The Wall Street Journal recently published an op‐ed by Institute for Justice Senior Attorney Robert McNamara, in which he describes IJ’s decision to join the raging battle against qualified immunity, a court‐confected doctrine that provides rights‐violating police and other government officials with what Cato has described as an “unlawful shield” against accountability for their misconduct. IJ’s focus on this issue will be a welcome addition to a fight that Cato has been waging for nearly two years with help from an astonishingly cross‐ideological cast of public interest organizations ranging from the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Second Amendment Foundation.
Cato launched its strategic campaign to challenge the doctrine of qualified immunity—an atextual, ahistorical doctrine invented by the Supreme Court in the 1960s — on March 1, 2018. Cato’s kick‐off panel featured Judge Lynn Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, who has sharply criticized the doctrine; Professor Will Baude, whose enormously influential law review article has formed the backbone of the legal challenge to qualified immunity; and Andy Pincus and Victor Glasberg, two practitioners with ample experience confronting the harsh realities of the doctrine. Shortly after that conference, George Will noted on Meet the Press that there would be a “national discussion” about qualified immunity, “led by the Cato Institute.”
The centerpiece of Cato’s strategic campaign to take down qualified immunity has been a series of targeted amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court to reverse its precedents and eliminate the doctrine outright. Since launching the campaign in March 2018, Cato has filed dozens of additional amicus briefs in our own name, but we have also organized a massive cross‐ideological alliance of public interest groups opposed to qualified immunity — what Judge Don Willett recently called “perhaps the most diverse amici ever assembled.” This “cross‐ideological brief” was first filed in July 2018, in support of the cert petition in Allah v. Milling, a case involving the illegal and unconstitutional solitary confinement of a pretrial detainee in Connecticut for nearly seven months. So unsettled was the state by the onslaught of amicus support that it settled the case by offering the plaintiff more to dismiss his cert petition than he had been awarded at trial.
A diverse array of lower court judges has also been increasingly critical of qualified immunity, with many explicitly calling for the Supreme Court to reconsider the doctrine. To underscore the incredible ideological breadth of the opposition to qualified immunity, it is worth noting that the judicial critics of the doctrine now include nominees of every single President since Carter, as well as one of the two remaining LBJ appointees on the bench. To give just a few notable examples:
- Judge Don Willett, a Trump appointee to the Fifth Circuit, has explained how “[t]o some observers, qualified immunity smacks of unqualified impunity, letting public officials duck consequences for bad behavior — no matter how palpably unreasonable — as long as they were the first to behave badly,” and sharply notes that “this entrenched, judge‐created doctrine excuses constitutional violations by limiting the statute Congress passed to redress constitutional violations.”
- Judge James Browning, a George W. Bush appointee to the District of New Mexico, has now issued several opinions that include a blistering criticism of the Supreme Court’s “clearly established law” standard, and citing Cato’s amicus briefs for the argument that “qualified immunity has increasingly diverged from the statutory and historical framework on which it is supposed to be based.”
- Judge Dale Drozd, an Obama appointee to the Eastern District of California, cited Cato’s March 2018 forum in his discussion of the campaign to challenge qualified immunity, and announced that “this judge joins with those who have endorsed a complete re‐examination of the doctrine which, as it is currently applied, mandates illogical, unjust, and puzzling results in many cases.”
Now, almost two years into Cato’s campaign, the Supreme Court finally appears to be preparing to confront the question of whether qualified immunity should be reconsidered. There are currently six major qualified immunity cert petitions pending before the Court, and the manner in which the Supreme Court has repeatedly rescheduled consideration of these cases strongly suggests that the Justices may be preparing to consider them together — which in turn suggests that they’re looking closely at the fundamental question of whether qualified immunity should be reconsidered. We first discussed this possibility back in October of last year, and we now have even more evidence suggesting the Court may be preparing to take up this issue. Here are the key details about each of the six cases:
- Baxter v. Bracey. This is the case where the Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity to two officers who deployed a police dog against a suspect who had already surrendered and was sitting on the ground with his hands up. The ACLU filed a cert petition back in April 2019, asking whether “the judge‐made doctrine of qualified immunity” should “be narrowed or abolished.” Cato filed a brief in support of the petition, and we also helped to coordinate the filing of an updated cross‐ideological brief. Jay Schweikert and Emma Andersson (one of the ACLU attorneys on the case) wrote a joint op‐ed discussing the case back in July, and Law360 ran a detailed story on Baxter, asking “Could A Dog Bite Bring An End To Qualified Immunity?”
