Tag: Mexico

Trump’s Wall Plan Is Disgraceful, Belligerent, and Disastrous

Regardless of whether wall construction is funded through a discriminatory tariff on imports from Mexico or the border adjustment taxes envisaged in the GOP tax proposal, U.S. consumers and taxpayers will be flipping the bill.  The very idea of building the wall in the first place is a disgrace, but demonizing our neighbors and hatching plans that could subvert the Mexican economy and put another Venezuela on our southern border, is belligerent and potentially disastrous.

Hitting all Mexican imports with a 20% tariff is, unfortunately, something the president could do.  Under the Constitution, Congress is authorized to regulate foreign commerce, which includes imposing tariffs.  But over the years, Congress has delegated some of that authority to the president through various statutes. All of those statutes require that some condition be met (findings of a surge in imports; subsidized imports; unfair foreign practices that hurt U.S. companies; national security crises; public health or safety threats, etc.) before restrictions can be imposed. Sometimes the restrictions are limited in magnitude and duration, sometimes not.  Sometimes the actions are subject to judicial review, sometimes not.

By and large, these statutes were passed in conjunction with legislation to implement trade agreements, lower tariffs, or otherwise liberalize trade.  They were crafted as safeguards to assuage those concerned that the country’s seemingly inexorable march toward free trade would bring rapid change, which would carry massive adjustment costs and other maladies and threats that the government would be incapable of addressing. The expectation was that the president would use this conditional power sparingly and in the service of greater openness and liberalization. In other words, unlike the Founding Fathers, U.S. Congresses during the 20th century failed to imagine adequately the likes of a Donald Trump as president.

Carrier Revisited

President-elect Donald Trump has claimed victory in his effort to preserve employment for Carrier workers in Indiana.  Assisted by $7 million in tax incentives provided by the State of Indiana, Mr. Trump persuaded the company not to move 800 furnace manufacturing jobs to Monterrey, Mexico.  This works out to a taxpayer-funded subsidy of $8750 per job. 

Another 1300 Carrier jobs still will move to Mexico between now and 2019.  Published reports have indicated that the company anticipated cost savings of some $65 million per year from moving all 2100 positions to Monterrey.  So Carrier is taking at least a partial step toward maintaining its global competiveness, while at least partially appeasing the incoming president.

I wrote an op-ed in Forbes on August 22, 2016, in which I argued that Carrier no doubt had quite good business reasons for planning the move to Mexico.  Carrier’s February 2016 announcement of the decision said that it was due to “ongoing cost and pricing pressures driven, in part, by new regulatory requirements.”  

Carrier has been manufacturing products in Monterrey for some years.  The company certainly has a clear understanding of why moving production of some air conditioning units makes business sense.  It would not be wise for them to explain their reasoning in public because such proprietary knowledge would be of great interest to their competitors. 

Some commentators have opined that the decision was driven largely by lower labor costs.  Carrier’s expenses for employee salary and benefits average about $34 per hour in Indiana, while those costs in Mexico are only around $6 per hour.  It’s possible the move was prompted primarily by labor cost savings, although my analysis of data compiled by The Conference Board suggests otherwise.  The value generated by an hour worked in the United States has risen by 40 percent over the past 22 years of NAFTA.  In Mexico, the gain has been only 10.5 percent.  Productivity has grown faster in the United States, so the incentive to shift production to Mexico today ought to be weaker than it was 10 or 20 years ago.  (Note:  Those figures apply to the productivity of all workers.  If it was possible to analyze just the manufacturing sector, perhaps the findings would change.)

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Have Terrorists Illegally Crossed the Border?

Yesterday, Cato published my policy analysis entitled “Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis” where I, among other things, attempt to quantify the terrorist threat from immigrants by visa category. 

One of the best questions I received about it came from Daniel Griswold, the Senior Research Fellow and Co-Director of the Program on the American Economy and Globalization at the Mercatus Center. Full disclosure: Dan used to run Cato’s immigration and trade department and he’s been a mentor to me. Dan asked me how many of the ten illegal immigrant terrorists I identified crossed the Mexican border?

I didn’t have a good answer for Dan yesterday but now I do. 

Of the ten terrorists who entered the country illegally, three did so across the border with Mexico. Shain Duka, Britan Duka, and Eljvir Duka are ethnic Albanians from Macedonia who illegally crossed the border with Mexico as children with their parents in 1984. They were three conspirators in the incompetently planned Fort Dix plot that was foiled by the FBI in 2007, long after they became adults. They became terrorists at some point after immigrating here illegally. Nobody was killed in their failed attack.

Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, Ahmed Ressam, and Ahmed Ajaj entered illegally or tried to do so along the Canadian border. Ajaj participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, so I counted him as responsible for one murder in a terrorist attack. Abdel Hakim Tizegha and Abdelghani Meskini both entered illegally as stowaways on a ship from Algeria. Shahawar Matin Siraj and Patrick Abraham entered as illegal immigrants but it’s unclear where or how they did so.

Based on this history, it’s fair to say that the risk of terrorists crossing the Southwest border illegally is minuscule.

How Trump Could Get Mexico to Pay for a Border Wall – Maybe

Republican frontrunner Donald Trump claims he is going to build a wall along the border and get Mexico to pay for it.  This has been laughed off as infeasible, perhaps even a little nutty.  Yet perhaps we should have held back our disdain a little longer.  In 1954, President Eisenhower prompted the Mexican government to deploy troops along the border to stop Mexicans from entering the United States.  While Mexico didn’t build a wall, they attempted to stem the tide of Mexicans emigrating to the United States and their government paid for it.  This might sound great to immigration restrictionists until they realize how Eisenhower did it.    

After months of failed negotiations between the two countries over the terms of the Bracero guest worker visa, the U.S. departments managing the visa issued a press release on January 15, 1954 stating that migrants who entered would be immediately awarded a labor contract and a job.  Outraged by this attempt to cut them out of the negotiations, the Mexican government deployed 5,000 soldiers along the border to threaten, detain, and deter migrants who tried to enter the United States.

Deborah Cohen sums up the resulting chaos:

When the United States actually pulled back the gate and opened the border on January 22, chaos ensued.  Hundreds of hopeful migrants rushed past the barrier, aided by the extended arms of United States Border Patrol agents, even as Mexican soldiers charged the men, trying to prevent them from crossing.  Soldiers grabbed their countrymen, often by the shirt, and yanked them back as they were pulled towards the other side by United States border guards.  [Mexican] Troops pelted men with fists, guns, water, and clubs in a vain attempt to contain this rush of bodies [emphasis added].

Mexicans who avoided their own military and made it across the border found helpful Border Patrol and INS officers who guided them to labor recruiters who gladly transported them to farms for legal work in the United States. 

Negotiations to renew the Bracero program broke down for two main reasons.  The first is that the Mexican government sought a monopoly on the export of labor.  Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 controlled the hiring of Mexican citizens abroad.  Cloaked in nationalistic justifications, it was a scheme that created a Mexican government labor monopoly to skim off rents.  To empower Article 123, historian Ernesto Galarza describes a Mexican immigration law passed in 1932 that “authorized the confiscation of vehicles uses to transport persons to the border for the purposes of facilitating their illegal entry into the United States.”  Galarza means “illegal entry” under Mexican law, not U.S. law.  Simply put, the Mexican government wanted higher rents and the U.S. government was reluctant to grant them.          

The second reason negotiations broke down is that Eisenhower wanted the Mexican government to contribute to migration control by patrolling their side of the border.  The Bracero program had existed since 1942 as a bilateral labor agreement between the two countries but unlawful Mexican immigration persisted.  The Mexican government’s failure to control illegal Mexican emigration and never ending American demand for workers lulled them into a position of salutary neglect so that by the early 1950s almost 2 million Mexican unauthorized immigrants were working in the United States.  Eisenhower wanted that stopped and thought the Mexicans could help.  The Americans eventually solved it themselves

The negotiations broke down in 1953 and 1954, prompting the Eisenhower administration’s January 1954 announcement that any Mexican who showed up would be granted a work visa.  Mexico quickly acceded to American demands and soon Bracero workers were flowing freely back and forth across the border again - to the economic benefit of everybody involved. 

Eisenhower’s opening of the border with Mexico in January 1954 was only possible because of the Bracero guest worker visa program that tied the two government’s together.  If a future President Trump negotiated a large scale guest worker visa program that allowed many temporary Mexican guest workers in annually and legalized most of the unauthorized immigrants in the United States, he could gain the diplomatic leverage to prompt Mexico to build a wall – or at least deploy some troops in a fancy show.

A legalization and the creation of a large scale guest worker visa program would make such a wall even more irrelevant than it would currently be (unlawful immigration from Mexico has essentially stopped) but at least we’d have a more functional immigration system. 

