Tag: trade war

The Growing U.S. Trade Surplus in Services: Part Two

President Trump and others who are mistakenly troubled by trade deficits with specific countries should at least get the facts straight. To fret about trade deficits in goods alone (ignoring services) is hopelessly old-fashioned in a world where the most exciting business and investment opportunities are typically in the service industries. U.S. businesses are famously outstanding in software and communications services, health and education services, food and lodging services, legal, financial, accounting and marketing services, and so on. Hollywood, Wall Street, Madison Avenue, Las Vegas and D.C.’s K-Street lawyers have always been known for their services, not “making stuff.”

The table shows a rapidly growing U.S. trade surplus in services with many important economies and regions. The U.S. services surplus tripled from 2003 to 2017 with Canada and was 7-times larger for the EU, 12-times larger for South Korea, 25-times larger for China. Rising trade surpluses in services have become large enough to more than offset the trade deficit in goods with some major trading partners – notably Canada. For all countries combined, of course, the surplus in services is not yet large enough to offset the familiar cyclical uptick in the trade deficit in goods (most imported goods are industrial components and materials). But it does not take much imagination or statistical expertise to envision an interesting trend in that direction.

Trade Surpluses in Services, in millions

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Trade Warriors Exclude a Third of U.S. Exports from “Trade Deficits”

Private services account for 69% of GDP, and 128.2 million jobs in June. In the Bureau of Economic Analysis industry accounts, private service industries “consist of utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information; finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing; professional and business services; educational services, health care, and social assistance; arts, entertainment, recreational, accommodation, and food services; and other services (except public administration).”

Goods-producing industries, by contrast, “consist of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining; construction; and manufacturing.” All of these goods-producing industries combined accounted for only 20.7 million jobs this June. That was fewer goods-producing jobs than in July 2000 (24.7 million) or August 1979 (25 million) or even May 1969 (22.9 million).  In other words, all long-term U.S. job growth has been in service occupations, not in manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture.

Employees producing Services or Goods

The United States is predominantly a service economy.  Many world-famous U.S. enterprises provide services all over the world – including entertainment, transportation, legal services, chain restaurants, advertising, accounting, medical tourism and college degrees.  In fact, rising U.S. service exports accounted for a third of total exports from January through May, and the U.S. surplus in services shrunk the total deficit by 31%.

Yet when President Trump and his trade war generals talk excitedly about bilateral trade deficits, they invariably talk only about goods - never services.  Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, for example, published “Free Trade Is a Two-Way Street” in The Wall Street Journal, writing only about “trade in goods” – as though a third of U.S. exports, most U.S. jobs and 69% of U.S. GDP is not worth mentioning.

Pro-business? Wilbur Ross Channels Hillary Clinton

On Wednesday members of the Senate Finance Committee questioned Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross about the costs to American businesses of the administration’s tariffs. Ross was unsympathetic:

When Thune warned that the drop in soybean prices (caused by China’s retaliatory tariffs) was costing South Dakota soybean farmers hundreds of millions of dollars, Ross responded by saying he heard the price drop “has been exaggerated.”…

Ross told Sen. Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.) that he’s heard the rising cost of newsprint for rural newspapers “is a very trivial thing,” and he told Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) that it’s tough luck if small businesses don’t have lawyers to apply for exemptions: “It’s not our fault if people file late.”

That reminded me of then-First Lady Hillary Clinton’s response in 1993 to a small businessman about how her health care plan might raise his costs:

“I can’t go out and save every undercapitalized entrepreneur in America.”

Seems like lots of Washington operators don’t care much about the burdens that taxes, regulations, mandates, tariffs, and other policies impose on small businesses and their employees.

U.S.-China Trade Deal Trumps U.S.-China Trade War

Amid increasing tensions between Washington and Beijing over economic and security matters, Chinese President Xi Jinping is in Florida today and tomorrow for meetings with President Trump.  Although economic frictions between the world’s two largest economies are nothing new, the safeguards that have helped prevent those frictions from sparking an explosion and plunging the relationship into the protectionist abyss may no longer be reliable.

