Tag: Syria’s civil war

Syrian Civilians Pay the Price in Ghouta

After a third consecutive day of attacks, the Syrian government has killed over 250 people in Eastern Ghouta, a region near Damascus. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights stated that the death toll included 58 children and 42 women, and will most likely rise as the attacks continue.

The Assad regime, backed by Russia, claims that the attacks, which include air strikes and barrel bombs, are necessary to rid Eastern Ghouta of terrorists. Eastern Ghouta is the last rebel stronghold and home to both Jaysh al-Islam, a Syrian opposition militia that routinely attacks the Assad regime, Islamic State, and selective Kurdish forces, and the al Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which aims to overthrown the Assad regime and replace it with the Islamic Emirate of Syria. Meanwhile, Turkish forces attacked a pro-Syrian government force yesterday in the Afrin district, another contested zone in northern Syria, in order to halt reinforcements to the Kurdish YPG militia.

The Syrian civil war has entered a new, more violent and dangerous phase. Who will come out on top when/if the violence ebbs? It will most likely be the Assad regime because: 1) the regime has strong sponsors in the form of Russia and Iran, and 2) the international community has no coherent practical response to the ongoing violence.

The Trump Administration Is Poised to Expand the U.S. War in Syria Without a Public Debate

In early September 2013, Americans rose up in opposition to the suggestion that the United States might undertake a limited military operation to punish Syrian President Bashar al Assad for using chemical weapons in the civil war there.

Even though Secretary of State John Kerry gave assurances that the punitive strikes would be “unbelievably small,” and were unlikely to draw the United States deeper into yet another Middle Eastern war, the mere possibility that they might do so was too great a risk for many Americans who had grown weary of inconclusive conflicts that didn’t serve U.S. vital security interests. They bombarded congressional offices with phone calls and emails saying “stay out.” At the time, Newt Gingrich was one of a very few Washington insiders who made a succinct case against intervention on behalf of the wider public: “A) I don’t understand why it’s our problem, B) I doubt very much that we can fix it, and C) the guys who are against Assad strike me as about as sick as Assad is.”

In the face of such opposition, President Obama’s decision to submit the question to Congress effectively shelved the idea.

Thou Shalt Not Covet Thy Neighbor’s “Leadership” in Syria

In December, Russia, Turkey, and Iran began high-level talks to work toward a political settlement of the brutal civil war in Syria. Much to the chagrin of Washington officials and commentators, these countries have deliberately excluded the U.S. from the negotiations.

One broad sketch of their approach to a settlement, according to some reports, is to first achieve a cease-fire on the ground, as best they can, and then negotiate a division of Syria into three separate regions in which Assad’s Damascus-based Allawite sect would share power in a federal structure. Assad himself would step down at the end of his current term. The plan is in its infancy, subject to change, and would of course require agreement from the regime and opposition forces, before ultimately seeking buy in from the Gulf states, the U.S., and the European Union.

There is no indication that this latest push is going to be any more successful than previous diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syrian civil war. Nationalism is a powerful force and, as recent history suggests, plans to simply divide war-torn states into federated systems get tossed into the trash bin pretty quickly, as happened with Iraq and with Bosnia and Herzegovina. That said, the players have clear interests at stake. Russia has real leverage with the Syrian regime and has now staked its prestige on mitigating the conflict on favorable terms. Turkey borders Syria and has not only borne the brunt of the spillover effects with regard to refugees and militancy, but also has a strong national interest in preventing the Kurds from carving out territory along the border so as to keep a lid on its own Kurdish separatist movement. And Syria is Iran’s only Shiite ally in the region and has proven a strategic asset for Iran on several fronts, not least in its proximity to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. When the stakes are high for the negotiating parties, they tend to take care in constructing a settlement.

Donald Trump and the Future of U.S. Policy in Syria

Discussion of President-elect Trump’s approach toward Russia, and what that means for U.S. policy in the Syrian civil war, is heating up. Last week, Senator John McCain warned Trump that “the price of another ‘reset’ would be complicity in Putin and Assad’s butchery of the Syrian people.”

Donald Trump doesn’t necessarily see it that way. During the campaign, he tangled with his running-mate Mike Pence over Syria, and late last week Trump admitted that he “had an opposite view of many people regarding Syria,” and suggested that he would withdraw support for anti-Assad rebels, and focus on fighting ISIS.

Although he sometimes speaks derisively of regime-change wars and nation building, Donald Trump is hardly an anti-war dove and there are reasons to believe that his administration will be quite hawkish. At a minimum, he is likely to be receiving advice from many establishment voices who have been urging the U.S. government to play a much more active role in the Syrian civil war.

The president-elect should go out of his way to consider other perspectives. President Obama was caught between wanting to see Bashar al-Assad’s regime overthrown, but not wanting to see violent extremists take its place (for example, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra). Unsurprisingly, the Obama administration’s efforts to arm the few factions that cleared the vetting process were an abject failure.

