President Obama's decision to release Bush-era memos discussing "enhanced interrogation techniques" is the right decision. Critics, such as the one featured in this Politico article, fail to comprehend terrorism as a strategy. Thus, they are locked into counterproductive policies like secrecy and torture.
Let's start with the strategic logic of terrorism: By goading strong powers into overreaction and error, terrorism weakens those powers and strengthens itself. Among other things, overreaction and misdirection on the part of the strong power draw sympathy and support to terrorists as it confirms the terrorist narrative that they are in a struggle against evil powers.
Torture or credible accounts of torture provide confirmation of a suspicion among relatively unsophisticated observers in the Middle East (once known as the "street") that the United States is a colonist and an oppressor of Muslims and Arabs. Secrecy is a way in which such stories grow and multiply. The results of torture and secrecy are millions of people who believe, suspect, or worry that they and their culture are on the losing end of a battle for supremacy in the world. (We have some of those on the American street, too.)
From these millions emerge individuals and groups — eventually perhaps networks — who devote their creativity to developing and eventually mounting attacks on the United States and the West. (The path to terrorism is not simple or well-understood. Several panels in our January counterterrorism conference explored dimensions of this question.)
Just as important, non-participants in terrorism who are ideologically or physically nearby to inchoate terrorists decline opportunities to undermine the terrorism brewing around them. Terrorists are bad people with ugly ideologies, and their neighbors know it, but these neighbors will overlook all that if they see the United States as a wrongdoer. Because of secrecy and torture, the United States loses these natural allies and the security they would otherwise provide.
But what about the loss of enhanced interrogation techniques? "Publicizing the techniques does grave damage to our national security by ensuring they can never be used again," says a critic, "even in a ticking-time-bomb scenario where thousands or even millions of American lives are at stake."
The ticking-time-bomb scenario is a movie plot that evidently thrills some in the counter-terrorism community. But the chance of a significant weapon being acquired and used by terrorists is very small. The chance that U.S. authorities will know about it and know who to interrogate at just the right moment: pure fantasy. Such a moment would only arrive as the result of many, many failures on the part of U.S. intelligence and security organizations to protect our interests.
Even assuming that torture actually works, which is very much in dispute, the security given by having the sympathy of millions of people in the Muslim and Arab worlds is much, much greater than the security of having legal authorization to torture. The security of having world goodwill helps ensure that we never arrive at the ticking time-bomb moment.
If that's frustrating to torture hawks, there are video games where they can avenge the 9/11 attacks over and over again. The rest of us will rue the failings that allowed 9/11 to happen while we work on sophisticated, strategic counter-terrorism that actually secures the country. Many in the intelligence and security communities have sophisticated views on counter-terrorism and are eager to get on with policies that aren't counterproductive.
President Obama has made the right decision in releasing the memos — and not just right in some abstract legal or moral sense. It is the correct strategic decision for countering terrorism.
His critics' focus on one or two trees — saplings like the "ticking time-bomb" fantasy — obscures the forest that would grow higher still should the United States persist in being a secretive torturer.
The designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group by Egypt highlights a fault line developing in the Middle East over relations with Israel and the United States.
On the one hand, there are those who favor negotiations to resolve the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. These countries include, most prominently, Egypt and Jordan, which both have signed treaties with Israel. Saudi Arabia also has promoted a negotiated solution.
Iran and Hezbollah, on the other hand, have emphasized what they call "resistance," which means the use of arms to wrest territory from Israel 's control. The admission by Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, that one of the people Egypt arrested was supplying arms to Hamas on Hezbollah's behalf indicates that Hezbollah's "resistance" is not limited to Lebanese sovereign territory.
Although Egypt's action is directed against Hezbollah (and, by extension, Iran), it also carries a warning for the United States and Israel. The "resistance" argument is gaining ground in the Middle East. If it is to be successfully countered, negotiations need to deliver something tangible for the Palestinians—and soon. Otherwise, the regional governments who favor negotiation will find their arguments undercut, which could not only jeopardize hopes for Middle East peace, but might also threaten their own stability.
Via Philip Weiss, I see that last week Karim Sadjadpour and Martin Indyk debated Elliott "Get Down Out of Those Trees and Be Democrats" Abrams and Joshua Muravchik on the proposition: "America cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran and must go to any lengths to prevent it." It's a topic that's been of interest to me for some time now.
Indyk and Sadjadpour acquitted themselves rather well, but it made me chuckle to see Abrams and Muravchik throwing some very familiar-smelling handfuls of argument into the discussion. I thought it might be worth passing a few of them along.
Muravchik responds to the argument that bombing would merely delay an Iranian nuclear capability by a period of years by saying that we'll just keep bombing them, then:
if we bomb and do wholesale damage to its nuclear weapons program, then the clock starts running on the next round.
And I donʹt see any reason to assume that, technologically, Iran is going to beat us in the next round. That is, they will be trying to find new ways to fortify and hide and whathave‐you, their rebuilt nuclear weapons program, if, in fact, they do attempt to rebuild it.
And we, in turn, will move forward with developing better bunker‐busting bombs or whatever else we need, and with additional intelligence, to find out where those things are and to have the capability to hit them ...
Note in that last paragraph that we're supposed to accept, arguendo, perfect intelligence and military technology endowed with borderline-magical powers. This is a variant of the "I don't know, the military will have to figure that stuff out" argument.
Elliott Abrams, freshly minted as a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons and is poised to cause trouble in the Middle East, it's possible that the countries in that region will lay down and decline to defend themselves:
if the Arab states look at Iran growing in power and see that what the United States has done, to prevent it from going nuclear, is nothing or something that failed, itʹs not at all clear that they will then further side with the United States against Iran, they may appease Iran.
Abrams then reaches for a 2003-vintage "greet us as liberators" selection, proposing that the Iranians might thank us for bombing their country by overthrowing their government for us:
we are not talking about the Americans killing civilians, bombing cities, destroying mosques, hospitals, schools. No, no, no – weʹre talking about nuclear facilities which most Iranians know very little about, have not seen, will not see, some quite well hidden.
So they wake up in the morning and find out that the United States if attacking those facilities and, presumably with some good messaging about why weʹre doing it and why we are not against the people of Iran.
Itʹs not clear to me that the reaction letʹs go to war with the Americans, but rather, perhaps, how did we get into this mess? Why did those guys, the very unpopular ayatollahs in a country 70 percent of whose population is under the age of 30, why did those old guys get us into this mess.
When Indyk protests that this reasoning didn't pan out terribly well for the Israelis in Gaza recently, Abrams shrugs that he's "not persuaded" that Gazans blame Israel for the IDF killing between a thousand and two thousand Palestinians during their incursion.
Then Muravchik reaches for the trump card: "our talks with North Korea have completely failed but if we bomb Iran they may well succeed the next day."
It goes on and on like this. If you're interested in these type of arguments, I'd encourage you to pick up a copy of Jack Snyder's Myths of Empire. These sorts of arguments are literally straight from the pages of Myths, a book where Snyder attempts to generalize the "myths" that empires endorse as they overexpand.