As I noted in this recent Cato Free Trade Bulletin: 

Never have the U.S. and Chinese economies been more interdependent than they are today. Never has the value of the bilateral trade and investment relationship been greater. Never has the precarious state of the global economy required comity between the United States and China more than it does now. Yet, with Donald J. Trump ascending to power on a platform of nationalism and protectionism, never have the stars been so perfectly aligned for the relationship to descend into a devastating trade war.

What are those safeguards and why might they no longer be reliable?

First, U.S. multinational business interests that used to favor treading lightly with China, and provided a policy counterweight to U.S. import-competing industries advocating protectionism, have grown disillusioned by the persistence of policies that continue to impede their success in Chinese markets. Many think a more aggressive posture from Washington, even if that makes matters worse for them in the short run, is overdue.

Second, the pro-China-trade lobbies in Washington have grown sheepish in their advocacy on account of an economic study that went viral last year, ascribing massive U.S. jobs losses to trade with China, and because many fear political retribution from challenging Trump’s assumptions.  Full-throated support for the relationship has become conditional support.

Third, now more than ever before, U.S. policymakers, media, and the public are less inclined to look at the bilateral economic relationship in isolation from the strategic and geopolitical aspects of the relationship.  Segregating the issues in the past allowed us to focus on the win-win elements of trade, where there was broad enough agreement that mutual benefits could be derived, without being distracted by the issues where the United States and China are less likely to agree.  Today, our economic frictions are viewed through the prism of our geopolitical differences – and that makes trade disputes more difficult to manage.

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Trump Adviser Peter Navarro: Reagan Critic, Industrial Policy Fan

Donald Trump always sounded just like a Bernie Sanders Democrat when talking about international trade. “We have one issue that’s very similar,” he said, “and that’s trade.”  That Trump-Sanders hostility to trade liberalization, in turn, is identical to that of the AFL-CIO and the Economic Policy Institute, a leftist think tank created and largely financed by labor unions.

It should be no surprise that Donald Trump’s most influential adviser and spokesman on international trade, Peter Navarro, is a former unsuccessful Democrat politician who seems closer to an old-style Bernie Sanders leftist Democrat than to a Bill Clinton “New Democrat.”

The only academic among Trump 13 economic advisers, Navarro returned to being an economics professor at U.C. Irvine, after losing San Diego mayoral election to Republican Susan Golding. In 1993 Navarro wrote the book, Bill Clinton’s Agenda for America.

With one caveat, the book was full of glowing praise for everything Clinton promised to do – notably lots more federal spending (which, ironically, fell substantially).

Navarro’s doubts about Clinton concerned NAFTA, which Bush created but Clinton promised to change. “I thought the NAFTA agreement ought to have been more properly called ‘SHAFTA,’” says Navarro.  But he notes that “candidate Clinton later acknowledged the problems of the environment and lost jobs raised by NAFTA, and called for wage safeguards and stricter environmental regulations. It remains to be seen whether this was merely rhetoric, or a serious concern that will have policy follow-through.”

Trade Policy Lessons in WTO Challenge of China’s Rare Earth Restrictions

This morning the Obama administration lodged an official complaint with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body over China’s ongoing restrictions of exports of “Rare Earth” minerals. Rare Earths are crucial ingredients used in the production of flat-screen televisions, smart phones, hybrid automobile batteries, and other high technology products.

The formal complaint was not entirely unexpected since the dispute has been on a low boil for nearly 18 months; the U.S. government recently prevailed in a WTO dispute over a similar issue concerning Chinese export restrictions on nine raw materials used in manufacturing; and, this is an election year in which President Obama has carte blanche to outbid the Republican presidential aspirants’ China-bashing rhetoric with administrative action. So, no surprises really.

Despite the added political incentive to look tough on China this year, the administration should be applauded for its efforts to compel China to oblige its WTO commitments. This is a legitimate complaint following proper channels. In fact, this is exactly the course of action I have long argued for. Negotiations, consultations, and formal WTO dispute resolution (which begin with a long consultation period in which the parties are encouraged to find solutions without formal adjudication) are precisely the methods of dispute settlement conducted by governments that respect the process, their counterparts, and the rule of law in international trade.

