Tag: Miami

Immigrants Don’t Lower Blue-Collar American Wages

Yesterday, Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) gave a speech on the floor of the Senate about “putting an end, once and for all, to chain migrations.”  The main argument that Senator Cotton made is that immigrants lower the wages of blue-collar American workers.  Senator Cotton said:

That means that you have thousands and thousands of workers with absolutely no consideration for what it means for the workers who are already here … The wages of people who work with their hands and work on their feet hold the type of jobs that require you to take a shower after you get off work, not before they got to work.  Blue-collar workers have begun to see an increase in their wages over the last year for the first time in decades and that is in no small part because of the administration’s efforts to get immigration under control.

There is vast empirical evidence that contradicts Cotton and shows that the wage effect is minuscule, concentrated on only high school dropouts, or that immigration actually increases the wages of lower-skilled Americans.  Even worse for Cotton’s argument, the wages for low-skilled American workers actually rose less slowly the last time the government cut low-skilled immigration to raise wages.  I’ve provided evidence pushing against Cotton’s position in previous posts but this one will present new evidence from the Mariel Boatlift. 

The last major academic debate on the wage effects of immigration concerned the Mariel Boatlift when about 125,000 Cuban refugees surged into Miami over a few months in 1980.  Indeed, this debate was so important that even Trump Administration White House aide Stephen Miller cited it in a press conference in 2017

The Mariel Boatlift a wonderful quasi-natural experiment that economists have exploited numerous times to estimate the effect of immigrants on wages.  David Card wrote a paper in 1990 showing that the effect of Mariel on wages and employment was near zero.  Recently, George Borjas of Harvard wrote another paper that found Mariel actually had an enormously negative effect on wages – a result that has been challenged by Giovanni Peri and Vasil Yasenov and Michael Clemens and Jennifer Hunt.  Professor Borjas responded here.  I added a bit to this debate by pointing out that under Borjas’ methods, the wages of Miamians with only a high school degree rose at the same time as the Boatlift and that wages for Hispanic dropouts in Miami rose rapidly shortly after the Boatlift, a perplexing result for the most-substitutable workers. 

The rest of this blog will ignore the criticisms of Borjas’ Mariel Boatlift paper and instead use his methods to show that the wages of blue-collar Miamians were not negatively affected relative to the placebo cities.  This will use some of the most recent and relevant economics research to see whether Senator Cotton can make a convincing case that immigrants lower the wages of blue-collar American workers.  We used the same CPS dataset that Borjas used for the full empirical exercise of 1977-2003.  The placebos are comparison sets of cities.  They are all cities that aren’t Miami (labeled as “Miami”), those selected by David Card, those that are similar to Miami in terms of employment prior to 1980, and those with similar low-skilled work forced prior to 1980.  I define blue-collar workers in two ways.  The first is all workers with less than a college degree.  The second is all workers who have at least a high school degree but less than college. 

Stephen Miller Doesn’t Understand the Economics of Immigration

Senior Trump administration aide Stephen Miller gave a press briefing yesterday defending the RAISE Act - a bill introduced by Sens. Cotton (R-AR) and Perdue (R-GA) that would slash the number of legal immigrants without increasing skilled or merit-based immigration.  The purpose of the RAISE Act is to restrict low-skilled immigration in order to raise the wages of American workers.      

When asked by a reporter for evidence that restricting low-skilled immigration would raise wages, Miller cited research by Harvard economist George Borjas on the Mariel Boatlift.  The Mariel Boatlift produced an unexpected surge of 125,000 Cubans (henceforth Marielitos) to Miami in 1980.  Because at least 60 percent of the Marielitos were high school dropouts, Borjas tested whether they lowered the wages of American dropouts. Since Borjas published his Mariel paper, there have been many rebuttals, criticisms, and additional research on it that should substantially diminish confidence in his findings.  Below I will briefly summarize these results.

The first such criticism is by economists Michael Clemens and Jennifer Hunt.  They conclude that the entirety of the wage decline observed by Borjas can be explained in how the wage survey in Miami increased the proportion of black workers surveyed, far in excess of their proportion of the population, when the Boatlift occurred (the CPS change was unrelated to the Boatlift).  Black American workers with less than a high school degree have lower wages than similarly skilled non-black Americans for myriad reasons that have nothing to do with immigration.  By including more of them in the survey at the same time the Marielitos were arriving made it look like there was a drastic wage decline when the observed effect was entirely due to shifting the demographics of the surveyed population.  That survey shift entirely explains the negative wage effect observed by Borjas.  Borjas’ response to Clemens and Hunt is weak.

