As Ilya noted, the Supreme Court yesterday cleared the procedural roadblocks for the Horne family, which grows and processes raisins in California, to challenge the operations of the USDA's marketing order system as an unlawful taking of their property without compensation. The Hornes say that under the USDA's California Raisin Marketing Order, the Raisin Administrative Committee demanded that they hand over 47 percent of their raisins to be disposed of in ways that do not compete with sales in the domestic retail raisin market, such as export programs and school lunches.
47 percent! Back in January that figure reminded me of an earlier scale of government extraction:
Max Boot, who has written a new book on the history of guerrilla movements, tells how Shamil, firebrand leader of a celebrated 19th-century Muslim insurgency in Chechnya and Dagestan, began to lose the allegiance of “many ordinary villagers who balked at his demands for annual tax payments amounting to 12 percent of their harvest.” Instead, they switched their allegiance instead to the rival Russian czar, whose demands were more modest.
If only Washington were content with the czar's less-than-12 percent. For more on regulatory takings, check out this testimony from way back in 1995 by Cato's own Roger Pilon before the House Judiciary Committee.
Yet again the unanimous Supreme Court has slapped down a government attempt to deprive property owners of their civil rights. What was at stake in Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture wasn’t even the property -- raisins! -- but the mere ability to challenge the government’s desire to take that property without meaningful judicial review.
Nobody should have to suffer a needless, Rube Goldberg-style litigation process to vindicate their constitutional rights. Yet that’s exactly what the U.S. Department of Agriculture sought to impose on raisin farmers Marvin and Laura Horne when they protested the enforcement of a USDA “marketing order” that demanded that the Hornes turn over 47% of their crop without compensation.
These New Deal-era regulations are bad enough -- forcing raisin “handlers” to turn over some of their crop to the government so it can control raisin supply and price -- but here the government kept throwing up obstacles to the Hornes’ attempts to assert that they shouldn’t legally be subject to them. The government demanded about $650,000 from the Hornes and didn’t want to give them a day in court until they paid the money and jumped through assorted administrative hoops.
The Supreme Court correctly rejected that absurd position and reversed the California-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that upheld it, reinforcing the line drawn by five other circuit courts. “In the case of an administrative enforcement proceeding,” Justice Thomas wrote on all his colleagues’ behalf, “when a party raises a constitutional defense to an assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in another.”
Indeed, there’s no reason to treat Fifth Amendment takings claims any differently than lawsuits against government violations of other constitutional provisions.
Here's more background on the case and Cato's amicus brief.
In the 19th Century, when railroads were being built across the West, the federal government granted significant land and benefits to the railroad companies. The Great Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 allowed the government to give railroad companies easements to build tracks — that is, a right to use sections of another’s property without legally owning it. The Brandt family eventually acquired land in Wyoming that came with pre-existing railroad easements.
In 2001, the owner of the easement formally abandoned all claims to it, presumably returning the property to the Brandts. But the government wanted that land. In 2006, it sued for title to the former easement land on the theory that the government retained a residual claim to it after the railroad abandoned it. The Brandts argue that the government has no such right and that taking their land requires just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
Although this may seem like a small, unique problem, the scope of the Old West’s railway system was huge and those old easements criss-cross the land of thousands of property owners. In 1983, Congress amended the National Trails System Act to allow the government to take abandoned railroad easements and turn them into land for public recreation and “railroad banking.” Landowners have been fighting the taking of their property under the Trails Act ever since, claiming, as here, that the government’s original grant to the railroads contained no residual right of possession for the government.
Indeed, two federal courts of appeals, the Seventh and Federal Circuits, have held that the government didn’t retain any residuary rights. In the Brandts’ case, however, the Tenth Circuit held otherwise. This circuit split is untenable. Over 5,000 miles of abandoned track has been taken by the government since the Trails Act, and about 10,000 property owners are currently fighting in federal courts to hold onto their property.
