Tag: war on terror

Counterinsurgency Math Revisited

When does 32,200 – 60,000 = 109,000? That seemingly inaccurate equation represents the estimated number of Islamist-inspired terrorists when the war on terror began, how many the U.S. has killed since 2015, and the number that fight today. And it begs the question of just how can the terror ranks grow so fast when they’re being depleted so rapidly.

As early as 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hinted at the potential mathematical problem when he asked, “Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?” In his memo, Mr. Rumsfeld correctly identified that both sides have a vote: the U.S. can deplete the terror ranks, while the terror groups and their supporters can replenish them.

What Rumsfeld had not yet imagined, however, was the possibility that military force might inadvertently benefit terror recruitment efforts. Specifically, he ignored the blowback a marauding U.S. military might engender among the Muslim world.

In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal pushed the conversation in that direction. He pointed to the counterintuitive aspects of terror recruiting. Calling it “COIN Mathematics,” he laid out his argument. “Let us say that there are 10 [insurgents] in a certain area. Following a military operation, two are killed.  How many insurgents are left?  Traditional mathematics would say that eight would be left, but there may only be two, because six of the living eight may have said, ‘This business of insurgency is becoming dangerous so I am going to do something else.’ There are more likely to be as many as 20, because each one you killed has a brother, father, son and friends, who do not necessarily think that they were killed because they were doing something wrong. It does not matter – you killed them.  Suddenly, then, there may be 20, making the calculus of military operations very different.” 

Though McChrystal did not explicitly connect U.S. military operations to the perceptions of the broader Muslim community, Osama bin Laden and his number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, certainly did. Five years before 9/11, bin Laden railed against the presence of the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia, home to the two holiest sites of Islam. On other occasions he spoke of the “American crusader forces” and “American occupiers.” His recurring theme of grievance centered on the U.S. waging war with Islam. Later, in 2005, al-Zawahiri put an exclamation point on it. In a letter to the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, he reminded him, “The Muslim masses…do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American.”

All I Want For Christmas Is to Fight Just the Necessary Wars

All I want for Christmas is for the U.S. to only fight the wars it has to and to stay out of all the others. The lives of young Americans are too high a price to pay for wars driven by threat inflation, ego, or fool-hardy social experiments.

First, we’re Americans. Enough of the hand wringing. Islamist-inspired terrorists do not hide around every corner. Instead, we have been and continue to be quite safe. The threat from groups operating within failed states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and so on pales in comparison to Hitler’s armies marching across Europe and our nuclear Cold War with the Soviet Union, despite President Trump’s attempts to equate the three.

Second, the unseemly traits of ego, vanity, and hubris should not push us to fight when we don’t have to. Teddy Roosevelt had it right: Walk softly and carry a big stick.

Third, American lives and financial treasure should not be spent on cool sounding social experiments like, “democracy will flourish in Muslim-majority states in response to U.S. invasions.” Since 9/11, though, all three U.S. administrations have referred to Afghan and Iraqi leaders as “reliable partners” at one time or another, while extolling democratic progress in both countries.

The data, however, provide no support for those claims. As of today, Freedom House gives both countries it’s lowest rating—“not free.” And, in terms of corruption, Iraq and Afghanistan’s governments rank worse than 94 and 96 percent of all governments worldwide.

All war is darkness. My Opa spoke those words to me 40 years ago. I remember it vividly because as he shared that one sentence, he pointed to the bullet hole in his shoulder and the shrapnel scar on his neck. He had barely survived the war as an enlisted man in the German army; and when the war ended, he found his home country had become East Germany. Three years later, he took my Oma and (then) three year old dad and they escaped to the west. Eventually, they made it to America.

My war experiences have been much briefer than my Opa’s, but I get his point. All war is darkness, so for the sake of those sent to do the fighting, the war has to be a necessary one. And our war on terror isn’t.

Let’s bring America’s sons and daughters home for the holidays. We’ll all be the better for it.

All I Want for Christmas…Is Information about U.S. Military Deployments

2017 has been a year of massive expansion for the Global War on Terror, but you could be forgiven for not noticing. In addition to the media focus on the ongoing chaos in the Trump White House, the Pentagon has consistently avoided disclosing where and who America’s armed forces are engaged in fighting until forced to do so.