The second criticism of Borjas’ Mariel Boatlift research is by economists Giovanni Peri and Vasil Yasenov.  They note that wages in Miami must be compared to wages in similar cities at the same time to measure how wages changed.  By selecting a set of comparison cities using the Synthetic Control Method, a different method than Borjas used, they found no statistically significant deviation in Miami’s wages compared to similar cities that did not absorb the Marielitos.  Furthermore, Borjas relied on smaller surveys with few relevant observations for Miami and other cities.  Peri and Yasenov used the larger to get even more data on wages.  Including the additional data also showed that the Marielitos did not lower wages.

Miami-Dade Police Abandon Aerial Surveillance Plans

Image from PSSThe Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) is scrapping plans to test persistent aerial surveillance technology following criticism from privacy advocates. This kind of technology has prompted privacy concerns in others cities, with Baltimore being perhaps the most notable. One of the best-known aerial surveillance companies allows users to keep a roughly 25 square mile area under surveillance and comes with “Google Earth with TiVo” capability, The news from Miami-Dade county. while reassuring, underlines a number of issues concerning federalism, privacy, and transparency that lawmakers must tackle as aerial surveillance tools improve and proliferate.

MDPD Director Juan Perez was set to ask county commissioners to retroactively approve a grant application to the Department of Justice for the aerial surveillance testing. The fact that MDPD was seeking federal money for the surveillance equipment reminds us that federal involvement in state and local policing should be strictly limited.

The aptly-named Persistent Surveillance Systems (PSS), the Ohio-based company that made the sensor system deployed in Baltimore, uses technology originally designed for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Military equipment has an unfortunate tendency to make its way from foreign battlefields into the hands of domestic law enforcement, as my colleagues have been outlining for years. This is a trend that ought to be strongly resisted.

It’s not clear if the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs would have approved MDPD’s grant application, but given the current attorney general’s record on civil liberties, as well as the president’s own enthusiasm for aerial surveillance, we shouldn’t be surprised if similar grants are approved during the Trump administration.

Further Thoughts on Mariel Boatlift

Jason Richwine just blogged about my recent Mariel Boatlift post that confirmed George Borjas’ finding of wage increases for those with only a high school degree in post-Mariel Miami.  George Borjas understood my quick extension of his research.  Below are some of Richwine’s points and my quick responses. 

“The point is not especially interesting, since the standard immigration narrative has always been that efficiency gains come at the expense of the natives with whom immigrants most directly compete – high school dropouts, in the case of Mariel.”

It’s important to identify which skill-group of Miamians could have benefited from the Boatlift.  George Borjas pointed out in his report for the Center for Immigration Studies:  “Economic theory predicts that immigration will redistribute income by lowering the wages of competing American workers and increasing the wages of complementary American workers as well as profits for business owners and other “users” of immigrant labor.”  Borjas focused on the benefits for business owners and other “users” of immigrant labor in that paper. 

The Mariel Boatlift Raised the Wages of Low-Skilled Miamians

Harvard economist George Borjas recently published an important paper on how the unexpected surge of 125,000 Cubans (henceforth Marielitos) to Miami in 1980 lowered the wages of native-born male Miamians with less than a high-school degree. Because at least 60 percent of the Marielitos were high school dropouts, Borjas found that the negative wage effects were concentrated on Miamians with the same level of education.  

There are excellent criticisms of Borjas’ paper that show his results hinge on the control cities he chose, his exclusion of women, the age group of the workers, whether Hispanics are included, whether high-school-or-less or no-high-school-at-all are included, and whether datasets with the larger samples are used. For the sake of argument, supposing that Borjas made the correct methodological choices on every single point above, the Mariel Boatlift still raised the wages for low-skilled U.S. workers collectively due to wage complementarities. That’s because native-born Miamians with only a high school degree (no associate degree, no education after high school) experienced significant wage increases immediately after Mariel relative to workers with the same levels of education in the control groups, or placebos, of other cities. Borjas’ supporters ignore this finding but he does not. 

