Tag: Peter Navarro

Trump Advisers Are All Wrong about South Korea Trade Deal

The Wall Street Journal reports: “Mr. Trump’s nominee for U.S. Trade Representative singled out Mexico and South Korea during his Senate confirmation hearing as sparking American trade deficits. ‘In some cases, the rules don’t seem to be working as well as others,’ Robert Lighthizer said. Critics say the deal has led to a flood of South Korean cars, auto parts, memory chips, motors and pumps into the U.S., weighing on American competitors and jobs. A U.S. Trade Representative report this month said the pact… doubled the U.S. trade deficit in goods with South Korea.”

National Trade Council boss Peter Navarro has likewise claimed “We lost 100,000 jobs because of that South Korean deal. Our trade deficit has doubled, and, more importantly, 75 percent of the damage that has been caused by that deal has been to the auto industry itself, which, of course, is based in Michigan.”

Navarro, Lighthizer and the Journal’s unnamed critics are entirely wrong about the March 15, 2012 Korea/U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS).  

KORUS could not possibly have “led to a flood of South Korean… memory chips, motors and pumps into the U.S.” because memory chips were already duty-free before that FTA, and so were motors (HS code 8501) and pumps (8413).

KORUS could not possibly explain the post-recession 2010-2015 rise in U.S. imports from South Korea because most U.S. tariffs were scheduled to be reduced from 2016 to 2021not from 2010 to 2015. 

KORUS had precisely zero effect on U.S. imports of Hyundai and Kia vehicles before 2016 because the U.S. tariff on Korean cars (HS code 8703) was 2.5% before KORUS and remained at 2.5% through 2015.  Ironically, when U.S. tariffs on autos and other products finally did come down in 2016, total U.S. imports from South Korea fell 2.6% (by $1.9 billion).

 The Korean tariff on imports of U.S. cars was cut from 8% in 2012 to 4% in 2015 and zero in 2016 and a 10% Korean tariff on U.S. trucks was eliminated.  Even before Korea cut its tariff on U.S. cars to zero in 2016, U.S. exports of cars to So. Korea tripled from $418 million in 2011 to $1.3 billion in 2015, according to the USTR.  Incidentally the USTR also notes that “Korea is currently our fifth-largest market for agricultural exports thanks to KORUS,” with farm exports up 208% from 2011 to 2015.

Manufacturing GDP and the Trade Deficit Rise and Fall Together

As The Wall Street Journal notes, “Mr. Trump and his advisers see the U.S. goods trade deficit as an indicator of U.S. economic weakness.” Manufacturing Output and Goods Trade Deficit

Yes, they do. But why?  As the graph clearly shows, the real gross output of U.S. manufacturing rises when the goods trade deficit (both measured in 2009 dollars) is also rising.  When trade deficits fall, so does U.S. manufacturing.  Sinking industries need fewer imported parts and materials, and their unemployed workers can’t afford imports.

Measured in 2009 dollars, the goods trade deficit fell from $863.4 billion in 2006 to $525.2 billion in 2009.  Peter Navarro, the President’s liberal protectionist trade adviser, would apparently call that good news.  The rest of us called it The Great Recession.

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Trump Adviser Peter Navarro: Reagan Critic, Industrial Policy Fan

Donald Trump always sounded just like a Bernie Sanders Democrat when talking about international trade. “We have one issue that’s very similar,” he said, “and that’s trade.”  That Trump-Sanders hostility to trade liberalization, in turn, is identical to that of the AFL-CIO and the Economic Policy Institute, a leftist think tank created and largely financed by labor unions.

It should be no surprise that Donald Trump’s most influential adviser and spokesman on international trade, Peter Navarro, is a former unsuccessful Democrat politician who seems closer to an old-style Bernie Sanders leftist Democrat than to a Bill Clinton “New Democrat.”

The only academic among Trump 13 economic advisers, Navarro returned to being an economics professor at U.C. Irvine, after losing San Diego mayoral election to Republican Susan Golding. In 1993 Navarro wrote the book, Bill Clinton’s Agenda for America.

