Tag: wages

Wage Effects of Immigration Are Small

Immigration has small long-run relative wage impacts on American workers by education (Figure 1). These estimates are the most popular and widely cited in the immigration debate. They were completed by George Borjas and Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri. Their findings are very close but diverge most appreciably for the wages of dropouts, even though the effect is small and positive for all native-born workers lumped together. According to the 2015 American Community Survey, 9.4 percent of native-born Americans over the age of 25 are dropouts. Thus, over 90 percent of American workers are in education-skill categories where immigration increased relative wage, according to the most negative finding (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Relative Impact of Immigration on Native Wages by Education


Sources: Borjas, p. 120; Ottaviano & Peri, Table 6.

Note: Borjas looks at 1990-2010. Ottaviano and Peri look at 1990-2006.

Borjas and Ottaviano and Peri find that the wages of immigrant workers are most affected by new immigrants (Figure 2). That’s because new immigrants have skills and education levels most similar to previous immigrants, so they compete against each other more than with natives who have very different levels of skill and education. As we point out in Figure 25 of this bulletin, immigrants still support liberalized immigration despite the negative wage effects they experience. There are at least three explanations for this.

Further Thoughts on Mariel Boatlift

Jason Richwine just blogged about my recent Mariel Boatlift post that confirmed George Borjas’ finding of wage increases for those with only a high school degree in post-Mariel Miami.  George Borjas understood my quick extension of his research.  Below are some of Richwine’s points and my quick responses. 

“The point is not especially interesting, since the standard immigration narrative has always been that efficiency gains come at the expense of the natives with whom immigrants most directly compete – high school dropouts, in the case of Mariel.”

It’s important to identify which skill-group of Miamians could have benefited from the Boatlift.  George Borjas pointed out in his report for the Center for Immigration Studies:  “Economic theory predicts that immigration will redistribute income by lowering the wages of competing American workers and increasing the wages of complementary American workers as well as profits for business owners and other “users” of immigrant labor.”  Borjas focused on the benefits for business owners and other “users” of immigrant labor in that paper. 

Rebuttal of Senator Tom Cotton’s Anti-Legal-Immigration Op-ed

Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) recently penned an op-ed for the New York Times in which he calls for a large reduction in legal immigration, something he believes will raise American wages. It’s nice when immigration restrictionists are honest about their intention to cut legal immigration, but Senator Cotton would be disappointed if his policy ever came to fruition. Senator Cotton does make some cursory arguments for expanding high-skilled immigration—a positive policy—but I will focus here on his argument to restrict it. I will respond to a few of Senator Cotton’s comments below. His will be in block quotes while my responses will follow. 

Higher wages, better benefits and more security for American workers are features, not bugs, of sound immigration reform. For too long, our immigration policy has skewed toward the interests of the wealthy and powerful: Employers get cheaper labor, and professionals get cheaper personal services like housekeeping. We now need an immigration policy that focuses less on the most powerful and more on everyone else.

Senator Cotton argues that skilled native workers are complementary to low-skilled immigrants, meaning that the former’s wages rise rather than fall when more of the latter arrive. This is because low-skilled immigrants and higher skilled workers don’t compete for the same jobs but instead work together, expanding productivity and compensation for both parties. These complementarities do exist, but there is also much evidence that lower-skilled American workers are actually complementary with low-skilled immigrants. Economists Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri found that immigration had a small positive relative effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree (between +0.6 percent and +1.7 percent) and a small positive effect on average native wages (+0.6%) from 1990 to 2006. Immigrants are complementary to native workers but substitutable for other immigrants who experienced a substantial relative negative effect (−6.7 percent) from immigration. It should not be surprising that new immigrants compete with older immigrants who both share similar skills while native-born American workers benefit overall.

The Mariel Boatlift Raised the Wages of Low-Skilled Miamians

Harvard economist George Borjas recently published an important paper on how the unexpected surge of 125,000 Cubans (henceforth Marielitos) to Miami in 1980 lowered the wages of native-born male Miamians with less than a high-school degree. Because at least 60 percent of the Marielitos were high school dropouts, Borjas found that the negative wage effects were concentrated on Miamians with the same level of education.  

There are excellent criticisms of Borjas’ paper that show his results hinge on the control cities he chose, his exclusion of women, the age group of the workers, whether Hispanics are included, whether high-school-or-less or no-high-school-at-all are included, and whether datasets with the larger samples are used. For the sake of argument, supposing that Borjas made the correct methodological choices on every single point above, the Mariel Boatlift still raised the wages for low-skilled U.S. workers collectively due to wage complementarities. That’s because native-born Miamians with only a high school degree (no associate degree, no education after high school) experienced significant wage increases immediately after Mariel relative to workers with the same levels of education in the control groups, or placebos, of other cities. Borjas’ supporters ignore this finding but he does not. 

In his Mariel paper, Borjas reports the wage of high school dropouts relative to high school graduates in Figure 3(C) and the wage of Miami high school graduates across an all cities permutation in Figure 4(B), but he doesn’t have a dramatic graph like this that shows what happened to the relative wages of high school graduates after Mariel. 

Another working paper by Borjas and Monras on the wage effects of refugees also found that “the rate of wage growth for high school graduates, a group whose size was only increased modestly by the Marielitos, is noticeably higher in Miami than outside Miami.”  They go on to write that, “the predominantly low-skill Marielitos … raised the wage of workers with a high school education, and this effect is both numerically and statistically significant. The cross-wage elasticity is about +0.7 [compared to -0.9 for high school dropouts].”  They do not find any employment effects for high school dropouts but they did uncover positive and statistically significant employment gains for those with a high school degree. Furthermore, Figure 7.5 on page 148 of Borjas’ new book We Wanted Workers hints at a wage increase for high school graduates immediately after Mariel.              

