigrant Stock 0.10
Immigrant Flow 0.11

Sources: WEIRD Index, ASEC, and author’s calculations.

There are a few problems with my above calculations.  First, those who choose to move here are likely more similar to Americans than those who do not.  There is obviously some difference in cultural values inside of a country as the average person does not choose to emigrate to the United States.  Second, American immigration laws likely select immigrants with similar cultural values through various means such as favoring the family members of Americans and those hired by American firms.  It’s reasonable to assume that foreigners who marry Americans and who are hired by American firms are more culturally similar than the average person from those countries.  Third, the cultural distance index only covers about two-thirds of the immigrant population in the United States.  It is possible that countries not on the list could shift the score significantly in either direction.

New immigrants to the United States are more culturally different than those of the past, but not by much.  This increase in the cultural difference of new immigrants could have had an outsized impact on Trump voters in 2016, but immigration overall is more popular with Americans than it used to be.

Brexit: What Now?

Two huge developments on Brexit this week.

First, Theresa May’s disastrous EU Withdrawal Agreement (negotiated and endorsed by the EU) suffered a crushing defeat in Parliament, going down by 432 votes to 202. This was a fundamental rejection of a deal with a host of problems. Under any normal circumstances, such a mammoth loss on a key policy would have ended a Prime Minister and a government.

Second, the leader of the opposition, Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn, called a subsequent vote of “no confidence” in the government. But with Brexiteers, including the Northern Irish DUP, swinging back behind the Prime Minister to avoid the possibility of a general election, the government survived (by 325 to 306).

What happens now? The default, set out by law, is that the U.K. leaves the EU on March 29th with or without a deal. It is well documented that there is a clear majority in Parliament who want to avoid leaving without a deal. But there is no clear majority for any of the options necessary to prevent a no deal exit.

I spent some time looking at the parliamentary arithmetic last night, from the perspective of Theresa May. She says that she a) wants to avoid no deal but b) wants to ensure she delivers Brexit. And there is no obvious means of achieving both of these goals.

Option 1: Operation Engage Conservatives

Her first option is to try to get more Conservatives on board to support a Withdrawal Agreement. But the difficulty of her being able to do so is set out by the graphic below. The Brexiteer Conservative rebels either want to completely throw out the Withdrawal Agreement for something new, remove a key provision (the backstop) or else simply leave without a deal. Given the EU has said publicly it will not renegotiate or remove the backstop, this seems a dead end unless May is willing to countenance no deal seriously.

The polling suggests that the Brexiteers were right about the politics up front – if the Prime Minister had pursued an “extensive Free Trade Agreement” Brexit and had not got bogged down in the complex arrangements she’d agreed, then a majority could just about have been eeked through on Conservative and DUP votes, with a smattering of Labour rebels (the no deal and no backstop crowds would have accepted it).

But we are where we are. Unless the EU is willing to reopen negotiations and offer a Canada+ deal for the whole of the UK (ending provisions to treat Northern Ireland differently) then tacking towards Brexiteers is endorsing the prospect of no deal, which May says she does not want.

It remains to be seen, of course, how many of these Brexiteers would actively support delivering Brexit through no deal if the EU rebuffed the opportunity to renegotiate outright. But through revealed preference (rejecting the Withdrawal Agreement), they have surely shown they are willing to countenance that risk.

One clear conclusion of this polling of Conservative rebels though is that there are only a tiny number of additional Conservative votes to be gained from a softer Brexit (single market *and* customs union membership – so-called Norway Plus). Given the commentariat all seem to think this week’s events must result in a softer Brexit, that means…

Option 2: Operation Engage The Opposition Parties

The second option is to give up on Conservative votes and try to reach out to opposition parties. Theresa May has offered Parliamentary talks to their leaders, and other groups of senior Parliamentarians. So far though, the leaders of the Labour party, the Lib Dems and the SNP have all said that their key demand is “taking no deal off the table.” Given no deal is the default Brexit, that essentially means “take guaranteeing Brexit off the table,” something the Prime Minister cannot do without her government likely falling.

The problem with dealing with the opposition parties is that they themselves are divided into two broad camps over what to do next.

Yesterday, 71 of 256 Labour MPs joined the campaign for a second referendum. Add in the Lib Dems, the SNP, the Green, a smattering of Independents who want this too and, say, 20 Conservatives, and there’s still only a combined circa 150 in the Chamber who are strongly for a fresh public vote. Even if the government went in this direction, and took the payroll vote with it, that would not command a majority in the chamber either. An overwhelming number of Conservative and Labour MPs in working class seats still by-and-large oppose a 2016 rerun. This could only happen if the Labour front-bench shift their position.

