Tag: regulations

A Message for Trump: Basel IV Will Kill Dreams of an Infrastructure Boom

Ever since the Financial Crisis, regulators have tightened their grip on banking activities (read: beaten up on banks) without taking note of unintended consequences. Prominent amongst these misguided regulatory interventions have been the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) mandates, which are touted as promoting global financial safety and economic stability. John Dizard of the Financial Times has seen through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s smoke and mirrors display and correctly concludes that the proposals provide background noise for the next crisis.

First, the new “Basel IV” reforms will dampen economic growth globally. The European Banking Federation claims that increased capital requirements will cause European Banks to raise an additional €850bn of capital. This will exacerbate the credit crunch because banks can increase capital-asset ratios by either shrinking assets or raising capital. In both scenarios, deposit liabilities are reduced and money is destroyed. Slower growth in the money supply, broadly measured, slows the expansion of nominal GDP. The implications are dire because Basel IV seeks specifically to increase capital requirements on project lending and banks account for 80 percent of lending to the real economy in Europe.

Second, Basel IV’s push to standardize risk weighted asset calculations will actually increase risky activities. Unbelievably, Dizard reports, “under the current version of the Basel ‘standardized approach’, unsecured lending to a non-public, below investment-grade corporate borrower requires the same bank capital commitment as project financing secured by assets, liens on equity and cash lockbox arrangements.” With all corporate risk considered the same, incentives will exist for bankers to lend for a risky, high-yield project instead of a safer, more productive one. The result will be a push away from revenue-producing infrastructure projects. 

The secretive Basel Committee on Banking Supervision continues to create systemic risks, which threaten to plunge the world into a slump. Thanks to the BIS mandates, we might experience the horrors of Quantitative Tightening (QT).

Obama’s Housing Toolkit: A Mixed Bag

Something striking happened last week: the Obama White House released its Housing Development Toolkit and Obama’s economic advisor, Jason Furman, wrote a follow-on op-ed about land use regulation’s negative consequences. While White House reports tend to be geared toward partisan political objectives, these two publications could have been written by non-partisan economists. Nevertheless, although the honest application of economic theory is welcome, libertarians will still find points of disagreement.

What’s good? The report highlights zoning policies’ influence on increasing housing prices, immobilizing workers in job deserts, creating costly uncertainty for developers, increasing inequality and racial segregation, and suppressing economic growth. These negative outcomes were attributed to “excessive barriers,” “unnecessarily slow permitting processes,” and “arbitrary or antiquated” zoning and land use regulations.

The White House even went so far as to say that “even well-intentioned land use policies” can have negative impacts. So far, so good.

What’s bad? The worst part of the report is the declaration that the President’s 2017 HUD budget includes a $300 million proposal for grants to help cities “modernize their housing regulatory approaches.” Since when does it cost $300 million to reduce regulation, which is all the “modernizing” that needs to be done?

Food Labeling Regulations Are Bad for Your Health

Besides offering unrealistic tax reform plans, most of the presidential candidates this year made some nod to regulatory reform in their 2016 campaigns. For the most part these involve some sort of wholesale examination of the rules currently in place to determine which can be safely jettisoned to save consumers and businesses billions of dollars. 

Such regulatory reform is counterproductive, though: As Sam Batkins and I point out in a forthcoming piece in Regulation magazine, once companies have spent what is necessary to comply with the new regulations-regardless of whether or not it is cost effective–there’s little to be gained from repealing it. 

However there is one regulation which, if repealed, would enormously improve the well-being of consumers at very little cost to business: the current food labeling rules. 

America’s Economic Problem Is Regulation, not Trade

Even when Donald Trump seems to get something right, he’s mostly wrong. At least when it comes to economics.

Many Americans are suffering financially. Yet the problem is not trade: Americans have grown wealthy as a trading nation. In contrast, regulation has done much to harm U.S. competitiveness.

The Obama administration is busy writing new rules to turn America into its vision of a good society, irrespective of the impact on liberty or prosperity. Last year Uncle Sam spent $62 billion to run the rest of our lives.

Observed Patrick McLaughlin and Oliver Sherouse of the Mercatus Center: “Over the last 20 years the regulatory budget has more than doubled in real terms while the number of total restrictions has grown by about 220,000—a 25 percent increase.”

The problem is not only the expense of enforcement. Far greater is the cost of the impact on the economy.

Last year Clyde Wayne Crews of the Competitive Enterprise Institute assessed the impact of regulation in his working paper entitled “Tip of the Costberg.” He figured the total price of regulation to be $1.88 trillion.

However, these figures almost certainly are too low. Crews argued: “Too often, regulatory impacts don’t get measured. But further, the disruption of market processes and the derailment of wealth, safety and health creating processes themselves are for the most part wholly neglected.”

Regulatory costs play out in many ways. One aspect is what an individual or company spends to comply with government dictates. Far harder to measure is what does not occur as a result of arbitrary and expensive rules. What products are not launched, what enterprises are not started, what jobs are not created?

Of course, regulations theoretically are promulgated because they yield net benefits after costs. However, agencies have an incentive to inflate the value of what they are doing. That means exaggerating problems and “social costs,” overstating alleged benefits, and discounting compliance costs.

Overall how much have we lost from excessive, unnecessary regulation? A lot, according to economists John W. Dawson and John J. Seater.

They considered the cumulative impact of losing a couple percent of economic growth year in and year out from 1949 through 2005: “That reduction in the growth rate has led to an accumulated reduction in GDP of about $38.8 trillion as of the end of 2011. That is, GDP at the end of 2011 would have been $53.9 trillion instead of $15.1 trillion if regulation had remained at its 1949 level.”