Of course, given the possible benefits of not having to pay compensation to landowners, the government has responded to these claims by being aggressively litigious, reaching into its endless war-chest of taxpayer-provided resources to challenge the landowners on every tiny point. As the Federal Circuit said, the government’s behavior is “puzzling” in that it is “foregoing the opportunity to minimize the waste both of its own and plaintiffs’ litigation resources, not to mention that of scarce judicial resources,” but also by advancing arguments “so thin as to border on the frivolous.”
Cato, along with the National Association of Reversionary Property Owners, has filed an amicus brief supporting the Brandts and asking the Supreme Court to rectify the above situation. We argue that the Tenth Circuit ignored the reasoning of its sister circuits and instead relied on far less persuasive authority. Given the scope of land possibly involved — there are approximately 130,000 miles of abandoned track in the country, with 3,000 more being abandoned every year — it’s difficult to imagine a decision more unsettling to the expectation of thousands of property owners than the Tenth Circuit’s unjustified ruling here.
Ironically, given the scope of the problem, the Court’s resolution of this issue against the government might actually save the government money, even if it has to pay just compensation. The government’s behavior in challenging these claims demonstrates not only the need for the Court to rectify circuit splits, but also to uphold the property rights of citizens against opportunistic, self-interested, and powerful governmental forces that often just don’t play fair.
The government will now have a chance to respond to the cert petition in Brandt v. United States, and then this fall the Supreme Court will decide whether to take the case.
One of the biggest dangers of not providing adequate constitutional protections for private property is that public officials can misuse their power to take property for private gains. Government actors, after all, have an incentive to act in a way that maximizes political gains and minimizes costs, so without adequate protection from the courts, they can be expected to use eminent to take private property for political (or even personal) benefit.
In 2005, in the now infamous case of Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court unfortunately eroded the protections of the “public use” portion of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause — “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation” — by ruling that the potential for increased tax revenue from a large corporation can count as a “public use.” Suzette Kelo’s house was thus taken and given to Pfizer (which ended up not doing anything with the land).
It’s hard to imagine that government abuse of the Takings Clause could get any worse than that, but one such unfortunate case has arisen in Guam — which, as a U.S. territory, is covered by the Constitution. Artemio Ilagan owns and operates an apartment building in Agana, Guam. His neighbors, Engracia and Felix Ungacta, own an adjoining, residential lot that once lacked access to a road. Unfortunately for Mr. Ilagan, Mr. Ungacta was also the mayor of Agana when the city took a parking lot from Mr. Ilagan and gave it to Mayor Ungacta.
When challenged, the city claimed that the taking was done in accordance with a post-World War II “economic development” plan — the “Agana Plan” — that was enacted to reconfigure irregular lot lines in Agana. At the time of the taking (1981), the Agana Plan had not been used for seven years and, during the years it was used, was never used to take any lots. Moreover, the Plan has not been used in the 30 years since the taking of Mr. Ilagan’s lot.
The Guam trial court held the taking unconstitutional, but Guam’s Supreme Court reversed the holding by purportedly applying Kelo’s standard of judicial deference. Mr. Ilagan is now petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, asking the Court whether it wants to allow other courts to use Kelo to cross the final bridge in eviscerating the Takings Clause — the blatantly pretextual taking of private property to give it to a public official.
Cato has joined the National Federation of Independent Business, 10 other organizations, and a group of constitutional and property law professors, on an amicus brief arguing that the Court should take the case in order to clarify, if not overrule, the broad language of Kelo. Kelo itself says that the government may not “take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”
In Kelo, taking the property as part of an “economic development plan” was held to constitute a public purpose. Here, however, the “economic development plan,” was clearly a pretext to take property to benefit a known private party who just “happened” to also be the mayor. We point out that, despite the Court’s distaste with “pretextual takings” articulated in Kelo, courts across the country are split over what a pretextual taking is. Some courts have even ruled out the possibility of their existence. Yet, from the misuse of “blight” condemnations—a designation often used to tear down old neighborhoods for the purposes of gentrification—to situations like Mr. Ilagan’s, pretextual takings occur far too often.
