As a general rule, the International Monetary Fund is a statist organization. Which shouldn't be too surprising since its key "shareholders" are the world's major governments.
And when you realize who controls the purse strings, it's no surprise to learn that the bureaucracy is a persistent advocate of higher tax burdens and bigger government. Especially when the IMF's politicized and leftist (and tax-free) leadership dictates the organization's agenda.
Which explains why I've referred to that bureaucracy as a "dumpster fire of the global economy" and the "Dr. Kevorkian of global economic policy."
I always make sure to point out, however, that there are some decent economists who work for the IMF and that they occasionally are allowed to produce good research. I've favorably cited the bureaucracy's work on spending caps, for instance.
But what amuses me is when the IMF tries to promote bad policy and accidentally gives me powerful evidence for good policy. That happened in 2012, for example, when it produced some very persuasive data showing that value-added taxes are money machines to finance a bigger burden of government.
Well, it's happened again, though this time the bureaucrats inadvertently just issued some research that makes the case for the Laffer Curve and lower corporate tax rates.
Though I can assure you that wasn't the intention. Indeed, the article was written as part of the IMF's battle against tax competition. As you can see from these excerpts, the authors clearly seem to favor higher tax burdens on business and want to cartelize the global economy for the benefit of the political class.
...what’s the problem when it comes to governments competing to attract investors through the tax treatment they provide? The trouble is...competing with one another and eroding each other’s revenues...countries end up having to...reduce much-needed public spending... All this has serious implications for developing countries because they are especially reliant on the corporate income tax for revenues. The risk that tax competition will pressure them into tax policies that endanger this key revenue source is therefore particularly worrisome. ...international mobility means that activities are much more responsive to taxation from a national perspective... This is especially true of the activities and incomes of multinationals. Multinationals can manipulate transfer prices and use other avoidance devices to shift their profits from high tax countries to low, and they can choose in which country to invest. But they can’t shift their profits, or their real investments, to another planet. When countries compete for corporate tax base and/or real investments they do so at the expense of others—who are doing the same.
Here's the data that most concerns the bureaucrats, though they presumably meant to point out that corporate tax rates have fallen by 20 percentage points, not by 20 percent.
Headline corporate income tax rates have plummeted since 1980, by an average of almost 20 percent. ...it is a telling sign of international tax competition at work, which closer empirical work tends to confirm.
But here's the accidental admission that immediately caught my eye. The authors admit that lower corporate tax rates have not resulted in lower revenue.
...revenues have remained steady so far in developing countries and increased in advanced economies.
And this wasn't a typo or sloppy writing. Here are two charts that were included with the article. The first one shows that revenues (the red line) have climbed in the industrialized world as the average corporate tax rate (the blue line) has plummeted.
This may not be as dramatic as what happened when Reagan reduced tax rates on investors, entrepreneurs, and other upper-income taxpayers in the 1980, but it's still a very dramatic and powerful example of the Laffer Curve in action.
And even in the developing world, we see that revenues (red line) have stayed stable in spite of - or perhaps because of - huge reductions in average corporate tax rates (blue line).
These findings are not very surprising for those of us who have been arguing in favor of lower corporate tax rates.
But it's astounding that the IMF published this data, especially as part of an article that is trying to promote higher tax burdens.
It's as if a prosecutor in a major trial says a defendant is guilty and then spends most of the trial producing exculpatory evidence.
I have no idea how this managed to make its way through the editing process at the IMF. Wasn't there an intern involved in the proofreading process, someone who could have warned, "Umm, guys, you're actually giving Dan Mitchell some powerful data in favor of lower tax burdens"?
In any event, I look forward to repeatedly writing "even the IMF agrees" when pontificating in the future about the Laffer Curve and the benefits of lower corporate tax rates.
I must be perversely masochistic because I have the strange habit of reading reports issued by international bureaucracies such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
But one tiny silver lining to this dark cloud is that it's given me an opportunity to notice how these groups have settled on a common strategy of urging higher taxes for the ostensible purpose of promoting growth and development.
Seriously, this is their argument, though they always rely on euphemisms when asserting that politicians should get more money to spend.
- The OECD, for instance, has written that "Increased domestic resource mobilisation is widely accepted as crucial for countries to successfully meet the challenges of development and achieve higher living standards for their people."
The Paris-based bureaucrats of the OECD also asserted that "now is the time to consider reforms that generate long-term, stable resources for governments to finance development."