Despite the anxiety surrounding the election, and the expectations that Hillary Clinton would have substantially increased U.S. military intervention globally, the great irony is that Clinton’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia and Syria might not have been all that different from Trump’s. Clinton’s so-called smart power would have struggled to find the moderate elements capable of prevailing in the Syrian civil war, and would have struggled to keep them alive once found. She, too, might have dropped the demand that Assad and his followers evacuate the country, and tacitly worked with Russia to target the very worst extremists, including ISIS, a group that poses a threat not merely to Assad, but to many others around the world.

Clinton also would have confronted a skeptical Congress, reflecting the sentiments of a skeptical public. As I note over at The Skeptics, “Some in Congress have pushed back against the executive branch’s occasional zeal for intervention in Syria,” and that is likely to continue. Recall that:

In the late summer and fall of 2013, members of Congress were flooded with phone calls urging them to block U.S. military action there. Obama got the message too, and backed away from his ill-advised red line that would have entailed direct U.S. military action in the civil war.

But the Obama administration continued to funnel money to some anti-Assad rebels. Since then, a few in Congress have tried to cut off funds for the so-called “Syrian Train and Equip” program. An amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill sponsored by Reps. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) and Austin Scott (R-GA) garnered 135 votes from both Republicans and Democrats, despite opposition from party leaders and the White House. It is reasonable to believe that a similar effort would fare even better in the post-election environment.

You can read the whole thing here.

Economic Freedom and Infants’ Lives

Recent reports that infants now die at a higher rate in Venezuela than in war-torn Syria were, sadly, unsurprising—the results of socialist economics are predictable. Venezuela’s infant mortality rate has actually been above Syria’s since 2008.

 

The big picture, fortunately, is happier. The global infant mortality rate has plummeted. Even Syria and Venezuela, despite the impact of war and failed policies, saw improvements up to as recently as last year. From 1960 to 2015, Syria’s infant mortality rate fell by 91% and Venezuela’s by 78%. This year (not reflected in the graph above or below), Syria’s rate rose from 11.1 per 1,000 live births to 15.4, while Venezuela’s shot up from 12.9 to 18.6. Meanwhile, infant mortality rates have continued to fall practically everywhere else, and have declined even faster in countries that enjoy more freedom and stability. Consider Chile.

Why We Should Be Wary of Calls to Intervene in Syria

In a recent commentary published on the World Post, Niall Ferguson criticizes President Obama for “Playing Patience While Syria Burns.”  In his view, the Obama administration has chosen to kick the can down the road because the president “naturally prefers the path of least resistance.” 

The problem with Ferguson’s argument (and many similar articles) is that it criticizes Obama for dithering over Syria without elaborating a viable alternative policy.  Ferguson quite rightly points out that the choice is not simply between doing nothing and plunging into another Iraq—“there are many degrees of intervention in a war like the one raging in Syria.”  Yet he never explains what type of intervention would actually help resolve the conflict in Syria. He seems to imply that Obama should have armed the Syrian rebels,but he fails to explain how that would end the conflict.  Could the rebels have toppled Assad if they had American arms (and maybe air support like in Libya)?  Is such an approach still viable following Russia’s intervention?  And even if the rebels were to succeed in toppling Assad, then what?  There are more than forty different rebel groups operating in Syria.  Are they all going to cooperate in forming a national unity government?  Or will they simply start carving out their own little fiefdoms, and perhaps begin fighting each other?  These are the types of questions that need to be addressed before the United States intervenes—and they’re surely questions that the Obama administration has been wrestling with. 

Ultimately, Ferguson’s article demonstrates that it’s a lot easier to criticize President Obama for doing too little than to devise a positive strategy that would accomplish much in Syria.  The fact that the situation in Syria is currently so abysmal does not necessarily mean that a more proactive approach would improve the situation.  U.S. intervention could easily make a bad situation worse.  Since the Syrian conflict is such a complex problem, as Ferguson acknowledges, we should remain wary of calls for the United States to do more until the proponents of greater intervention are able to explicate a clear, detailed strategy—a strategy that explains specific actions the United States can implement, and, more importantly, how those actions will actually facilitate a resolution of the conflict.

Current Wisdom: Did Human-Caused Climate Change Lead to War in Syria?

The Current Wisdom is a series of monthly articles in which Patrick J. Michaels, director of the Center for the Study of Science, reviews interesting items on global warming in the scientific literature that may not have received the media attention that they deserved, or have been misinterpreted in the popular press.

Did human-caused climate change lead to war in Syria?

Based only on the mainstream press headlines, you almost certainly would think so.

Reading further into the articles where the case is laid out, a few caveats appear, but the chain of events seems strong.

The mechanism? An extreme drought in the Fertile Crescent region—one that a new study finds was made worse by human greenhouse gas emissions—added a spark to the tinderbox of tensions that had been amassing in Syria for a number of years under the Assad regime (including poor water management policies).

It is not until you dig pretty deep into the technical scientific literature, that you find out that the anthropogenic climate change impact on drought conditions in the Fertile Crescent is extremely minimal and tenuous—so much so that it is debatable as to whether it is detectable at all.

This is not to say that a strong and prolonged drought didn’t play some role in the Syria’s pre-war unrest—perhaps it did, perhaps it didn’t (a debate we leave up to folks much more qualified than we are on the topic)—but that the human-influenced climate change impact on the drought conditions was almost certainly too small to have mattered.