Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

White House Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs’

This morning in The Wall Street Journal:

The Obama administration’s new drug czar says he wants to banish the idea that the U.S. is fighting “a war on drugs,” a move that would underscore a shift favoring treatment over incarceration in trying to reduce illicit drug use.

…Gil Kerlikowske, the new White House drug czar, signaled Wednesday his openness to rethinking the government’s approach to fighting drug use.

Mr. Kerlikowske’s comments are a signal that the Obama administration is set to follow a more moderate – and likely more controversial – stance on the nation’s drug problems.

The Obama administration is likely to deal with drugs as a matter of public health rather than criminal justice alone, with treatment’s role growing relative to incarceration, Mr. Kerlikowske said.

Well, that’s at least a modest step in the right direction. However, I want to see how policies change (if they do) under the Obama administration. A change in terminology won’t mean much if the authorities still routinely throw people in jail for violating drug laws.

As for the international war on drugs, everyone in the Washington area is welcome to join us this Friday on Capitol Hill to discuss the consequences of the war on drugs abroad.

Former FBI Agent: Torture Sucks. Don’t Do It.

The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings produced an ugly picture of the role torture played in interrogating Al Qaeda leaders. The testimony of former FBI agent Ali Soufan shows how traditional intelligence techniques worked on Abu Zubaydah and “enhanced” techniques did nothing to advance national security interests:

Immediately after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a fellow FBI agent and I were flown to meet him at an undisclosed location. We were both very familiar with Abu Zubaydah and have successfully interrogated al-Qaeda terrorists. We started interrogating him, supported by CIA officials who were stationed at the location, and within the first hour of the interrogation, using the Informed Interrogation Approach, we gained important actionable intelligence.

We were once again very successful and elicited information regarding the role of KSM as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and lots of other information that remains classified. (It is important to remember that before this we had no idea of KSM’s role in 9/11 or his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure.)

Soufan then recounts a tug-of-war between the interrogators and the contractors brought in to apply the third degree. The intelligence and law enforcement professionals struggled to reestablish rapport with Zubaydah after each iteration of harsh interrogation tactics.

The new techniques did not produce results as Abu Zubaydah shut down and stopped talking. At that time nudity and low-level sleep deprivation (between 24 and 48 hours) was being used. After a few days of getting no information, and after repeated inquiries from DC asking why all of sudden no information was being transmitted (when before there had been a steady stream), we again were given control of the interrogation.

We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence.

The enhanced interrogation techniques were not only inferior to traditional interrogation techniques, they proved counterproductive. The use of illegal techniques resurrected the “wall” between the CIA and the FBI with regard to these detainees. This prevented FBI experts who knew more about Al Qaeda than anyone else in the government from questioning them. Plus, as Soufan recounts, coercive techniques make detainees tell you what you want to hear, whether it is true or not. As Jesse Ventura says, “you give me a waterboard, Dick Cheney, and one hour, and I’ll have him confess to the Sharon Tate murders.”

Torture did not advance the work of picking apart Al Qaeda, it disrupted it.

McChrystal and Direct Action

Fred Kaplan and the New York Times say that the decision to replace General David McKiernan with Lt. General Stan McChrystal as the principle US commander in Afghanistan is another step in the COINification of the Pentagon under Robert Gates. They say we’ve replaced a conventional warfare guy with an unconventional warfare guy.

That’s too simple. McChrystal is known for his mastery of the sharp or kinetic end of the counterinsurgency mission. The command he headed from 2003 to 2008 – Joint Special Operations Command – is essentially the operational component of Special Operations Command, which has really become a fifth service. JSOC organizes special operations missions in war zones.  According to many officers, JSOC has also become enraptured with direct action. That means using intelligence from various sources to plan raids, often kicking down doors in the dead of night, interrogating people to generate more intelligence, doing it again immediately, and eventually capturing or killing insurgent leaders with the intelligence gleaned. 