- The IMF is banging on this drum as well, with news reports quoting the organization's top bureaucrat stating that "...economies need to strengthen their fiscal frameworks…by boosting...sources of revenues." while also reporting that "The IMF chief said taxation allows governments to mobilize their revenues."
- And the UN, which has "...called for a tax on billionaires to help raise more than $400 billion a year" routinely categorizes such money grabs as "financing for development."
As you can see, these bureaucracies are singing from the same hymnal, but it's a new version.
In the past, the left agitated for higher taxes simply in hopes for having more redistribution.
And they've urged higher taxes because of spite and hostility against those with high incomes.
Some folks on the left also have supported higher taxes on the theory that the economy's performance is boosted when deficits are smaller.
But now, they are advocating higher taxes (oops, excuse me, I mean they are urging "resource mobilization" to generate "stable resources" so there can be "financing for development" in order to "strengthen fiscal frameworks") on the theory that bigger government is the way to get more growth.
You probably won't be surprised to learn, however, that these reports from international bureaucracies never provide any evidence for this novel hypothesis. None. Zero. Zilch. Nada. The null set.
They simply assert that governments will be able to make presumably wonderful growth-generating "investments" if politicians can squeeze more money from the private sector.
And I strongly suspect that this absence of evidence is deliberate. Simply stated, international bureaucracies are willing to produce shoddy research (just look at what the IMF and OECD wrote about the relationship between growth and inequality), but there's a limit to how far data can be tortured and manipulated.
Especially when there's so much evidence from real scholars that economic performance is weakened when government gets bigger.
Not to mention that most sentient beings can look around the world and look at the moribund economies of nations with large governments (such as France, Italy, and Greece) and compare them with the better performance of places with smaller government (such as Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Singapore).
But if you read the aforementioned reports from the international bureaucracies, you'll notice that some of them focus on getting more growth in poor nations.
Perhaps, some statists might argue, government is big enough in Europe, but not big enough in poorer regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.
So let's look at the numbers. Is it true that governments in the developing world don't have enough money to provide core public goods?
The answer is no.
But before sharing those numbers, let's look at some historical data. A few years ago, I shared some research demonstrating that countries in North America and Western Europe became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when the burden of government spending was very modest.
One would logically conclude from this data that today's poor nations should copy that approach.
Yet here's the data from the International Monetary Fund on government expenditures in various poor regions of the world. As you can see, the burden of government spending in these areas is two or three times larger than it was in America and other nations that when they made the move from agricultural poverty to middle class prosperity.
The bottom line is that small government and free markets is the recipe for growth and prosperity in all nations.
Just don't expect international bureaucracies to share that recipe since one of the obvious conclusions is that we therefore don't need parasitical bodies like the IMF, OECD, World Bank, and UN.
P.S. Unsurprisingly, Hillary Clinton also has adopted the mantra of higher-taxes → bigger government → more growth.
Okay, I'll admit the title of this post is an exaggeration. There are lots of things you should know - most bad, though some good - about international bureaucracies.
That being said, regular readers know that I get very frustrated with the statist policy agendas of both the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
I especially object to the way these international bureaucracies are cheerleaders for bigger government and higher tax burdens. Even though they ostensibly exist to promote greater levels of prosperity!
I've written on these issues, ad nauseam, but perhaps dry analysis is only part of what's needed to get the message across. Maybe some clever image can explain the issue to a broader audience (something I've done before with cartoons and images about the rise and fall of the welfare state, the misguided fixation on income distribution, etc).
It took awhile, but I eventually came up with (what I hope is) a clever idea. And when a former Cato intern with artistic skill, Jonathan Babington-Heina, agreed to do me a favor and take the concept in my head and translate it to paper, here are the results.
I think this hits the nail on the head.
Excessive government is the main problem plaguing the global economy. But the international bureaucracies, for all intents and purposes, represent governments. The bureaucrats at the IMF and OECD need to please politicians in order to continue enjoying their lavish budgets and exceedingly generous tax-free salaries.
So when there is some sort of problem in the global economy, they are reluctant to advocate for smaller government and lower tax burdens (even if the economists working for these organizations sometimes produce very good research on fiscal issues).
Instead, when it's time to make recommendations, they push an agenda that is good for the political elite but bad for the private sector. Which is exactly what I'm trying to demonstrate in the cartoon,
But let's not merely rely on a cartoon to make this point.
