The House of Representatives are set to debate and vote on introducing a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Such a move is almost certain to fail, as it requires a super-majority in both chambers of Congress, and three-quarters of the states—38 out of 50—would need to ratify it. Coming hot on the heels of the recent spending-cap busting omnibus bill, it’s difficult not to see this as a form of Republican fiscal virtue-signalling.
As I wrote in my recent paper on fiscal rules, the best way to build support for fiscal conservatism is to deliver it. That means constructing an argument about the supply and demand for government, getting public and political buy-in for a new fiscally responsible budgeting framework, and taking the necessary steps to get to a stage where the budget is balanced, ideally though spending cuts. Neither party has shown an appetite for this so far – in fact, quite the opposite.
Rule design is an incredibly important part of acceptance, and then adherence to a rule, too, though: critics and economists have a point about some of the downsides of a pure year-on-year BBA (as proposed). Evidence from around the world suggests rules that are too inflexible to changing circumstances and recessions prove less durable.