As Walter Olson has noted, before Antonin Scalia became a federal judge and ultimately a Supreme Court justice, he spent part of his career working in public policy, including a stint as editor-in-chief (and other roles) of Regulation, which was then published by the American Enterprise Institute and now is published by Cato. Scalia wrote articles for the magazine himself and edited those written by others. The sharp analysis and rhetorical wit he would later display on the Court can be seen in Regulation’s pages.
For example, in this 1979 article he argued against the Legislative Veto, a proposal to give Congress the broad power to disapprove specific regulations through resolution (which could not be overturned by presidential veto). Though Scalia was often skeptical of federal regulatory policy, he was also skeptical of this effort to constrain it, because it further removed Congress from its constitutional duty to set policy. He wrote:
Has the difficulty really been that Congress has tried repeatedly to reverse the results of agency rulemaking through legislation but has been stymied by the President? I am not aware of a single instance. … The problem has been, quite simply, that both houses have had neither the time nor the inclination to review agency rulemaking, just as they have had neither the time nor the inclination to write more detailed legislation in the first place, which would render the most significant rulemaking unnecessary.
In the same vein, this 1980 Scalia article examined the judicial implications of congressional delegation of authority to executive agencies. Such delegation is worrisome and constitutionally dubious, he acknowledged; lawmakers dodge the difficult policy questions, leaving them to agency staff. However, the proposed remedy for this delegation—having the courts settle such issues when discerning legislative intent—is even more worrisome and dubious, he argued. Rather, Congress should fulfill its duties under the Constitution:
The sorts of judgments alluded to above—how great is the need for prompt action, how extensive is the social consensus on the vague legislated objective, and so forth—are much more appropriate for a representative assembly than for a hermetically sealed committee of nine lawyers. In earlier times heated constitutional debate did take place at the congressional level.