In an article for the American Enterprise Institute, Glenn Hubbard and Kevin Hassett discuss the intersection of economic policy and international bureaucracies. They start by explaining that these organizations would promote jurisdictional competition if they were motivated by a desire to boost growth.
...economic theory has a lot to say about how they should function. ...they haven’t achieved all of their promise, primarily because those bodies have yet to fully understand the role they need to play in the interconnected world. The key insight harkens back to a dusty economics seminar room in the early 1950s, when University of Michigan graduate student Charles Tiebout...said that governments could be driven to efficient behavior if people can move. ...This observation, which Tiebout developed fully in a landmark paper published in 1956, led to an explosion of work by economists, much of it focusing on...many bits of evidence that confirm the important beneficial effects that can emerge when governments compete. ...A flatter world should make the competition between national governments increasingly like the competition between smaller communities. Such competition can provide the world’s citizens with an insurance policy against the out-of-control growth of massive and inefficient bureaucracies.
Using the European Union as an example, Hubbard and Hassett point out the grim results when bureaucracies focus on policies designed to boost the power of governments rather than the vitality of the market.
...as Brexit indicates, the EU has not successfully focused solely on the potentially positive role it could play. Indeed, as often as not, one can view the actions of the EU government as being an attempt to form a cartel to harmonize policies across member states, and standing in the way of, rather than advancing, competition. ...an EU that acts as a competition-stifling cartel will grow increasingly unpopular, and more countries will leave it.
They close with a very useful suggestion.
If the EU instead focuses on maximizing mobility and enhancing the competition between states, allowing the countries to compete on regulation, taxation, and in other policy areas, then the union will become a populist’s dream and the best economic friend of its citizens.
Unfortunately, I fully expect this sage advice to fall upon deaf ears. The crowd in Brussels knows that their comfortable existence is dependent on pleasing politicians from national governments.
And the same is true for the bureaucrats at the IMF and OECD.
The only practical solution is to have national governments cut off funding so the bureaucracies disappear.
But, to cite just one example, why would Obama allow that when these bureaucracies go through a lot of effort to promote his statist agenda?
When I first came to Washington back in the 1980s, there was near-universal support and enthusiasm for a balanced budget amendment among advocates of limited government.
The support is still there, I'm guessing, but the enthusiasm is not nearly as intense.
There are three reasons for this drop.
- Political reality - There is zero chance that a balanced budget amendment would get the necessary two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate. And if that happened, by some miracle, it's highly unlikely that it would get the necessary support for ratification in three-fourths of state legislatures.
- Unfavorable evidence from the states - According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, every state other than Vermont has some sort of balanced budget requirement. Yet those rules don't prevent states like California, Illinois, Connecticut, and New York from adopting bad fiscal policy.
- Favorable evidence for the alternative approach of spending restraint - While balanced budget rules don't seem to work very well, policies that explicitly restrain spending work very well. The data from Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Colorado is particularly persuasive.
Advocates of a balanced budget amendment have some good responses to these points. They explain that it's right to push good policy, regardless of the political situation. Since I'm a strong advocate for a flat tax even though it isn't likely to happen, I can't argue with this logic.
Regarding the last two points, advocates explain that older versions of a balanced budget requirement simply required a supermajority for more debt, but newer versions also include a supermajority requirement to raise taxes. This means - at least indirectly - that the amendment actually is a vehicle for spending restraint.
This doesn't solve the political challenge, but it's why advocates of limited government need to be completely unified in favor of tax-limitation language in a balanced budget amendment. And they may want to consider being more explicit that the real goal is to restrain spending so that government grows slower than the productive sector of the economy.
Interestingly, even the International Monetary Fund (which is normally a source of bad analysis) understands that spending limits work better than rules that focus on deficits and debt.
Here are some of the findings from a new IMF study that looks at the dismal performance of the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact. The SGP supposedly limited deficits to 3 percent of GDP and debt to 60 percent of GDP, but the requirement failed largely because politicians couldn't resist the temptation to spend more in years when revenue grew rapidly.
