Topic: International Economics, Development & Immigration

New Rule to Deny Status to Immigrants Up to 95% Self-Sufficient

The Trump administration has finally published its long awaited proposed regulation that expands a current rule denying applications to immigrants it deems “public charges”—that is, people who are likely to rely on the government for their support in the United States. As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) explains in its proposed new rule.

The primary benefit of the proposed rule would be to help ensure that aliens who apply for admission to the United States, seek extension of stay or change of status, or apply for adjustment of status are self-sufficient, i.e. do not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their family, sponsor, and private organizations.

My colleagues at the Cato Institute have repeatedly urged proposals that would lead to this same result. Indeed, we believe that this goal should apply to all people regardless of immigration status. For decades, we have proposed to build a wall around the welfare state, not around the country. However, while this version of the rule significantly improves upon a draft version leaked to the public earlier this year – which I commented on here – it unfortunately still retains many of the same problems as the first version. These defects will seriously undermine any fiscal benefits that the rule could provide.

Background

As I’ve explained before, since 1891, federal immigration law has denied visas or status to foreigners deemed “likely to become a public charge” in the United States. The likely public charge law does not directly prevent immigrants from legally receiving welfare. Rather, it prevents them from receiving legal status in the United States if a government bureaucrat predicts that they could end up at some point in the future depending on welfare that the law allows them to receive. This draft rule would alter the procedures governing how DHS bureaucrats make these likely public charge predictions. It would apply to anyone in the United States applying to adjust or extend their status in the country or those seeking to enter the country for the first time.

DHS’s current guidance from 1999 defines public charge to mean “primarily dependent” on welfare, as demonstrated by the receipt of certain cash welfare programs. This new rule would redefine the term to mean receipt of any government assistance in any amount greater than 15 percent of the poverty line over the course of any year of their lives (or the use of certain programs for more than 1 year). To predict the likelihood of future use, the rule requires adjudicators to consider a list of seven factors and at least 19 pieces of evidence.

A Contemporary Economist’s Account of the “Crowning Folly of Tariff of 1930”

“[T]here came another folly of government intervention in 1930 transcending all the rest in significance. In a world staggering under a load of international debt which could be carried only if countries under pressure could produce goods and export them to their creditors, we, the great creditor nation of the world, with tariffs already far too high, raised our tariffs again. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of June 1930 was the crowning folly of the who period from 1920 to 1933….

Protectionism ran wild all over the world.  Markets were cut off.  Trade lines were narrowed.  Unemployment in the export industries all over the world grew with great rapidity, and the prices of export commodities, notably farm commodities in the United States, dropped with ominous rapidity….

The dangers of this measure were so well understood in financial circles that, up to the very last, the New York financial district retained hope the President Hoover would veto the tariff bill.  But late on Sunday, June 15, it was announced that he would sign the bill. This was headline news Monday morning. The stock market broke twelve points in the New York Time averages that day and the industrials broke nearly twenty points. The market, not the President, was right.”

– Dr. Benjamin M. Anderson [chief economist at Chase National Bank 1920-39], Economics and the Public Welfare: A Financial and Economic History of the United States, 1914-1946 (Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 1979, pp. 229-230)

CIS’s Inaccurate Response to Cato Brief on ICE Detainers for Americans

Dan Cadman of the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) has written a blog post purporting to identify issues in a short brief that I wrote about U.S. citizens in Texas for whom ICE filed detainers. In it, he makes numerous inaccurate and unsupported assertions. Cadman presents zero evidence to rebut the conclusion of the brief and instead accuses an ICE supervisory officer of perjury because his statements fail to support Cadman’s position.

My brief uses data from Travis County, Texas to identify people who claimed U.S. citizenship and presented Social Security Numbers to local authorities, but ICE submitted a detainer request for them anyway, only to later cancel or not execute it. Cadman responds:

While it’s true that people who later prove to be U.S. citizens sometimes find themselves in removal proceedings (something I’ve previously commented on and explained), most often this occurs because an individual doesn’t even know he is a U.S. citizen…

In his link in support of his “most often” claim, he cites a single case where the person didn’t know he was a U.S. citizen, while we know of many individual cases in which detainers were filed for U.S. citizens who asserted their citizenship at the start of the process (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, etc.). In any case, every person in my brief asserted U.S. citizenship at the outset from the time of their booking by Travis County Sheriff’s Office until ICE finally cancelled their detainer. Cadman continues:

[Bier] would have us believe that ICE agents actively “target” American citizens even though it is clear that they have no hand at all into what individuals are arrested by police and booked into Travis County (or any Texas) jail, and merely respond to the information passed to them as a consequence.