But the only other option that opposition parties might be interested in is a much softer Brexit: either a full, permanent customs union (Labour’s official position) or a Norway style option. Given 150 MPs would prefer a second referendum, it is unclear how many would opt for this if it was available. The only means of getting it through seems to be with Labour front-bench support, giving blessing to large numbers of Labour MPs to vote with the government. That would tear the Conservative party apart and probably guarantee a defeat in the next election, which would naturally appeal to Labour. But on the flipside, large numbers of Labour MPs in Leave constituencies would consider it highly risky as much of the media would describe as Brexit In Name Only, and the completely unreconciled Remainers would reject it for not fully ending Brexit.

Conclusion

Over the coming weeks, Parliament will likely host lots of indicative votes on all these options. The government has to bring forward a revised motion and try again. But so far the Prime Minister appears unwilling to change much of substance, and it’s not clear where she turns.

Crucial now will be the sequencing of votes by MPs for alternatives. If it gets to a stage where it’s the prospect of no deal against the last perceived line of defense against that happening, then Remainers and soft Brexiteers could unite. For now though, they are hopelessly divided too. Absent further constitutional vandalism endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Commons (a strong possibility), I still believe a no deal Brexit is highly possible, despite media claims to the contrary.

New Bill Would Stop Eminent Domain Abuse Along the Border

President Trump’s proposed border wall would cut across nearly a thousand miles of privately owned land, so to build this project, the administration would need to use eminent domain to seize the land—something that the president is eager to do. Aside from the unpleasantness of taking people’s property without their consent, federal eminent domain use comes with it a particularly obnoxious component: the government can take the land but not provide just compensation until years later. New legislation would stop this practice.

As I wrote in 2017:

Right now, when Border Patrol wants to take someone’s land, they send them a letter offering them a nominal low sum of money for their land and threatening to file condemnation proceedings against them if they don’t accept it… . [But] under the eminent domain statute, the federal government can seize property almost as soon as it files a condemnation proceeding—as soon as the legal authority for the taking is established—then they can haggle over just compensation later.

It’s called “quick take.” Quick take eminent domain creates multiple perverse incentives for the government. 1) It can quickly take land, even when it doesn’t really need it, and 2) it has no real incentive to compromise or work with the land owner on compensation. The owner’s bargaining power is significantly diminished. The federal government already possesses the property. This means that for years, people who are subject to a border wall taking go without just compensation.

An NPR analysis of fence cases found that the resolved cases took more than 3 years to resolve. In many other cases, the process took more than a decade for a court to determine just compensation, and some cases are still pending more than 12 years later. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has determined that this “quick take” eminent domain does not violate the 5th amendment requirement that no “private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The reasoning is that as long as the person will eventually get compensation, the taking is constitutional.

The awful component of this process is that, in order to challenge the taking, the property owner must not accept the offered payment. But the border wall will go up on their land just the same. Meanwhile, they have to fight in court without getting the compensation that they deserve. Many people cannot even afford to challenge the taking for this reason alone.

Today, Rep. Justin Amash (R-MI) introduced the Eminent Domain Just Compensation Act to deal with just this issue. “It is unjust for the government to seize someone’s property with a lowball offer and then put the burden on them to fight for what they’re still owed,” Rep. Amash said in a statement. “My bill will stop this practice by requiring that a property’s fair value be finalized before DHS takes ownership.”

It makes this reform by amending Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1103), which details the powers of the Secretary of Homeland Security.  Current law provides that:

The [Secretary of Homeland Security] may contract for or buy any interest in land, including temporary use rights, adjacent to or in the vicinity of an international land border when the [Secretary] deems the land essential to control and guard the boundaries and borders of the United States against any violation… When the [Secretary] and the lawful owner of an interest identified pursuant to paragraph (1) are unable to agree upon a reasonable price, the [Secretary] may commence condemnation proceedings pursuant to section 3113 of title 40.

The Eminent Domain Just Compensation Act would amend this provision by adding that: “the Government may not take any land prior to the issuance of a final judgment pursuant to the proceedings under section 3113 of such title.’’ This language forecloses the opportunity for the Trump administration to seize land quickly for the president’s unnecessary, ineffective, and costly border wall without first fully compensating the owners. 

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