An analysis of stability programs during 1999–2007 suggests that actual expenditure growth in euro area countries often exceeded the planned pace, in particular when there were unanticipated revenue increases. Countries were simply unable to save the extra revenues and build up fiscal buffers. ...This reveals an important asymmetry: governments were often unable to preserve revenue windfalls and faced difficulties in restraining their expenditure in response to revenue shortfalls when consolidation was needed. ...The 3 percent of GDP nominal deficit ceiling did not prevent countries from spending their revenue windfalls in the mid-2000s. ... Under the SGP, noncompliance has been the rule rather than the exception. ...The drawbacks of the nominal deficit ceiling are particularly apparent when the economy is booming, as it is compatible with very large structural deficits.
The good news is that the SGP has been modified and now (at least theoretically) requires spending restraint.
The initial Pact only included three supranational rules... As of 2014, fiscal aggregates are tied by an intricate set of constraints...government spending (net of new revenue measures) is constrained to grow in line with trend GDP. ...the expenditure growth ceiling may seem the most appealing. This indicator is tractable (directly constraining the budget), easy to communicate to the public, and conceptually sound... Based on simulations, Debrun and others (2008) show that an expenditure growth rule with a debt feedback ensures a better convergence towards the debt objective, while allowing greater flexibility in response to shocks. IMF (2012) demonstrates the good performance of the expenditure growth ceiling
This modified system presumably will lead to better (or less worse) policy in the future, though it's unclear whether various nations will abide by the new EU rules.
One problem is that the overall system of fiscal rules has become rather complicated, as illustrated by this image from the IMF study.
Which brings us back to the third point above. If the goal is to restrain spending (and it should be), then why set up a complicated system that first and foremost is focused on red ink?
That's why the Swiss Debt Brake is the right model for how to get spending under control. And this video explains why the objective should be spending restraint rather than deficit reduction.
And for those who fixate on red ink, it's worth noting that if you deal with the underlying disease of too much government, you quickly solve the symptom of deficits.
For the people of China, there's good news and bad news.
The good news, as illustrated by the chart below, is that economic freedom has increased dramatically since 1980. This liberalization has lifted hundreds of millions from abject poverty.
The bad news is that China still has a long way to go if it wants to become a rich, market-oriented nation. Notwithstanding big gains since 1980, it still ranks in the lower-third of nations for economic freedom.
Yes, there's been impressive growth, but it started from a very low level. As a result, per-capita economic output is still just a fraction of American levels.
So let's examine what's needed to boost Chinese prosperity.
If you look at the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World, there are five major policy categories. As you can see from the table below, China's weakest category is "size of government." I've circled the most relevant data point.
China could--and should--boost its overall ranking by improving its size-of-government score. That would reduce the burden of government spending and lower tax rates.
With this in mind, I was very interested to see that the International Monetary Fund just published a study entitled, "China: How Can Revenue Reforms Contribute to Inclusive and Sustainable Growth."
Did this mean the IMF is recommending pro-growth tax reform? After reading the following sentence, I was hopeful:
We highlight tax policies that can facilitate economic transition to high income status, promote fiscal sustainability and make growth more inclusive.
After all, surely you make the "transition to high income status" through low tax rates rather than high tax rates, right?
Moreover, the study acknowledged that China's tax burden already is fairly substantial:
Tax revenue has accounted for about 22 percent of GDP in 2013... The overall tax burden is similar to the tax-to-GDP ratio for other Asian economies such as Australia, Japan, and Korea.
So what did the IMF recommend? A flat tax? Elimination of certain taxes? Reductions in double taxation? Lowering the overall tax burden?
The bureaucrats want China to become more like France and Greece.
I'm not joking. The IMF study actually wants people to believe that making the income tax more punitive will somehow boost prosperity.
Increasing the de facto progressivity of the individual income tax would promote more inclusive growth.
Amazingly, the IMF wants more "progressivity" even though the folks in the top 20 percent are the only ones who pay any income tax under the current system.
Around 80 percent of urban wage earners are not subject to the individual income tax because of the high basic personal allowance.
But a more punitive income tax is just the beginning. The IMF wants further tax hikes.
Broadening the base and unifying rates would increase VAT revenue considerably. ... Tax based on fossil fuel carbon emission rates can be introduced. ... The current levies on local air pollutants such as [sulfur dioxide] and [nitrogen oxides] emissions and small particulates could be significantly increased.
What's especially discouraging is that the IMF explicitly wants a higher tax burden to finance an increase in the burden of government spending.
