Tag: refugee

Free Trade Agreements Don’t Increase the Number of Asylum Seekers and Refugees

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the recent winner of a Democratic primary for Congress in New York, argued that free-trade agreements (FTAs) have caused the number of refugees and asylum seekers to the United States to grow.  This is a somewhat common claim among some critics of trade or FTAs in particular. 

To test this claim, we gathered a list of all the FTAs that the United States has signed and how many asylum seekers and refugees they sent to the United States since the year 2000.  We combined all asylum seekers, affirmative and defensive, that were counted by the United Nation Human Rights Commission.  Some asylum seekers from these countries are double or triple counted due to the oddities of the asylum system.  We then added refugee admissions from the Department of Homeland Security. 

Next, we ran several regressions to see the relationship between having an FTA with the United States and the number of asylum seekers, refugees, or those two categories of humanitarian visas combined who arrive in the United States from those countries.  The first regression was a difference-in-differences with two-way fixed effects.  The second was a difference-in-differences regression with linear time trends.  The third was a triple difference-in-differences with two-way fixed effects that also included asylum seekers, refugees, and humanitarian immigrants from Latin America specifically.  To ensure proper statistical inference, we computed robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for country-level autocorrelation in these variables.

Our results are that there is no statistically significant change in the number of asylum seekers or refugees that countries send to the United States after they sign an FTA in any of the above regressions.  We find very low within R-squares for these models that suggest that the presence of FTAs has very little predictive power for within-country variability for the number of asylum seekers and refugees.  In other words, FTAs don’t explain the flow of asylum seekers and refugees, and other variables that we did not include in our model do.       

Figure 1 shows the number of asylum seekers from countries that have signed an FTA since 2000 in the five years before and after the agreement going into effect.  Each line represents a different country.  There is no relationship between signing an FTA and the number of asylum seekers.

Figure 1

Asylum Seekers within Five Years of Signing an FTA per Country

Source: United Nation Human Rights Commission

The refugee system is the other half of the humanitarian immigration system and it shows no change in the number of asylum seekers before and after the signing of FTAs (Figure 2).  It’s worth noting that nations that send refugees to the United States send very few refugees and almost all of those sent in Figure 2 are Colombian.

Figure 2

Refugees within Five Years of Signing an FTA per Country

 

Source: Department of Homeland Security.

There are many potential explanations for changes in the number of asylum seekers and refugees coming to the United States.  They range from changing conditions in other countries to alterations in American law or policy and everything in between—but let us set aside the notion that FTAs somehow force people to flee their home countries. 

Make “Enhanced” Vetting Great Again

Last week, President Trump issued a new executive order (EO) that restarts the refugee system with new “enhanced” vetting procedures.  The new procedures will subject the follow-on family members of refugees to about the same level of vetting as the original refugee sponsors who have already been settled in the United States.  This extension of the current refugee vetting system will cover about 2,500 additional follow-on refugees per year.  The EO also forward-deploys specially trained Fraud Detection and National Security officers at refugee processing locations to help identify potential fraud, national security, and public safety issues earlier in the screening process.  Additional actions of the EO are enhanced questions to identify fraud and other inadmissible characteristics as well as upgrades to databases to detect potential fraud or changes in refugee information at different interview stages.  The EO also directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, to review and reform refugee vetting procedures on an annual basis. 

The EO justifies these new measures by stating that, “It is the policy of the United States to protect its people from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats … Those procedures enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who might commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United States, and they bolster our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the country.”  

All in all, these new vetting procedures are modest additions to the already intensive refugee screening that occurs.  If these new enhanced screening procedures are supposed to be the “extreme vetting” that President Trump proposed then they show just how extreme and secure the refugee program already was.  Furthermore, they are unnecessary.

Terrorists by Refugee-Restricted Countries

The EO also places additional scrutiny on refugees from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.  Those eleven nations represent supposed security threats identified on the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) – a government list of nations established in the 1990s whose nationals are supposed to be more closely scrutinized for particular national security threats.  The government has updated and expanded the SAO criteria as well as the nations on the list multiple times since 9/11.    

The government may have an excellent rationale for designating nationals from these eleven countries as serious threats that require more refugee vetting but those reasons and the evidence supporting them are not available for the public to examine.  Publicly available information points to a small refugee threat from refugees from these nations that does not justify additional screening.  Since 1975, zero Americans have been murdered on U.S. soil in a terror attack committed by refugees from any of the eleven countries.    

Heritage Report Shows Refugees Are Not a Major Threat

Olivia Enos, David Inserra, and Joshua Meservey of the Heritage Foundation published an interesting Backgrounder last week about the U.S. refugee program. We agree with many, though not all, of its conclusions and think that it serves as a wonderful example of policy experts grappling with a difficult policy question in a nuanced and thoughtful way – two characteristics often lacking in Washington, D.C.

