Tag: Supreme Court

Another Bleak Day for Property Owners

Property owners have long suffered under the Supreme Court’s erratic rulings. It got worse today. In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Court ruled against the owners, 5-3, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts writing a dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Thomas writing a separate dissent, and Justice Gorsuch taking no part. The problem isn’t simply with the majority’s holding and opinion, it’s with the dissent as well. Only Thomas points in the right direction.

This was a regulatory takings case arising under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which prohibits government from taking private property for public use without just compensation. In separate conveyances in 1994 and 1995, the Murrs, four siblings, inherited two contiguous lots on the St. Croix River that their parents had purchased in 1960 and 1963. The parents had built an ancestral home on the first lot. They bought the second for investment purposes.

The trouble began in 2004 when the Murrs sought to sell the second lot, valued at $410,000, and use the proceeds to upgrade the ancestral home. But they were blocked by a 1975 local zoning ordinance that treated the two lots as one, even though they had long been deeded and taxed separately. Under the ordinance they had to sell the lots together or not at all. Out $410,000, the Murrs sued, claiming that the ordinance had deprived them of their right to sell their property.

Big Goings-On at Supreme Court as We Race to the End of Term

The Supreme Court today came down with opinions in two cases in which Cato filed a brief. First, in Murr v. Wisconsin, it unfortunately ruled against property owners in an important regulatory-takings case. Then, in Lee v. United States, it correctly found that a criminal defendant who had virtually no chance to win at trial—absent jury nullifcation, which was our focus—was still prejudiced by (and entitled to a new trial due to) his counsel’s wrong advice that he wouldn’t be deported if he pled guilty.

Murr: Whenever you see a court invoke a “multifactor balancing test,” you know it’s just making stuff up. Alas that’s what happened in Murr v. Wisconsin, where a family was deprived of significant use of its property—not to mention economic benefits—because of an unfortunate operation of local law. The Supreme Court compounded that harm by essentially deferring to state determinations of property owners’ rights, and did so by applying that “multifactor” standard that allows it to reach whatever result it wants. This ruling shows that in the grander scheme, as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, the Supreme Court needs to reevaluate its regulatory-takings jurisprudence altogether. (For more, see Cato’s amicus brief.)

Lee: The Court was correct to give even seemingly hopeless criminal defendants the right to adequate legal repreentation. Jae Lee only took a plea deal because his lawyer repeatedly assured him that he wouldn’t face deportation. The fact that going to trial, where he had no legal leg to stand on, would’ve almost certainly resulted in a longer prison sentence is immaterial. It’s clear that for Lee, who was brought to the United States from South Korea as a child, the risk of being forced to leave the only country he knows was much more important than a longer prison sentence. Lurking under this case was the controversial doctrine-that-must-not-be-named of jury nullification, which was essentially Lee’s only chance for acquittal. (For more, see Cato’s amicus brief.)

Stay tuned Monday for the Supreme Court’s final opinions of the term (especially Trinity Lutheran), as well as decisions on whether to take up the travel-ban case, Masterpiece Bakery (vendors for same-sex weddings), and Peruta (Second Amendment right to carry). And maybe, just maybe, Justice Anthony Kennedy will announce his retirement—though if I had to bet, I’d say he sticks around another year.

Immigrants Trust American Governmental Institutions

Hudson Institute historian and political scientist John Fonte has written that immigrants are not patriotically assimilating.  Fonte blames this supposed development on many factors but frequently credits changes in public school curricula away from the nation building Americanization Movement of the Progressive Era toward a multicultural ethos today.  In previous posts, I have challenged Fonte’s claims about a lack of patriotic assimilation amongst today’s immigrants and have shown that his claims about the success of the Americanization Movement are based on anecdotes and that there as many that show it actually slowed assimilation.  

A more subtle reading of Fonte’s work is that he is worried about immigrants and their descendants weakening American political institutions by not supporting them as much as Americans whose ancestors have been here for many generations.  The General Social Survey (GSS) asks many questions of immigrants and their descendants that can help lessen Fonte’s worries. 

Don’t Compel Doctors to Promote State-Favored Programs

Like all states, California has licensed medical centers of every kind. One particular type, often known as a “crisis pregnancy center,” provides pregnancy-related services with the goal of helping women to make choices other than abortion. Based on opposition to these centers, the California legislature enacted a law requiring licensed clinics “whose primary purpose is providing family planning or pregnancy-related services” to deliver to each of their clients the following message: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.” But the law also creates an exception for clinics that actually enroll clients in these programs—so, in effect, it applies only to clinics that oppose the very program they must advertise.

Several of these crisis pregnancy centers sued to block the law, arguing that it violated their First Amendment rights by forcing them to express a message to which they are opposed. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the law, holding that it regulates only “professional speech” and therefore should be reviewed under a more deferential standard, rather than the normal strict judicial scrutiny that applies to laws compelling speech. The centers have petitioned the Supreme Court to review their case; Cato has filed a brief supporting that petition.