Take Syria, where the Pentagon long claimed that there were only 500 boots on the ground, even though anecdotal accounts suggested a much higher total. When Maj. General James Jarrard accidentally admitted to reporters at a press conference in October that the number was closer to 4000, his statement was quickly walked back. Finally, last week, the Pentagon officially acknowledged that there are in fact 2000 troops on the ground in Syria, and pledged that they will stay there ‘indefinitely.’ 

Even when we do know how many troops are stationed abroad, we often don’t know what they’re doing. Look at Niger, where a firefight in October left four soldiers dead. Prior to this news—and to the President’s disturbing decision to publicly feud with the widow of one of the soldiers—most Americans had no idea that troops deployed to Africa on so-called ‘train-and equip’ missions were engaged in active combat.

Yet U.S. troops are currently engaged in counterterrorism and support missions in Somalia, Chad, Nigeria, and elsewhere, deployments which have never been debated by Congress and are authorized only under a patchwork of shaky, existing authorities.

Even in the Middle East, deployments have been increasing substantially under the Trump administration, with the number of troops and civilian support staff in the region increasing by almost 30% during the summer of 2017 alone. These dramatic increases were noted in the Pentagon’s quarterly personnel report, but no effort was made to draw public attention to them.

The fundamental problem is simple. With only limited knowledge of where American troops are, and what they are doing there, we cannot even have a coherent public discussion about the scope of U.S. military intervention around the globe. We should be discussing the increase in U.S. military actions in Africa or the growth in U.S. combat troops in the Middle East, but that discussion is effectively impossible—even for the relevant congressional committees—with so little information.

So if I could ask for one change to U.S. foreign policy for Christmas, I’d like to know where American troops are and what they’re doing there. It’s past time for a little more transparency, from the Trump administration, and from the Pentagon. 

Militarization Makes Police More Violent

When Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced yesterday the Trump Administration’s repeal an Obama-era rule limiting the distribution of certain military equipment (such as tracked vehicles, camouflage uniforms, high-powered rifles, bayonets, and grenade launchers), he dismissed concerns about police militarization as “superficial.”  The evidence suggests otherwise: militarization makes police more violent.

Earlier this year, a study conducted by researchers from Harvard, Stanford, Cincinnati, and Gardner-Webb concluded that the Pentagon’s 1033 weapons transfer program made participating departments more likely to engage in deadly violence.  After receiving 1033 gear, departments were more likely to kill civilians as well as dogs.  The researchers included the number of dog killings by police (which, according to the Department of Justice, number around 10,000 a year) in order to control for possible variations in human behavior during the period of the study.

The study found:

1033 receipts are associated with both an increase in the number of observed police killings in a given year as well as the change in the number of police killings from year to year, controlling for a battery of possible confounding variables including county wealth, racial makeup, civilian drug use, and violent crime.

[…]

[D]ue to concerns of endogeneity, we re–estimate our regressions using an alternative dependent variable independent of the process by which LEAs request and receive military goods: the number of dogs killed by LEAs. We find 1033 receipts are associated with an increase in the number of civilian dogs killed by police. Combined, our analyses provide support for the argument that 1033 receipts lead to more LEA violence.

The researchers pointed to four areas of militarization that drive the increase in violence:

[W]e argue that increasing LEA access to military equipment will lead to higher levels of aggregate LEA violence. The effect occurs because the equipment leads to a culture of militarization over four dimensions: material; cultural; organizational; and operational. As militarization seeps into their cultures, LEAs rely more on violence to solve problems.

It turns out that having a hammer really does make everything look more like a nail.

But what if that increased violence is justified by increased police readiness to deal with emergency situations? 

When asked to justify the push for militarization, many law enforcement agencies are quick to point to terrorist attacks and mass murders as a justification for the equipment. Indeed we can imagine situations in which the police might legitimately need grenade launchers or .50 caliber rifles (though the thousands of bayonets local cops have taken from the federal government may be tougher to explain).

But such events are exceedingly rare, while history proves that the police deployment of militarized weapons and tactics will not be. Police routinely cite rare hypothetical emergencies to justify tactics and policies that end up becoming far more routine and abusive.

SWAT teams were originally designed to handle hostage situations and active shooters. Today they often function as hyper-violent warrant servers, as the number of SWAT raids has ballooned from hundreds per year to tens of thousands and responding to hostage situations has given way to serving search and drug warrants.

Police defend civil asset forfeiture with appeals to “taking the profit out” of terrorist organizations and drug cartels, but black market drug profits remains strong as thousands of regular Americans have their property taken without charge or trial.

