Tag: transatlantic

The Economics, Geopolitics, and Architecture of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Cato Online Forum

In mid-2013, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations were launched to great fanfare with a pledge from its architects to conclude a deal within one year on a “single tank of gas.” Nearly two and a half years and 10 negotiating rounds later, a final TTIP deal is nowhere in sight. Well, if there is anything that trade policy observers should know by now to be an ironclad law of physics, it’s that deadlines for concluding negotiations are never respected.

Concluding trade agreements can be a long and arduous process, especially if the United States or the European Union is a party to the negotiations.  So when the United States and the European Union (who are used to dictating the terms of trade deals to smaller economies) are both party to a negotiation, it probably makes sense to budget in a little extra time for refueling – and perhaps even a new set of tires.

With that in mind, on October 12 the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies will host a conference titled: Will the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Live Up to Its Promise? Featuring 30-35 international trade and investment policy experts from academia, think tanks, business, and government, the conference will examine the economics, geopolitics, and architecture of the TTIP during a full day of panel presentations, interviews, and debates. The program is open to the public and you are encouraged to attend.

Among the many questions that will be raised during the conference are:

  • What are the prospects for reaching a comprehensive trade and investment deal between the United States and the European Union?
  • What exactly is under negotiation, and what is the strategy for advancing those negotiations?
  • Would it make sense to exclude sacred-cow issues that will only bog down the negotiations?
  • Is it wise to continue pursuing a single comprehensive deal for all issues on the table, or is it better to aim for a sequence of smaller agreements?
  • Should a deal include other closely integrated countries, such as Canada, Mexico, and Turkey?
  • How will TTIP affect the multilateral trading system, relations with the BRICS countries, and prospects for developing countries?
  • Where are the biggest potential gains for U.S. and European businesses?  For consumers and taxpayers?
  • What are the major domestic political impediments?

No Time for Mercantilist Posturing in Transatlantic Trade Talks

Pitched as a cure for Europe’s woes, salvation for the multilateral trading system, and the last best chance to restrain the Chinese juggernaut, the stakes are high for the upcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Of course the primary objective of the TTIP is to reduce nagging impediments to commerce between the United States and the European Union. But success is far from a sure bet.

Given the numerous bilateral trade frictions that have eluded resolution for many years, the goal of a “comprehensive” agreement by the end of 2014 – the current target – is simply not credible. Success would require negotiators to lay down their calculators and spreadsheets, disavow the “exports good, imports bad” mantra of mercantilist doctrine on which they were raised, and act on behalf of their citizens instead of their domestic producer lobbies.

That outcome would be too good to be true, but there may be a certain genius to the tight timeframe: it will demand that negotiators forego excessive posturing and will limit the potential for ever-shifting political calculations to subvert progress. Regardless, success can only take the form of a less comprehensive agreement or, perhaps, a two-phased agreement where the first phase meets the 2014 deadline by achieving accord on relatively agreeable matters, while the tougher issues are relegated to a later train.

A recent paper co-published by the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation presented the results of a survey of American and European trade policy experts about the prospects for a successful TTIP agreement. More than half thought the negotiations would produce a “moderate agreement,” and most thought the agreement would take effect by the end of 2015 or 2016.

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NATO and Turkey: Moribund Alliances, Military Snares, and Unnecessary Wars

NATO fulfilled its Cold War role by deterring rather than sparking conflict. Yet if Turkey and Syria come to blows, the transatlantic alliance could turn into a transmission belt of war for America.

Syria’s developing civil war has spilled over into Turkey. Moreover, Ankara has begun to meddle in the conflict next door. Despite Turkey’s denials, the Erdogan government appears to be channeling arms shipments to rebels and sheltering Syrian opposition activists.

Thus, tension between the two governments was rising even before the Syrian military destroyed a Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance plane. Damascus claimed the aircraft was in Syrian airspace; Ankara said the jet had strayed over Syrian territory but was over international waters when downed. The plane may have been on a surveillance mission:  the Erdogan government has been pressing for NATO military action against Syria.

After the shoot-down, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “any military approach to the Turkish border from the Syrian side will be perceived as a threat and will be dealt with accordingly.” Ankara also sought backing from NATO’s members: “We consider this act to be unacceptable and condemn it in the strongest terms,” explained Alliance chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Rasmussen said that Article 5, regarding use of military force in defense, had not been discussed. And he stated “It is my clear expectation that the situation won’t continue to escalate.” Wars have a way of happening unexpectedly, however. If Turkey attacks Syrian military units in their own territory, sparking retaliation by Damascus followed by a call from Ankara to NATO for support, the United States could find itself, however reluctantly, at war.

Alliances make sense when directed against an overwhelming outside threat. The Soviet Union constituted one. Syria does not.  NATO has turned into an association which drags members into everyone else’s wars, actually reducing collective security.

The United States pulls Europe into Afghanistan, a mission widely opposed by the European people. Europe pulls America into Libya, a mission widely opposed by the American people. Turkey could pull both America and Europe into Syria, a mission generally opposed by both the American and European people.

The security argument for Washington’s defense of Europe disappeared years ago. The worsening confrontation between Turkey and Syria offers a sharp reminder that NATO is not only unnecessary but dangerous. The U.S. should drop this outmoded security commitment before it draws America into yet another war in the Middle East.

Cross-posted from the Skeptics at the National Interest.