Bob Woodward’s latest book argues that JSOC’s role in employing these tactics in Iraq was crucial to the supposed success of the surge. But some informed observers beg to differ, arguing that standard counterinsurgency tactics and the contributions of Iraqis themselves mattered far more.  Some complain that JSOC’s aggressive tactics and limited coordination with those in the regular chain of command undermined pacification efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the (recently released!) book on the post Cold War evolution of the US military that I co-edited, Colin Jackson and Austin Long have a chapter discussing the politics of special operations command. They argue that the direct action theory of victory in counterinsurgency is a close relative to the air force’s theory of decapitation, which says you can defeat a nation by attacking its leaders from the air.  They explain that direct action has long been the favored tactic of secret or “black” SOF organizations like Delta Force, but that the wars made it the dominant mission in SOCOM as a whole, crowding traditional “white” counterinsurgency missions like population protection, force training, and civil affairs. To them, that is a problem, because the direct action theory of victory is badly flawed.  You can’t kill your way to victory in these sorts of wars, they argue. That’s particularly true in Afghanistan, I’d add, where distance and poor roads make the exploitation of intelligence far more time-consuming.

I don’t know to what extent McChrystal shares the black SOF worldview. He would probably say that direct action is just part of the toolkit.  It is possible, however, that his appointment reflects a decision to downplay nation-building in Afghanistan and focus more on killing raids and training Afghan soldiers.

It is also interesting to speculate about what Michael Vickers (the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) had to say about this. Vickers – a key advisor to Gates and a carry-over from the Bush administration – is said to be skeptical about troop surges in counterinsurgency, preferring to train local forces.

According to Greg Grant of DoD Buzz:

In a speech before a defense industry gathering last month, Vickers said he foresees a shift over time from the manpower intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to more “distributed operations across the world,” relying on close to 100 small teams of special operations forces to hunt down terrorist networks, part of a “global radical Islamist insurgency.”

I don’t like the across the world part, but if this appointment means more limited objectives in Afghanistan, it’s good news.

A final note on McChrystal: he reportedly runs many miles a day, sleeps only a few hours, and avoids eating until evening to avoid sluggishness. Apparently the iron-man thing goes over well with Rangers, but I think commanders, whose job is mostly thinking, should get a good night’s sleep and three square.

McKiernan’s Out, McChrystal’s In

General David McKiernan, top American commander in Afghanistan, will be replaced by former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

According to the New York Times, Department of Defense officials said McKiernan had been removed primarily because “he had brought too conventional an approach to the challenge.”

Does a change at the top signal a shift in tactics? I would hope, but probably not.

In the past couple weeks U.S. air strikes have killed scores of innocent civilians. In response, White House National Security Adviser Gen. James L. Jones said the air strikes would continue.

By the day I’m growing more pessimistic about our ability to effect a better outcome in Afghanistan than what would exist in absence of our efforts. Every measure is taken to limit civilian casualties. But the accidental killing of civilians by U.S. air patrols fuels resentment against the presence of the U.S.-led coalition. The problem I see is simple: the collateral damage unleashed from air strikes make the Taliban appear to be a force against injustice and consequently undermine the very security Western forces are attempting to provide. Ergo, why remain?

In the “more of the same” war in Afghanistan, according to the LA Times, “The Pentagon also is considering a radical shift in deployment cycles, assigning key leaders and planners to Afghanistan for as long as five years.” (emphasis mine)

As my good friend and fellow libertarian Anthony Gregory says about Barack Obama versus George W. Bush: “Same big stick, just more soft-spoken.”

Why Egypt?

President Obama will give a speech in Egypt on June 4 about America’s relations with the Muslim world. Why Egypt? I suspect many Americans think that Egypt is the largest Muslim country, but the White House and the State Department surely know that it’s not even in the top 5. I think White House press secretary Robert Gibbs touched on the reason when he was asked “Why Egypt?” and he responded that Egypt “represents the heart of the Arab world, and I think [the trip will be] an opportunity for the President to address and discuss our relationship with the Muslim world.”

Americans forget that the Muslim world and the Arab world are not synonymous. In fact, only 15 to 20 percent of Muslims live in Arab countries, barely more than the number in Indonesia alone and far fewer than the number in the Indian subcontinent. It seems to me that Obama would be better off delivering his message to the Muslim world somewhere closer to where most Muslims live. Perhaps even in his own childhood home of Indonesia.