In his Mariel paper, Borjas reports the wage of high school dropouts relative to high school graduates in Figure 3(C) and the wage of Miami high school graduates across an all cities permutation in Figure 4(B), but he doesn’t have a dramatic graph like this that shows what happened to the relative wages of high school graduates after Mariel. 

Another working paper by Borjas and Monras on the wage effects of refugees also found that “the rate of wage growth for high school graduates, a group whose size was only increased modestly by the Marielitos, is noticeably higher in Miami than outside Miami.”  They go on to write that, “the predominantly low-skill Marielitos … raised the wage of workers with a high school education, and this effect is both numerically and statistically significant. The cross-wage elasticity is about +0.7 [compared to -0.9 for high school dropouts].”  They do not find any employment effects for high school dropouts but they did uncover positive and statistically significant employment gains for those with a high school degree. Furthermore, Figure 7.5 on page 148 of Borjas’ new book We Wanted Workers hints at a wage increase for high school graduates immediately after Mariel.              

My intern Cole Blondin and I followed Borjas’ methods to create graphs for the wages of high school graduates before and after the Boatlift. We used the March Current Population survey (March CPS) and combined the May Current Population Survey and the May Outgoing Rotation Group (May CPS-ORG) datasets. The only differences are that we present the figures in dollars rather than logs, we did not use three-year averages to smooth the data, and we did not recreate the synthetic control. One final note, the wage effect of the Marielitos must be compared to placebos because there was only one Miami in 1980 and we can’t actually observe what would have happened to that city had the Marielitos not arrived. We used the same sets of placebo cities as Borjas.

Even under Borjas’ assumptions, native-born male Miamians with a high school degree or less saw a ­net-wage increase after the Mariel Boatlift.    

A Tale of Two Studies

Academics and professional economists have critiqued many well known academic papers on immigration in the last year. The first was by Alan de Brauw and Joseph R.D. Russell and it replicates and expands a famous 2003 paper by Harvard University economist George Borjas entitled “The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.” 

Borjas famously found that from 1960-2000 there was a  wage elasticity of -0.38, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the size of the labor force due to immigration in a particular skill-cell lowered the average weekly wages in that cell by 3.8 percent relative to workers in other skill-cells.  Borjas’ paper is an impressive piece of scholarship and has been the lynchpin of arguments to close the border in order to protect wages.  Many economists disagree with Borjas

De Brauw and Russell had three findings.  Their first finding was that the wage elasticity dropped to -0.22 when they extended Borjas’ study to 2010. That is an important finding by itself – if the Borjas model was correct then why would the impact of immigrants on wages decrease as more of them entered the labor force between 2000 and 2010? 

Their second set of findings is that small changes in variable definitions turned some of Borjas’ ideas into statistically insignificant results. While not definitive, that suggests that the conclusions in his paper are not reliable.     

That leads to De Brauw and Russell’s third set of findings. They looked at the relationship between annualized male and female wages in the skill-cells when women entered the workforce in significant numbers. The correlation turned out to be positive­, which means men and women with the same skill level are complementary.  Thus, they argued that Borjas’ model is misspecified as it assumed immigrants and natives in the same skill-cells are more substitutable than they really are. If this finding is true, it would call into question the assumptions Borjas’ built in to his model, namely that immigration and natives are substitutable rather than complementary.

I’m still eagerly awaiting Borjas’ response to De Brauw and Russell’s paper. The critique of Borjas’ paper was serious because it replicated his work, extended it another decade, and found the results didn’t hold up. Many academics have already contested Borjas’ claims in numerous ways as I document here and here but this challenge cuts deep.

Police Shootings in Miami

Today’s New York Times reports that seven African-American men have been shot and killed by Miami police officers over an eight month period.  One officer, who has since been discharged for unrelated misconduct, was responsible for two of the shooting incidents over a span of just days. 

Each shooting should be scrutinized on its own merits.  The circumstances of each incident matters.  However, one question concerns the aggressive culture often found in police “tactical” units, which too often enagage in a reckless style of police work.  Since 2009, the Times reports, more than 100 officers have been added to Miami’s tactical units.  Another question is whether the Miami police department should be the agency investigating these cases.  An impartial investigation into these shootings needs to be conducted.

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