My intern Cole Blondin and I followed Borjas’ methods to create graphs for the wages of high school graduates before and after the Boatlift. We used the March Current Population survey (March CPS) and combined the May Current Population Survey and the May Outgoing Rotation Group (May CPS-ORG) datasets. The only differences are that we present the figures in dollars rather than logs, we did not use three-year averages to smooth the data, and we did not recreate the synthetic control. One final note, the wage effect of the Marielitos must be compared to placebos because there was only one Miami in 1980 and we can’t actually observe what would have happened to that city had the Marielitos not arrived. We used the same sets of placebo cities as Borjas.

Even under Borjas’ assumptions, native-born male Miamians with a high school degree or less saw a ­net-wage increase after the Mariel Boatlift.    

The Hidden Costs of ObamaCare’s Millennial Mandate

Guests mingle during the second annual Future of America gala at the House of Sweden in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Friday, Oct. 3, 2014. "Our guests are not people that are traditionally struggling with unemployment," said David Pattinson, founder of David Pattinson's American Future, a Washington-based nonprofit, which aims to get the millennial generation more fully employed. Photographer: T.J. Kirkpatrick/Bloomberg

There is a current running through the ObamaCare debate that goes something like this:

Every other advanced country provides health insurance to all its citizens for a fraction of what Americans spend on health care. ObamaCare emulates what those countries do. Anyone who complains about ObamaCare increasing premiums or imposing other costs is therefore a right-wing nut who doesn’t understand that universal coverage results in lower spending, not higher spending.

This line of reasoning, so to speak, leads supporters to believe ObamaCare is a free lunch. Their ignorance is not accidental. MIT health economist and ObamaCare architect Jonathan Gruber helpfully explained some years ago that he and his co-architects deliberately designed the law to hide its costs and make the benefits seem like a free lunch.

ObamaCare’s “Millennial mandate”—the requirement that employers who offer health coverage for employees’ dependents continue to offer such coverage until the dependents turn 26 years old—is one of those supposed free lunches. This mandate’s benefits unquestionably come at a cost. Expanding health insurance coverage among adults age 19-26 leads them to consume more medical care. When those people file insurance claims, health-insurance premiums rise. Yet ObamaCare does an amazing job of hiding those costs from voters.

Does ObamaCare impose a special tax that the IRS collects to pay for that extra coverage? No. That would be far too transparent. The cost just gets added to your premiums.

Does ObamaCare require employers to include a line-item on your premium payments, to show you how much this additional coverage is costing you? Absolutely not. That, too, would make the costs dangerously noticeable. The additional cost just gets thrown onto the pile, hidden among the costs of all the other mandated coverage you don’t want, and the coverage you actually do want.

Maybe workers see their premiums rising, and are merely ignorant of the fact that the Millennial mandate is part of the reason? Nope. ObamaCare hides the cost further still. Explaining how requires a little bit of labor economics.

CIS’ All Job Growth Since 2000 Went to Immigrants’ Report Is Flawed

The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) has released a number of reports purporting to show that all employment growth since the year 2000 has gone to immigrants. The CIS report does not include econometrics. However, the report includes a few references to the economic literature (those few references present have little to do with native job displacement caused by immigration, which is the topic of the CIS report). Nonetheless, the CIS report has gained significant attention.

The CIS method of measuring job displacement caused by immigration is not used by professional economists to study this issue. Fundamentally, CIS assumes a static number of jobs that is unchanging based on immigration and does not consider what the job market would look like with fewer immigrant workers, entrepreneurs, and consumers—estimates essential for understanding the actual labor market impact of immigrants.  I discuss those actual effects here, here, and here

Regardless of their flawed methods, I decided to recreate CIS’s research in order to exactly understand how they got their results.

The study did not find any evidence of immigrants pushing natives out of the job market. After spending hours recreating their data and checking it, all I can conclude is that immigrants hold about a percentage of jobs in the economy that is roughly equal to their percent of the population. I am underwhelmed by that finding. 

Below I will present the academic literature on immigration-induced job displacement, explain how CIS got its results, and detail why its analysis of the data does not prove that “All Job Growth Since 2000 Went to Immigrants.” (If you just want the meat, scroll down to the hed “CIS’s Three Big Conclusions Are False”).

Damning Trade with Faint Praise

A Washington Post editorial today pushes back against the argument that a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement would exacerbate income inequality. Amen, I suppose. But in making its case, the editorial burns the village to save it by conceding as fact certain destructive myths that undergird broad skepticism about trade and unify its opponents.

“All else being equal,” the editorial reads, “firms move where labor is cheapest.”  Presumably, by “all else being equal,” the editorial board means: if the quality of the factors of production were the same; if skill sets were identical; if workers were endowed with the same capital; if all production locations had equal access to ports and rail; if the proximity of large markets and other nodes in the supply chain were the same; if institutions supporting the rule of law were comparably rigorous or lax; if the risks of asset expropriation were the same; if regulations and taxes were identical; and so on, the final determinant in the production location decision would be the cost of labor. Fair enough. That untestable premise may be correct.

But back in reality, none of those conditions is equal. And what do we see? We see investment flowing (sometimes in the form of “firms mov[ing],” but more often in the form of firms supplementing domestic activities) to rich countries, not poor. In this recent study, I reported statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis revealing that:

Nearly three quarters of the $5.2 trillion stock of U.S.-owned direct investment abroad is concentrated in Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Singapore. Contrary to persistent rumors, only 1.3 percent of the value of U.S.-outward FDI [foreign direct investment] was in China at the end of 2011.