According to the proposed reform scenario, China could potentially aim to increase public expenditures by around 1 percent of GDP for education, 2‒3 percent of GDP for health care, and another 3–4 percent of GDP to fully finance the basic old-age pension and to gradually meet the legacy costs of current obligations. These would add up to additional social expenditures of around 7‒8 percent of GDP by 2030... The size of additional social spending is large but affordable as part of a package of fiscal reforms.
The study even explicitly says China should become more like the failed European welfare states that dominate the OECD:
Compared to OECD economies, China has considerable scope to increase the redistributive role of fiscal policy. ... These revenue reforms serve as a key part of a package of reforms to boost social spending.
You won't be surprised to learn, by the way, that the study contains zero evidence (because there isn't any) to back up the assertion that a more punitive tax system will lead to more growth. Likewise, there's zero evidence (because there isn't any) to support the claim that a higher burden of government spending will boost prosperity.
No wonder the IMF is sometimes referred to as the Dr. Kevorkian of the global economy.
P.S.: If you want to learn lessons from East Asia, look at the strong performance of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, all of which provide very impressive examples of sustained growth enabled by small government and free markets.
P.P.S.: I was greatly amused when the head of China’s sovereign wealth fund mocked the Europeans for destructive welfare state policies.
P.P.P.S.: Click here if you want some morbid humor about China's pseudo-communist regime.
P.P.P.P.S. Though I give China credit for trimming at least one of the special privileges provided to government bureaucrats.
It’s not very often that I applaud research from the International Monetary Fund.
That international bureaucracy has a bad track record of pushing for tax hikes and other policies to augment the size and power of government (which shouldn’t surprise us since the IMF’s lavishly compensated bureaucrats owe their sinecures to government and it wouldn’t make sense for them to bite the hands that feed them).
But every so often a blind squirrel finds an acorn. And that’s a good analogy to keep in mind as we review a new IMF report on the efficacy of “expenditure rules.”
The study is very neutral in its language. It describes expenditure rules and then looks at their impact. But the conclusions, at least for those of us who want to constrain government, show that these policies are very valuable.
In effect, this study confirms the desirability of my Golden Rule! Which is not why I expect from IMF research, to put it mildly.
Here are some excerpts from the IMF’s new Working Paper on expenditure rules.
In practice, expenditure rules typically take the form of a cap on nominal or real spending growth over the medium term (Figure 1). Expenditure rules are currently in place in 23 countries (11 in advanced and 12 in emerging economies).
Such rules vary, of course, is their scope and effectiveness.
Many of them apply only to parts of the budget. In some cases, governments don’t follow through on their commitments. And in other cases, the rules only apply for a few years.
Out of the 31 expenditure rules that have been introduced since 1985, 10 have already been abandoned either because the country has never complied with the rule or because fiscal consolidation was so successful that the government did not want to be restricted by the rule in good economic times. … In six of the 10 cases, the country did not comply with the rule in the year before giving it up. …In some countries, there was the perception that expenditure rules fulfilled their purpose. Following successful consolidations in Belgium, Canada, and the United States in the 1990s, these countries did not see the need to follow their national expenditure rules anymore.
But even though expenditure limits are less than perfect, they’re still effective – in part because they correctly put the focus on the disease of government spending rather than symptom of red ink.
Countries have complied with expenditure rules for more than two-third of the time. …expenditure rules have a better compliance record than budget balance and debt rules. …The higher compliance rate with expenditure rules is consistent with the fact that these rules are easy to monitor and that they immediately map into an enforceable mechanism—the annual budget itself. Besides, expenditure rules are most directly connected to instruments that the policymakers effectively control. By contrast, the budget balance, and even more so public debt, is more exposed to shocks, both positive and negative, out of the government’s control.
One of the main advantages of a spending cap is that politicians can’t go on a spending binge when the economy is growing and generating a lot of tax revenue.
One of the desirable features of expenditure rules compared to other rules is that they are not only binding in bad but also in good economic times. The compliance rate in good economic times, defined as years with a negative change in the output gap, is at 72 percent almost the same as in bad economic times at 68 percent. In contrast to other fiscal rules, countries also have incentives to break an expenditure rule in periods of high economic growth with increasing spending pressures. … two design features are in particular associated with higher compliance rates. …compliance is higher if the government directly controls the expenditure target. …Specific ceilings have the best performance record.
And the most important result is that expenditure limits are associated with a lower burden of government spending.