- Brennan v. Dawson. In this case, the Sixth Circuit granted immunity to a police officer who, in an attempt to administer an alcohol breath test to a man on misdemeanor probation, parked his car in front of the man’s home at 8:00pm; turned the lights and sirens on for over an hour; circled the man’s house five to ten times, peering into and knocking on windows; and wrapped the home’s security camera in police tape. The court held that this warrantless invasion of the curtilage violated the Fourth Amendment, but nevertheless granted immunity due to a lack of “clearly established law.” The cert petition in this case was filed on January 11, 2019, and asks the Court to “reign in the qualified immunity standard to … reflect the common‐law roots of qualified immunity.”
- Zadeh v. Robinson and Corbitt v. Vickers. We’ve discussed these cases in more detail previously, but Zadeh is the case where the Fifth Circuit granted immunity to state investigators that entered a doctor’s office and, without notice and without a warrant, demanded to rifle through the medical records of 16 patients. And Corbitt is the case where the Eleventh Circuit granted immunity to a deputy sheriff who shot a ten‐year‐old child lying on the ground, while repeatedly attempting to shoot a pet dog that wasn’t posing any threat. The plaintiffs in both cases are now represented by Paul Hughes, who filed cert petitions on November 22, 2019, each of which asks “[w]hether the Court should recalibrate or reverse the doctrine of qualified immunity.” Cato submitted briefs in both cases, this time taking the lead on the cross‐ideological brief, whose signatories also included the Alliance Defending Freedom, the American Association for Justice, the ACLU, Americans for Prosperity, the Due Process Institute, the Law Enforcement Action Partnership, the MacArthur Justice Center, the NAACP, Public Justice, R Street, and the Second Amendment Foundation.
- Kelsay v. Ernst. This is the case where the Eighth Circuit, in an 8 – 4 en banc decision, granted immunity to a police officer who grabbed a small woman in a bear hug and slammed her to ground, breaking her collarbone and knocking her unconscious, all because she walked away from him after he told her to “get back here.” The cert petition in this case was filed on November 26, 2019, and while it doesn’t ask the Court to reconsider qualified immunity outright, it does ask the Court to “take steps within the confines of current law to rein in the most extreme departures from the original meaning of Section 1983.” Cato filed a brief in support of this petition as well.
- West v. Winfield. As related in the IJ op‐ed mentioned above, police officers told Shaniz West that they were looking for her ex‐boyfriend and thought he might be inside her house, so she gave them permission to go in and look. But instead of entering, they instead called a SWAT team, who bombarded it from the outside with tear‐gas grenades, effectively destroying her home and all her possessions (the ex‐boyfriend wasn’t even inside). The Ninth Circuit granted immunity to the officers, on the grounds that no prior case specifically established that this sort of bombardment exceeded the scope of consent that Ms. West gave to allow officers to enter her home. Yesterday, the IJ filed a cert petition on behalf of Ms. West asking the Court to clarify and limit the scope of qualified immunity. As noted, this case marks the launch of IJ’s “Project on Immunity and Accountability,” which is focused on challenging doctrines like qualified immunity that erroneously permit public officials to operate above the law. IJ has previously joined various iterations of the Cato‐conceived cross‐ideological brief described above, but we’re looking forward to filing our own amicus brief in support of IJ’s cert petition in West.
The Court has yet to make a final decision about any of these cert petitions, but there’s good reason to think the Justices are preparing to consider at least some of them jointly. First, in every single one of these cases (except West, as it was just filed yesterday), the Court has “called for a response” to the cert petition. Although a CFR alone is no guarantee of a cert grant, it’s an encouraging sign that at least some of the Justices are looking closely at the case, and want to hear more from the respondents about the issue.