In a Cato paper published last week, I wrote:

There is little doubt that certain other Chinese policies would not pass muster at the WTO. China’s so-called indigenous innovation policies, forced technology transfer requirements, porous intellectual property enforcement regime, and rare earth mineral export restrictions are some of many legitimate concerns that might justify formal WTO challenges. (Emphasis added.)

Now, my perspective is not motivated by a fetish for WTO litigation, but a certainty that the alternatives would be bad. Unilateral, discretionary actions taken by governments to redress perceived violations or shortcomings of another government undermine the rule of law in trade and encourage retaliation. Both China and the United States are guilty of taking such unilateral, discretionary actions, and bilateral tensions have increased as a result (see here).

U.S. policymakers should appreciate that today’s formal complaint on rare earths is an example of the right way to address perceived trade barriers. They should also recognize in the arguments advanced by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative the flawed economics in their support of last week’s countervailing duty legislation (the so-called GPX or NME/CVD bill).

Here’s the USTR’s rationale for the Rare Earths complaint:

China imposes several different types of unfair export restraints on the materials at issue in today’s consultations request, including export duties, export quotas, export pricing requirements as well as related export procedures and requirements. Because China is a top global producer for these key inputs, its harmful policies artificially increase prices for the inputs outside of China while lowering prices in China. This price dynamic creates significant advantages for China’s producers when competing against U.S. producers – both in China’s market and in other markets around the world. The improper export restraints also contribute to creating substantial pressure on U.S. and other non-Chinese downstream producers to move their operations, jobs, and technologies to China.

And here’s a quote from USTR Ron Kirk:

America’s workers and manufacturers are being hurt in both established and budding industrial sectors by these policies. China continues to make its export restraints more restrictive, resulting in massive distortions and harmful disruptions in supply chains for these materials throughout the global marketplace.

And here’s Ambassador Kirk in a statement responding (a few months ago) to the WTO Appellate Body ruling that China’s export restrictions on nine raw materials were not in conformity with that country’s WTO commitments:

Today’s decision ensures that core manufacturing industries in this country can get the materials they need to produce and compete on a level playing field.

And, finally, a statement from the USTR’s website on the raw material export restrictions cases:

These raw material inputs are used to make many processed products in a number of primary manufacturing industries, including steel, aluminum and various chemical industries. These products, in turn become essential components in even more numerous downstream products.

USTR’s argument against Chinese export restrictions in the raw materials and Rare Earths cases are just as applicable to U.S. import restrictions. Removing restrictions—whether the export variety imposed by foreign governments or the import variety imposed by our own—reduces input prices, lowers domestic production costs, enables more competitive final-goods pricing and, thus, greater profits for U.S.-based producers.

Yet the U.S. government imposes its own restrictions on imports of some of the very same raw materials. It maintains antidumping duties on magnesium, silicon metal, and coke (all raw materials subject to Chinese export restrictions).  In fact, over 80 percent of the nearly 350 U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty measures in place restrict imports of raw materials and industrial inputs—ingredients required by U.S. producers in their own production processes. But those companies—those producers and workers for whom Ambassador Kirk professes to be going to bat in the WTO case on rare earths (and the previous raw materials case)—don’t have a seat at the table when it comes to deciding whether to impose AD or CVD duties. (Full story here.)

Ambassador Kirk’s logic and the facts about who exactly is victimized by U.S. trade policies provide a compelling case for trade law reform, such as requiring the administering authorities to consider the economic impact of AD/CVD measures on producers in downstream industries—companies like magnesium-cast automobile parts producers, manufacturers of silicones used in solar panels, and even steel producers, who require coke for their blast furnaces.

Last week, when the CVD legislation passed both chambers overwhelmingly, Congress was implicitly thumbing their noses at these same producers and workers who the USTR rightly identifies as victims of Chinese trade restrictions. They are clearly victims of our own policies, derived in dark shadows by interests with asymmetric influence on the process. Maybe we should dwell on that hypocrisy for a while, and work to fix it by reconsidering the self-flagellation that is the U.S. trade remedies regime.

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Congress Poised to Escalate the U.S.-China Trade War

U.S. policymakers hold the key to vastly improved economic relations with China.  They also have the key to the vehicle that will take the bilateral relationship over the cliff, which appears to be the route that has been chosen. Republican House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp will introduce legislation this afternoon that makes explicit the applicability of the U.S. Countervailing Duty (anti-subsidy) law to imports from countries considered to have “Non-Market Economies” (i.e., China and Vietnam). 