This post was written with the help of Andy Yuan

Contrary to Trump-Sanders Theory Imports Rise in Booms and Fall in Recessions

Real GDP Growth and ImportsNearly all surviving Democrat and Republican presidential candidates (except John Kasich) have essentially endorsed the shared campaign theme of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders that the U.S. economy is weak because we import too many goods from foreign countries.  If only we could raise the cost of imports with tariffs, according to the Trump-Sanders theory, then the U.S. economy would supposedly have more jobs and higher real wages.   

Paying more for anything (such as Fords or iPhones) is no way to get rich.  Yet that concept somehow eludes many non-economists.  Theory aside, the idea that fewer imports are good for the economy is the exact opposite of what we have experienced.  The fact is that U.S. imports always fall when the economy slips into recession and imports rise briskly whenever the economy does.

Sugar and the TPP

How much Australian sugar should be allowed to enter the U.S. market?  That’s a key question the U.S. government must answer prior to concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.  The United States is the largest sugar market in the TPP, consuming about 11 million metric tons (MMT) per year.  It also is the largest producer (7-8 MMT) and importer (3 MMT) in the group.  Australia generally is believed to be the most cost-competitive sugar producer among the12 TPP nations.  It also is the largest exporter, annually shipping 3-4 MMT to other countries. 

To complicate matters further, sugar liberalization was explicitly excluded from the 2004 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) due to U.S. political sensitivities.  Australian sugar producers understandably want to redress that omission.  Failure to obtain commercially meaningful access to the U.S. sugar market could lead to rejection of the pact by the Australian parliament.

The U.S. sugar program includes a price-support level for raw cane sugar of 22.25 cents per pound ($490/MT), with refined sugar supported at 26 cents.  Those levels effectively have been raised more than 10 percent to around 24.7 cents ($545/MT) and 30-32 cents, respectively, under the trade-restricting terms of the recent settlement agreement in the antidumping/countervailing-duty (AD/CVD) dispute involving imports from Mexico. (For more on U.S.-Mexico sugar issues, see here and here.)  Mexico is the largest supplier of U.S. sugar imports, generally providing between 1.0-1.5 MMT per year.  Suffice it to say that the agreement between the U.S. and Mexican governments will limit the amount of sugar Mexican producers can export to the United States, and also force that sugar to be sold at higher prices. 

With global raw sugar prices currently at relatively low levels of around 12 cents, Australian cane growers find the possibility of selling more sugar to the United States at high prices to be quite intriguing.  However, those sales currently are limited to the amount allocated to Australia under the U.S. tariff-rate quota (TRQ) regime – a modest quantity of only 87,000 MT.  Australia is asking that the TRQ be boosted by 750,000 MT, an increase of more than nine times.  The United States apparently has offered an additional 65,000 MT (official figure not disclosed), which would not even double Australia’s current access. 

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Managing Sugar Markets Gets Even Messier

In a previous blog post I discussed the implications of the proposed agreement to settle the antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases brought by U.S. sugar producers against imports from Mexico.  That article amounted to a lament on the difficulties of trying to balance sugar supply and demand by government fiat.  Market managers employed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) have a really hard job, as do their counterparts in the Mexican government.  Not only do the supply, demand, and price of sugar tend not to stay quiet and well behaved, but important firms involved in the business also can prove (from the perspective of the program managers) to be vexing and disputatious.

Such is the case with Imperial Sugar Company and AmCane Sugar, both of which are U.S. cane refiners that rely on ample supplies of raw sugar to run their operations.  Much of that raw sugar comes from other countries; in recent years Mexico has been the largest supplier to the United States.  It now appears that U.S. cane refiners were not too happy with either the original proposed settlement that was announced on October 27, 2014, or the final suspension agreements announced December 19 that set aside the underlying AD/CVD investigations. 

One source of that unhappiness seems to have been that the initial proposal would have allowed 60 percent of imports from Mexico to be in the form of refined sugar rather than raw.  The U.S. and Mexican governments acknowledged that concern in the December 19 agreement by reducing the allowable level of refined sugar imports to 53 percent.  Another issue bothering U.S. refiners likely was the relatively narrow spread between the original proposal’s import reference prices, which were 20.75 cents per pound for raw sugar and 23.75 cents per pound for refined.  U.S. refiners may have feared suppression of their processing margins, if imported refined sugar from Mexico could have been sold at only 3 cents per pound above the price of raw sugar imports.  The December 19 version increased that price spread to 3.75 cents (22.25 cents for raw and 26.0 cents for refined).  From the standpoint of the refiners, that margin still may be uncomfortably narrow.

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