Second, the Court’s repeated rescheduling decisions strongly suggest that they’re planning to consider them together, meaning they’re likely to address the fundamental, underlying question of whether qualified immunity itself should be reconsidered. Specifically, Baxter and Brennan were both fully briefed and originally set to be considered in October 2019. But since then, the Baxter petition has been rescheduled five times, and Brennan has been rescheduled three times, most recently on January 8th in both cases. January 8th also happens to be the same day in which the Court called for a response in both Zadeh and Corbitt (with the Kelsay CFR following five days later, on January 13th). It’s hard to imagine why else the Court would postpone these fully briefed petitions for over three months, unless they were holding them to consider along with these more recent petitions raising the same ultimate question.
Of course, this is all still speculative to some degree, and even if the Court does grant cert in one or more of these cases, there’s a wide range of potential outcomes. But the confluence of so many powerful petitions pending at the same time, combined with the Court’s obvious focus on this issue, makes undeniable what Cato has been saying for years — one way or another, the Supreme Court is going to have to confront the glaring legal inadequacies of qualified immunity, together with the massive injustices the doctrine has perpetrated on countless individuals whose rights have been violated with impunity by unaccountable police and other government officials.
“We caught him in the act and terminated him,” President Trump said in his first public comments about the January 3rd targeted killing of Iranian General Qassim Suleimani. The strike was ordered to avert “imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel.” Over the last two weeks, the Trump administration has offered a farrago of conflicting accounts—and zero evidence for that claim. In this case — apologies to Don Rumsfeld—absence of evidence is evidence that imminence was absent. And, unless you believe the Constitution gave the president practically unbridled discretion to embroil us in war, that means legal authority for the move was absent too.
The Pentagon’s initial announcement made no claim of exigent circumstances: “this strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.” Hours later, however, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed the president acted “in response to imminent threats to American lives” — “dozens if not hundreds” of them. Since then, when asked to elaborate, Pompeo has served up (1) a word‐salad about “situational awareness of risk and analysis”; (2) a backward‐looking theory by which past attacks demonstrate the imminence of future ones; and (3) the defensive insistence that “it was real,” even if “we don’t know precisely when and we don’t know precisely where” — also, don’t give me that look: “those are completely consistent thoughts”! He may yet crack under questioning.
“We did it because they were looking to blow up our embassy,” President Trump said last Thursday; wait, make that embassies, plural, four of them, he told Fox’s Laura Ingraham on Friday. Given the administration’s well‐known preference for keeping Congress in the dark, maybe it’s not surprising nobody mentioned the alleged embassy threat in the post‐hoc, closed‐door Hill briefing last week. But surely it’s a little odd that Trump’s own secretary of defense didn’t get the intel memo.
There’s a simple explanation for the Trump Team’s shifting explanations: they’re lying. Leave aside the dubious notion that it’s possible to stop an imminent attack by killing a senior military commander (were the plans just in his head?) — apparently, the president conditionally authorized the Soleimani killing some seven months ago. (According to NBC News, Pompeo and then‐national security adviser John Bolton even urged Trump to greenlight the hit last June, in response to the Iranians plinking a US drone.) The news that the day of the strike, U.S. forces tried and failed to take out another top Quds Force commander in Yemen further undermines the administration’s story that their aim was to avert an imminent threat.Read the rest of this post »
Today, a split panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit “reluctantly” dismissed Juliana v. United States, known colloquially as the “kids’ climate case.”
We should all be thankful for the court’s avowed restraint — for much of this controversy, judges in the circuit seemingly champed at the bit to take on central planning of the American economy. A big assist is due the Supreme Court, which bench‐slapped some sense into the Ninth Circuit.
Here’s the backstory. In 2015, a group of children filed suit in a federal district court in Oregon, alleging that the federal government infringed on on their putative constitutional right to a climate unaffected by anthropogenic global warming.
On its face, the kids’ case is silly. For starters, it’s not terribly plausible to claim there’s an unenumerated constitutional right to a specific atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. But let’s assume there is, for the sake of argument. What could a court do about it?
As a remedy, the Juliana plaintiffs sought for the court to order the government to draw up a comprehensive climate plan – one that is subject to judicial approval and ongoing oversight.
The requested relief, therefore, is a court‐ordered scheme to regulate the American economy. If the plaintiffs had their druthers, a single federal district court judge would become, after the president, the most powerful official in the country. Obviously, that’s a big practical problem with the plaintiff’s argument.