However, the Backgrounder’s claim that 61 refugees were convicted of Islamist “terrorism-related” offenses since 2002 has earned a lot of attention from the media. David Inserra was kind enough to send us a complete list of the refugee terrorists he and his colleagues counted. Here are the facts about these 61 people:

  • None of these refugees killed anyone in a terrorist attack on U.S.-soil.
  • Only five (8 percent) were refugees who attempted or planned an attack on U.S. soil. The other 56 (92 percent) of the list were either not refugees or not terrorists targeting U.S. soil.
  • At most 50 were actual refugees who may have committed terrorism offenses, out of the 2.1 million refugees admitted since 1989, which is the earliest year that anybody on the list entered as a refugee. At least eleven (18 percent) of the refugee terrorists reported by Heritage were either not actually refugees or not convicted of terrorism offenses.
  • Only five (8 percent) entered as refugees since 2008.
  • Only five (8 percent) were likely refugee security vetting failures who entered as adults or older teenagers and committed an offense soon after entering.
  • The 50 refugees represent just five of the 124 nationalities of refugees admitted since 2002 (4 percent). Three-quarters of the refugees who committed a terrorism offense came from a single nation.

The security threat from refugees is minuscule, concentrated among a few Somalis, and has little to do with vetting.

The Non-Refugees and Non-Terrorists

The Backgrounder’s use of terrorism-related offenses is problematic as it is not synonymous with actual direct or indirect support of terrorism. There is no definition of a terrorism-related offense in U.S. statutes but there is a broad working GAO definition: that it relates to “terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well as other information.” As far as we can tell, the term terrorism-related is used to describe a conviction for any offense that results from a terrorism investigation – even if it is for crimes that bear no relation to terrorism such as buying stolen cereal. David Inserra told us that “Our [Heritage’s] inclusion criteria wasn’t based on convictions for terrorism offenses because people could be involved in that sort of activity and not ever be convicted. We were trying to find the happy medium between overly-restrictive and too loose definitions.” Thus, we are working with different definitions and the reader should keep that in mind. 

Six individuals on the Heritage list were not convicted of terrorism offenses. The government dismissed its complaint against Al-Hazmah Mohammed Jawad. Aws Mohammed Younis Al-Jayab and Ali Mohammed Al Mosaleh were charged with making false statements. Abdi Mahdi Hussein was convicted of failure to follow financial reporting requirements and was “not charged with any terrorism offense and was not alleged to have knowingly been involved in terrorism activities,” according to the FBI. Yusra Ismail was charged with stealing a U.S. passport—not terrorism—and Saynab Hussein was convicted of perjury.

Huge Net Costs from Trump’s New Executive Order Cutting Refugees

President Trump today issued a revised version of his infamous executive order to temporarily ban the issuance of new green cards and visas for nationals from Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. The new order dropped Iraq, which eviscerated Trump’s argument that the list of banned countries is based on an existing list in U.S. law. The order also cuts the number of refugee admissions by about 37 percent compared to the post-1975 average number of annual refugees admitted—from 79,329 per year to just 50,000. However, there were 110,000 refugees scheduled to be admitted in 2017 so the actual decrease in refugees this year is a whopping 55 percent under this executive order. The Trump administration thinks this new order addresses many of the legal challenges made against the first version.

Introduction

When the first version of this order was signed at the end of January, Cato’s research showed that the actual domestic terrorism risk from nationals of those six countries was minor and that the order stands on shaky legal ground. For this iteration of the executive order, I intend to show that the permanent decrease in refugees costs native-born Americans more than we’d save from fewer terrorism deaths. This cost-benefit analysis does not look at the cost of temporarily reducing green cards and other visas.

Results

If Trump’s refugee reduction eliminated all deaths from refugee terrorists then it will cost native-born Americans about $159.4 million per life saved, which is about 10.6 times as great as the $15,000,000 per statistical life estimates if the average number of refugee admissions had stayed at 79,329 going forward (Figure 1). In other words, such a policy would reduce your annual chance of dying a terrorist attack committed by a refugee on U.S. soil from one in 3.64 billion per year to zero at a cost of $159.4 million per life saved. 

However, President Trump’s executive order is not decreasing refugee flows by 37 percent in 2017. The Obama administration slotted 110,000 refugee admissions for 2017, so this year’s reduction is actually 55 percent. If I assume that the new 110,000 annual admission figures would have been the new normal in the absence of Trump’s executive order, the economic costs increase to $326 million per life saved for a 100 percent reduction in your chance of dying in a refugee terrorist attack on U.S. soil. The economic costs incurred are about 21.7 times as great as the cost for a single death by refugee terrorist in this scenario (Figure 1). 

No Mr. President, Mexico Is Not “Absorbing a Great Number of Refugees”

On Tuesday, President Obama delivered a short address to the Leaders Summit on Refugees at the United Nations.  He went out of his way to praise the Mexican government by stating:“Mexico … is absorbing a great number of refugees from Central America.” 

In reality, the Mexican government has done very little to absorb refugees.  From 2013 to 2015, Mexico only recognized 720 refugees from Honduras, 721 from El Salvador, and 62 from Guatemala.  During the time period, Mexico granted asylum to 129 Hondurans, 82 Salvadorans, and 17 Guatemalans.  That’s a total of 1,731 refugees and asylum seekers from those countries.  Only 83 of them were children. 