Law enforcement agencies purchase military-grade surveillance devices such as Stingray cell phone trackers with terrorism grant money, and justify the outrageous secrecy that shrouds them on national security grounds, but they’re virtually never used for terrorism investigations, instead being deployed thousands of times for routine law enforcement investigations as an end-around the warrant requirement.

In other words, military weapons and tactics are inevitably used far more often in everyday policework than in the rare situations that supposedly justify them.

Contrary to Attorney General Sessions’ dismissal, the damage done by these government policies is not “superficial.” It’s not superficial when a SWAT team throws a flash grenade in a baby’s crib and disfigures the infant’s face, or when a family’s life is ruined by militarized police looking for tea leaves, or when protesters find themselves staring down the barrels of sniper rifles and accosted by masked, camo-wearing, rifle-toting police units.

Combined with President Trump’s recent pardon of Sheriff Joe Arpaio (who is no stranger to overly violent militarized raids and was convicted for repeatedly violating people’s rights in defiance of a court order), this move sends a strong message that police restraint and accountability are taking a back seat in this administration. 

Peter King Wants Nationwide Surveillance of Muslim Americans

Rep. Peter King (R-NY), fresh out of a meeting at Trump Tower yesterday, said he pressured President-elect Donald Trump to implement a nationwide surveillance program directed at Muslim Americans “similar to what” existed in the New York Police Department’s Demographics Unit under Commissioner Ray Kelly.

Rep. King insisted that the NYPD program “which unfortunately the civil liberties union and The New York Times didn’t like … [was] very effective in stopping terrorism and really should be a model for the country.”

There is little evidence that the program “stopped terrorism,” and Rep. King did not provide any revelations. The evidence we do have (much of it from agents themselves) points in the opposite direction. In more than a decade of pervasive surveillance, the program simply didn’t work.

America’s Invisible Wars: Event January 25th

On January 14th, the White House announced that Gen. Joseph Votel - the current head of U.S. Special Operations Command – will take over as the head of U.S. Central Command, a position which will place him in charge of America’s wars in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The symbolism of the appointment could not be clearer. As Foreign Policy noted,

“With 3,000 special operations troops currently hunting down Taliban militants in Afghanistan, and another 200 having just arrived on the ground in Iraq to take part in kill or capture missions against Islamic State leadership, Votel’s nomination underscores the central role that the elite troops play in the wars that President Barack Obama is preparing to hand off to the next administration.”

The growing use of special operations forces has been a hallmark of the Obama administration’s foreign policy, an attempt to thread the needle between growing public opposition to large-scale troop deployments and public demands for the United States to ‘do more’ against terrorist threats, all while dancing around the definition of the phrase ‘boots on the ground.’ But the increasing use of such non-traditional forces – particularly since the start of the Global War on Terror – is also reshaping how we think about U.S. military intervention overseas.

Third Circuit Reinstates Muslim Discrimination Suit against the NYPD

Yesterday, in a case called Hassan v. The City of New York, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated a lawsuit accusing New York City of violating the 1st and 14th Amendment rights of Muslim-Americans in New Jersey under a sprawling and ineffective NYPD surveillance dragnet.

The ruling overturns a decision by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing the suit for lack of standing and for failing to state a claim.

In layman’s terms: the district court, without a trial or the presentation of evidence, ruled that the plaintiffs weren’t harmed unjustifiably, that they hadn’t alleged sufficient wrongdoing by the police, and that they had no right to sue.  The Third Circuit ruling rejects those determinations and the case will now move forward at the district court.

An Associated Press investigation uncovered the NYPD program in 2011 and detailed the immense breadth of the NYPD’s surveillance efforts against the Muslim community in several states.  Police officers and informants infiltrated dozens of mosques. Police installed surveillance cameras so that Muslim-owned businesses, places of worship, and residences in New Jersey could be surveilled remotely. The NYPD even sent undercover officers to infiltrate Muslim student organizations at out-of-state universities such as Yale and the University of Pennsylvania, including one field trip to go whitewater rafting.  Those agents recorded the names of the students, how often they prayed, and what they talked about.  The NYPD is alleged to have “generated reports on every mosque within 100 miles of New York City.”

Despite the cost and the seemingly boundless geographic and jurisdictional scope of the spying program, there is little evidence of success.  In fact, the now-defunct “Demographics Unit,” a central component of the program, generated no convictions or, according to one agent deposition, even any tangible leads in more than a decade of operation.

Pages