From a legal perspective, the Constitution vests Article III judges with the “Judicial power.” National regulatory plans, by contrast, emanate from the “legislative” or “executive” powers that are the province of the political branches of government. Simply put, judges have no constitutional authority to initiate and oversee major climate policy.
For these reasons, judges in other circuits have been quick to nix similar challenges. Last February, for example, U.S. Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Paul Diamond dismissed a near‐identical suit. According to Judge Diamond, the Constitution does not guarantee children a right to a “life‐sustaining climate system.” After disavowing both “the authority [and] the inclination to assume control of the Executive Branch,” he concluded that climate change regulation “is a policy debate best left to the political process.”
Yet, in Juliana, U.S. Oregon District Judge Ann Aiken entertained no such reservations. Not only did she deny two of the federal government’s procedural motions to stop the case, but she initially refused to certify her orders for interlocutory appeal — that is, she refused to allow the government to appeal her procedural orders before the case went to trial. It seemed as if she wanted to try Juliana.
The Ninth Circuit, too, seemed eager for the case to proceed. Twice, the court denied government petitions to end the case.
If all these judges in the Ninth Circuit were so eager to take the case, then how did Juliana get dismissed today?
The answer involves unmistakable signals sent from the Supreme Court. At various points during the litigation, the federal government asked the Court to pause the case. In denying these motions as untimely, the Court included language that unequivocally imparted its concern regarding the constitutional viability of the claims at issue in Juliana.
For example, in July of 2018, the Court observed that “The breadth of respondents’ claims is striking,” and further directed District Court Judge Aiken to “take [justiciability] concerns into account.” A few months later, the Supreme Court basically ordered the Ninth Circuit to hear the federal government’s appeal (on justiciability grounds).
After the Supreme Court’s second order, the Ninth Circuit leaned on Judge Aiken to certify her procedural orders and thereby permit the government’s appeal. Last June, the Ninth Circuit held oral arguments. Today, it “reluctantly” dismissed the case, holding:
We reluctantly conclude … that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, the latter of which can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box. That the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well‐intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.
It bears noting that a majority on the three‐judge panel dismissed Juliana over the impassioned (though wrong) dissent of Judge Josephine L. Staton. So a third of the panel would have allowed the case to proceed, while the rest ended Juliana only with “reluctance.” It may not be pretty, but I welcome the outcome nevertheless.
It’s January, so most state legislatures are kicking off their sessions. Across state capitols, one issue to monitor is the fallout from the Supreme Court’s 2019 landmark decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, a holding which may compel many local governments to rethink how they regulate private property.
The main point at issue in Knick is whether the Court should overrule or limit Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, a 1985 decision that makes it virtually impossible to bring many types of takings cases in federal court. Under Williamson County, a property owner who contends that the government has taken his property and therefore owes “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment, cannot file a case in federal court until he or she has first secured a “final decision” from the relevant state regulatory agency and has “exhausted” all possible remedies in state court. At that point, it is still often impossible to bring a federal claim, because various procedural rules preclude federal courts from reviewing state court decisions in cases where the case was initially brought in state court.
Property owners prevailed last Summer, as explained by my colleague Ilya Shapiro:
[Today] the Supreme Court in Knick v. Township of Scott ruled 5 – 4 that a government violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and a property owner may bring a claim to that effect in federal court at any time … Knick represents the culmination of many years of challenges to Williamson County, and years of effort to put property rights (and takings claims specifically) on the same procedural footing as other rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
No longer will courts relegate the Takings Clause to “second‐class status” among our rights. Of course, the Knick holding is only the start. Now, states must deal with the constitutional consequences.
As Justice Elena Kagan noted in her dissenting opinion, “There are a nearly infinite variety of ways for regulations to affect property interests.” One such “way” — increasingly popular of late — involves local laws that obstruct mineral extraction on private property. Obviously, these measures would result in property owners losing some or all of the value of their subsurface mineral rights.
After Knick, affected property owners are much more likely to get their day in federal court to seek just compensation from the government. This access to courts, in turn, changes the dynamic between local governments and regulated entities. Most localities have insufficient resources to either litigate these challenges or provide just compensation (if they lost in court). The upshot is that Knick gives local governments a strong incentive to revisit recently passed roadblocks to oil and gas production.