Increased regulation also contributes to increased inequality. In January McLaughlin and Laura Stanley of Mercatus concluded that such rules “skew income toward politically connected producers and away from individual who lack the resources necessary to navigate the legal and regulatory framework.” 

Finally, there is the issue of lost liberty. Crews released a second study last year entitled “Mapping Washington’s Lawlessness 2016.” It reviewed what he termed “regulatory dark matter.”

The regulatory process is essentially lawless, beyond the normal accountability of a democratic system. As Crews explained: “Congress passes and the president signs a few dozen laws every year. Meanwhile, federal departments and agencies issue well over 3,000 rules and regulations of varying significance. A weekday never passes without new regulation. Beyond those rules, however, we lack a clear grasp on the amount and cost of the thousands of executive branch and federal agency proclamations and issuances, including memos, guidance documents, bulletins, circulars, and announcements with practical regulatory effect.”

Americans are suffering. But closing off the economy is no answer to them.

As I pointed out in American Spectator online: “Policymakers should address federal, state, and local governments which are doing so much to prevent American companies from out-competing foreign operations and rewarding Americans accordingly. These are the bad policies to blame for creating today’s economic problems and imposing widespread financial hardship, thereby fueling the populist Trump bandwagon.”

Regulating School Choice: The Debate Continues

Last week, the Cato Institute held a policy forum on school choice regulations. Two of our panelists, Dr. Patrick Wolf and Dr. Douglas Harris, were part of a team that authored one of the recent studies finding that Louisiana’s voucher program had a negative impact on participating students’ test scores. Why that was the case – especially given the nearly unanimously positive previous findings – was the main topic of our discussion. Wolf and I argued that there is reason to believe that the voucher program’s regulations might have played a role in causing the negative results, while Harris and Michael Petrilli of the Fordham Institute pointed to other factors. 

The debate continued after the forum, including a blog post in which Harris raises four “problems” with my arguments. I respond to his criticisms below.

The Infamous Education Productivity Chart

Problem #1: Trying to discredit traditional public schools by placing test score trends and expenditure changes on one graph. These graphs have been floating around for years. They purport to show that spending has increased much faster than expenditures [sic], but it’s obvious that these comparisons make no sense. The two things are on different scales. Bedrick tried to solve this problem by putting everything in percentage terms, but this only gives the appearance of a common scale, not the reality. You simply can’t talk about test scores in terms of percentage changes.

The more reasonable question is this: Have we gotten as much from this spending as we could have? This one we can actually answer and I think libertarians and I would probably agree: No, we could be doing much better than we are with current spending. But let’s be clear about what we can and cannot say with these data.

Harris offers a reasonable objection to the late, great Andrew Coulson’s infamous chart (shown below). Coulson already addressed critics of his chart at length, but Harris is correct that the test scores and expenditures do not really have a common scale. That said, the most important test of a visual representation of data is whether the story it tells is accurate. In this case, it is, as even Harris seems to agree. Adjusted for inflation, spending per pupil in public schools has nearly tripled in the last four decades while the performance of 17-year-olds on the NAEP has been flat. 

U.S. Education Spending and Productivity

Producing a similar chart with data from the scores of younger students on the NAEP would be misleading because the scale would mask their improvement. But for 17-year-olds, whose performance has been flat on the NAEP and the SAT, the story the chart tells is accurate.

How TTIP Will Affect the Structure of Global Trade Policy

Swedish economist Fredrik Erixon, an authority on international trade policy, who heads up the Brussels-based think tank known as ECIPE (the European Centre for International Political Economy), was a big contributor to the discussions held this week in conjunction with Cato’s TTIP conference.  Among many other trade topics, Fredrik has written extensively on TTIP, the WTO, and how the former may impact the latter.

In his conference essay, Erixon agrees with alarmed, “pure” multilateralists that the TTIP will supplant the WTO as “the organising entity of future trade policy,” but explains why that is not necessarily a bad thing.  While he dismisses fears that the United States and European Union may be turning toward an arrangement that excludes the rest of the world, and explains how they will “leverage TTIP for global trade liberalisation,”  Fredrik does worry that TTIP – if it “succeeds” in the area of regulatory harmonization – will result in the export of failed regulatory policies to the rest of the world.

His concluding remarks on that topic: 

Currently, the differences between EU and U.S. regulations and regulatory approaches are far too wide for the TTIP to be a realistic candidate for setting the global rules in this area. But TTIP will likely push trade agreements further in the direction of prescriptive regulatory conditionality, making it harder for trade agreements in the future to advance global commercial freedom through deregulation and simple, transparent rules.

Read Erixon’s essay here; see him discuss the issues during this conference session; see all the conference essays here.

Rules versus Discretion: Insights from Behavioral Economics

For half a century now, the “rules versus discretion” debate in monetary economics has focused on the so-called “time inconsistency” problem.  The problem is that, although a discretionary central bank might promise not to allow the inflation rate to rise above zero (or some other ideal value), the fact that an inflation “surprise” can boost employment and output in the short run will tempt it to break its promise.  Realizing this, market participants will anticipate higher inflation.  The long-run result is a higher inflation rate with no improvement in either employment or output.  By limiting the central bankers’ options, a monetary rule solves the time inconsistency problem.

An earlier rules-versus-discretion debate had taken place in the 1920s and 1930s.1  The later one, which was inspired by the stagflation of the 1970s, differed in that it was influenced by the New Classical revolution that was taking place around the same time.  Consequently, the later critics of monetary discretion, including Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott,  Guillermo Calvo, Benn McCallum, Robert Barro and David Gordon, and John Taylor,2 differed from their predecessors by building their arguments on the premise that central bankers were both well (if not quite perfectly) informed and well intentioned.  Discretion, according to them, leads to less than ideal outcomes not because central bankers are ignorant or misguided, but because of misaligned incentives.

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