Not only are there more Muslims in Asia than in the Middle East, the Muslim countries of south and southeast Asia have done a better job of integrating Islam and modern democratic capitalism. Obama has received some criticism for giving his speech in a repressive country and seeming to embrace Hosni Mubarak’s autocracy. But the criticism ought to go deeper: He should give his speech on U.S.-Islamic relations in the region of the world where most Muslims live, and where Muslims are successfully joining the modern world. Egypt is a fine place for a speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict. But in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, or Pakistan he could give a speech on America and the Muslim world surrounded by rival political leaders in a democratic country and by internationally recognized business leaders. It would be good for the president to draw attention to this more moderate version of Islam.

According to this chart based on the CIA World Factbook, Egypt is the seventh-largest Muslim country. Another chart shows Egypt fifth, but still far behind the Asian countries. Americans should take a close look, as we tend to associate Islam with the Arab world and its discontents. 

Country Muslim Population
1 Indonesia 182,570,000
2 Pakistan 134,480,000
3 India 121,000,000
4 Bangladesh 114,080,000
5 Turkey 65,510,000
6 Iran 62,430,000
7 Egypt 58,630,000
8 Nigeria 53,000,000
9 Algeria 30,530,000
10 Morocco 28,780,000
 
Source: CIA World Factbook

Defense Spending and “Global Public Goods”

Matt Yglesias picks up on a discussion between Will Wilkinson and Joseph Heath about American conservatives’ curious enthusiasm for providing “global public goods” (GPGs) in the form of enormous military spending to attempt to secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and do other things that are dubbed GPGs.

I think Matt is onto something bigger when he writes that

a considerable portion of American defense spending is genuinely wasteful. If we didn’t do it, it just wouldn’t be done. After all, it’s important to understand that excess capacity in military equipment is about as close as you can get to a real-world example of entirely wasteful public sector activity.

The economists tell us that one of the main properties of public goods is that they ought to be under-provided.  As Matt writes, it seems like we’re over-providing what are being called “public goods” here.  To my mind, this strongly implies that they aren’t public goods.

(Then again, if we’re going to accept that the entire globe is the jurisdiction to which the U.S. government is supposed to be providing public goods, you’re back to public goods – that is, we’re under-supplying the GPG of global security.)

While I’m not sure what my views are on traditional GPGs like a stable monetary or trading order, I’m very skeptical that anything related to security can be dubbed a GPG.  The two key properties of public goods are nonrivalrousness and nonexcludability.  Nonrivalrousness means that my consumption of the good doesn’t conflict with yours.  Nonexcludability refers to the idea that if you’re living within the jurisdiction of the provider of the public good, it’s impossible to opt out of consuming it.

Economists teach defense as the example of the quintessential public good.  For two people living in a country, one’s consumption of defense doesn’t conflict with the other’s and neither can be excluded from its benefits.

But I’m pretty sure you can’t move from the idea of a bounded jurisdiction like that of a state to the entire globe and still have public goods in a meaningful sense.  For example, the Japanese will recall from their experience in the 1930s that the control of SLOCs is very much excludable.  Our inability to supply truly global security means that we have to pick and choose to whom we allocate resources.  Our provision to one country of a formal alliance, for example, is very much rivalrous with neighboring countries’ security.

More generally, in the context of the defense budget at home, I’m more inclined to think that a big chunk of U.S. defense spending constitutes a public bad: transfer payments from taxpayers to defense companies.  Think about it for yourself; what is the marginal benefit to you of an extra F-22?  An extra nuclear warhead?  To whom is the social surplus (or more accurately, rents) allocated?

As is probably clear, my views aren’t terribly well formed here, but the problem is an interesting one.  Chris Preble discusses GPGs in The Power Problem, and a case against the defense budget as a pure public good is Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Don Lavoie’s “National Defense and the Public-Goods Problem,” in Robert Higgs, ed., Arms, Politics, and the Economy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990), pp. 37-60.