In 2015 alone, Mexico deported 175,136 people to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador - more than 100 times as many as were accepted by the humanitarian visa programs from 2013 to 2015.    

Instead, President Obama should have thanked the Mexican government for enforcing American immigration laws in a way that shields his administration from criticism.  Mexico has improved its immigration laws in recent years but refugee and asylum laws are one area still in desperate need of reform.  Let’s not let flowery speeches obscure the reality.

Thanks to Bryan Johnson for bringing this to my attention and Guillermina Sutter Schneider for her translation of Mexican government documents. 

Syrian Refugees Face Hard Life: Americans Can Help

Accepting Syrian migrants in America and Europe has become an increasingly divisive political issue. While the Gulf States have refused to offer refuge to any fleeing Syrians, Syria’s direct neighbors bear a huge burden, with Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey each hosting more than a million refugees. More than four million people have left Syria and even more have been displaced internally.

Last year I visited Zaartari Refugee Camp, located just a few miles from the Syrian border in Jordan. I was traveling with International Orthodox Christian Charities, which carries out an expansive ministry addressing the many needs of Syrians inside and outside of their country.

Zaartari, just a few miles from the Syrian border, opened in July 2012 and now contains around 80,000 people, making it Jordan’s 4th largest “city.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has overall authority to care of refugees, but a multitude of other governments and NGOs, such as the IOCC, my host, support Zaartari’s operations.

Camp residents are dependent on the charity of others. Economic life is almost entirely controlled from outside.

I visited a clinic which typically serves about 700 people daily. Samer Makahleh, with the Jordan Health Aid Society, coordinates health care programs. “To fill gaps we go to outside partners like IOCC,” he explained. Two people came up to me during my brief visit seeking financial support for operations.

Refugees receive a stipend of roughly $30 a month. Many also work for the camp, NGOS, or in private shops. Most surprising may be the diversity of private businesses, around 2500 in all, many of which line the main street, called the Champs-Elysees. (I’ve included photos in my photo-essay on Forbes online.)

The UNHCR estimates that 60 percent of working age refugees are employed to some degree. Helping with security was 22-year-old Abdul al-Jabbar, who said his family of nine came from the city of Daraa to the camp three years ago. Life is difficult, he said, “but at least we are alive. We must adapt.”

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States Have Accepted Many Syrians

Many more Syrians are living in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States than at the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011.  The World Bank reports that 1,000,000 Syrians resided in Saudi Arabia in 2013, a whopping 795 percent increase over 2010.  There were 1,375,064 Syrian migrants living in the Gulf States in 2013, a 470 percent increase over 2010.  Excluding Oman, the 2013 Syrian population in every Gulf State has increased dramatically since right before the beginning of the Syrian civil war. 

Syrian Population Residing in Each Country

  2010 2013 Increase Since 2010
Saudi Arabia

111,764

1,000,000

794.75%

UAE

0

60,926

 
Kuwait

122,878

142,000

15.56%

Bahrain

1,254

5,614

347.87%

Qatar

0

12,320

 
Oman

0

0

 
Iraq

5,228

154,204

2849.58%

All Gulf

241,123

1,375,064

470.27%

Source: World Bank Bilateral Migration Indices, 2010 and 2013

These Syrians are technically not “refugees” because Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States are not signatories to the 1951 UNHCR convention that created the modern international refugee system. 

NGOs that work in the region are harshly critical of the Gulf States’ response to the Syrian crisis.  Gulf State spokesmen also haven’t gotten their stories or numbers straight when explaining their policies.  Nabil Othman, acting regional representative to the Gulf States at the UNHCR, said Saudi Arabia has accepted 500,000 Syrian refugees but called them “Arab brothers and sisters in distress.”  Kuwait extended the residency permits for Syrians stranded there.  Spokesmen for the Gulf States have issued other statements claiming that they have accepted many Syrian refugees.  

Most likely, Syrians living in the Gulf States are largely workers and some could be related to the Syrian communities in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that existed before the civil war.  Legal conventions, treaties, and the technical definition of the word “refugee” aside, there are many more Syrian migrants living in every Gulf State (except Oman) in 2013 than in 2010.  Every additional Syrian migrant living in the Gulf States is one fewer potential refugee elsewhere. Many immigrant groups in the 19th and 20th centuries were also refugees even though there was no legal category for them at the time.          

Some Americans and Arab critics argue that the Gulf States should accept more refugees. They should, but that shouldn’t blind us to the large number of Syrians who have settled there since the outbreak of the civil war. Gulf State intentions aside, allowing Syrians to live in their territory has helped relieve the humanitarian crisis somewhat.      

A note on the numbers and quotes here:  The World Bank data may be limited, omit some return flow numbers, be inaccurate in other ways, or/and updated spreadsheets may show a completely different situation.  I cannot verify the statements from the Gulf State countries because their publicly available government documents are in Arabic.