The results illustrate that countries with expenditure rules, in addition to other rules, exhibit on average higher primary balances (Table 2). Similarly, countries with expenditure rules also exhibit lower primary spending. …The data provide some evidence of possible implications for government size and efficiency. Event studies illustrate that the introduction of expenditure rules is indeed followed by smaller governments both in advanced and emerging countries (Figure 11a).
And it’s also worth noting that expenditure rules lead to greater efficiency in spending.
…the public investment efficiency index of DablaNorris and others (2012) is higher in countries that do have expenditure rules in place compared to those that do not (Figure 11b). This could be due to investment projects being prioritized more carefully relative to the case where there is no binding constraint on spending
Needless to say, these results confirm the research from the European Central Bank showing that nations with smaller public sectors are more efficient and competent, with Singapore being a very powerful example.
One rather puzzling aspect of the IMF report is that there was virtually no mention of Switzerland’s spending cap, which is a role model of success.
Perhaps the researchers got confused because the policy is called a “debt brake,” but the practical effect of the Swiss rule is that there are annual expenditures limits.
So to augment the IMF analysis, here are some excerpts from a report prepared by the Swiss Federal Finance Administration.
The Swiss “debt brake” or “debt containment rule”…combines the stabilizing properties of an expenditure rule (because of the cyclical adjustment) with the effective debt-controlling properties of a balanced budget rule. …The amount of annual federal government expenditures has a cap, which is calculated as a function of revenues and the position of the economy in the business cycle. It is thus aimed at keeping total federal government expenditures relatively independent of cyclical variations.
And here are some of the real-world results.
The debt-to-GDP ratio of the Swiss federal Government has decreased since the implementation of the debt brake in 2003. …In the past, economic booms tended to contribute to an increase in spending. …This has not been the case since the implementation of the fiscal rule, and budget surpluses have become commonplace. … The introduction of the debt brake has changed the budget process in such a way that the target for expenditures is defined at the beginning of the process, which must not exceed the ceiling provided by the fiscal rule. It has thus become a top-down process.
The most important part of this excerpt is that the debt brake prevented big spending increases during the “boom” years when the economy was generating lots of revenue.
In effect, the grey-colored area of the graph isn’t just an “ideal representation.” It actually happened in the real world.
Though the most important and beneficial real-world consequence, which I shared back in 2013, is that the burden of government spending has declined relative to the economy’s productive sector.
This is a big reason why Switzerland is in such strong shape compared to most of its European neighbors.
And such a policy in the United States would have prevented the trillion-dollar deficits of Obama’s first term.
By the way, if you want to know why deficit numbers have been lower in recent years, it’s because we actually have been following my Golden Rule for a few years.
So maybe it’s time to add the United States to this list of nations that have made progress with spending restraint.
But the real issue, as noted in the IMF research, is sustainability. Yes, it’s good to have a few years of spending discipline, but the real key is some sort of permanent spending cap.
Which is why advocates of fiscal responsibility should focus on expenditure limits rather than balanced budget requirements.
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the United States has a terrible long-run fiscal outlook. Assuming we don't implement genuine entitlement reform, the only countries in worse shape are the United Kingdom and Japan.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, meanwhile, also has a grim fiscal outlook for America. According to their numbers, the only nations in worse shape are New Zealand and Japan.
But I've never been happy with these BIS and OECD numbers because they focus on deficits, debt, and fiscal balance. Those are important indicators, of course, but they're best viewed as symptoms.
The underlying problem is that the burden of government spending is too high. And what the BIS and OECD numbers are really showing is that the public sector is going to get even bigger in coming decades, largely because of aging populations. Unfortunately, you have to read between the lines to understand what's really happening.
But now I've stumbled across some IMF data that presents the long-run fiscal outlook in a more logical fashion. As you can see from this graph (taken from this publication), they show the expected rise in age-related spending on the vertical axis and the amount of needed fiscal adjustment on the horizontal axis.
In other words, you don't want your nation to be in the upper-right quadrant, but that's exactly where you can find the United States.
Yes, Japan needs more fiscal adjustment. Yes, the burden of government spending will expand by a larger amount in Belgium. But America combines the worst of both worlds in a depressingly impressive fashion.
So thanks to FDR, LBJ, Nixon, Bush, Obama and others for helping to create and expand the welfare state. They've managed to put the United States in a worse long-run position than Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and other failing welfare states.