With one caveat, the book was full of glowing praise for everything Clinton promised to do – notably lots more federal spending (which, ironically, fell substantially).

Navarro’s doubts about Clinton concerned NAFTA, which Bush created but Clinton promised to change. “I thought the NAFTA agreement ought to have been more properly called ‘SHAFTA,’” says Navarro.  But he notes that “candidate Clinton later acknowledged the problems of the environment and lost jobs raised by NAFTA, and called for wage safeguards and stricter environmental regulations. It remains to be seen whether this was merely rhetoric, or a serious concern that will have policy follow-through.”

Alan Reynolds in 1997 on Exchange Rates and Trade

I stumbled on this 1997 talk abut NAFTA by my old friend Roberto Salinas-Leon, making a case for Hillary’s Wikileak dream of Hemispheric free trade (but not for her other dream of “open borders” if that really meant unhindered migration).  

I may be biased, but the following heretofore lost quote from me still seems relevant, but for the U.S. too, not just Mexico. Trump adviser Peter Navarro thinks the dollar is 45% too strong against the Chinese yuan, which supposedly excuses Trump’s threat of a 45% tariff.  (I’m more in the “strong dollar is good for America” camp, though strong doesn’t mean continually rising.) 

As Alan Reynolds has recently explained, “the explicit goal of devaluation is to worsen the terms of trade”-for instance, to make Mexico trade more exports for fewer imports. Reynolds continues: “…even if Mexico wanted to impoverish itself in this way, it does not work. When the peso was devalued at the end of 1994 that did not result in Mexican oil or beer being one cent cheaper in terms of U.S. dollars. After a devaluation, interest rates soar, real tax receipts collapse, and the foreign debt burden increases. This causes a squeeze on the government’s budget, and on the budgets of families, farms and firms. This is no way to make a country “competitive.” Economic growth depends on more and better labor and capital, neither of which are encouraged by a currency of unpredictable value. A weak currency has never produced a strong economy.”

To be sure, concerns surrounding currency revaluation are closely mixed with the fear of generating a substantial trade deficit. Reynolds again explains the misdiagnosis of increased imports as a sign of bad times: “current account deficits have nothing to do with ‘competitiveness.’ They are caused by a gap between investment and domestic savings that is filled by foreign investment (which is good) or loans (which are not so good). To the extent that a devaluation might “fix” such a gap, it does so by slashing investment, not raising savings.”

Trump Adviser Peter Navarro: Reagan Critic Advocates Crony Capitalism

Peter Navarro, a Professor at U.C. Irvine, is Donald Trump’s most influential adviser/spokesman on international trade, and the only academic among his 13 economic advisers.   

After a losing campaign to become mayor of San Diego as an anti-NAFTA Democrat running against Republican Susan Golding, Navarro wrote a 1993 book, Bill Clinton’s Agenda for America. It provides intriguing clues about the sort of policy advice he now offers Mr. Trump.

Navarro begins by saying, “if Clinton and Gore carry through with their agenda … we will become more globally competitive, our educational system will improve, better protection will emerge for our environment, our cities will be rebuilt, and, most important of all, hundreds of thousands of jobs will be created.”

He goes on to write of “The Failure of Reaganomics” and the “Trickle Down Rip-Off.” The complaint is mainly about the U.S. spending too much on defense, with Japan financing the resulting budget deficits and aiming to “locate many of their plants within U.S. borders to avoid the certain protectionism they saw coming.”

“Countries like Japan, Germany, France and Taiwan have very sophisticated industrial policies,” wrote Navarro, while “Reagan and Bush Administrations… [were] clinging to a free-trade philosophy.”  Without a protectionist industrial policy the U.S. couldn’t possibly compete, particularly since “Japan and Germany were devoting over 10 times what the U.S. was spending on public infrastructure and new technologies.”

“The essence of a national industrial policy,” Navarro explained, “is a full partnership between government and business… [T]he role of government is to help a nation’s businesses compete by providing technological assistance, subsidies and protectionist measure such as tariffs and quotas.”