The egregious case of Ilagan v. Ungacta is a perfect vehicle for the Court to clarify the concept of a pretextual taking and to bring some semblance of coherence back to a vital constitutional provision. More on our brief from Ilya Somin at the Volokh Conspiracy.
This blogpost was co-authored by legal associate Matt Gilliam.
In December 2010, the FCC adopted Preserving the Open Internet, a “network neutrality” order regulating broadband internet access service. Issued under authority (ostensibly) derived from 24 disparate provisions of federal communications law, Preserving the Open Internet is predicated on three basic rules: transparency, no blocking, and no discrimination.
Broadly speaking, “transparency” requires broadband providers to “disclose network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of services.” The “no blocking” rule forbids fixed broadband providers from “blocking lawful content, applications, services, and non-harmful devices.” Meanwhile, mobile broadband providers are restricted from blocking “lawful websites” and certain applications. The “No Discrimination” rule prohibits broadband providers from unreasonable discrimination in transmitting lawful network traffic.
The promulgation of the FCC’s network neutrality order will have serious consequences for the constitutional rights of broadband providers. One such provider, Verizon, now seeks to challenge the FCC order in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. This week, Cato joined TechFreedom, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Free State Foundation, on a brief urging the court to uphold Verizon’s First and Fifth Amendment rights.
We first argue that the FCC order violates broadband providers’ First Amendment rights by compelling speech, forcing them to transmit messages from content providers that they might not wish to convey, preventing them from transmitting messages they want to convey, prohibiting them from exercising editorial discretion, and generally restricting the mode and content of their communications. Because the order singles out certain speakers, it demands “strict scrutiny,” which it cannot survive because it neither serves a compelling governmental interest nor is narrowly tailored. We next argue that the FCC order violates broadband providers’ Fifth Amendment rights by subjecting them to physical and regulatory takings. The FCC order enacts a physical taking by granting the content providers an unrestricted right to occupy property while slicing through the bundle of property rights broadband providers enjoy as network owners. The order essentially gives the content providers unlimited use of the network owners’ physical property without any compensation, forbidding the rightful owners from exercising their right to control the use of their property and exclude others.
Furthermore, in forcing network owners to give network space to content providers, the regulation shifts costs to consumers, discouraging them from using broadband service and thus diminishing the network’s economic value. The FCC order also constitutes a regulatory taking because it prevents broadband providers from attaining their networks’ full economic value and subverts network owners’ reasonable investment-backed expectations. Finally, we argue that the FCC’s assertion of authority to regulate the Internet is a dangerous aggrandizement of agency power. In sum, while seeking to benefit content providers, the FCC has promulgated a regulation that violates the First and Fifth Amendment rights of broadband providers.
The case of Verizon v. FCC will be argued at the D.C. Circuit later this summer.
This blogpost was co-authored by Trevor Burrus.
A seemingly complicated legal case that has caught Cato's attention, CCA Associates v. United States, boils down to a simple constitutional question: If the government reneges on a contract and forces a property owner to rent apartments at below-market rates for longer than originally agreed, does it constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment (which would require the government to pay just compensation)?
In 1961, Congress amended the National Housing Act to create incentives for private builders to supply housing to low- and moderate-income families. Builders were given below-market mortgages backed by the federal government and, in return, the owners agreed to certain restrictions from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the most relevant being limitations on raising rent. Owners were also given the right to pre-pay the 40-year mortgage after 20 years, however, freeing them at that time from their rent-control obligations.
In 1990, as one 20-year period came to a close, Congress took away the owners' right to pre-pay their mortgages. In 1996, however, Congress returned the property owners' right to pre-pay. Therefore, between 1991 (when the original 20-year period would have lapsed) and 1996, the property owners were forced to rent at below-market rates.