I never claimed that ICE agents “actively” seek out people who they know are American citizens. As I wrote in the executive summary of my brief, I state that these are “mistakes” that ICE only belated attempts to correct. In any case, if a law enforcement agency arrests hundreds of innocent people, it is perfectly legitimate to say that hundreds of “innocent people” were targeted by that agency, even if the individual agents didn’t know or intend to target innocent people. Moreover, it is incorrect to claim that ICE agents “merely respond to information passed to them”—Travis County Sheriff’s Office doesn’t make assessments of removability or citizenship, nor do they issue detainers. ICE makes those determinations.

Cadman attempts to argue that even though ICE canceled the detainers for these people, we cannot suppose that it was because they were U.S. citizens. He attempts to sketch out what he believes is happening:

ICE agents don’t, nor should they, always accept such assertions [of U.S. citizenship] at face value because they know the frequency with which false claims are made. One strategy they exercise is to immediately file the detainer while concurrently obtaining the release date of the individual being held by the police. They then work against the clock to either verify the claim or disprove it… . Keep in mind that when ICE agents withdraw a detainer, it doesn’t mean the claim isn’t false — it just means they couldn’t break it in the time frame they had to investigate.

If this is what ICE agents are doing, it would violate current ICE policies, which require agents to issue detainers based on what they believe to be is “probable cause” of removability. A simple assertion of U.S. citizenship would never overcome a determination based on actual probable cause (such as a biometric record of a prior deportation). In the bad days before even agent-determined probable cause was required, an assertion of U.S. citizenship would not have triggered cancelation either. Again, ICE would require the U.S. citizen to substantiate the claim first.

Cadman’s scenario implies that ICE agents are issuing detainers for people claiming U.S. citizenship based on their gut instincts and then hoping to prove that the person is lying before they are released. If this is what is occurring, it would indeed explain why U.S. citizens are regularly targeted by ICE as well as showing that the agency is breaking its own policy. That is a poor defense of ICE’s actions.

In any case, my brief quoted court testimony under oath from ICE Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer John Drane from Rhode Island stating that, in fact, a detainer canceled for a person claiming U.S. citizenship is almost certainly because they were a U.S. citizen. Cadman responds:

while even ICE agents in the northeast would not be completely immune to the phenomenon of false claims, the claims would be of a significantly smaller scale and different character from those in Texas. This would certainly have had an impact on how Drane framed his response to the question of withdrawing a detainer, because his experiences would be nothing like those of ICE agents working in south or central Texas.

This is simply incorrect. The rate of U.S. citizenship claims overall was actually higher in Rhode Island around this time (7.2 percent) than in Travis County (5.7 percent), so Drane dealt with the same issue: some people do make false claims, while others, including the litigant in the case, make valid claims of U.S. citizenship when targeted with detainers. Cadman continues:

The time frame of Drane’s deposition (April 2015) is also significant. In November 2014, President Obama and then-Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson announced a host of new “executive actions” that would govern how immigration agencies administered their responsibilities… . . many detainers were withdrawn as not meeting the new criteria of criminality drawn up by Secretary Johnson and his cohorts… .

Cadman presents no data or even anecdotes to support the claim that many detainers were withdrawn due to the Jeh Johnson enforcement criteria. In fact, the Johnson policies changed the criteria for issuing a detainer, so detainers for people who were not subject to enforcement priorities were not issued to begin with, leading to a significant decline in detainers issued. In any case, 90 percent of the U.S. citizens identified in my brief were targeted before Johnson’s new enforcement priorities were in effect or after the Trump administration rescinded them. In addition, the rate of cancelations for people claiming U.S. citizenship actually decreased during those years. Cadman continues:

It’s not a surprise that Drane avoided speaking to these very real, very major reasons that many detainers were withdrawn by ICE. One can surmise that he sidestepped the issue of agents being obliged to cancel detainers under the imposed-from-above priority system for fear of his job.

Here, Cadman actually accuses an ICE supervisory agent of lying under oath to avoid disclosing the reasons for the detainer cancelations. I don’t understand how Cadman can have complete faith in ICE under some circumstances while assuming the worst about them in others without any evidence. More importantly, Cadman’s claims about Drane are simply false. He has zero incentive to lie. The Obama administration was not hiding its looser enforcement policies in 2015—it was bragging about them. More importantly, in the context of this case, Drane is admitting something that would place blame on his office for wrongfully targeting U.S. citizens—something that the Obama administration would certainly not want to disclose. Lastly, why would he risk potential jail time by perjuring himself on this point? It simply makes no sense. Cadman concludes:

Bier has taken what are clearly dubious conclusions about the number of U.S. citizens against whom detainers were filed in the Travis County jail after arrest for criminal offenses, and then through extrapolation and aggregation, applied them to assert that, if this many were caught up in ICE “targeting” of citizens in the county, then as a matter of simple multiplication one can derive how many U.S. citizens must have been “targeted” statewide… . . Each county and each state is sufficiently unique in population and demographics that using any one of them to extrapolate to a whole is different entirely than using legitimate random sampling techniques.