Which brings us to Colorado, among the biggest beneficiaries of the recent revolution in American oil and gas production ushered in by technological breakthroughs in directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing. At present, the industry annually creates more than $30 billion in wealth for the state.
A mere months before the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick, Colorado Governor Jared Polis signed SB19-181, a massive overhaul to the state’s oil and gas regulatory regime. Among other measures, the law provides local governments with increased authority to limit subsurface property rights.
In Knick’s wake, some Colorado officials are asking hard questions about SB19-181. One of them is Sen. Kevin Lundberg. Almost a decade ago, I worked with Sen. Lundberg on the state’s implementation of the Clean Air Act, and I know he’s a serious lawmaker.
Last month, Lundberg led the Republican Study Committee of Colorado in a series of hearings on how SB19-181 will function in a post‐Knick world. His findings are sobering: Potentially, “thousands of Colorado citizens who are mineral interest owners can have their day in Federal court” and seek “literally trillions of dollars.”
In his writeup of the hearings, Sen. Lundberg correctly observed that “Something has to give … If [state] policy makers are smart, they will unwind SB19-181 before it becomes a crisis for the entire state.”
During the new legislative session, Sen. Lundberg promised more hearings on the matter. Coloradans should hope his colleagues give this matter the attention it deserves. Even if the state lawmakers don’t act, I suspect that municipal and county governments in Colorado will think twice before they exercise their SB19-181 authority to constrain property rights.
The Indian Child Welfare Act strips basic constitutional rights from any child who is racially classified as “Indian.” ICWA was initially created to prevent seizure of Native American children from their intact families by state actors. Modern‐day applications, however, hurt the administrative process of foster families’ adoption proceedings. Even in cases where the Native American parent(s), relatives, or affiliated tribe have no issue with the adoption, the process is still delayed by arbitrary administrative rules. In some cases, the child is even removed from stable adoptive parents to be placed in a neglectful, abusive situation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to deem ICWA as applied to adoption unconstitutional under principles of equal protection, the Tenth Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
This Fifth Circuit ruling creates a dangerous new precedent that eliminates the distinction between racial and political classifications, upholding ICWA’s definition of a child’s political classification based solely on her race (as determined by a minute blood quantum). This logic ignores the cultural and political identification of the child while bolstering the use of race in government decision making. At the very least, biological eligibility for tribal membership is a form of national‐origin classification, which is subject to the same strict scrutiny that applies to racial classifications in other contexts.
The court asserted that because many racially Indian children do not fall under ICWA’s definition of “Indian child,” this term is not a racial classification — which is incorrect, in that legal precedent dictates that a state classification does not become race‐neutral simply because it is over or underinclusive. Another ICWA provision requires children to be placed with “Indian” adults, regardless of tribal affiliation. In other words, a Sioux child must be placed with Seminole parents instead of a potentially better situation with black, white, Asian, or Hispanic parents. This “generic Indian” concept is a blatantly arbitrary racial identification.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling will, in fact, further harm the most at‐risk minorities. Native American children are at greater risk of abuse, neglect, molestation, alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide than any other demographic in the nation. Instead of providing these children with more legal protection, ICWA creates heavier evidentiary burdens, thus forcing children to remain in abusive homes longer.
Fortunately, the full Fifth Circuit decided to hear the case en banc. Together with the Goldwater Institute and Texas Public Policy Foundation, Cato has filed an amicus brief on behalf of parent plaintiffs frustrated in a wish to adopt children of Native descent. (We likewise did so before the Fifth Circuit panel and on the plaintiffs’ motion to rehear the case en banc.) We argue that under ICWA, “Indian child” is a genetics‐based racial category and that ICWA does not constitutionally promote tribal sovereignty. The government may not treat American citizens differently, as it does here, based on whether their genetic ancestry would qualify them for tribal membership. For Congress to impose a racialized and non‐neutral regime on parents and children is not only unwise and unfair, but unconstitutional.
May a state prohibit a trade association from employing lawyers to dispense legal advice to member firms? Last spring the Fourth Circuit ruled that it does not violate the First Amendment for the state of North Carolina to maintain such a ban, and on December 16 the Supreme Court let that result stand by declining a certiorari petition. But the issues in the case are worth our attention.