Maybe that’s not as obvious an example of escalation as Nixon’s bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, but it is very likely to accelerate the deterioration of U.S.-China economic relations.  Costs will rise and life will become more difficult for U.S. companies trying to do business in China, as well as for U.S. producers and consumers who rely on imports from China.

Those pushing the legislation don’t want the public to understand the issues, which are highly technical and legalistic (and, quite frankly, too much trouble for our legislators to think through, particularly when there’s only political upside in China-bashing). But the consequences will be felt broadly – and there’s danger in that – so let me attempt to boil the matter down to a few salient points.

The U.S. government considers China a non-market economy for purposes of how it applies the antidumping law.  Certain outdated assumptions about prices, wages, and interest rates being unreliable and fictitious in non-market economies result in China being subject to a punitive antidumping calculation methodology – the NME methodology – by the U.S. Commerce Department.  Under the terms of the treaty by which China joined the World Trade Organization back in 2001, the United States must end the NME designation by no later than December, 2016, which means that China will then be subject to the still-onerous, but less-punitive, market-economy methodology.

The United States also has a Countervailing Duty law, which for 22 years up until 2007 had not been applied to imports from countries that, for purposes of the antidumping law, were deemed NMEs.  In not applying the CVD law to NMEs during that period, the Commerce Department was being consistent: if prices and other market signals are unreliable or fictitious in Country A for purposes of antidumping determinations, then they cannot be reliable of useable for purposes of measuring the benefits of subsidies in Country A in CVD cases. 

For political purposes, that logic suddenly ceased to apply in 2007, when Commerce changed its policy and began initiating CVD cases against NMEs.  Today, the U.S. government has 24 separate CVD orders in place on various imports from China (in addition to 5 cases pending determinations).  In December, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that it is illegal for the United States to apply its countervailing duty law to NMEs because Congress’s intent had been subsumed in the policies of multiple administrations to not apply the law to NMEs, and reinforced by the fact that there had been substantial revisions to the trade laws during that 22-year period – a period during which Congress did not make CVD application to NMEs explicit. (Scott Lincicome is the authority on the background and legal interpretation of the “GPX” case.)

Excluding legal appeals (which take us to the same decision tree if the CAFC decision is upheld), the Obama administration has three choices.  First, it can abide the CAFC decision, revoke the 24 existing CVD measures, drop the pending cases, and initiate no more CVD investigations against NME countries. Second, it can do what it is doing: work with Congress to pass a new law making CVD explicitly applicable to NMEs, which will be perceived by Beijing as taking extraordinary measures to punish China, which will invite blatant and subtle forms of retaliation from the Chinese government against U.S. interests and produce numerous lawsuits over the myriad legal issues stemming from the acts of preserving 24 CVD measures imposed under a law that has been found to be illegal.  Third, it can graduate China to “market economy” status now, instead of waiting until 2016.  Option three requires no legislative action whatsoever, preserves domestic industry access to both the AD and CVD laws, and wins enormous amounts of goodwill from Beijing.

From the perspective of a free trader, the first option is best.  But its likelihood can be measured in terms of hundredths of a percentage point.  The second option, which leaves use of the CVD law as well as applicability of the NME methodology of the AD law to China in tact, is the worst.  The third option preserves access to the CVD law, as well as the antidumping law, for U.S. protection-seekers, but requires the Commerce Department to use the market economy methodology in cases involving China.

Option three is the great compromise.  It makes antidumping actions against China slightly less onerous for U.S. consumers and Chinese producers, but domestic industries still have access to both laws.  That’s not great for consumers, consuming-industries, or free-traders on its face, but it would be considered a sufficiently decent gesture of good will by Beijing that it could stop and possibly reverse declining relations.  And that could head off a destructive trade war and be the catalyst for considerably more trans-Pacific cooperation resolving issues that adversely affect consumers, producers, workers and investors in both countries, and beyond.

Unfortunately, dark clouds are gathering as pursuit of that path seems less likely this afternoon.