Cadman is correct that a state-wide random sample would provide far more useful data. Every county in Texas should release this information if they have it. But the data that we do have allow us to learn something about Travis County, at a minimum. Maybe Travis County is an outlier in either direction, we simply don’t know, but I never claimed that my extrapolation from Travis County to the whole state of Texas is anything but an estimate.

Travis County, Texas is the third largest recipient of detainers in the state of Texas, providing a significant sample of the detainers in the state. Moreover, the dynamics in Travis County are substantially similar to other counties in Texas—all are fairly close to the border and all are subject to Texas law with regard to immigration enforcement. Cadman takes issue with my hedging this extrapolation, but that is simply what prudent analysts do when the evidence is incomplete.

My brief shows that ICE often issues detainer requests for people who claim U.S. citizenship and present Social Security Numbers to local authorities, only to then cancel those requests. The best explanation—based on ICE policies and ICE testimony—is that ICE issued detainers for hundreds of U.S. citizens. It is noteworthy that ICE itself in a statement to the Washington Post did not use any of Cadman’s poor defenses, but only asserted that it works to improve its processes over time. That may be true, but severe deficiencies still remain.

E-Verify Wouldn’t Have Prevented Mollie Tibbetts’ Murder

Shortly after Iowa prosecutors charged illegal immigrant Christian Rivera with the murder of Molly Tibbetts in August, his Iowa employer erroneously stated that E-Verify had approved him for legal work. That later turned out to be false as his employer, Yarrabee Farms, ran his name and Social Security Number (SSN) through another system called Social Security Number Verification Service (SSNVS) that merely verified that the name and number matched, not E-Verify.  That mix-up has inspired many to argue that an E-Verify mandate for all new hires would have stopped Rivera from working and, thus, prevented the murder of Mollie Tibbetts.  That’s almost certainly not true.  New details reveal that E-Verify would likely not have prevented Rivera from working.    

E-Verify is an electronic eligibility for employment verification system run by the federal government at taxpayer expense. Created as a pilot program in 1996, E-Verify is intended to prevent the hiring of illegal immigrants by verifying the identity information they submit for employment against federal government databases in the Social Security Administration and Department of Homeland Security.  The theory behind E-Verify is that illegal immigrants won’t have the identity documents to pass E-Verify (hold your laughter) so they won’t be able to work, thus sending them all home and preventing more from coming.  That naïve theory fails when confronted with the reality of the Rivera case.

Rivera submitted the name John Budd on an out of state drivers license and an SSN that matched that name to his employer, Yarrabee Farms, when he was hired in 2014.  Yarrabee Farms ran the SSN and name John Budd through the Social Security Number Verification Service (SSNVS) to guarantee that they matched for tax purposes (Yarrabee Farms confused SSNVS with E-Verify).  SSNVS matched the name with the SSN and approved Rivera-disguised-as-Budd to work. 

E-Verify would also have matched the name with the SSN and approved Rivera for work.  The systematic design flaw in E-Verify is that it only verifies the documents that a worker hands his employers, not the worker himself.  Thus, if an illegal immigrant hands the identity documents of an American citizen to an E-Verify-using employer then it verifies the documents and the worker with the documents gets the job – just as happened here with Rivera handing Yarrabee Farms the identity of John Budd.  That’s why 54 percent of illegal immigrants run through E-Verify are approved for legal work.  E-Verify is worse than a coin toss at identifying known illegal immigrants. 

Rivera’s identity would even have gotten around the DRIVE program in Iowa because he handed his employer an out-of-state drivers license.  DRIVE is intended to link other identity information from the Iowa state’s DMV to the job applicants as an extra layer of security.  If any of that information doesn’t match the information that the applicant gives to his employer then his employer is supposed to realize the applicant is an illegal worker.  However, the flaw in DRIVE is that it only works for the state-level DMV and fails to add extra security for out-of-state drivers licenses.  Thus, Rivera’s out-of-state identity would not have been caught by DRIVE.     