It is still taught that corporations cannot practice law, but the exceptions to that maxim are big ones. Long ago the rules changed to permit corporations to hire in‐house lawyers and insurance companies to employ staff lawyers to represent policyholders. Meanwhile, lawyers themselves have won the right to the advantages of incorporation, which amounts to saying a corporation can practice law so long as lawyers run it. In general, what survived was more like a rule that if you want to practice law on behalf of third party clients you need to be either self‐employed or employed by other lawyers.
Whether rules like this restricting the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) make sense is a matter of debate. On the one hand, no less an authority than now‐Justice Neil Gorsuch has written that opening up a bigger role for non‐lawyers can sometimes “be expected to lower prices, drive efficiency, and improve consumer satisfaction.” There are, to be sure, counter‐arguments about how legal practice will fare better under the putatively higher ethical standards of lawyers as opposed to regular business people.
Over the past 60 years, at any rate, courts have eroded the old rules further in a significant new way. In 1963’s NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court ruled that Virginia UPL laws could not prevent the NAACP from dispensing legal advice to its members. In 1967’s United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, it held that the First Amendment gives a labor union the right to hire lawyers to dispense advice to its members. And in 1978’s In re Primus, it accorded the ACLU a similar right. Along the way, various state courts have extended the principle to non‐profit disability and housing‐rights groups, even in cases where the recipient of legal advice is not a member of the organization in question.
That makes the trade association’s claim more interesting. Why shouldn’t it be allowed to dispense legal advice to its business members, the same way a union can for its members? The advice might even come on a matter in which the other side was being represented by a lawyer from one of the unions or private advocacy groups exercising their First Amendment rights under cases like UMW, Primus, or Button.
But the Fourth Circuit rebuffed this argument. It said the difference was that the unions and advocacy groups were “expanding and guarding [members’] civil rights,” whereas all the trade association wanted to do was “help its members ‘resolv[e] private differences.’”
If the Fourth Circuit panel believes that all the idealism, all the regard for civil and constitutional rights, and all the public‐spiritedness in legal work is to be found on the side adverse to business, and none on the side that defends it, that’s really… well, contestable. Talk to lawyers who represent businesses and many will tell you that defending those businesses’s rights can be just as moral and idealistic a line of work as filing claims against them, or pursuing other courtroom specialties such as criminal or local‐government law. (Julie Havlak of Carolina Journal quoted me in covering the North Carolina controversy.)
The Court won’t be deciding those issues this term. But let’s hope it will have a chance to look at them in the future.
Earlier today, Cato issued a press release based on the current results of a major and ongoing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) project designed to try to determine the magnitude of FBI domestic surveillance activities that may be unconstitutional or otherwise questionable from a civil liberties standpoint. First, some background.
Since April 2019, I’ve filed over 400 FOIAs. One of the core questions my FOIA work seeks to answer is whether, and to what extent, the kinds of domestic surveillance abuses that were surfaced by the Church Committee (and later the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) have resumed—particularly the targeting of domestic groups on the basis of their constitutionally protected right to free speech and association. Based on the evidence I and others in the media and civil liberties community have accumulated to date, I believe the answer is yes.
To refresh your memory, I wrote this piece for JustSecurity on Constitution Day 2019 regarding some very disturbing findings I and others had made regarding FBI targeting of domestic advocacy groups, including groups involved in immigration work.
On November 26, I reviewed all of the FOIA responses I’ve received to date to ensure any additional actions that might be necessary on my part and not previously addressed were cataloged and scheduled. In the course of that review, I realized that one Department of Justice Office of Information Policy (DoJ/OIP) response I received in June 2019 regarding Cato contained “Glomar” exemption language. The third paragraph of the DoJ letter contains the key language and reads as follows:
"I have determined that the FBI properly refused to confirm or deny the existence of any national security or foreign intelligence records responsive to your request because the existence or nonexistence of any such responsive records is currently and properly classified. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Please be advised that the Department Review Committee will determine whether the existence or nonexistence of this category of records should continue to be considered a classified fact. Additionally, the existence or nonexistence of any such responsive records is protected under the FOIA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). This provision concerns matters specifically exempted from release by a statute other than the FOIA (in this instance, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), which pertains to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949).”
So what exactly is a “Glomar” FOIA response and what does it mean? A little background follows.Read the rest of this post »