Supreme Court Reaffirms the Presumption of Innocence

On Wednesday, the Supreme Court decided a relatively small but important case out of my home state of Colorado. Colorado, like many states, imposes certain monetary penalties and costs on convicted defendants. Those can include court costs, docket fees, and payments into victim restitution funds. What happens, however, if a defendant’s conviction is later overturned, either by a higher court or on a re-trial? Can the once-convicted defendants easily get their money back, as would seem to be only fair? Not in Colorado, which is (was) unique in requiring that exonerated defendants go to court again to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence before they could get their money back. Thankfully, the Supreme Court, in a 7-1 opinion (Justice Gorsuch only began participating in cases in the last two weeks), held that Colorado’s “Exoneration Act” violates the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Nelson v. Colorado is a combination of two different cases. One concerned Shannon Nelson, who was convicted by a jury of two felonies and three misdemeanors arising from the alleged sexual and physical abuse of her four children. Nelson conviction was reversed on appeal, however, and on retrial she was acquitted of all charges. In the course of her ordeal, Nelson paid $8,192.50 in costs and fees.

Louis Madden, the petitioner in the other case, was convicted of patronizing a child prostitute and third-degree sexual assault. His conviction was later overturned by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the state declined to retry the case. Madden paid the state $1,977.75 in the course of his legal troubles.

Although Madden and Nelson were innocent of their crimes in the eyes of the law–remember everyone is innocent until proven guilty by a legally proper trial (Cato’s brief in the case focused on the deep historical roots of the presumption of innocence)–they were faced with having to prove their innocence in a subsequent civil proceeding if they were to get their money back. Instead, they went all the way to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was unconstitutional to require them to do anything more to prove their innocence.

Writing for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made fairly short work of Colorado’s law. “The sole legal basis for these assessments was the fact of Nelson’s and Madden’s convictions,” she wrote, and “absent those convictions” Colorado has “no legal right to exact and retain petitioners’ funds.” Once the convictions were erased, “the presumption of their innocence was restored” and “Colorado may not presume a person adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary exactions.”

Why Judicial Independence Matters

Late yesterday The Hill posted a short op-ed I wrote on President Trump’s nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch to fill the seat of the late Justice Antonin Scalia. As often happens, a couple of editorial changes, especially in the title, muted somewhat the central point of the piece. But even were that not so, that point is worth further attention.

It concerns judicial independence. As I wrote, facing a nominee with impeccable qualifications, Democrats are now crafting an indirect assault against Judge Gorsuch. Thus, they’re pointing to the president’s outrageous attacks on the judiciary, among other things he’s said, and contending that he’s imposed a “litmus test” on the nominee. So they’re demanding that Judge Gorsuch “very explicitly and directly” disavow the president’s remarks, which he has already done respectfully, but in addition that he “very specifically” make his own policy views known in the upcoming confirmation hearings (which we’ve just learned will begin on March 20).

Neil Gorsuch Will Make a Fine Justice

My first choice from the president’s fabulous list of terrific judges – they’re all winners, believe me (no really, solid list) – was probably the judiciary’s twitter laureate, Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett, but Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit was right up there. As you can see by my statement to CNN, I’m pleased as punch with the selection. 

There’ll be time enough to analyze Judge Gorsuch’s work, but after reading a stack of his opinions over the weekend, the most salient parts of his judicial record are as follows:

  1. A keen appreciation for constitutional structure as a guarantor of our rights and liberties.
  2. A real devotion to originalism – probably more than the self-described “faint-hearted originalist” Antonin Scalia – and textualism.
  3. Strong support for the freedom of speech and religion, and the First Amendment more broadly.
  4. Skepticism of the administrative state.
  5. Like Scalia, he construes criminal statutes narrowly, so people aren’t convicted and punished without the government’s meeting its evidentiary burden or establishing that it didn’t violate constitutional rights in arresting and prosecuting defendants.
  6. Really, really good writing, which even Justice Elena Kagan has praised.

Gorsuch also maintains a good relationship with Cato and has published a Policy Analysis with us. In short, Donald Trump has managed to pick a nominee who should please everyone other than progressives: social conservatives, libertarians, legal elites, and I imagine the populists who trust him to pick “the best judges.” Left-wing activists are already talking about how Gorsuch is extreme and is anti-women, workers, yada yada – they have to raise money somehow – but I find it hard to see how Senate Democrats will muster 40 votes to sustain a filibuster against someone who was unanimously confirmed in 2006, particularly with a tough 2018 map.

For more analysis, see my short piece in the New York Post, plus Andrew Grossman and David Rivkin in the Wall Street Journal, as well as these excellent essays by Ramesh Ponnuru and Ed Whelan.

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