Rivera is a low-skilled and poor illegal immigrant from Mexico whose English language skills are so bad that he needs an interpreter in court.  Yet he would easily have been able to fool E-Verify, a sophisticated government immigration enforcement program praised by members of Congress, the President, and the head of at least one DC think-tank, by using somebody else’s name and SSN with a driver’s license from another state. 

A law passed in 1986 has required workers in the United States to present a government identification to work legally – a requirement that has resulted in an explosion in identity theft.  Rivera likely stole Budd’s identity to get a job, an unintended consequence of that 1986 law. A national E-Verify mandate will vastly expand identity theft

As a further wrinkle, if Yarrabee Farms found any of Rivera’s identity documents or information suspicious and confronted Rivera with their suspicions concerning Rivera’s identity, his name, race, or age, then Yarrabee Farms would likely have run afoul of other labor laws and exposed itself to a serious lawsuit.  The federal government expects employers to enforce immigration laws but not to the point that they can profile applicants.  The safe choice is not to profile anyone and hire those who present documents so long as they are not obviously fake.

The last wrinkle is that many businesses don’t comply with E-Verify in states where it is mandated.  In the second quarter of 2017, only 59 percent of new hires in Arizona were run through E-Verify even though the law mandates that 100 percent be run through.  Arizona has the harshest state-level immigration enforcement laws in the country and they can’t even guarantee compliance with E-Verify.  There is even evidence that Arizona’s E-Verify mandate temporarily increased property crime committed by a subpopulation that is more likely to be illegally present in the United States, prior to that population learning that E-Verify is easy to fool.  South Carolina, the state with the best-reputed enforcement of E-Verify, only had 55 percent compliance in the same quarter of 2017.  The notion that a lackluster Washington will do better than Arizona or South Carolina is too unserious a charge to rebut. 

Since SSNVS matched the name John Budd with a valid SSN and Rivera used an out-of-state drivers license, E-Verify would not have caught him.  E-Verify is a lemon of a system that is not a silver bullet to stop illegal immigration.  It wouldn’t have stopped Rivera from working legally in Iowa.  E-Verify’s cheerleaders should stop using the tragic murder of Mollie Tibbetts as a sales pitch for their failed government program.

 

Italy’s Macroeconomic Problems Cannot Be Remedied By Issuing a Domestic Quasi-Money

The Italian general elections of March 4, 2018 have produced an improbable coalition government between two upstart populist parties: left-Eurosceptic-nationalist Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) and the right-Eurosceptic-nationalist Lega (League). The coalition partners agree on greater public spending and, at the same time, on tax cuts that would reduce revenue. How then to pay for the additional spending? Italy is already highly indebted. Its public debt stands at 133 percent of GDP, highest in the Eurozone apart from Greece, and well above the EU’s average of 87 percent. Its sovereign bonds carry a high default risk premium. Today, the yield on Italian 10-year bonds stands at 291 basis points above the yield on 10-year German bunds, up from a spread in the 130-40 range during the months before the election.

If tax revenue and debt cannot practically be increased, the remaining fiscal option—for a country with its own fiat currency—is printing base money. But Italy is part of the Eurozone, and only the ECB can create base-money euros. A group of four Italian economists (Biagio Bossone, Marco Cattaneo, Massimo Costa, and Stefano Sylos Labini), correctly noting that “budget constraints and a lack of monetary sovereignty have tied policymakers’ hands,” and regarding this as a bad thing, have proposed in a series of publications that Italy should introduce a new domestic quasi-money, a kind of parallel currency that they call “fiscal money.” Similar proposals have been made by Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek finance minister, and by Joseph Stiglitz, the prominent American economist. Italy’s coalition government is reportedly considering these proposals seriously.

Under the Bossone et al. proposal, the Italian government would issue euro-denominated bearer “tax rebate certificates” (TRCs). The government would pledge to accept these at face value in “future payments to the state (taxes, duties, social contributions, and so forth).” The certificates in that sense would be “redeemable at a later date – say, two years after issuance.” If non-interest-bearing, they would trade at a discounted value. But if interest were paid to keep the certificates always at par, and the payment system accordingly accepted them as the equivalent of base-money euros, the certificates would be additional spendable money in the public’s hands. “As a result,” they argue, “Italy’s output gap — that is, the difference between potential and actual GDP — would close.” Thus they claim that “properly designed, such a system could substantially boost economic output and public revenues at little to no cost.”

Remarkable claims. Bossone et al. have recently argued that their “fiscal money” program would not violate ECB rules. But there is a more basic question: would it actually work to boost real GDP sustainably by shrinking unemployment and excess capacity? On critical examination, the answer is no. The proposal is based on wishful thinking.