CCA Associates is one of many similarly situated property owners who are suing the federal government for its clear act of duplicity. CCA Associates' case, among many others, has been bouncing back and forth between the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit for many years.
One of the key questions is how to determine the degree to which the government's actions economically affected CCA Associates' property. One view is that there was substantial economic impact during the five-year period between when Congress eliminated and then restored the pre-pay right -- CCA Associates lost approximately 81% of the property's possible value during those five years. Another view looks at the impact during the five-year period as fraction of the entire life of the property, not just the diminished value during the five-year period. Under this calculation, CCA Associates only lost 18% of the total value of the property.
The Federal Circuit adopted the latter formula and held that 18% is not a substantial enough economic impact to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. Cato has joined the National Federation of Independent Business, the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, and Professor Steven Eagle of George Mason University Law School on an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take CCA Associates' case.
We argue that adopting the Federal Circuit's answer to the so-called "denominator question" -- that is, whether the denominator in the "economic impact" fraction should be the entire life of the property or the shorter (here five-year) period during which the government temporarily took the owners' right to rent at the market price -- could preclude all possible claims that the government committed a "temporary taking." By choosing a big-enough denominator, courts can always characterize an economic impact as being below the constitutional threshold.
We also argue that, in applying the Supreme Court's factors in the famous 1978 Penn Central case (which set up the analytical framework for regulatory takings), the Federal Circuit incorrectly treated the factors as a magic formula and ignored other relevant factors. Finally, we point out how courts are obviously confused about the proper standards to apply in these cases, thus creating a perfect time for the Supreme Court's guidance.
The Court will decide this fall whether to hear CCA Associates v. United States.
Cato today filed an amicus brief supporting a request that the Supreme Court review Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States. Here's the case:
The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission owns and operates 23,000 acres of land as a wildlife refuge and recreational preserve; the preserve's trees are essential to its use for these purposes. Clearwater Dam, a federal flood control project, lies 115 miles upstream. Water is released from the dam in quantities governed by a pre-approved "management plan" that considers agricultural, recreational, and other effects downstream.
Between 1993 and 2000, the government released more water than authorized under the plan. AGFC repeatedly objected that these excessive releases flooded the preserve during its growing season, which significantly damaged and eventually decimated tree populations. In 2001, the government acknowledged the havoc its flooding had wreaked on AGFC's land and ceased plan deviations. By then, however, the preserve and its trees were severely damaged, so AGFC sued the government, claiming damages under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
The district court awarded $5.8 million in lost timber and reforestation costs based on the substantiality of the government's flooding and the foreseeability of the damage it caused. The Federal Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the flooding of private land can never be a taking unless that flooding is permanent. It further held that, in determining whether the government's intrusion on AGFC's land was permanent or temporary, courts must focus on the character of the policy behind the intrusion rather the effects of the intrusion itself. A taking cannot have occurred here because each deviation from the plan constituted a "temporary" policy, the court concluded, so AGFC had no constitutional remedy.
AGFC is asking the Supreme Court to review its case; the Court itself has recognized that something less than a permanent invasion of land can constitute a compensable taking. Cato joined the Pacific Legal Foundation on a brief urging the Court to hear the case and uphold the Fifth Amendment rights of property owners whose land is destroyed by the federal government. Our brief highlights the conflict between the Federal Circuit's decision and both Supreme Court and lower court precedent. First, an invasion of land by flooding is no different from an invasion of land by any other means. Second, the government's self-professed "intent" that a possible taking be "temporary" should have no bearing on whether a Fifth Amendment remedy exists when that taking has, in fact, occurred. Instead, the relevant inquiry should be whether the government caused permanent damage and, if so, how much.
The Federal Circuit's new rule — that, so long as it might be "temporary," no government flooding can be remedied under the Fifth Amendment — runs afoul of the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision meant to compensate property owners for government intrusions on their land. We urge the Court to grant AGFC's petition and maintain constitutional protections for private property.
The Supreme Court will decide in the new year whether to take the case, and would hear argument in the fall if it does.