To provide empirical context, note that estimated slack in the Italian economy is already shrinking. The OECD estimate of Italy’s output gap (the percentage by which real GDP falls short of estimated full-employment or “potential” GDP) was large—greater than 5 percent—for 2014, the year when Bossone et al. first floated their proposal. Among the major Eurozone economies, only Greece, Spain, and Portugal had larger gaps; France had a gap half as large, while Germany was above its estimated potential GDP. For 2018, however, Italy’s estimated output gap is under 0.5 percent. For 2019 the OECD projects that actual GDP will exceed full-employment GDP.

Theoretically (as famously argued by Leland Yeager and by Robert Clower and Axel Leijonhufvud), in a world of sticky prices and wages a depressed level of real output can be due to an unsatisfied excess demand for money, which logically corresponds to an aggregate excess supply (unsold inventories) of other goods including labor. People building up their real money balances will do so by buying fewer goods at current prices and offering more labor at current wages. But is that the cause depressed output in Italy today? Yeager’s “cash-balance interpretation of depression” assumes an economy with its own money, domestically fixed in quantity, so that an excess demand for money can be satisfied only by a drawn-out process of falling prices and wages that raises real balances.

But Italy today does not have its own money. It is a part of a much larger monetary area, the Eurozone. (For one indication of Italy’s share of the euro economy, Italian banks hold 14.7% of euro deposits.) The European Central Bank through tight monetary policy can create an excess demand for money in the entire Eurozone, in which case Italy suffers equally with other Eurozone countries, but it cannot create an excess demand for money specifically in Italy. A specifically Italian excess demand for money can arise if Italians increase their demand for money balances relative to other Eurozone residents, but in that case euros can and will flow in from the rest of the Eurozone (corresponding to Italians more eagerly selling goods or borrowing) to satisfy that demand.

Because Italy’s small output gap in 2018 therefore cannot be plausibly attributed to an unsatisfied excess demand for money, an expansion of the domestic money stock through the creation of “fiscal money” is not an appropriate remedy.

The Government’s Poor Defense of Counting Derivatives against Immigration Quotas

As I reported before, a group of Chinese investors under the EB-5 immigration program have challenged the government’s illegal practice of counting spouses and minor children of investors against the immigration quota for investors. This practice, however, hurts all legal immigrants because the same provision governs the admission of derivatives of all legal immigrants. Counting derivatives dramatically reduces legal immigration, harming people trying to immigrate legally to the United States. The government finally responded to the lawsuit on Friday, and its response leaves much to be desired.

Background

Section 203 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides three broad pathways for legal immigrants to receive green cards (i.e. permanent residence):

(a) Preference allocation for family-sponsored immigrants.—Aliens subject to the worldwide level specified in section 201(c) of this title for family-sponsored immigrants shall be allotted visas as follows …

(b) Preference allocation for employment-based immigrants.—Aliens subject to the worldwide level specified in section 201(d) of this title for employment-based immigrants in a fiscal year shall be allotted visas as follows …

(c) Diversity immigrants… aliens subject to the worldwide level specified in section 201(e) of this title for diversity immigrants shall be allotted visas each fiscal year as follows …

Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 203 do not make the spouses and minor children of the family members, employees-investors, or diversity lottery winners eligible for status. It is only subsection (d) that creates an opportunity for them to immigrate:

(d) Treatment of family members.—A spouse or child… shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under subsection (a), (b), or (c), be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.

Nothing in subsection (d) of section 203 applies the “worldwide levels” (or quotas) under subsection (a), (b), or (c) to the spouses and minor children of immigrants. They are then presumptively not subject to those limits.

Peter Kirsanow’s Numerous Errors

Last Thursday, Tucker Carlson invited Peter Kirsanow onto his top-rated Fox News show Tucker Carlson Tonight to discuss illegal immigration and crime. They began the segment by playing a recent clip of me and Carlson arguing about data on illegal immigrant criminality in Texas. In that earlier segment, Carlson said we don’t have good data on illegal immigrant criminality and I said we do, specifically from the state of Texas. The data show that illegal immigrants have a lower murder conviction rate than native-born Americans. 

Kirsanow responded to my clip in a multi-minute near-monologue. Unfortunately, Kirsanow made many errors and misstatements. His comments on television parroted a piece that he wrote earlier this year in National Review. That piece made so many mathematical, definitional, and logical errors that I rebutted it in detail in Reason this February.

Since I was not invited on Thursday’s segment to debate Kirsanow while he criticized my points and presented his own, I’ve decided to respond here.  Below are Kirsanow’s quotes from his recent appearance on Tucker Carlson Tonight, followed by my rebuttal.

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